JUDGMENT - MOHTA V.A., J.:---Shrihari Dharmadhikari, the respondent was a permanent employee of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, the petitioner. He had put in more than 12 years' continuous service as a Bus conductor, on 25-9-1975 when his services came to be terminated under Clause 61 of the Bombay State Transport Employees' Service Regulations (the Regulations) which reads thus: "61. The services of an employee, who does not hold a permanent appointment in State Transport or a lien on a permanent appointment in any Government Department from which he is transferred are liable to be terminated by the Competent Authority by giving a calendar month's notice or a calendar month's pay in lieu, provided that- (a) the services of causal workers and part-time workers may be terminated without any notice; (b) a permanent employee of State Transport shall be entitled to 60 days' notice or 60 days' pay in lieu; (c) a permanent employee or a temporary employee who has put in not less than 3 years' continuous service in State Transport and who is aggrieved by the decision of termination of services on grounds other than of physical unfitness under this Regulation, may prefer an appeal within one month from the date of communication of the decision, to the Head of the Department/Branch concerned through his head of office. Where the decision of termination of service is taken by the General Manager as an Appointing Authority, an appeal will lie to the Vice-Chairman. The decision of the Appellate Authority shall be final and binding;" X X X 2. Aggrieved by the said order of termination, the respondent raised an industrial dispute which was referred to the Third labour Court, Nagpur by the Deputy Commissioner of labour, Nagpur under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("The I.D. Act"). The respondent contended that in truth and substance, the impugned order was penal in nature and since it was not preceded by a departmental enquiry, it was bad. The petitioner denied the averment that the termination was penal in nature. The order was justified as the one passed under Clause 61 of the Regulations on account of loss of confidence. On 7-7-1978 the petitioner filed an application for permission to adduce evidence to establish loss of confidence before the Third Labour Court. The following order came to be passed on the said application: "Application is allowed. The order was justified as the one passed under Clause 61 of the Regulations on account of loss of confidence. On 7-7-1978 the petitioner filed an application for permission to adduce evidence to establish loss of confidence before the Third Labour Court. The following order came to be passed on the said application: "Application is allowed. The employee is permitted to adduce evidence to prove facts which go to justify the order passed under Regulation 61." 3. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that the same respondent had allowed the passengers to travel without ticket, there was enough justification for loss of confidence and, therefore, for exercise of power under Clause 61. But the Court held that the order violated section 25-F of the I.D. Act and was illegal on that account. Considering the fact that it was a case of loss of confidence, the relief of reinstatement was refused and in lieu thereof, compensation for twelve months was granted along with back wages from the date of termination till the date of Award viz., 31-3-1979. The monetary value of the Award estimated at Rs. 21,000/- has been deposited in the Court by the petitioner and the same has been withdrawn by the respondent on giving security. Validity of the said Award is impugned in the petition. 4. The learned Counsel for the respondent has contendent that Clause 61(b) of the Regulations contains arbitrary and unreasonable power and is, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and also violative of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act being opposed to public policy. It seems to us that the contention is well founded and deserves to be accepted. Indeed, the point is no more res integra in view of the catena of decisions rendered by various Courts in the matter of similar power contained in various other Service Regulations. The first decision on the point is the case of (S.S. Muley v. J.R.D. Tata)1, 1980 Lab.I.C. 11 wherein this High Court declared as unconstitutional 'Regulation 48(a) of the Air India Employees' Services Regulations enabling termination of service without any enquiry and assigning any reason. The second decision is the case of (Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. and another v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and others)2, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 251 wherein Standing Order of Hindustan Steel Ltd. has been held to be constitutionally void since it dispenses with enquiry. The second decision is the case of (Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. and another v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and others)2, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 251 wherein Standing Order of Hindustan Steel Ltd. has been held to be constitutionally void since it dispenses with enquiry. The third decision is the case of (West Bengal State Electricity Board and others v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and others)3, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 722 wherein Regulation 34 of the W.B. Electricity Board's Regulations enabling the Board to terminate services of permanent employee by giving three months' notice or salary in lieu thereof has been held to be totally arbitrary since it confers on the Board a power which is capable of vicious discrimination. The fourth decision is the case of (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another)4, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1571 wherein Rule 9 of the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. Service Discipline and Appeal Rules empowering the Corporation to terminate service of its permanent employees by giving notice or pay in lieu of notice period has been declared as void under (i) section 23 of the Contract Act as being opposed to public policy, (ii) Article 14 of the Constitution being arbitrary and discriminatory and contrary to the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Articles 39(a) and 41. The fifth decision is the case of (O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and others)5, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 111 wherein Rule 31(v) of the Indian Tourism Development Corporation (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1978 authorising termination of service of employee by merely giving a notice of termination is held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The last word on the subject is to be found in the case of (M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank and others)6, 1987(Supp.) S.C.C. 643 wherein Regulation 10(2)(a) of the Gurgan Gramin Bank (Staff Services) Regulations, 1980 has been declared to be unconstitutional for conferring arbitrary and unguided powers of termination merely by giving a notice for specified periods like one month or three months. 5. There is no material difference in the letter and spirit of Clause 61(b) of the Regulations and those referred to above. The said clause is as arbitrary as all the clauses which have been held to be unconstitutional. Under the circumstances, the relevant Clause 61(b) is hereby declared as unconstitutional. 6. 5. There is no material difference in the letter and spirit of Clause 61(b) of the Regulations and those referred to above. The said clause is as arbitrary as all the clauses which have been held to be unconstitutional. Under the circumstances, the relevant Clause 61(b) is hereby declared as unconstitutional. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that on a finding that the respondent had permitted passengers without ticket which is an act of misconduct, section 25-F of the I.D. Act was not attracted. In the whole context, we find it difficult to accept this submission. The consistent case of the petitioner has been that the termination was not penal. Evidence has been allowed to be adduced before the Labour Court only to justify termination under Clause 61(b) of the Regulations. The respondent thus had notice of only such claim proposed to be established before the Labour Court by the petitioner. The petitioner cannot be allowed to contend in this background that charge of misconduct should be held to be established and on that basis to uphold the validity of the impugned order. To hold otherwise would be prejudicial to the respondent and permit the petitioner to have best of both the worlds. Many questions would even otherwise arise e.g. since which date the termination should be held to be valid -the date of actual termination or the date of order of the Labour Court holding for the first time that misconduct is established before it. In the instant case, no order of reinstatement is granted. Therefore, for all these reasons rightly has the Labour Court held that there was a breach of section 25-F of the I.D. Act. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the case of (M. K. Ravi v. Managing Director, Keral State Bamboo Corporation and another)7, 1987 Lab.I.C. 355. In that case termination was found to be in fact dismissal for misconduct of misappropriation of money. The order of termination, however, was innocently worded as discharge simpliciter. The employer proved misconduct before the Labour Court. It is in the above context that the case of the employer that it was a case of dismissal by way of punishment was accepted and a conclusion was reached that there was no 'retrenchment' and , therefore, section 25-F of the I.D. Act was not attracted. The employer proved misconduct before the Labour Court. It is in the above context that the case of the employer that it was a case of dismissal by way of punishment was accepted and a conclusion was reached that there was no 'retrenchment' and , therefore, section 25-F of the I.D. Act was not attracted. We do not think that the ratio of that decision can apply in the instant case where consistent stand of the management has been of exercise of power under clause 61(b) of the Regulations. Our attention was also invited to the case of (Chandu Lal v. The Management of Pan American World Airways Inc.)8, 1985 Lab.I.C. 1225 wherein the services of the workman were terminated on the ground that he was involved in the act of smuggling without holding any departmental enquiry. The said order of termination was held to be vitiated since it was not preceded by a departmental enquiry. In that background it was held that there was no retrenchment. In our judgment that decision also does not advance the case of the petitioner any further. 8. The expression 'termination of service for any reason whatsoever' in section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act has been interpreted widely in the case of (Santosh Gupta v. State of Patiala)9, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1219 so as to cover every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in section 25-F or not expressly provided for by the provisions of the I.D. Act such as section 25-FF or section 25-FFF. In this context, we may notice a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Air Corporation Employees Union v. Air India, Bombay and another)10, 1987 Mh.L.J. 875 wherein termination of services on account of loss of confidence was held to be a termination amounting to 'retrenchment' and since requirements of section 25-F of the I.D. Act were not followed, the order of termination was quashed. In that case also not the relief of reinstatement but of compensation was granted. The factual settings in that decision and the present case, though not identical are quite similar. 9. In the circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The petition is dismissed and Rule discharged with no order as to costs. Needless to mention that the interim order stands automatically vacated. Petition dismissed -----