JUDGMENT - SHAH I.G., J.:---The Chief Officer, Municipal Council, Osmanabad the Original Complainant in Summary Case No. 1087/87, filed against the present respondent No. 1 has preferred this revision application to challenge the order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, in Criminal Appeal No. 32/88 setting aside the conviction and sentence passed against the respondent No. 1 in- Criminal Appeal No. 32/82. 2. Briefly stated, facts giving rise to this revision application, are as under: The present applicant filed a complaint against the present respondent No. 1 that she had put up an illegal construction on Plot No. 6 on 31-12-1986, as she had put up a tin-shed without obtaining any permission from the Municipal Council. The present applicant came to know about the said illegal construction on the basis of an application made by Swamy and Mehboob and thereafter Sanitary Inspector was deputed to visit the spot and submit the report. The Sanitary Inspector after inspecting the spot submitted his report on 1-1-1987 that the present respondent No. 1 had erected a tin-shed over Survey No. 14 belonging to Swamy and Mehboob and therefore, a notice was issued to the respondent No. 1 on 9-1-1987 by the Municipal Council to remove the said construction consisting of a tin-shed within 15 days and she was further informed that if she did not comply with the said directions, she would be liable for action. It appears that thereafter again the Sanitary Inspector was directed to visit the spot and ascertain as to whether the notice was complied with or not. Accordingly the Sanitary Inspector after visiting the spot submitted his report on 30-1-1987 that the construction was not removed. It appears that then the Municipal Council directed the Sanitary Inspector on 4-2-1987 to remove the construction within a week and report about the same. However, it appears that on the same day the Sanitary Inspector was further intimated by a stay order that he should not remove the construction. It appears that thereafter again Mehboob applied to the Municipal Council on 6-2-1987 and requested the Municipal Council to direct the present respondent No. 1 to remove the construction. However, it appears that on the same day the Sanitary Inspector was further intimated by a stay order that he should not remove the construction. It appears that thereafter again Mehboob applied to the Municipal Council on 6-2-1987 and requested the Municipal Council to direct the present respondent No. 1 to remove the construction. The President, Municipal Council thereafter ordered to proceed against the respondent No. 1 in accordance with law and according to the said order passed on 20-2-1987 the present revision petitioner filed complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Osmanabad, under section 296(2) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act and section 53 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act. 3. It is admitted position that the construction was erected by the present respondent No. 1 and that too without obtaining necessary permission. Both the Courts below have also given a findings to that extent and, therefore, it is not urged before me that the construction was removed or not and such construction, as claimed by the present revision petitioner in the complaint , was put up by the present respondent No. 1. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the said factual aspect in this revision petition. The trial Court on the basis of the material placed before it founded that the present respondent No. 1 had erected a construction consisting of a shed on the Plot No. 64 in the land survey No. 14 without the permission from the Municipal Council. Osmanabad and convicted her of the offence punishable under section 189(8) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act and sentenced her to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default S.I. for 2 month and further ordered the present respondent No. 1 to remove the said construction with intimation to the Municipal Council, Osmanabad, within a period of one month from the date of order, in default of the accused removing the said construction after the stipulated period. She shall be liable to pay penalty at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day till the said construction is removed. She shall be liable to pay penalty at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day till the said construction is removed. Being aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court against the present respondent No. 1 she preferred an appeal be ring Criminal Appeal No. 32/88 to the Sessions Court, and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who heard the appeal allowed the same holding that the complaint filed by the present revision petitioner on 25-9-1987 was barred by limitation and therefore, the prosecution must fail. Keeping with the said finding, the learned Additional Session Judge acquitted the present respondent No. 1 setting aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the present respondent No. 1 Begin aggrieved by the said order of the leaned Additional Sessions Judge, the present revision petition is filed. 4. In view of the arguments advanced before me, the point that arises for my determination is as to whether the complaint filed by the present revision petitioner could be said to be barred by limitation in view of the provisions of section 296(2) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. It would also be necessary to consider as to whether the provision of section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act is applicable to the prosecution launched under section 296(2). It would also be necessary to consider as to whether the offence under section 53 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act could be said to have also been committed and whether the said offence being a continuing offence, there is no question of limitation arising at least in that respect. 5. Section 296 provides for institution of criminal actions in respect of the offences provided under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act and Rules or bye laws framed thereunder. Sub-section (2) of section 296 provides limitation in such prosecution. The said sub-section (2) runs as under: "296. (1) .... ..... ..... ...... 5. Section 296 provides for institution of criminal actions in respect of the offences provided under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act and Rules or bye laws framed thereunder. Sub-section (2) of section 296 provides limitation in such prosecution. The said sub-section (2) runs as under: "296. (1) .... ..... ..... ...... (2) No prosecution for any offence under this Act or the Rules or bye-laws made thereunder, shall be instituted, except within six months next after the date of the commission of the offence, or if such date is not know or the offence is a continuing one within six months after the commission or discovery of such offence." On behalf of the revision petitioner it is strenuously tried to be contended before me that the said provision of sub-section (2) provides for a limitation of six months next after the date of commission of the offence in cases whether the date of the offence is know and it further provides that if such date of offence is not know or the offence is a continuing one then apparently the limitation provided is of six months after the commission or the discovery of such offence. It was tried to be contended that the wordings, "after the commission or the discovery of offence" suggest that in case of a continuing offence no limitation can be said to have been provided. I am unable to agree with the said proposition. In the first part, sub- section (2) provides for a limitation in cases where the date of the commission of the offence is known and the second part, provides for limitation for the offence in respect of which the date of commission of offence is not know or the offence is a continuing one. The words, "six months after the commission" definitely relate to the one in which the date of the offence is not known and in respect of the continuing offence the limitation would start running from the date on which the offence is discovered and, therefore, even in a case of a continuing offence the limitation would definitely start running from the date at least on which it is discovered to have been committed. In the present case, it is very clear form the facts which I have stated earlier that the complaint was received by the Municipal Council on 31-12-1989 making it clear that the present respondent No. 1 had erected a construction in plot No. 64 illegally. The said fact was also got ascertained and confirmed by the Municipal Council through its own officer as the Inspector had also submitted a report confirming the said fact as long back as on 1-1-1987. Thereafter on 9-1-1987, the Municipal Council gave a notice calling upon the present respondent No. 1 to remove the construction within a fortnight. Thereafter further it is also clear that on 30th or 31st of January, 1987, the Inspector reported to the Municipal Council that in spite of the notice. The present respondent No. 1 had not removed the construction as per the directions given in the notice, and therefore at least by 31st January, 1987 the Municipal Council was clearly aware of the fact that the offence was committed by the respondent No. 1. The limitation, therefore, has provided under section 296(2) would at least commence from 31-1-1987. if not earlier. In that view of the matter, the complaint ought to have been filed in the court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Osmanabad, by the present revision petitioner till 30-7-1987. Admittedly, the complaint is filed on 25-9-1987 and therefore, it cannot be said that the complaint is filed within the period of limitation as provided under section 296(2) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. 6. Shri Bora, who appears on behalf of the revision petitioner tired top contend relying on a Ruling reported in 1986 Mah.L.R. 855. (Municipal Corporation through Municipal Commissioner v. Shanker s/o Haribhau Jadhav)1, 1986(2) Bom.C.R. 38 , that in respect of the offences punishable under sections 52, 53 and 54 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act the prosecution cannot be said to be barred by limitation as the offence is a continuing one, However, unfortunately for the revision petitioner, the trial Court also did not find the respondent No. 1 guilty of the offence under section 53 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act. The present revision petitioner did not file any appeal against the said order of acquittal and, therefore, it is not necessary to consider as to whether the said acquittal order passed by the trial Court was correct or not and the Ruling cited by Shri Bora. The learned Counsel is only is respect of the offence under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act and not in respect of the offence under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act. Even a reference is not made to the provisions of section 296(2) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act in the said Ruling. 7. Shri Bora also tried to contend that this Court has taken the view that the period of limitation provided under section 296(2) should be extended under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and he relied upon the Ruling reported in 1982(2) Bombay Cases Reporter 126. (Dombivli Municipal Council at Dombivili v. Smt. Sundrabai Khimji Chedha and Khimji Palan Chedha and another)2, Now it does appear that Kanade, J., of this Court had also taken a view that in view of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, which lays down that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provision of section 3 shall apply as if such period where the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law and the plain reading of section 296 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 shows that it does not exclude the application of the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Indian limitation Act. In this view of the matter it was held in the said decision that the Court was not precluded from applying the provisions of section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to a complaint made under the provisions of Maharashtra Municipalities Act. 1965. This view expressed by this Court definitely will have to be respected and I do not find any reason to differ with the same. 1965. This view expressed by this Court definitely will have to be respected and I do not find any reason to differ with the same. Now it is true that in view of the above cited decision, with which I agree, section 5 of the Limitation Act could be invoked in a proper case for extension of limitation period even for prosecutions launched in respect of the offences provided under the Municipalities Act. However, unfortunately for the present revision petitioner, there is nothing in the complaint admittedly to show that any such extension of the period of limitation was sought. For application of section 5 of the Limitation Act, the person who seeks the extension of limitation has got to make out sufficient grounds and reasons and as nothing has been stated in the complaint by the present revision petitioner is this respect it must be held that to case for extension of period of limitation under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been made out by the present revision petitioner. Shri Bora also tried to contend that the present revision petitioner should be given an opportunity to file an application and give sufficient 5 reasons for extension of period of limitation as provided under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. He, therefore, contended that the matter should be remanded and the opportunity should be given to the present revision petitioner. He also tried to contend that illegal construction still stands and, therefore, it would be proper to show this indulgence in favour of the revision petitioner. Now it is clear that the decision relied upon by Shri Bora, which show that the provisions of section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act would be applicable even in respect of the offences under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, was delivered by the Court in 1982 and, therefore, if the present revision petitioner wanted to take advantage of the same he should have filed the application before the trial Court itself. It would not be proper now to remand the matter to the trial Court to give an opportunity to the present revision petitioner to file such as application. It would not be proper now to remand the matter to the trial Court to give an opportunity to the present revision petitioner to file such as application. Even in respect of the construction, it could be said that the Municipal Council has sufficient powers under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act to remove the structure, which is illegal and the said power is not at all hampered merely because the prosecution has failed. Therefore, merely because the illegal construction still stands it would not be proper to remand the matter and allow the revision petitioner to now show that there was sufficient reason for condoning the delay. 8. In the result, the view taken by the Lower Appellate Court is legal and there is no reason to interfere with the same. The revision petition, therefore will have to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed . Rule discharged. Revision petition dismissed. -----