Judgment Suresh Chandra Mookherji, J. 1. These two criminal revisions arising out of the judgment and the order dated 28-7-87 passed by Sri Prem Dutt Prasad, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Sikahana at Motihari in Cr. Misc. No.6 of 1980 (Trial No.1768 of 1987) whereby, a sum of Rs.100/- per month has been granted by way of maintenance to Maya Devi the petitioner of Cr. Rev No.806 of 1987, wife of the petitioner of Cr. Rev. No.694 of 1987, Bhagya Narain Singh have been heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment. 2. This is a dispute between a husband and wife. In Cr. Rev. No.806 of 1987 the wife-petitioner has prayed for enhancement of the maintenance allowance and in other Cr. Rev. No.694 of 1987 the husband has challenged the competency of the Magistrate to pass an order of maintenance. 3. The background of the case, in short, is that earlier Maya Devi had filed a civil suit for grant of maintenance on the ground that she was being neglected by her husband after taking a second wife against her consent and a decree was passed in her favour granting maintenance in the manner that she would receive six maunds of rice, four maunds of wheat, two maunds of pulse, one maund of gram, one maund of msutard, half maund of maize and also Rs.100/ in cash. It appears that in execution of the decree, about 14 bighas of land of her husband was auctioned sold and the same was purchased and mutated in her name. 4. The grievance of the wife is that the auction purchase etc. was a paper transaction and in fact, she had been not receiving anything by way of maintenance. A petition under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed and the court below granted maintenance at the rate of Rs.80 per month from the date of the order dated 19-6-82. Against that order, both the wife and husband preferred revisions in this Court and the case was remanded for recording final order afresh in accordance with law, with a further direction to give an opportunity to the parties to be further heard. The matter went back to trial court and there were again revisions against the order by both sides being Cr. Revision No.670 of 1984 and 468 of 1984. The matter went back to trial court and there were again revisions against the order by both sides being Cr. Revision No.670 of 1984 and 468 of 1984. Both these revisions were disposed of on 4th of September, 1986. Thereafter, the matter was again reconsidered by the Magistrate in the light of the observations made in the aforesaid Cr. Revisions and the impugned order was passed. The present revisions are against that order for the reasons indicated above. 5. Mr. Thakur Prasad appearing on behalf of the husband has raised limited points. His first submission has been that once the civil court had decided the question of maintenance and the opposite party had executed the decree and purchased the share of the petitioner merely about 14 bighas, the subsequent petition before a Magistrate under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not maintainable. The next submission is that even if it be assumed that the learned Magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he ought to have considered the means of the wife while passing the order and that having not been done, the order impugned is bad in law on this court also. 6. On the other hand, Mrs. Mridula Mishra appearing on behalf of the opposite party-wife has contended that the Magistrate has full jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if he is satisfied that the wife is unable to maintain herself. She has further submitted that, no doubt, in execution of the civil court decree about 14 bighas of land of the husband has been auctioned sold and the same has been purchased by her, but that remained mere a paper transaction because her husband has been harassing her to enjoy the usufructs of the land by filing litigations through different persons and thereby, she has been virtually deprived of the fruits of the land. 7. So far as the civil court decree is concerned, the same cannot be questioned these cases. It is not in controversy that a big chunk of land which was owned by the husband has been auctioned sold, in execution of the civil court decree. Whether the wife has been enjoying the usufructs of that land or not, is not a matter for consideration here. It is not in controversy that a big chunk of land which was owned by the husband has been auctioned sold, in execution of the civil court decree. Whether the wife has been enjoying the usufructs of that land or not, is not a matter for consideration here. The only question that arises for consideration is whether impugned order could have been passed by the learned magistrate in face of the civil court decree and if so, whether the quantum of the maintenance was justified or not. 8. In a Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Bhgwant Singh V/s. Surjit Kaur, 1981 Cri LJ p.151 it has been held that: "where, the decree of the Civil Court, as in the present case, is directly on the issue of the liability or the quantum of maintenance, then it is obviously a judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction directly on the point. Once that is so, it calls for noitce that the language of statute is in terms mandatory. The Legislature has designedly used the words "shall cancel the order or, as the case may be, vary the same accordingly. " The opening part of Sec.127 (2) of the new code undoubtedly vests a certain discretion in the Magistrate. He must be satisfied or at least it should appear to him that the decision of the competent Civil Court has necessitated a cancellation or variance of the earlier order. However, once he comes to that conclusion then the language of the provision implies that he has no discretion but to cancel or vary the order in accordance with the Civit Court decree though we are well aware of the rule, that, in a peculiar context, the words shall and may may be used as, interchangeable terms, nothing has been brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the respondent, which may compel one to construe the word shall as may in this provision. It is well settled that strong grounds are needed to read a mandatory provision as directory one, or vice versa i. e. to read a directory provision as an obligatory one. It is well settled that strong grounds are needed to read a mandatory provision as directory one, or vice versa i. e. to read a directory provision as an obligatory one. " Further, their Lordships after discussing various decisions of different Courts observed that: "on the language of Sec.127 (2) of the new Code as also on principle and precedent, that it would be obligatory for a Magistrate to follow the judgment of a competent Civil Court, specifically on the point of maiatenance and, consequently, to cancel or vary the earlier order of the Criminal Court under Sec.125 of the new Code, accord-ingly". In the instant case, it has already been pointed out that there was a Civil Court decree allowing the quantum of maintenance and when the husband failed to satisfy the decree, the wife levied an execution case and got a substantial part of her husbands land auctioned sold and purchased it in her favour. In such a situation, it appears to me that the Magistrate ought not to have entertained the application under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or atleast could have issued appropriate order under Sec.127 (2) where, he had two options either to cancel the previous order passed under Sec.125 or vary the earlier order in accordance with law. That having not been done, the impugned order cannot allow to stand on this ground aloae. 9. The order of the Magistrate is also bad on the ground that he had not taken into consideration the means of the wife while passing the impugned order. In this connection, reference of a decision of the Supreme Court reported in shri Bhagwan Dutt V/s. Smt. Kamla Devi and another, (1975) 2 SCC p.386, may be made. That was, no doubt, a case under the provisions of old section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (new Sec.125) of the new Code, where both the husband and the wife were employed. The Magistrate directed the husband for maintenance both for the wife and her child, without taking into consideration the independent income of the wife. The question that came up for consideration was as to whether the income of the wife be taken into account in determining the amount of maintenance payable to her under Sec.488 of the old Code. The Magistrate directed the husband for maintenance both for the wife and her child, without taking into consideration the independent income of the wife. The question that came up for consideration was as to whether the income of the wife be taken into account in determining the amount of maintenance payable to her under Sec.488 of the old Code. After giving a comparative study of the old and new provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure their Lordships observed that: "the object of these provisions being to prevent vagrancy and destitution the Magistrate has to find out as to what is required by the wife to maintain a standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious, but is modestly consistent with the status of the family. The needs and requirements of the wife for such moderate living can be fairly determined, only if her separate income, also, is taken into account together with the earnings of the husband and his commitments. There is nothing in these provisions to show that in determining the maintenance and its rate, the Magistrate has to inquire into the means of the husband, alone, and exclude the means of the wife altogether from consideration. Rather, there is a definite indication in the language of the associate Sec.489 (1), that the financial resources or the wife are also a relevant consideration in making such a determination. Sec.489 (1) provides inter alia, that on proof of a change in the circumstances of any person receiving under Sec.488 a monthly allowance, the Magistrate, may make such alteration in the allowance as he thinks fit. The "circumstances" contemplated by Sec.489 (1) must include financial circumstances and in that view, the inquiry as to the change in the circumstances must extend to a change in the financial circumstances of the wife. Keeping in view the object, Scheme, setting and the language of these associate provisions in Chapter XXXVI, it seems to us clear that in determining the amount of maintenance under Sec.488 (1), the Magistrate is competent to take into consideration the separate income and means of the wife. . . . . . . . . . . Any other construction would be subversive of the primary purpose of the section and encourage vindictive wives having ample income and means of their own, to misuse the section as a punitive weapon against their husbands". . . . . . . . . . . Any other construction would be subversive of the primary purpose of the section and encourage vindictive wives having ample income and means of their own, to misuse the section as a punitive weapon against their husbands". The principles laid down in the decision are applicable in this case as it appears from the materials on record that a major part of the land of the petitioner-husband has been auctioned sold in execution of the maintenance decree and now he (husband) is left with only a fractional part of it. In such a situation, the learned Magistrate ought to have also considered whether in the changed circumstances, she could maintain herself with her own income and if she can, granting her nothing by way of allowance. This important aspect of the matter having not been considered, the order impugned cannot be sustained. 10 Therefore, applying the principles laid down in the decisions cited above, it would be plain that the petitioner-husband is entitled to succeed. Accordingly, the order under revision has to be set aside and in accordance with the judgment and decree of a Civil Court, the subsequent grant of maintenance of rs.100 per month under Sec.125 of the new Code has to be necessarily cancelled. 11. The result is, that Cr. Revision No.694 of 1987 is allowed and cr. Revision No.806 of 1987 is dismissed. Revision decided accordingly.