JUDGMENT Plaintiffs-petitioners have challenged the judgment and order dated 23rd December, 1988 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, 8th Court, Alipore, in Misc. Appeal No. 282 of 1987 reversing the order of maintenance of status quo in respect of the suit property to the order of status quo in relation to the Doba only as found by the Commissioner in the suit. The case of the petitioners, in short, is that the Premises Nos. 54C and 54D, Satchasi Para Road (formerly 54 Satchasi Para Road) within the Police Station of Cossipore, Calcutta-2, measuring about 1 Bigha 8 Chattack of land including tank and its bank once belong to one Pannalal Dutta. On Sri Dutta's death the said property devolved upon his son Moloy Samiran Dutta and the predecessors-in-interest of Moloy Samiran Dutta being proforma-Opposite Party Nos. 3 to 6 settled the entire Bastu land from the part of the said Premises No. 54, Satchasi Para Road to different tenants including the petitioners on ground rents with customary easement right in the aforesaid tank. With the coming of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981, the rights of the landlords in the lands vested with the State and the Opposite Party Nos. 3 to 6 to save the property from the mischief of section 5 of the said Act filled up three-fourth of the tank in collusion with the agents of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and managed to get the separate holding numbers as 54C and 54D, Satchasi Para Road. After filling in the three-fourth of the suit tank the said Opposite Party Nos. 3 to 6 divided the land into several plots and entered into agreements for sale with different parties. The Defendant-Opposite Party No. 1 is a firm of which the Defendant-Opposite Party No. 2 is a partner. The Opposite Party No. 1 has been authorised to filling the rest of the tank now left and to let out and construct roads, drains, etc. to develop the suit land in collusion with the local anti-social elements and thus they are bent upon destroying the right of easement of the petitioners in the said tank. The Opposite Party No. 1 has been authorised to filling the rest of the tank now left and to let out and construct roads, drains, etc. to develop the suit land in collusion with the local anti-social elements and thus they are bent upon destroying the right of easement of the petitioners in the said tank. This compelled the petitioners to institute Title Suit No. 86 of 1987 in the 3rd Court of Munsif at Sealdah for declaration of right of easement in the suit tank and the permanent injunction restraining the opposite parties from changing the nature and character of the suit property and also for mandatory injunction and other relief’s. The learned Munsif by his order dated 30th April, 1987 directed both the sides to maintain status quo in respect of the suit property. The opposite parties preferred an appeal and the learned Assistant District Judge was pleased to modify the order of the learned Munsif by partially allowing the appeal and granted status quo in respect of the existing Doba only which is yet to be filled in. Being aggrieved by the order of the Lower Appellate Court this revisional application has been preferred to set aside the order of the learned Judge. 2. On 24th January, 1989, this Hon'ble Court issued a Rule and granted interim order. The Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 i.e., the Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 in the revisional application, filed an application for vacating the interim order on 8th March, 1989 which according to Mr. Kapur, appearing for this defendant, should be taken as affidavit-in-opposition to the application under section 115 of C.P.C. 3. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, forcefully made out a case that the predecessors-in-interest of Moloy Samiran Dutta submitted a plan to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and therein the suit tank was clearly shown and also the Smart Plan clearly shows that the suit property is nothing but tank. It appears from a true copy of the plan supplied by the Chief Valuer and Surveyor's Department dated 16th March, 1987, being Annexure 'D' to the revisional application, that the Opposite Party Nos. It appears from a true copy of the plan supplied by the Chief Valuer and Surveyor's Department dated 16th March, 1987, being Annexure 'D' to the revisional application, that the Opposite Party Nos. 3 to 6 who are wife, daughter and sons of the late Moloy Samiran Dutta, respectively, submitted this plan in respect of the suit property where the tank has been prominently shown and the plan bears the signatures of the aforesaid opposite parties. The said plan is also accompanied by the copy of a portion of the Smart Survey Map, being Annexure 'E', and it very much tallies with the plan Annexure 'D' and in the Smart Plan the tank is as prominent as in the plan submitted by the legal heirs of Moloy Samiran Dutta. On the basis of the plan and the Smart Map Mr. Roy Chowdhury enforces his right of temporary injunction and order of status quo in respect of the entire tank and not the Doba only. In the application under Order 39, Rule 1 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is Annexure 'A' to the revisional application, the petitioners have described in detail as to how their rights accrue in respect of the said tank in question and how their rights are being eroded by the Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 by making constructions thereon contrary to the interest of the petitioners. 4. The learned Advocate for the petitioners cited two decisions to bring home the point that an order of temporary injunction is essential from this Court to stop the mischief of the Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2. The first decision relates to the case of (1) Israil and Ors. v. Samser Rahman and Ors. reported in 18 CWN 176 and the second one is a decision in (2) Hamanta Kumar Ray and Anr. v. Baranagar Jute Factory Co. reported in 20 Cal LJ 441. 5. The Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 (who are Defendant Nos. 1 and 2) have filed an application for vacating the interim order dated the 24th January, 1989 passed by this Hon'ble Court as I have pointed out. Mr. Kapur has already indicated that this application for vacating the interim order be treated as affidavit-in-opposition. It is contended therein that a perusal of the Advocate Commissioner's Report indicates that the claims of plaintiffs are concocted, false and fraudulent. Mr. Kapur has already indicated that this application for vacating the interim order be treated as affidavit-in-opposition. It is contended therein that a perusal of the Advocate Commissioner's Report indicates that the claims of plaintiffs are concocted, false and fraudulent. The existence of any tank in the suit land is denied at any time and date or at all. It is said that the Opposite Parties Nos. 1 and 2 after taking possession of the suit property demolished the structure for developing the property and thereupon the petitioners, although not interested in the suit property, started creating obstruction. There is also an allegation in the said application that the petitioners had sometime in November, 1989 agreed not to create any obstruction provided they were given a free gift of 3 feet strip of land from the northern side of the suit property. The opposite parties, i.e., Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 started construction on the suit property on 30th November, 1986 and soon thereafter the petitioners with anti-social elements threatened these defendants and these defendants had to take recourse to section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code in January, 1987. It is the specific case of the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 that the suit land is at present vacant and is also a solid land and there wasp never any tank or pond in it. It is contended in the affidavit that the vacating application strongly supports the findings of the Lower Appellate Court which is based on facts, evidence and materials. The affidavit further asserts that the plaintiffs have falsely alleged that the suit land is vested in the State under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981. 6. Mr. Kapur, the learned Counsel appearing for the Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 (Defendant Nos. 1 and 2) have also made a forceful argument in support of the order of the Lower Appellate Court which according to him was fully justified to reverse the status quo order of the trial Court in respect of the entire property and limiting the said status quo order to the Doba only. Mr. Kapur contended that according to the Commissioner's Report the suit property contains only a Doba and not the tank and the except the Doba the rest of the suit property is vacant land. Mr. Kapur contended that according to the Commissioner's Report the suit property contains only a Doba and not the tank and the except the Doba the rest of the suit property is vacant land. He submitted that after obtaining loan from the Banks these defendants have appointed architects, engineers, labourers and masons and purchased and stored huge quantities of materials to start pacca construction on the suit property. The petitioners with the sheer intention to blackmail the Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 and putting undue pressure on them wanted to delay the process of development of the suit property. The allegation that the major portion of the tank was filled in with rubbish and black ash of the CESC Ltd. by force was totally false. Mr. Kapur contended that the prima facie balance of convenience is strongly in favour of the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the interim order passed by this Hon'ble Court in liable to be vacated and the order of the learned Assistant District Judge must be confirmed for the ends of justice otherwise the Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 would suffer irreparable loss and injury. 7. I have considered the facts of the case and the submissions made by the learned Counsels of the respective parties. I straight go to the Final Report dated 13th April, 1987 submitted by the Advocate-Commissioner to the trial Court. I quote the relevant portion from the said Commissioner's Report :- "The suit land is a big one. I found no existence of any tank in the suit land. But on the contrary, I found a Doba which was located in the south-west corner of the suit land and has also clearly depicted in the sketch Map with its measurement. The said Doba was existing at the time of inspection within the suit land ......... besides the said Doba, the rest portion of the suit land was lying vacant." 8. In the application for vacating the interim order which is treated as affidavit-in-opposition these defendants contend that when the construction work was started on 30th November, 1986, the plaintiffs with the anti-social elements obstructed but the Report of the Commissioner dated 13th April, 1987 indicates that at the time of inspection by the Commissioner the land was lying vacant, so it is not proper on the part of these Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 to say that the construction did commence on 30th November, 1986. The contention of the Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 that there was no tank in the suit land cannot be sustained in view of the true copy of the Plan supplied by the Chief Valuer & Surveyor's Department on 16th March, 1987 duly submitted by the successors-in-interest of Moloy Samiran Dutta, clearly indicates the tank marked with the letter 'A'. This further supports the case of the petitioners by the Smart Survey Plan supplied by the Department of Chief Valuer & Surveyor. There also the tank is very much in existence marked as No. 36. This fact goes very much against the Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2. They are obtaining or have obtained the loans from Banks but they have not given the names of the Banks nor disclosed the amount of loans. The plea of appointment of architects, engineers, labourers and masons and the storing of materials would not be of any help to them to usurp the right of the petitioners without proper adjudication of their grievances. The Division Bench in the Case of Israil and Ors. v. Samser Rahman and Ors. (Supra), rightly held that in such a dispute at the interlocutory stage the real point is not how the question ought to be decided at the hearing of the cause but whether there is a substantial question to be investigated and whether matters should not be preserved in status quo until that question can be finally disposed of. The Division Bench went a step further and held that in such a case it would not only be proper for granting an ad-interim order of injunction restraining the defendants from r proceeding further but the Court might, if it so desires, order the removal of the building already erected. In the case of Hamanta Kumar Ray and Anr. v. Baranagar Jute Factory Co. (Supra), the dispute was between the co-owners, the defendants commenced to dig the foundation for extension of their factory house. Immediately the plaintiffs instituted a suit and applied for the issue of temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from proceeding with the erection of the extended factory house during the pendency of the litigation. v. Baranagar Jute Factory Co. (Supra), the dispute was between the co-owners, the defendants commenced to dig the foundation for extension of their factory house. Immediately the plaintiffs instituted a suit and applied for the issue of temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from proceeding with the erection of the extended factory house during the pendency of the litigation. It was held by the Division Bench presided over by Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J. that the plaintiffs were entitled to such injunction as would preserve the status quo to the necessary extent. It was further held that if the defendants were left free to expedite building operations at their choice, while the plaintiffs were pursuing the only remedy open to them, their rights would be essentially defeated. Both the above cases strongly support the contentions of Mr. Roy Chowdhury. If the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are allowed to carryon the construction work in the suit land which they have filled in, except the Doba, and after high-rise constructions are made thereon then at that stage if the petitioners succeed in the suit where woule lie their remedy. The principle enunciated in the aforementioned two cases stands good even today and comes to the protection of the poorer and weaker sections of the people who have not the power to wield their swords with the affluent classes of people who have considerable influence and means at their disposal. Once building or buildings are allowed to go up in the suit land, the petitioners will be left without a remedy because even after succeeding in the suit the decree will virtually become infructuous. The interpretation of law must be pragmatic and in keeping with the changing time, particularly with the spirit of the Constitution of our socialist secular democry which secures to all citizens social and economic justice. I have no hesitation to accept the submissions made by Mr. Roy Chowdhury and disagree with the submissions made by Mr. Kapur which are neither based on realistic approach nor on the facts on the record. In the facts and circumstances of the case the balance of convenience and inconvenience singularly signals towards the petitioners. 9. In that view of the matter I set aside the order of the learned Assistant District Judge, Alipore, and confirm the order of the learned Munsif. In the facts and circumstances of the case the balance of convenience and inconvenience singularly signals towards the petitioners. 9. In that view of the matter I set aside the order of the learned Assistant District Judge, Alipore, and confirm the order of the learned Munsif. There will be an order of temporary injunction to maintain status quo as of 30th April, 1987 in respect of the entire suit property till the disposal of the suit. The application is accordingly allowed. There will be nor order as to costs.