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1989 DIGILAW 311 (ORI)

STATE OF ORISSA v. BHOLANATH NAYAK

1989-09-12

K.P.MOHAPATRA

body1989
K. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Jagatsinghpur, acquitting the respondent of the charge under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case stated in brief is that in the night of 8-9-1972 a dacoity took place in the house of P. W. 7 Sankarsan Naik, informant. In course of dacoity, cash and ornaments were stolen, the women folk of the house were manhandled and ornaments worn by them were snatched away. First Information Report (Ext. 1) was lodged at Balikuda Police Station. Investigation commenced and in course thereof, a gang of dacoits were arrested. After close of investigation charge sheet was submitted against ten persons including the respondent for having committed an offence under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 3 ) THE respondent could not be tried along with the other accused persons because, for some reason or other, he could not be apprehended. At a subsequent stage of the trial, therefore, his case was split up as against him. The other accused persons against whom charge sheet was submitted stood their trial and I am informed at the Bar that the case ended in acquittal against them on the ground of unsatisfactory evidence with regard to their identification. ( 4 ) AFTER apprehension of the respondent, he was put to trial and his defence was denial of his participation in the alleged dacoity in the house of P. W. 7. ( 5 ) THE main evidence against the respondent during trial was: i. identification and ii. recovery of stolen articles. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge disbelieved the evidence of identification and found that recovery of stolen articles from the respondent was not proved. Accordingly he held that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the respondent and so, recorded the order of acquittal. ( 6 ) P. WS. 6 and 7, wife and husband respectively were the main identifying witnesses. P. W. 6 stated in her evidence that for the first time she saw the respondent at the time of occurrence and for the second time she saw him in the court during trial. In between she had not seen him. ( 6 ) P. WS. 6 and 7, wife and husband respectively were the main identifying witnesses. P. W. 6 stated in her evidence that for the first time she saw the respondent at the time of occurrence and for the second time she saw him in the court during trial. In between she had not seen him. She remembered the respondent because snatched away the necklace from her neck P. W. 7 stated that out of the culprits who entered into his house on the day of occurrence, he could identify the respondent who was in the dock during trial. The respondent was not put to a test identification parade. In Budhsen and anr. v. State of U. P. it was held that the evidence of identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. In Kanan and ors. v. State of Kerala it was held that where a witness identities an accused who is not known to him in the court for the first time, his evidence is absolutely valueless unless there has been a previous test identification parade to test his powers of observation. The idea of holding test identification parade under Section 9 of the Evidence Act is to test the veracity of the witness on the question of capability to identify an unknown person whom the witness may have seen only once. If no test identification parade is held then it will be wholly unsafe to rely on his bare testimony regarding the identification of an accused for the first time in court. Expressing a similar view it was held in State (Delhi Admn.) v. V. C. Shukla and ors. that identification of a person by a witness for the first time in court without being tested by a prior test identification parade is valueless. In view of the above legal principles, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge was justified in rejecting the evidence of P. Ws. 6 and 7 with regard to their identification of the respondent for the first time in court without being tested by a prior test identification parade. ( 7 ) THE next item of evidence against the respondent is recovery of stolen property from the house of the respondent under seizure-list (Ext. 2 ). The learned Assistant Sessions Judge had analysed the evidence of P. Ws. ( 7 ) THE next item of evidence against the respondent is recovery of stolen property from the house of the respondent under seizure-list (Ext. 2 ). The learned Assistant Sessions Judge had analysed the evidence of P. Ws. 6 and 16 and held that there was no proof that any property was recovered from the house of the respondent because, such property was not produced before the court and so was not put to test identification nor ascertained that actually they belonged to P. W. 7 and having been stolen at the time of dacoity were subsequently recovered from the possession of the respondent This being the position, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge was justified in rejecting the evidence of P. Ws. 6 and 16 with regard to recovery of stolen property. ( 8 ) THERE is no other evidence to prove the complicity of the respondent in the dacoity committed in the house of P. W. 7. The trial of the respondent took place about nine years after the dacoity and at that distant point of time, it was hardly possible to adduce full proof evidence against the respondent to bring about his conviction. Therefore, I do not find any ground at all to interfere with the order of acquittal. ( 9 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. .