JUDGMENT - DHARMADHIKARI C.S., J.:—The petitioners filed a writ petition challenging the order passed by the Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur acting under section 45(2) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (as unamended) (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as "the Ceiling Act"). It appears that a preliminary objection was raised before the Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur regarding the bar of limitation in initiating revisional proceedings under section 45(2) proviso of the Ceiling Act. It was contended that the proceedings were initiated or the records were called for exercising the revisional jurisdiction under section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act after the expiry of period of three years from the date of the declaration under section 21(2) of the Ceiling Act. Said contention was negatived by the learned Commissioner. It appears that the Division Bench of this Court has taken a view in (Kisan Gangaram v. Additional Commissioner)1, 1977 U.C.R. (Bom.) 313 that all that section 45(2) requires is that the Commissioner to whom the powers of the State Government under the proviso to that section are delegated must call for the record of any enquiry or proceedings of a declaration or part thereof under section 21 before the expiry of period of three years from the date of such declaration or part thereof. The proviso to section 45(2) does not require the Commissioner to pass an order within three years from the date of declaration. Once the papers were called within the period of three years, there is nothing in the proviso to prevent the Commissioner from passing an order on the perusal of the papers thereafter. 2. However, when the matter was placed before the learned Single Judge (Dhabe, J.), the learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon the later decision of this Court in (Pedre Januario Carles v. Union of India)2, 1984 Mh.L.J. 132 in which a view is taken that the revisional authority must complete the proceedings and quash the order within the prescribed period of limitation from the date of the impugned order. Though the said decision was based on the provisions of Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code, 1968, the learned Single Judge found that the provisions were in pari materia or analogous to section 45(2) of the old Ceiling Act except for the difference of the time limit prescribed. Though the said decision was based on the provisions of Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code, 1968, the learned Single Judge found that the provisions were in pari materia or analogous to section 45(2) of the old Ceiling Act except for the difference of the time limit prescribed. Since there was apparent conflict between the views taken in these two decisions, the learned Judge thought it fit that the matter should be referred to a larger Bench and this is how this writ petition is placed before us. Since this was the only question raised in the petition, the learned Judge found that the whole petition can be disposed of by the Full Bench. 3. Section 45 of the Ceiling Act with which we are concerned in this petition reads as under : "45(1). In all matters connected with this Act, the State Government shall have the same authority and control over the officers authorised under section 27, the Collectors and the Commissioners acting under this Act, as they do in the general and revenue administration. (2) The State Government may, suo motu or on an application made to it by the aggrieved person, at any time, call for the record of any inquiry or proceedings under sections 17 to 21 (both inclusive) or under section 27 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any inquiry or proceedings (or any part thereof) under those sections or of any order passed under section 27, and may pass such order thereon as it deems fit, after giving the party a reasonable opportunity of being heard : Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall entitle the State Government to call for the record of any inquiry or proceedings of a declaration or part thereof under section 21 in relation to any land, unless an appeal against any such declaration or part thereof has not been filed within the period provided for it, the possession of such land has not been taken under sub-section (4) of section 21 and a period of three years from the date of such declaration or part thereof has not elapsed. (3) The State Government may, subject to such restrictions and conditions as it may impose, by notification in the Official Gazette, delegate to the Commissioner the powers conferred on it by sub-section (2)." From the bare reading of sub-section (2) with the proviso of section 45, it is quite clear that the State Government or its delegate, the Commissioner, whom the powers are delegated, may suo motu or on an application made to him by an aggrieved person, at any time, call for the record of any enquiry or proceedings under sections 17 to 21 (both inclusive) or under section 27 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any enquiry or proceedings or any part thereof under those sections. Though sub-section (2) is generally worded and does not provide for any limitation for exercising the power, the proviso to section 45 in terms lay down that nothing in sub-section (2) shall entitle the Government to call for a record of enquiry or proceedings of a declaration or part thereof under section 21 in relation to any land, unless an appeal against any such declaration or part thereof has not been filed within the period provided for it and the possession of such land has not been taken under sub-section (4) of section 21 and a period of three years from the date of such declaration or part thereof has not elapsed. 4. It is contended by Shri Madkholkar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, that when the section specifically provides the purpose for which the record is to be called, then all the expressions used in the section will have to be read together. The proviso lays down a period of three years from the date of declaration or part thereof for calling the record and even passing the ultimate order. According to him, calling for the record is not an empty formality but has a specific purpose behind it, namely, for satisfying as to the legality and propriety of the order or declaration etc. If this is so, then the view taken by the Division Bench in Pedre Januario Carle's case (cited supra) is the only view possible. Any other view will defeat the very purpose as well as the object of the Act. 5. If this is so, then the view taken by the Division Bench in Pedre Januario Carle's case (cited supra) is the only view possible. Any other view will defeat the very purpose as well as the object of the Act. 5. On the other hand, it is contended by Shri L.K. Khamborkar, the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the view taken by the Division Bench in Pedre Januario Carles's case (cited supra) is based on the provisions of the said enactment. Even otherwise, when a limitation is prescribed for calling for the record only, by interpretative process the Court cannot import a limitation even for passing an order. That will not only run counter to the legislative intent but will defeat the very purpose. Normally for passing an order in an appeal or revision, no period of limitation is prescribed. The period of limitation is prescribed for filing of an appeal or a revision or initiation of proceedings. Therefore, there is nothing in section 45(2) read with the proviso from which an inference could be drawn that the period prescribed for calling for the record also applies to the passing of the order. In substance, it is contended by him that the view taken by this Court in Pedre Januario Carles's case (cited supra) does not lay down the correct law. On the other hand, the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Kisan Gangaram v. Additional Commissioner (cited supra) under the very enactment is the correct view. He also contended that once the record is received by any method whatsoever within a period of three years, the prescription of limitation stands exhausted and the State Government or its delegate is at liberty to pass an order at any time thereafter. 6. Having considered the rival contentions raised before us, in our view section 45(2) will have to be reasonably construed to achieve the object of the legislation. The starting point of limitation as prescribed in the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 45 is the declaration or part thereof under section 21 of the Act. It also lays down certain conditions. The meaning assigned to the word "call" in Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 2 and Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary is "to summon". The starting point of limitation as prescribed in the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 45 is the declaration or part thereof under section 21 of the Act. It also lays down certain conditions. The meaning assigned to the word "call" in Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 2 and Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary is "to summon". If this is the meaning of the word "call", then it contemplates some action or application of mind on the part of the State Government or its delegate before calling for the record. It cannot be equated with a mechanical, clerical or ministerial act of calling for the records of all the proceedings irrespective of the fact whether they are required or not for the purpose specified in the section. We are informed that general instructions have been issued to all the Collectors and Sub-Divisional Officers to send all the records of the proceedings to the Commissioner. Thus in substance all the records relating to the proceedings resulting in the declaration under section 21 of the Act are practically stored in the office of the Commissioner. Such a storing of the records or sending of the records by the respective Collectors or Sub-Divisional Officers cannot be equated with the summoning of the records or calling for the records for the purposes specified in section 45(2) of the Act. It requires a conscious application of mind on the part of the competent authority qua particular proceedings. The word "any" as used in sub-section (2) of section 45 is indicative of this intention. Section 45(2) contemplates different stages, namely, calling for the records, giving opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned and ultimate decision. However, record is not to be called for merely satisfying the curiosity of for storing. It has a purpose behind it. The State Government is not appointed as roving Commission; but is expected to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The object behind prescribing the limitation for calling for the record is not to upset settled position at very late stage. The proviso to section 45(2) will have to be construed in this background. In a given case it may not be possible to dispose of a revision itself within the period of 3 years from the date of declaration for more than one reason. The ultimate decision of the revision will depend upon the various circumstances. The proviso to section 45(2) will have to be construed in this background. In a given case it may not be possible to dispose of a revision itself within the period of 3 years from the date of declaration for more than one reason. The ultimate decision of the revision will depend upon the various circumstances. Issuing of notices to the parties concerned for giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard is a must. In a given case in view of the several uncertainties including the death of the parties and the time taken for bringing their legal representatives on record, it may not be possible to dispose of the whole revision within the period of 3 years. Therefore, the Legislature in its wisdom has restricted the limitation prescribed under the proviso only to calling for the record. Though this calling for the record, will require some positive act on the part of the authority, it must ultimately depend upon the facts of each case; as to when record was actually called by the concerned authority. We do not find any compelling reason to construe proviso so as to include in its import all the proceedings, namely, right from the initiation to the ultimate order. If that was the intention of the Legislature, then the proviso would have been differently worded. Therefore, we agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Kisan v. Additional Commissioner's case (cited supra). 7. We find further internal evidence available for construing section 45(2) read with the proviso in the manner we have construed it in section 44-A of the Ceiling Act. Section 45-A was inserted in the Ceiling Act by Maharashtra Act No. XXI of 1975. It confers the powers of revision upon the Commissioner in enquiry and proceedings under sections 25 and 27 of the Act. In this proviso also a limitation is prescribed for calling for the record. However, an exception is made in case of a reference from the State Government. Said section lays down that in case the Commissioner decides to exercise the revisional powers suo motu or on an application made to him by an aggrieved person, then he cannot summon the record after the expiry of the period of one year from the date of the award of compensation or grant of the land by the Collector. Said section lays down that in case the Commissioner decides to exercise the revisional powers suo motu or on an application made to him by an aggrieved person, then he cannot summon the record after the expiry of the period of one year from the date of the award of compensation or grant of the land by the Collector. This clearly indicates that the Legislature has not treated calling of a record as a ministerial act, but a conscious act on the part of the revisional authority after due application of mind. As already observed, the record is to be called for a specific purpose namely, for satisfying as to the legality or propriety of the enquiry or proceedings of the declaration or part thereof. Therefore, it is quite obvious to us that after applying his mind, the revisional authority will have to call for the record of the enquiry or proceedings after conscious application of mind to the facts and circumstances of each case. 8. So far as the decision of another Division Bench in Pedre Januario Carles's case is concerned, the said decision will have to be read in its context. We do not feel that it lays down a general law in that behalf. The Division Bench in the said case was concerned with the provisions of Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code, 1968 including section 192 and section 32(2)(c) of the said Code. Section 192 of the said Code was somewhat similarly worded as that of section 45(2) read with the proviso. However to the case before the Division Bench section 32(2) of the Code applied which dealt with deemed permission after the lapse of ninety days. The Division Bench also placed reliance on the ruling reported in (State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghava Natha)3, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1297. In paragraph 12 of the said judgment while construing somewhat similar provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, this is what the Supreme Court observed : "12. It seems to us that section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under section 211. Under section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. Under section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the Legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case, the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on October 12, 1961, i.e. more than a year after the order, and it seems to us that this order was passed too late." It appears from the judgment of the Division Bench in Pedre Januaric Carles's case that in view of these observations of the Supreme Court the Division Bench held that to the cases covered by section 32(2)(c) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code, even for exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 192 of the Code a period of one year as prescribed by the proviso could be treated as a reasonable period. Therefore, the observations of the Division Bench in that case should be confined to the facts of that case. In our view, by interpretative process it cannot be held that though the proviso in specific terms lays down that no record shall be called after the expiry of one year from the date of the order sought to be revised and even though the record is called during the said period, no order could be issued thereafter. By interpretative process a limitation could not have been laid down even for passing an order or giving a decision in all cases. To that extent, we find it difficult to agree with the view taken in Pedre Januaria Carles's case. By interpretative process a limitation could not have been laid down even for passing an order or giving a decision in all cases. To that extent, we find it difficult to agree with the view taken in Pedre Januaria Carles's case. However, it must be held as observed by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav (cited supra) or in (Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak)4, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1239 that the State Government or its delegate are expected to exercise said power within a reasonable time depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 9. In the case before us, admittedly the necessary application of mind on the part of the Commissioner was much beyond the period of three years of the impugned order. In the view we have taken, therefore, it will have to be held that the records were not called within period of three years. In view of this admitted position, it is clear that the Commissioner had no powers to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. On this short ground, therefore, the rule will have to be made absolute. 10. Hence the rule is made absolute. The order passed by the Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur dated 29th April, 1980 is quashed and set aside and that of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Umrer dated 30-12-1963 and that of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bhandara dated 1-10-1965 are restored. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----