JUDGMENT Roy, J. By this Revisional Application, M/s. Kalimpong Land and Building Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the said Company), which is a Public Limited Company, incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, having its Registered Office at p-11, New Howrah Bridge Approach Road, Calcutta and one of their Directors and Shareholders being petitioner No. 2, have asked for a Rule under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and order dated 27th February, 1989, passed in Misc. Case No. 25 of 1988 by the learned District Judge, Darjeeling. Since the parties entered appearance through their learned Advocates as indicated above the application was heard on contest, for the purpose, whether a Rule should or should not be issued. 2. There is a godown known as White Wool Godown (hereinafter referred to as the said godown), at 11th Mile, Kalimpong and the said Company has claimed to be the landlord in respect of the same. The said godown is admittedly a very big one and stated, is constructed on an area of about 53,000 Sq.ft. On or about 24th May, 1964, the Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling, in exercise of his powers conferred under section 3(1) of the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), issued a Show Cause notice asking the said Company to show cause within 15 days of the said notice, as to why the said godown should not be requisitioned. It has been stated that various objections were raised by the said Company against such requisition and thereafter, by a notice of 23rd June, 1964, the said godown was actually requisitioned by the authorities as mentioned hereinbefore and it has been alleged that possession of the same was forcibly taken by the authorities concerned. 3. The action as taken, was claimed to be illegal and arbitrary and it was further claimed that the authorities concerned fixed compensation of the said godown at only Rs. 834/- per month and such steps or actions have also been claimed to be irregular, void and invalid. Admittedly, against such fixation of arbitrary rent and compensation, the erstwhile owners of the said godown filed a case before the Arbitrator appointed under the said Act, being Misc. 834/- per month and such steps or actions have also been claimed to be irregular, void and invalid. Admittedly, against such fixation of arbitrary rent and compensation, the erstwhile owners of the said godown filed a case before the Arbitrator appointed under the said Act, being Misc. Judicial Case No. 9 of 1967 and it has been stated that the said proceedings is still pending and it was the categorical case of the said Company that in fact, the decision in the concerned Arbitration case has not been made since 1967 and as a result whereof, the said Company made repeated representations and requests to the authorities concerned, for making arrangements for expeditious hearing of the matter. But all such attempts having failed, the petitioners moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for appointment of an Arbitrator within a stipulated period and the said proceedings was numbered as C.R. No. 1900(W) of 1981 and the same was disposed of on 31st March, 1981, by a learned Single Judge of this Court. It was directed that the Respondents concerned should take steps for appointment of an Arbitrator as early as possible and preferably not later than six months. 4. It has been stated that even after making such order, no notification was made in the light of the observations as made by this Court and as such the case could not be taken up and the same was required to be adjourned times without number and as a result thereof, several District Judges of the concerned District were transferred. It was the case of the said Company that having no other way, they moved another Writ application for the same and similar reliefs as indicated earlier, on 18th September, 1985 an another learned Judge of this Court, was pleased to direct in that proceedings that the learned Arbitrator appointed in Misc. Judicial Case No. 9 of 1967, should dispose of the matter within 90 days from the date of commencement of the order. In fact, it has been stated that such order was made by consent. 5. Judicial Case No. 9 of 1967, should dispose of the matter within 90 days from the date of commencement of the order. In fact, it has been stated that such order was made by consent. 5. It was the further case of the said Company that even after the above order, the arbitration application was not heard, but the same was adjourned from time to time and in such circumstances, on 13th May, 1986, they had to move another Writ application and a learned Judge of this Court, this time, while disposing of the said application, directed that the newly appointed Arbitrator by the State Government in terms of section 8(1)(b) of the Said Act, who is or has been or is qualified for appointment as a Judge of High Court, will be at liberty to proceed from the stage it was left by the previous Arbitrator, for the purpose of expedition and passing the award in Misc. Judicial Case No. 9 of 1967 as aforesaid. It has further been alleged that adjournments after adjournments were taken, as a result thereof, District Judges were transferred from time to time and the political situation at Darjeeling became worst day by day. As a result thereof, the said Company has stated that on an application being made by them on 19th August, 1987, a learned Judge of this Court, who issued the said C.O. No. 6156(W) of 1986 on 7th September, 1987, was pleased to appoint Shri Amiya Kumar Mukherjee, a retired Judge of this Court, as Arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of section 8(1)(b) of the said Act, for determining the rent compensation in the concerned arbitration proceedings. Since reference was made to the above mentioned section, we think, we should quote the same here. Section 8 deals with principles and method of determining compensation and sub-section (b) of section 8(1) is as under:- (1) ……………………………………………………………………… (a) ……………………………………………………………………… (b) where no such agreement can be reached, the Central Government shall appoint as arbitrator a person who is or has been, or is qualified for appointment as, a Judge of a High Court ; (c) ……………………………………………………………………… (d) ……………………………………………………………………… (e) ……………………………………………………………………… (f) ………………………………………………………………………. (g) …………………………………………………………………….. 6. It would appear that the Arbitrator, who appointed now entered upon the concerned reference on 13th September, 1987, with notice to the parties, who were at that time before him. (g) …………………………………………………………………….. 6. It would appear that the Arbitrator, who appointed now entered upon the concerned reference on 13th September, 1987, with notice to the parties, who were at that time before him. In fact, at that lime, Union of India and Central Tibetans School Administration, New Delhi were not notified, since they were not parties in the proceedings, but subsequently they appeared in the Arbitration proceedings before the learned Arbitrator and an application being made by them, they got them added in the concerned arbitration proceedings. In fact, such addition was asked for, after the 9th sitting before the learned Arbitrator and till then the Slate of West Bengal was duly represented before him. It has been stated that at the 22nd sitting before him, on 12th August, 1988, the learned Arbitrator Published his award, which was dated 11th August, 1988 and made over copies of the same to the Advocate for the said Company and also to the Advocate for the State Respondent and added Respondents. The statements as indicated hereinbefore, are also verifiable from the records as produced before us. It has been stated that the learned Arbitrator directed Shri Someswar Prosad Singh, a Director and Shareholder of the said Company and who is Petitioner No. 2, to hand-over the award and other records to the learned District Judge, Darjeeling and in fact he did so on 16th August, 1988 and on the next day, the learned District Judge opened the sealed cover in the presence of the learned Advocates for the said Company and also the respondents and directed that the matter be put up for orders on 31st August, 1988, when it was submitted before him by the said Company that the directions as given by him, for issuing notices under the said Act after the award was published, were not proper. In fact, it has been stated that on such, the learned Court directed that for the asked of convenience, a notice be issued to the State Government fixing 15th September, 1988, for further hearing and order. On 24th September, 1988, he allowed the concerned Misc. Judicial Case No. 9 of 1967 in terms of the award. It was the case of the said Company that after a protracted proceedings, they had succeeded in obtaining the award of Rs. On 24th September, 1988, he allowed the concerned Misc. Judicial Case No. 9 of 1967 in terms of the award. It was the case of the said Company that after a protracted proceedings, they had succeeded in obtaining the award of Rs. 84,92,924/- as rent compensation for the period upto July, 1988 and it has further been claimed by them that since the parties concerned had full knowledge and intimation of the award as made by the learned Arbitrator, there was no reason or justification and any ground whatsoever for challenging the same. In fact, is has been pointed out that the respondents concerned have not preferred any appeal within the stipulated period as mentioned in the said Act and it would be abundantly clear from their conduct, that the award as made on adjudication, was accepted by them. It has further been alleged that inspite of the above, the respondents concerned, have wrongfully withheld the payment of the adjudicated amount and such action on their part was arbitrary, malafide and harassive too. 7. It has been alleged that even though the said Company succeeded in obtaining the award as mentioned above, after about 25 years, yet they have not been able to get or enjoy the fruits of the same, because of arbitrary action and machination by the respondents concerned and as such, on an application being made, on 11th October, 1988, a learned Judge of this Court directed as under : This Writ petition is being moved without notice to the Respondents. Having heard Dr. Banerjee for the petitioners, I direct the Writ petitioner to serve copies of the Writ petition upon all the Respondents and file an affidavit of service. Let this application come up for hearing on 21st November, 1988. The State Respondents are also directed to in form the Court as to why they would not implement the award passed by the learned Arbitrator appointed by this Court. Let a plain copy of this order countersigned by the Asstt. Registrar (Court) be given to the Ld. Advocates for the petitioner, as prayed for communication. The State Respondents are also directed to in form the Court as to why they would not implement the award passed by the learned Arbitrator appointed by this Court. Let a plain copy of this order countersigned by the Asstt. Registrar (Court) be given to the Ld. Advocates for the petitioner, as prayed for communication. It has been stated on 24th November, 1988, when the said Company's application for directions of payment came up for hearing, it was submitted on behalf of the answering Respondents that as they filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the proceedings before this Court be stayed and on such basis, the said learned Judge initially adjourned the hearing of the concerned application for two months and directed that in the meantime, the concerned application for setting aside the ex parte decree be decided. The said application under Order IX, Rule 13 was adjourned from time to time and ultimately the hearing of the same was fixed on 9th December, 1988. 8. In such circumstances, another application was moved before this Court in its Writ jurisdiction, for fixing an early date of hearing of the said pending application and on 21st December, 1988, the learned Judge ordered as under :- In a very unfortunate circumstances this application has been filed on behalf of M/s. Kalimpong Land & Building Ltd., a public limited company for enforcement of the Award passed by Arbitrator, who is an ex-Judge of this Court which was pending before the learned District Judge, Darjeeling, in a peculiar circumstances for a considerable period of time. Earlier, an award has been passed by an ex-Judge of this Court, who has been appointed as Arbitrator and the said Award has been submitted before the Civil Court for passing judgment on Award. This Court is informed that a decree has been passed on the basis of the said Award by the competent Civil Court i.e. the Court of the learned District Judge, Darjeeling. The Respondents, Union of India has not preferred any appeal against the said decree before this Court in any first Appeal, as such, the respondents are duty bound to pay the award money, to the applicant. The Respondents, Union of India has not preferred any appeal against the said decree before this Court in any first Appeal, as such, the respondents are duty bound to pay the award money, to the applicant. Unfortunately, there was an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as submitted by the Samarendra Nath Banerjee, learned Advocate and thereafter on ill-advised application has been filed hopelessly out of time, for setting aside the award. This Court expects the said two applications should be disposed of by the learned Distract Judge Darjeeling specifically on February 23, 1989, as agreed upon by the parties. This Court has been informed that the learned District Judge, Darjeeling has already fixed February 23, 1989 for hearing the applications. It is desired that the learned District Judge should dispose of the two applications, if possible, immediately after the re-opening of the Civil Court after the Christmas Holidays, on January 2, 1989. In the event if it is not possible to dispose of the two applications within this time, it should be disposed of on or before February 23, 1989, and no further adjournment should be granted except inordinate circumstances. Let a plain copy of this order countersigned by the Asstt. Registrar Court be handed over to the learned District Judge, Darjeeling. 9. When the application for directions for payment came up for hearing on 24th November, 1988, the answering Respondents disclosed the fact of filing of the concerned application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the said Company claimed to be not bona fide and was intended to delay the payment under the Arbitration award. However, after some adjournments, the said proceedings was fixed for hearing on 9th December, 1988 and in the meantime the said Company moved another application for fixing the hearing of the concerned application at an early date and on which, the order as quoted hereinbefore, was made by the learned Judge of this Court. It was contended by the said Company all throughout and before us also that the said application under Order IX Rule 13 was intended to delay the concerned payment. It was contended by the said Company all throughout and before us also that the said application under Order IX Rule 13 was intended to delay the concerned payment. In the said application under Order IX Rule 13, the main contentions of the appellant were that the award in question, was obtained ex-parte or after keeping them in the dark and the said Company contended that the applicants were neither necessary nor required parties, since the State Government, at whose instance the award was made, was made a party respondent. In such view of the matter and since the fact of making the award by the learned Arbitrator was known to the applicants, the said application was also claimed to be not bona fide and was presented on false and incorrect statements. It was further claimed and contended by the said Company that there was no provisions in the said Act, for issuing further notices as required under the Arbitration Act and the more so when, section 8(1)(g) of the said Act states that nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940) shall apply to arbitration under this section. In their contests as indicated hereinbefore, the said Company further claimed that since the date of signing of the decree by the Court does not give rise to any right to make an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code and the date of decree as per law was the date of the award i.e. 11th August, 1988 in this case and not 24th September, 1988 and the concerned award was passed in the presence of all the parties, including the applicants, so they were and are bound by the said award or decree as passed on 11th August, 1988 in the case under consideration and as there is no provisions in the said Act for filing any objection after passing of the award and before signing of the decree as per the concerned award and same became final and binding on the parties and no appeal was preferred therefore within 30 days of the award, the Civil Court was not authorised to exercise its jurisdiction in respect of any matter, on which the competent Arbitrator, as in this case, had made the award. 10. 10. After hearing the proceedings by the impugned judgment and order, the learned District Judge, Darjeeling set-aside the order of ex parte decree as made on 24th September, 1988 in Misc. Case (Arbitration) No. 1967 and restored the Misc. Case to file. Before the learned District Judge, it was submitted that after the award was filed in Court and before the same was made as rule of the Court, the Court ought to have issued proper and sufficient notices to the parties concerned under section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as the applicants before him were the vital and most interested parties in the award in question. It is an admitted fact and that too, have been found by the learned District Judge that no such notice was issued by the Court upon the applicants before him. He has found that once an ward is filed in Court, it is the duty of the Court under section 14(2) of the Act as mentioned hereinbefore, to issue notices to the parties concerned and since no such notice was given, there was material irregularities in the matter. It has also been observed that the limitation under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, would not start running until such notice under section 14(2) was given. It should be noted that the contesting parties before the learned District Judge, claimed that since the property was requisitioned under the provisions of the said Act, the provisions of the Arbitration Act would not be applicable in this case and as such, notice under section 14(2) as mentioned above, was not required. The learned District Judge has observed that admittedly there was a requisition in the instant case, under section 8 of the said Act, which is a self contained Code and in this case, the Arbitrator was appointed following the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and such position was accepted duly by the parties. It has also been observed by the learned Court that in this case, the Arbitrator was appointed by the High Court at the instance of the opposite parties appearing before it and if the provisions of the said Act were followed, then, only the Central Government had the jurisdiction to appoint the Arbitrator and none else. It has also been observed by the learned Court that in this case, the Arbitrator was appointed by the High Court at the instance of the opposite parties appearing before it and if the provisions of the said Act were followed, then, only the Central Government had the jurisdiction to appoint the Arbitrator and none else. Moreover, it has been recorded that the Arbitrator had filed the award in Court, obviously for making, the same as a rule of the Court and for such filing also, the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 were followed and all parties concerned accepted that position and they also accepted the order of the Civil Court making the award rule of the Court. Such being the position, the learned Court below has found and observed that there was reasonable cause for the applicants before him, for not attending the Court on the date of the hearing and passing the ex parte order. Apart from the above, from the attending circumstances, the learned Court below also observed that requirements of section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, which were necessary, were not fulfilled in this case. 11. It was then contended before the learned Court below that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were not applicable in this case and as such, the application as filed under Order IX Rule 13, was not maintainable. Such stand was taken by the answering opposite parties before the learned Court below i.e., the applicants before him, had in the facts of this case, remedy by way of an appeal and such appeal not having admittedly been filed, the application as filed, was not legally maintainable. Those contentions were not accepted by the learned Court below on a reference to the provisions of section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which lays down that "no appeal shall lie from such a decree except on the ground that it is an excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award" and it has been observed that no such ground as contemplated in the said section 17, were available in the present case. 12. 12. Then and thirdly, it was contended before the learned Court below that the application as filed by the applicants before it, was time barred since the date of the award should be the date of the judgment and decree and in that case the application in question for setting aside the ex-parte decree was time barred. Those submissions were not accepted by the learned Court below, as the correct position of law and it has been observed that the date of the award of the Arbitrator cannot be the date of judgment or decree passed by the learned Court below making the award rule of Court and the limitation for filing the application to set aside the decree, should run from the date of the decree and not from the date of the award as made by the Arbitrator. It has been observed that the application in question, was filed by the applicants for setting aside the ex-parte decree, well within the period of limitation, since the decree was passed on 24th September, 1988 and the application was filed on 1st October, 1988. 13. In the view as above and on consideration of the relevant aspects of the case, the learned Court below held that the applicants before it were prevented by reasonable cause for not appearing in Court, when the award was made rule of Court by an order of decree passed by the Court on 24th September, 1988 in the concerned Misc. case, because of non service of notice under section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act upon them, and as such, the ex-parte order of decree was liable to be set aside and the concerned Misc. case to be restored in its original number and file. 14. Dr. Banerjee appearing in support of the application, after relying on the series of events and the orders as made by this Court, wanted to establish that because of the enormous delay in making the award, the said Company was well within its right and jurisdiction to move this Court for appointment of an Arbitrator and the Arbitrator in the instant case, was appropriately appointed under the provisions of the said Act. It was also claimed by him that compensation at the rate of Rs. 834/- per month as fixed, was too meagre and not fixed bona fide. It was also claimed by him that compensation at the rate of Rs. 834/- per month as fixed, was too meagre and not fixed bona fide. It was also contended by him that filing of the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code by the answering respondents before us, before the learned Court below was not bona fide and the same should not have been entertained, as steps for filing the application in question, was not taken within thirty days from the date of the publication of the award, which was 12th August, 1988 and the appeal therefrom was barred after 30 days from that date. He further pointed out that when the appointment of the Arbitrator in the instant case, was made by this Court under section 8(1)(b) of the said Act, it was not open to the learned Court, below to take a contrary view and it was its bounden duty and obligation as an inferior Court, to accept the order as made by this Court even if the same was not appropriately done. He further pointed out that in the Arbitration proceedings, the answering respondents before us, got themselves added or substituted and they, not having filed an appeal under section 11 of the said Act, which deals with appeals from awards in respect of compensation and to the effect that any person aggrieved by an award of the arbitrator made under section 8 may, within thirty days from the date of such award, prefer an appeal to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the requisitioned or acquired property is situate : Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time, the entertaining of the application in question, by the learned Court below was highly improper and without jurisdiction. In support of his submissions as above, Dr. In support of his submissions as above, Dr. Banerjee pressed reliance on the determinations in the case of (1) Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd v. Income-tax Officer, Bhopal, AIR 1961 SC 182 , where in the circumstances as indicated in the judgment, the appellant company moved the Judicial Commissioner, Bhopal, then exercising the powers of a High Court for that area, for the issue of a writ to compel the respondent to carry out the directions given by the Tribunal. The learned Judicial Commissioner found in express terms that the respondent had acted arbitrarily & in clear violation of the directions given by the Tribunal; in other words, be found that the respondent had disregarded the order of the Tribunal, failed to carry out hit duty according to law and had acted illegally. Having found this, the learned Judicial Commissioner went on to examine the correctness or otherwise of the order of the Tribunal and found that the Tribunal went wrong in not treating the centres as 'markets' within the meaning of Rule 23 of the Income-tax Rules. He then came to the conclusion that in view of the error committed by the Tribunal, there was no manifest injustice as a result of the order of the respondent; accordingly, he dismissed the application for the issue of a writ made by the appellant company. In fact, on the basis of such determinations, it was specifically claimed and contended by Dr. Banerjee that the learned Court below, as slated earlier, being subordinate to this Court was not authorised to question the wisdom of the order as made by this Court and according to him, sub-ordinate Court, should adhere to the orders made by the superior Court, even if such order is erroneous and contrary to law and more particularly when, in the facts as involved in the said Supreme Court decision, it has been observed that where the Income-tax Officer had virtually refused to carry out the clear and unambigious directions which is a superior tribunal like the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, had given to him by its final order in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him such refusal is an effect a denial of justice, and is furthermore destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is on the hierarchy of Courts. In such a case a writ of mandamus should issue ex debito justitiae to compel the Income-tax Officer to carry out the directions given to him by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The High Court would be clearly in error if it refused to issue a writ on the ground that no manifest injustice had resulted from the order of the Income-tax Officer in view of the error committed by the Tribunal itself in its order. Such a view is destricted of one of the basic principles of the administration of justice. Thereafter, reference was made by Dr. Banerjee to the case of (2) Pallav Das Mathura Das Lakhani & Ors. v. Municipal Committee, Malkapore, AIR 1970 SC 1002 , which has indicated that a suit for refund of tax illegally collected by the Municipality would be maintainable under section 72 of the Contract Act, 1872 and since under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the Supreme Court is binding on High Court, the same cannot be ignored on the ground that the relevant provisions was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. 15. While on the point, further reference was made by Dr. Banerjee to the case of (3) Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Shri Bhimsen Dixit, AIR 1972 SC 2466 , where it has been observed that the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments acts as a quasi judicial authority and is subject to the superintendence of the High Court and as such the decision of that High Court are binding on him. This determination was made while dealing with a proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This determination was made while dealing with a proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In that case, it has also been observed that a senior judicial officer with an experience of 23 years, when serving as a Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, refused to be bound by a decided case of Orissa High Court on ground that he had moved the Supreme Court against that High Court decision and as such the matter was sub judice, while in fact, only a petition was pending in High Court for certificate to appeal to Supreme Court, the judicial officer was deliberately avoiding to follow the decision by giving wrong and illegitimate reasons and his conduct was clearly mala fide and amounted to disobedience and disregard of Court by acting in opposition to the authority, justice and dignity thereof and thereby bringing the administration of law into disrepute. 16. It wall then submitted by Dr. Banerjee that the order as made in this case, was against the law on the face of it since section 8(g) of the said Act is a self contend code and has laid down a complete procedure of appeal against any requisition or acquisition order, and as such the invocation of the Arbitration Act, as sought to be made by the learned Court below, was absolutely wrong and in view of the above and more particularly when the provisions of appeal were not followed, the learned Court below did not act appropriately in entertaining the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code and more particularly when, the appointment of the Arbitrator in the instant case was made by the High Court and the High Court had jurisdiction to make such appointment. He further contended that even when the Central Government is the authority to appoint an Arbitrator under the said Act, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court in the Writ jurisdiction would have jurisdiction to direct such appointment to be made for ends of justice or for avoiding injustice to a party. He specifically contended that in case of injustice the High Court is not certainly denuded of its powers to interfere. In support of such submissions, Dr. Banerjee referred to the case of (4) The Comptroller and Auditor General of India etc v. K.S. Jagannathan & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 537 . He specifically contended that in case of injustice the High Court is not certainly denuded of its powers to interfere. In support of such submissions, Dr. Banerjee referred to the case of (4) The Comptroller and Auditor General of India etc v. K.S. Jagannathan & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 537 . In that case it has been observed that the High Courts exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government of a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to present injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised is discretion. Apart from indicating that in the circumstances of the case, the petitioners who belonged to Scheduled Caste and entitled to relaxation of marks in the qualifying examination under the Departmental instructions could seek relief under Article 226 as the instructions were not followed by the Govt. and hence directions issued by the Court were justified. The petitioner in that case belonged to Scheduled Caste and were working in India Audit and Accounts Dept Madras. They appeared for SAS Exam. Part II in December, 1980. The instructions in office memorandum Dt. 21-1-1977 regarding relaxation of marks in qualifying exam for promotion was not followed by the authorities. and hence directions issued by the Court were justified. The petitioner in that case belonged to Scheduled Caste and were working in India Audit and Accounts Dept Madras. They appeared for SAS Exam. Part II in December, 1980. The instructions in office memorandum Dt. 21-1-1977 regarding relaxation of marks in qualifying exam for promotion was not followed by the authorities. The petitions filed by the petitioners were dismissed by the single Judge of High Court and on appeal to D.B. The D.B. issued directions to use the discretion under the order. The decision of D.B., was given on 12.1.1984. The Govt. filed special leave appeal to Supreme Court and obtained interim stay of order of D.B. and in such circumstances it has been held that the interim stay had come to an end. Further examinations, however, must have been held in the meantime. In view of the order of interim stay, they must have been held on the same basis as the December, 1980 Examination. The petitioners had appeared in Part II of the SAS Examination in December, 1980 and, therefore, to give the same or similar directions as were given by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court would result in further delay and would perhaps result in a fresh writ petition. Further, such directions cannot be given only with respect to the Respondents because there may be other candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes who are similarly situated nor can such directions be confined merely to the December, 1980 Examination. They also should not jeopardixe those who have already been promoted for none of them are parties to the SC Appeal. It is, therefore necessary that in order to do complete justice to all concerned as required by Article 142 of the Constitution, the matter should not be left to the Comptroller and Auditor General of India but all requisite directions should be given by the Supreme Court. It is, therefore necessary that in order to do complete justice to all concerned as required by Article 142 of the Constitution, the matter should not be left to the Comptroller and Auditor General of India but all requisite directions should be given by the Supreme Court. In fact, the gist of the power of the High Court has been stated to the effect that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion malafide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion. It should be noted that the above observations have been made on a reference to the cases of (5) Dwarkanath v. Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur, AIR 1966 SC 81 and (6) Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 2226 and Dr. Banerjee also relied on those determinations. It should be noted that the above observations have been made on a reference to the cases of (5) Dwarkanath v. Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur, AIR 1966 SC 81 and (6) Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 2226 and Dr. Banerjee also relied on those determinations. It was claimed by him on the basis of the above determinations that when in the instant case, the High Court admittedly appointed the Arbitrator under section 8 of the said Act in the presence of the State of West Bengal and no appeal has been taken from such order of the High Court and the parties appeared before the learned Arbitrator, who held 22 sittings and not only the State but the answering respondents before us participated before him, if not all throughout, at least from the 9th sitting and never raised any question regarding the jurisdiction of the learned Arbitrator to make the award, they should not be allowed to challenge the jurisdiction collaterally and through an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code. In support of his submissions, Dr. Banerjee referred to and relied on an unreported judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of (7) Arwachin Shiksha Samiti & Anr. v. Smt. Sarita Gupta & Ors., (Civil Writ Petition No. 1226 of 1982) where the petitioners challenged the impugned order of the Tribunal inter alia, on the ground that the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal, who made the order, was not legally competent to be appointed and or designated as such by virtue of lacking in the requisite qualification for the purpose laid down in section 8 of the Act. The petition prays for the further relief of a declaration to that effect. On the Rule Nisi being issued, the operation of the impugned order was unconditionally stayed pending hearing of the application for stay after notice to the respondent. The order was eventually made absolute till the decision of the petition on the condition that the petitioners pay a sum of Rs. 15,000/- to the respondent subject to the pleas of the parties. The order was eventually made absolute till the decision of the petition on the condition that the petitioners pay a sum of Rs. 15,000/- to the respondent subject to the pleas of the parties. The payment has since been received by the respondent and during the pendency of the petition, the respondent, who was kept restrained from working as T.G.T. resigned in disgust and allegedly under the compulsion of adverse circumstances and pressure and the resignation was willingly accepted by a grateful management. The right of the respondent to be put back in service in one capacity or the other by virtue of any appointment or as a result of the operation of the impugned order, therefore, admittedly does not survive. The only importance of the proceedings in the changed context is the impact of the outcome on the right of the respondent to salary for the intervening period as also the adjustment of the amount already paid to the respondent under the order of this Court. The question as to the validity of the appointment of the Presiding Officer also does not survive because in another case, this Court has quashed the appointment on the ground on which the challenge has mounted in the present petition. The only questions that still survive and were hotly contested areas to the impact of the legal incompetence of the Presiding Officer on the impugned order and should the order be valid notwithstanding the admitted legal incompetence, how far was the order otherwise liable to be quashed. 17. Dr. The only questions that still survive and were hotly contested areas to the impact of the legal incompetence of the Presiding Officer on the impugned order and should the order be valid notwithstanding the admitted legal incompetence, how far was the order otherwise liable to be quashed. 17. Dr. Banerjee pointed out that in such facts as indicated above, a point arose in that case, as to how far the legal incompetence of the Presiding Officer of the Delhi School Tribunal and the voiding of his appointment by the Court; vitiated the impugned order and if the impugned order was saved by doctrine of de facto officer, was in issue in that case and in such circumstances, after relying on Wade's Administrative Law and the observations of Sir Asutosh Mukherjee, J. in the case of (8) Pulin Behari v. King Emperor, (1912)15 Cal LJ 517 to the effect that substance of the matter is that the defacto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the public and the individual where these interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large. In deed, if any individual or body of individuals were permitted, at his or their pleasure, to collaterally challenge the authority of and to refuse obedience to the government of the Stage and the numerous functionaries through whom it exercised its various powers on the ground of irregular existence or defective title, insubordination and disorder of the worst kind would be encouraged. For the good order and peace of society, their authority must be upheld until in some regular mode their title is directly investigated and determined and the observations of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of (9) P.S. Menon v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 Kerala 165 to the effect that this doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and individuals involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law. But although these officers are not officers de jure they are by virtue of the particular circumstances, officers, in fact, whose acts, public policy requires should be considered valid and also the observations in (10) Gokaraju Rangoraku v. State of A.P., AIR 1987 SC 1473 to the effect that a Judge de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. There is yet another rule also based on public policy. The defective appointment of a de facto judge may be questioned directly in a proceeding to which be may be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the Judge except as a Judge. Two litigants litigation their private titles cannot be permitted to bring in issue and litigate upon the title of a Judge to his office, Otherwise so soon as a Judge pronounces a judgments litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment is void because the Judge is no Judge. A Judge's title to his office cannot be brought into jeopardy in that fashion. Hence the rule against collateral attach on validity of judicial appointments. To question a Judge's appointment in an appeal against his judgment is, of course such a collateral attack which decision has again been followed in the case of (11) Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 194 . It has been observed amongst others, thus it is well-established, both on principle and authority, that the invalidity of the appointment of an officer does not necessarily vitiate his orders and decisions so long as he acts under the colour of authority and that such orders or decisions would not he subject to collateral challenge. It has been observed amongst others, thus it is well-established, both on principle and authority, that the invalidity of the appointment of an officer does not necessarily vitiate his orders and decisions so long as he acts under the colour of authority and that such orders or decisions would not he subject to collateral challenge. These principles, though judicially evolved, are based on public policy, the principle of public acquiescence in the act of de facto officer and the imperative need of public convenience. The principle has in fact been legislatively recognised and there is a growing practice to incorporate a provision in the various statutes protecting orders and decisions of authorities from any defect in the appointment of the authority making these orders or decisions. In view of the above it was Dr. Banerjee's claim and contentions that the doctrine of de facto officer should also be applied in this case if his submissions on the first part as indicated earlier, fail. He further claimed on a reference to 71 Law Quarterly Review that such rule as indicated earlier should also be applied in this case. 18. It was further submitted by Dr. Banerjee that the question in this case and chat too on the pleadings, would be whether the appointment of the learned Arbitrator was made under section 8 of the said Act or the Arbitration Act and it was stated by him, that there was no scope for holding otherwise than the appointment was made under section 8 of the said Act, if prayers to the Writ petition are looked into and which without any doubt bas expressly to be mentioned that the appointment was made under section 8 of the said Act. There was no challenge to such observations and furthermore, parties to the proceedings participated before the learned Arbitrator without taking any exception. To support his submissions on the question of participation, Dr. Banerjee took us through the various minutes as maintained by the learned Arbitrator and which, according to him, without any doubt would establish that the proceedings were taken under section 8 of the said Act. To support his submissions on the question of participation, Dr. Banerjee took us through the various minutes as maintained by the learned Arbitrator and which, according to him, without any doubt would establish that the proceedings were taken under section 8 of the said Act. He further reiterated that section 8(1)(g) excludes the application of the Arbitration Act and since nobody took any exception under the Arbitration Act, till the award was passed, they should be deemed to have taken a chance to get a favourable award and that being the position, they must not be allowed to contend other wise now. In fact, he submitted that submissions were made before the learned Arbitrator on the basis of the provisions of the said Act and not the Arbitration Act. 19. In view of the above and because of the participation of the parties before the learned Arbitrator without raising any dispute, Dr. Banerjee submitted that the applicants in the said application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, who are answering respondents before us, should be deemed to be estopped by their conduct from challenging the Award. 20. While on his submissions on estoppel and acquisance, Dr. Banerjee firstly, referred to the case of (12) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Dalmia Iron & Steel Ltd., AIR 1965 Calcutta 42, where it has been observed, whether the question, a particular claim comes within the scope of an insurance policy is a matter of construction of the policy itself and when dispute regarding the claim is submitted to arbitrators it is within the province to decide upon construction of the terms of the policy. If the arbitrators or their umpire have gone into the question and determined the same in a particular way, it is not open to the Court to disturb or interfere with that determination except in the case of an error of law apparent on the face of the award. An error in law on the face of the award means, that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. An error in law on the face of the award means, that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. Where no such legal proposition is found, the problem whether there is any error in law on the face of the award does not arise, apart from holding that it is well settled that whether the arbitrator acts within his jurisdiction or not depends solely upon the clause of reference, and where, therefore, the arbitration is fairly wide had covers all differences, the contention that on some particular issue there was inherent lack of jurisdiction of the arbitrators or their umpires is untenable, secondly; to the case of (13) Nadia District Bus Owners Association v. District Magistrate, Nadia & Ors., AIR 1969 Calcutta 458. In that case, on the question of shifting a Bus Stand from the existing site, the petitioners surrendered to the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate and on such facts, it has been held that they could not be allowed to raise the question of jurisdiction of the District Magistrate by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of Indict and the High Court may not use its discretion when a party seeking the writ has also forfeited his other remedies, Dr. Banerjee, thirdly, referred to the case of (14) M/s. Tikaram & Sons Ltd. etc. v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P., AIR 1968 SC 1286 , where the Appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Revisional Authority under Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act and of the High Court, on the question of the validity of certain provisions of that Act and on such, the Supreme Court has observed that the appellants having submitted to such jurisdiction and having taken a chance of judgment in their favour could not take exception to the jurisdiction of the High Court, Apart from the above and fourthly, Dr. Banerjee, also relied on the case of (15) Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh and Chandrikah Singh v. Rashbehary Singh, ILR 36 Calcutta 193, where a suit was instituted originally in the Court of the second Subordinate Judge the District Judge transferred the case to his own Court acting in the exercise of the powers conferred on him section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1982). Subsequently, the District Judge transferred the case to the first Subordinate Judge as he himself was about to proceed on leave. The case was tried by him and no objection was taken by either party to the effect that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to try the case. On an objection taken as to the want of jurisdiction and as in fact, it has been held that inasmuch as under section 9 of Act XII of 1887 the District Judge had administrative control over all the Civil Courts within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he had inherent power to transfer the case from his own Court to that of a Subordinate Judge, especially when the order was for the obvious benefit of the litigants and for the speedy determination of the matter, apart from holding that under section 18 of Act XII of 1887, the Subordinate Judge unquestional possessed jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation and that therefore the case was not one of absolute want of jurisdiction, but was at best an irregular assumption of jurisdiction; and as no objection at an earlier stage of the proceedings was taken by the defendants appellants, the waived their right to take exception to the power of the Subordinate Judge to try the cause under authority of an order of transfer made by the District Judge. 21. There is no dispute that the said godown was requisitioned in 1964 and it was pointed out by Mr. Banerjee, appearing for the answering respondents, that the Judicial Commissioner, Darjeeling, on enquiry fixed Rs. 834/- rent per month for the same in 1972, the said Company became a lessee for the same for 999 years @ Rs. 100/- per month and paid a salami of Rs. 5,000/- and in 1981 were substituted in the Requisition proceedings and there was an Arbitration proceedings, for the purpose of decision and determining the rent. 834/- rent per month for the same in 1972, the said Company became a lessee for the same for 999 years @ Rs. 100/- per month and paid a salami of Rs. 5,000/- and in 1981 were substituted in the Requisition proceedings and there was an Arbitration proceedings, for the purpose of decision and determining the rent. He also agreed that by the Writ petitions as mentioned earlier, the said Company asked for appointment of Arbitrator and directions were given therein that Arbitrator be appointed by the Central Government. Such directions, Mr. Banerjee claimed and contended to be proper, but he said the time schedule as indicated, could not be maintained and ultimately, the Commissioner, Darjeeling was appointed as the Competent Authority by the Government of India. He also pointed out that in the third Writ proceeding a retired Judge of this Court, whose particulars, we have indicated earlier was appointed as Arbitrator and in that proceeding, Union of India was not made a party. Such appointment as made in this Court by the learned trial Judge, was claimed by Mr. Banerjee, to be unauthorized and without jurisdiction and as such void. It was further indicated that under the provisions of the said Act, it was the Central Government and not this Court, who could direct such appointment to be made. It was specifically submitted by Mr. Banerjee that High Court can never place itself in the position of the Central Government and perform the duties of that Government under the said Act or as envisaged thereunder and thus, the entire proceedings of the Arbitrator as appointed by this Court was void and without jurisdiction. 22. Mr. Banerjee then referred to the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting held on the 12th day of August, 1988 and specifically pointed out that only the State of West Bengal was made party by the said Company, in their application for judgment upon Award before the learned District Judge, Darjeeling and they did not make Union of party although they were vitally interested in the said proceedings as payment were required to be made by them and they only came to know from the Land Acquisition office, Darjeeling, about the passing of the decree. In fact, it was pointed out by Mr. In fact, it was pointed out by Mr. Banerjee that no notice of the Arbitration proceedings was served on Union of India either by the learned Arbitrator or by the said Company. He then complained that the provisions of section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act were not duly complied with in this cast and such being the admitted position, Appeal was not filed by the said Company. Mr. Banerjee then stated that on a reference to the writ petition, it would appear that the said Company also proceeded on the basis of the provisions of the Arbitration Act and as such, the impugned order was rightly and authorisedly made. 23. On a further reference to section 8(1)(b) of the said Act; Mr. Banerjee submitted that the jurisdiction to appoint an Arbitrator was with the Central Government and the language of the said provisions would also show that those provisions are mandatory and leaves no discretion to any authority in the matter including the High Court to make such an appointment of the Arbitrator. To supplement his submissions or to support and augment them, Mr. Banerjee referred to the case of (16) Balai Chandra Hazra v. Shewdhari Jadav. AIR 1978 SC 1062 , which in a case arising out of section 13(3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, has indicated that a party did not object to the appellate Bench examining witnesses and recording finding of facts on appreciation of evidence cannot estop him from raising the point in Supreme Court since the Court lacked inherent jurisdiction and no amount of consent could confer jurisdiction. On the basis of the above, Mr. Banerjee submitted that since the initiation of the Arbitration proceeding and the ultimate culmination of the same was without jurisdiction from the very initial stage, such or any question of lack of jurisdiction the answering respondents can duly challenge at any stage and in this Court and their participation, in any event, will not estop them from throwing such challenge as in this case. 24. Mr. Banerjee placed the facts of the case of The Comptroller and Auditor General of India etc. v. K.S. Jagannathan & Anr. (Supra), where the respondents belong to the Schedule castes and were working as Selection Grade Auditors in the Department of Indian Audit and Accounts at Madras. 24. Mr. Banerjee placed the facts of the case of The Comptroller and Auditor General of India etc. v. K.S. Jagannathan & Anr. (Supra), where the respondents belong to the Schedule castes and were working as Selection Grade Auditors in the Department of Indian Audit and Accounts at Madras. The next promotional post for them was that of Section Officer in the same Department and in order to obtain such promotion, Selection Grade Auditors were required to pass the Subordinate Accounts Service Examination (hereinafter referred to as "the SAS Examination"). The SAS Examination consists of two parts, namely. Part I and Part II. Both the respondents had passed the Part II Examination held in December, 1979. They appeared for the Part II Examination in December 1980. Both of them secured the minimum number or marks in each individual subject which was 40 per cent and in some papers more than the minimum number of marks but failed to secure the aggregate minimum which was 45 per cent. The First respondent secured 42.4 per cent and the Second respondent 40.8 per cent, thereupon they filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, being Writ Petition No. 10706 of 1981, in the Madras High Court, praying for a writ of Mandamus directing the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India another Accountant General-I, Madras-the Appellants, to make in accordance with the instructions contained in the Office Memorandum No. 36021/10/76 Estt. (SCT) dated January 21, 1977, issued by the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms to all Ministries etc. suitable relaxation for the respondents in the qualifying standard of marks for Part II of the SAS Examination held in December, 1980 and to declare them as having passed the said examination. The said writ petition was dismissed with no order as to costs by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. suitable relaxation for the respondents in the qualifying standard of marks for Part II of the SAS Examination held in December, 1980 and to declare them as having passed the said examination. The said writ petition was dismissed with no order as to costs by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The respondents thereupon filed the Writ Appeal No. 409 of 1982 which was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court, directing the Appellants to give suitable relaxation to the respondents within two months from the date of its judgment and to consider, whether the respondents had qualified themselves in Part II of the SAS Examination held in December, 1980 and further directing the Appellants, while granting such relaxation, to bear in mind the observations made by it in its judgment as also the criteria envisaged in the said Office Memorandum dated January 21, 1977. The Division Bench made no order with respect to the costs of the Appeal and commented, that on such facts, the Supreme Court, amongst others has indicated that the Constitution of India has made certain provisions with a view to undo the wrong and to right the injustice done to the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes for centuries. Article 335 of the Constitution provides that the claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes should be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. Article 46, which occurs in Part IV containing the Directive Principles of State Policy, provides that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Article 46, which occurs in Part IV containing the Directive Principles of State Policy, provides that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Article 16 which embodies the Fundamental Right of all citizens to equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State, makes an exception in clause (4), is as follows :- "(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State, and so also the observations as quoted earlier, submitted that thus, the determinations as made in those given facts of that case, would not apply in this case. It was his further claimed that when this Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writs as asked for in the case, the power as sought to be exercised should not have been or could not be exercised and more particularly when the Appropriate Authority to appoint an Arbitrator under the said Act, was not the Court but the Central Government. Similarly, Mr. Banerjee submitted that the de facto officer doctrine, as sought to be introduced by Dr. Banerjee, to have the application in this case, will have no application in this case. It was also submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the determination as made in the Supreme Court judgment as referred to above, will not also apply, since in this case, there has been no injustice cased to the said Company. 25. Mr. Banerjee then submitted that the Award in this case was made in a void proceeding, the same cannot thus be deemed to have been made with jurisdiction and as such, the same would not confer any right to the said Company. In support of his submissions, Mr. Banerjee relied on the determinations in the case of (17) Joginder Singh v. Smt. Nirmal Naini Mehra & Ors., AIR 1986 Delhi 305, which has laid down that an order without jurisdiction or a void order is no order at all. In support of his submissions, Mr. Banerjee relied on the determinations in the case of (17) Joginder Singh v. Smt. Nirmal Naini Mehra & Ors., AIR 1986 Delhi 305, which has laid down that an order without jurisdiction or a void order is no order at all. It confers no right on the person in whose favour it professes to be. It is no way binds the person against whom it is made. Such an order would be treated as a nullity whenever and wherever and for whatever purpose it is sought to be used or relied on as a valid order. Such an order was incapable of execution. The objector is in possession of the shop in dispute, though, of course, without having any independent title. He is sought to be dispossessed with the help of a void order. He is a party to the proceedings under Order 21 Rule 97, C.P.C. and had, therefore, locus standi to challenge the validity of the order under section 44 of the Evidence Act which permits a party to a proceeding to show that an order, which has been proved by the other party was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it. In view of the above, it was also contended by Mr. Banerjee that the unreported decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Arwachin Shiksha Samiti & Anr. (Supra), will not also ensure to the benefit of the said Company. As the decree, according to Mr. Banerjee, was passed on the basis of an incompetent and void Award, so the same was a nullity and thus could not be given effect to or acted upon. To bring home such submissions, Mr. Banerjee relied on the case of (18) Smt. Kaushalya Debi & Ors. v. K.L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838 , the facts in which appeal, were that one Raghunath Sharma, predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff-instituted on February 7, 1956, suit No. 53 of 1956 in the Court of Sub-Judge 1st Class, Delhi, for the eviction of his tenant, K.L. Bansal, hereinafter referred to as the defendant. v. K.L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838 , the facts in which appeal, were that one Raghunath Sharma, predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff-instituted on February 7, 1956, suit No. 53 of 1956 in the Court of Sub-Judge 1st Class, Delhi, for the eviction of his tenant, K.L. Bansal, hereinafter referred to as the defendant. He gave three grounds for ejectment in the plaint; (1) that the premises were required bona fide by the plaintiff for occupation as residence for himself and other members of the family, and that he had no other suitable accommodation to meet his bona fide residential requirements; (2) that the defendant already owned a house in Delhi which was suitable for him; and (3) that the defendant had defaulted in payment of rent and on the basis of the relevant fact and pleadings, it has been held that the decree passed on the basis of an award was in contravention of section 13(1) of the Act because the Court had passed the decree in terms of the award without satisfying itself that the ground of eviction existed. Accordingly the decree in so far as it directed delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord was a nullity and could not be executed. 26. Mr. Banerjee, then referred to the Bench determination of this Court in the case of (19) Konnagar Samabaya Bank Ltd. v. Nilmoni Banerjee & Ors., 91 CWN 1112, in which case the first opposite party was a member of the Konnagar Samabaya Co-operative Bank Ltd. He and his wife, the Opposite Party No. 2 had a joint savings bank account. The opposite parties claimed that they had deposited a sum of Rs. 25,000/- in the said Bank. The Bank denied the claim. The opposite parties instituted a suit for recovery of the said sum. In the suit, by consent of the parties, the dispute as to the amount claimed was purported to be referred to an Enquiry Committee whose decision was to bind the parties. The said award was filed under section 14 of the Arbitration Act with prayer for a passing thereon in terms of section 14 of the said Act. In the suit, by consent of the parties, the dispute as to the amount claimed was purported to be referred to an Enquiry Committee whose decision was to bind the parties. The said award was filed under section 14 of the Arbitration Act with prayer for a passing thereon in terms of section 14 of the said Act. The court having struck off the written statement of the petitioner on the ground that the objection preferred by the said petitioner under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 would be barred by limitation, the petitioner preferred this revisional application challenging the said order. The case made out for it was the subject-matter of the reference to the Enquiry Committee appointed by both the parties being fully covered by the section 86 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 the entire proceeding including the award was null and void and on such facts, it has been indicated that the petitioner Bank's only remedy in respect of the said award was not limited to filing of objection under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as it challenged the entire proceeding as null and void, apart from indicating further that the petitioner Bank had the right to challenge the aforesaid award obtained against it by the opposite parties on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The submission that the petitioner Bank having allowed its remedy under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration to be come barred, the court was bound to pass a decree in terms of section 17 of the said Act and only at the execution stage the petitioner Bank could have objected thereto on the ground of want of jurisdiction of the arbitrators to pass the award would be an utterly inconvenient technicality and where determination of said question relating to want of jurisdiction would not involved investigation of facts, it the trial Court concerned had no jurisdiction to pass any decree upon the award in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of the Arbitration Act, this Court ought not to allow the proceeding to go on further leaving the petitioner with opportunity to raise objection to the validity of the award at the execution stage or by filing a separate suit for declaration and that in exercise of power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India this Court possesses enough powers to quash a proceeding whose continuance would be an abuse of the process of law. On the basis of the above determination, which according to Mr. Banerjee was not only put on the point but appropriately applicable in this case, there was specific ouster of jurisdiction of the learned Arbitrator to make the Award, on the basis whereof the decree was passed and as such be claimed that the learned Court below acted duly and with jurisdiction in allowing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code. 27. On the power of this Court on the question of interference under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, reference was made by Mr. Banerjee, to the case of (20) Jatindra Nath Nandi & Ors. v. Krishnadhan Nandi & Ors., 56 CWN 858, where the plaintiff instituted a suit for declaration of his right to a pala of worship of a deity and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s exercise of that right comes within the purview of section 7(iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act, and as such the plaintiff has the option of valuing his relief. The subject-matter of litigation is only the right to perform the sheba and the puja and there is no objective standard of valuation. The subject-matter of litigation is only the right to perform the sheba and the puja and there is no objective standard of valuation. It is impossible for any Court to ascertain what the value of a pala would be and it has been held that the High Court is competent to see that proper orders are made when a matter comes up in revision. The mere fact that in the present case, the plaintiffs did not move against a particular order would not stand in the way of the High Court making an order in accordance with law. In fact, on the basis of the said determination it was claimed by Mr. Banerjee that this Court in this Revisional Jurisdiction, has thus the jurisdiction to see if proper order has been passed and also to see that if the said order was made in a properly instituted proceeding and not on a proceeding, the initiation whereof, was altogether void. While on the power of this Court to see proper orders are made, reference was also made to the determinations in the case of (21) In re: M/s Dwarkadas Raghubir Prosad Chowdhury & Anr., 1987(1) Cal LJ 479, while on the powers of this Court while dealing with applications under section 115 of the Code, further reference was made by Mr. Banerjee, to the Bench determination in the case of (22) Mahananda Dutt & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Uma Charan Law & Ors., 68 CWN 179, in which case there was dispute, in the instant case, relating to the amount payable under section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and it was found that as such clearly therefore section 17(2) would be attracted and accordingly, the order striking out the written statement was without jurisdiction inasmuch as no order under section 17(2) of the Act was made in the case and it has been observed that it is hardly, arguable that a point which goes to the root of the court's jurisdiction, cannot be taken in a revision application if the said point has not been urged in the trial Court. That will practically nullify the revisional powers of the High Court in appropriate cases and when a Rule comes up for final hearing before the High Court, it is open to the court, if it finds that the Rule should succeed on some ground, not initially taken or on a ground, on which it was not issued, that is, on a ground other than the one, on which it was issued, to consider the same and allow the application after giving the other party proper opportunities to meet the same objection. The High Court is not so powerless and its powers are not so limited as to preclude it from doing justice between the parties in the exercise of its revisional power, merely because the Rule was not issued at the initial stage on the particular ground or grounds concerned. 28. Mr. Banerjee again reiterated that under section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, not only by the learned Arbitrator but also by the Court below, his clients were required to be notified before passing the decree or filing the Award. It was further claimed that in the matter of filing the Award, the learned Arbitrator also acted irregularly. 29. From the Award as made, it appeared that the learned Arbitrator had also taken into consideration, the compensation as claimed to have been available on account of arrears of rent from 1964, which Mr. Banerjee submitted, on a reference to section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, could not be made available to the said Company as they were transfers from Jagadamba Ltd. Such submissions were made by him on a reference to the case of (23) Sree Rameswar Chand & Sree Rameswar Chandra Chand & Anr. v Sree Sadhan Chandra Dey & Ors., 75 CWN 478, in which case, the provisions of section 24 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was considered and the meaning of "Landlord" along with the effect of default after transfer of ownership and so also the effect of legal position under section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and it has been held inter alia amongst others that the definition of "Landlord" under W.B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 is much wider and by its terms in proper context "Landlord" would include such person who had been the landlord of the premises at earlier point of time. If such landlord accept rent in default which is due to him, the legal effect of such acceptance will not merely be the extinction of the liability of the tenant for the arrear of rent in default, it will operate as a waiver of such defaults under provisions of section 24 of the Act. This incident of the tenancy always remains with the landlord of the premises at any point of time in respect of rent due to him. By a transfer of the premises by such landlord to the present landlord, there will not be with it an assignment of rent or a transfer of the benefit of default or of the cause of action arising from default, as even after transfer of the premises. The transferor landlord will be entitled to the rent in default due to him under section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act and acceptance thereof will also operate as waiver of such default under section 24 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. In view of the express provision of the said section the position is that on such transfer of the premises there will be no assignment along with such transfer of the rent in default or of the benefit arising from such default or of the cause of action from the default. 30. This interpretation will be in harmony with the provisions of section 17 of the Act wherein "landlord" would mean in the context the plaintiff landlord and the arrear rent would be such rent which is due to such landlord. Finally, Mr. Banerjee contended not the learned arbitrator went wrong in fixing the compensation on account of rent of the rate of the same without appointing a surveyor. In fact, he claimed that there was no appropriate and proper evidence before the learned Arbitrator on such issue. 31. From the facts of the case as narrated earlier, it would appear that Jagadamba Limited, in July 1963, transferred the said godown to M/s. Temple Company Ltd. and then the said Company got the same on the rent as fixed, so also the price as indicated. It would also appear from the statements as filed in different proceedings that the said Jagadamba Ltd., M/s. Temple Co. It would also appear from the statements as filed in different proceedings that the said Jagadamba Ltd., M/s. Temple Co. Ltd. and Kashiram Agarwal unequivocally stated that they had no right, title and interest either in the said godown or in the plots as involved and as such, they had also no claim on account of the rent compensation for the said godown and thus, it was further and categorically indicated that the said Company was only entitled to receive the rent compensation for the requisition of the said godown. The learned Arbitrator has enhanced the rent compensation @ Rs 25.541/- against Rs. 834/- per month upto July, 1988 and on such basis, the sum of about Rs. 84,092,924/- would be due and payable for the requisition of the said godown. We have earlier indicated the other facts as emanating from the proceedings, in details. 32. On the basis of the submissions as made, we shall have to first find out and determine whether the learned Arbitrator in the instant case, was duly and appropriately appointed or if this Court in its Writ jurisdiction had the necessary authority to appoint such Arbitrator, read with the provisions of section 8(1)(b) of the said Act as quoted earlier. There is no doubt that under section 8 of the said Act, in case any property as in this case, is requisitioned or acquired under the said Act, compensation shall be paid on the concerned amount, which would be determined in the manner as indicated and in accordance with the principles as pointed out and sub-clause (b) of section 8(1) makes it clear that when no agreement between the parties could be leached, the Central Government shall appoint as Arbitrator, a person who is or has been, is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court. Thus, so far the learned Arbitrator in this case was concerned, he had the due qualifications of being appointed as such under the said Act. But the question would be, whether the authority to appoint such Arbitrator must be with the Central Government or this Court. Sub-clause (g) of section 8(1) of the said Act makes it also specifically clear that nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940, shall apply to arbitration under the section. But the question would be, whether the authority to appoint such Arbitrator must be with the Central Government or this Court. Sub-clause (g) of section 8(1) of the said Act makes it also specifically clear that nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940, shall apply to arbitration under the section. Thus, there is no doubt that if and when the learned Arbitrator is appointed under the said Act, the provisions of Arbitration Act will not apply and thus, they are not applicable in this case. While on the construction of the said Act, we must also have it on record, that under section 11 of the same, a person who is aggrieved by an award of the Arbitrator, made under section 8 may, within a stipulated time of 30 days from the date of such award, prefer an appeal to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the requisitioned or acquired property is situate and the said section 11 provides for and makes provisions for the High Court to entertain the appeal on condonation of limitation, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. In this case, admittedly, the appeal under the said Act was not preferred and after the decree was made by the learned Court below on the basis of the award as made, a proceeding under Order IX Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code was initiated. It should also be noted that since the arbitration proceeding under the said Act; as indicated earlier, could not be finished or finalised within a reasonable time, this Court had appointed the learned Arbitrator. We feel that the findings as arrived by us on the question of the authority to appoint the Arbitrator viz. the Central Government and not the High Court, would get support from the determinations in the case of Balai Chandra Hazra v. Shewdhari Jadav (Supra). We feel that the case of The Comptroller and Auditor General of India etc. (Supra), would not apply in this case. When the Award has been made in a void proceeding as indicated by us, so the findings as arrived at would get supported from the observations in the cases of Joginder Singh v. Smt. Nirmal Nalini Mehra & Ors. We feel that the case of The Comptroller and Auditor General of India etc. (Supra), would not apply in this case. When the Award has been made in a void proceeding as indicated by us, so the findings as arrived at would get supported from the observations in the cases of Joginder Singh v. Smt. Nirmal Nalini Mehra & Ors. (Supra), and Smt. Kaushalya Debi v. K.L. Bansal (Supra), and finally, from the Bench determinations of this Court in the case of Konnagar Samabaya Bank Ltd v. Nilmoni Banerjee & Ors. (Supra). 33. On the sequence of events/happenings after the date of appointing a learned retired Judge of this Court as an Arbitrator and from the facts as indicated, there is no doubt that the said Arbitrator was appointed under section 8(1)(b) of the said Act and thus sub-section (g) of section 8(1) would come into play and the provisions of Arbitration Act will have no application. On consideration of the submissions as made before us, we do not find any justification in holding that any authority other than the Central Government, was entitled to appoint an Arbitrator in this case. Such being the position, we cannot but hold that the appointment as directed to be made by the High Court, was not proper and in due exercise of its powers and jurisdiction. The appeal under the said Act would have certainly been a bar in entertaining this proceeding or any proceedings arising out of under section 8(1)(b), if the appointment of the learned Arbitrator as made, was due and proper. Since the very appointment itself, according to us, was not due, valid and proper so the provisions of section 11 of the said Act cannot be treated as an embargo for maintaining or entertaining this proceeding, as the appellants before us had not filed the necessary statutory appeal. Non filing of statutory appeal cannot he treated as a bar, if the proceedings as initiated, is initially without jurisdiction or authority. Thus, we hold that as this Court had no power to appoint the Arbitrator under the said Act, without preferring an appeal, the award as made, can be challenged and as such, this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings which have been taken either before it or before any other lower Tribunal, without exhausting the remedies under section 11 of the said Act. 34. 34. There is no doubt that great delay in obtaining the award in this case has happened, but such delay in making of any award, will not authorise this Court to have an Arbitrator appointed under the said Act and that too, for the views as expressed by us earlier. 35. We cannot of course, agree with the submissions of Mr. Banerjee that his clients had no notice, knowledge or intimation about the making of the award, since from the records of the learned Arbitrator, it appeared that they had made representati0ns before the learned Arbitrator and the case as sought to be made out by them, have been considered. They were, of course necessary parties to the proceeding and it would have been better, if in the arbitration proceeding, they were made parties and they were not required to ask for their addition an getting some news about the arbitration proceeding under the said Act. We also feel that in the circumstances of the case, before obtaining the decree on the basis at the Award they should have been brought on record and notice should have been given. 36. We have also indicated earlier the reasons which the Court below has given for entertaining the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. While on the point, considering the facts that the appellants before us were not made parties in the initial proceeding and the decree was also obtained in this case without notice to them and in their absence, even though they were vitally interested in the proceeding and had also got themselves substituted before the learned Arbitrator, we feel that in all fairness, before obtaining such decree, they should have been brought on the record and the decree, even on the basis of the arbitration award, was obtained in their presence. Since on the facts of this case, it appeared admittedly, that the appellants were not brought on the record before the decree was obtained and they were not intimated about such decree, so their application under Order IX Rule 13 cannot be said to be not maintainable as claimed. Here, we must also record the other submissions of Dr. Since on the facts of this case, it appeared admittedly, that the appellants were not brought on the record before the decree was obtained and they were not intimated about such decree, so their application under Order IX Rule 13 cannot be said to be not maintainable as claimed. Here, we must also record the other submissions of Dr. Banerjee to the effect that since the learned District Judge was subordinate to this Court, so even when the arbitration proceeding under the said Act was initiated, continued and completed wrongly under orders of this Court, the Court below had no jurisdiction to question the validity of the decree as made on the basis of the arbitration award, but was bound to follow the same. Even on consideration of the cases as cited by Dr. Banerjee, we feel that such submissions would have been appropriate if the appointment of the learned Arbitrator under the said Act was due and proper and since the appointment under the said Act by this Court, has been found by us to be not duly made, so we feel that in entertaining the application under Order IX Rule 13 or making its observations in the facts of the case, the learned Court below was not wrong. But it would have been highly appreciated, if before making such observations the learned Court below, had referred the matter to this Court for its opinion before such findings as arrived at by him, were tentatively made. 37. As we are of the view that• the award by the learned Arbitrator in this case was made in a proceeding or in such proceedings, where he was not authorisedly appointed, the bar of appeal under section 11 and consequently the limitation as prescribed therein, would not apply. 38. The submissions of Dr. Banerjee no de facto officer even on the cases as cited by him, in our view would not appropriately apply in this case and the cases as cited are distinguishable. 39. Then comes the question of estoppel, which was pleaded by Dr. Banerjee. We reiterate that those submissions would have been very much appropriate, if the award as made, was due and with jurisdiction and since the award as made, was without jurisdiction for the reasons as mentioned hereinbefore, we feel, the plea of estoppel will not be available. 39. Then comes the question of estoppel, which was pleaded by Dr. Banerjee. We reiterate that those submissions would have been very much appropriate, if the award as made, was due and with jurisdiction and since the award as made, was without jurisdiction for the reasons as mentioned hereinbefore, we feel, the plea of estoppel will not be available. A person of authority will certainly be estopped from challenging the orders award as made, if the same was with jurisdiction, but not in a case where the award was made without jurisdiction and on the basis of inappropriate appointment and such being the position, we cannot also hold that by mere participation in a proceeding where such an award was made we further feel that because, of the character of the proceeding as indicated, the appellants were not also estopped from challenging the validity of the award. 40. We fell that under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and that too, in terms of the observations in Jatindra Nath Nandi v. Krishnadhan Nandi & Anr. (Supra), this Court will not be denuded of its powers to interfere and on the basis of such determinations amongst others, it cannot be held and that too, considering the award as made in the character of proceeding as indicated earlier, the learned Court below was also authorised and competent enough to find out whether the award as made, was due, proper and with jurisdiction. Such view also finds support from the case of Mahananda Dutt & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Uma Charan Law & Ors. (Supra), and we also agree that this Court is not so powerless and its powers are not so limited so as to preclude it from doing justice between the parties in exercise of its Revisional powers in the facts of this case. 41. On the facts as indicated earlier, it is true and there is no doubt that the said Company was transferee from Jagadamba Ltd., and such being the position, section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, would not be available to the said Company and the decision as cited by Mr. Banerjee in the case of Sree Rameswar Chand & Sree Rameswar Chandra Chand & Anr. v. Sree Sadhan Chandra Dey & Ors. (Supra), will apply in this case. We also agree with the submissions of Mr. Banerjee in the case of Sree Rameswar Chand & Sree Rameswar Chandra Chand & Anr. v. Sree Sadhan Chandra Dey & Ors. (Supra), will apply in this case. We also agree with the submissions of Mr. Banerjee that even though the learned Arbitrator has given the reasons for fixing of the rent compensation at a higher rate on the basis of the facts available before him, yet it would have been better, if he had come to the necessary findings on the question of compensation, after appointing a surveyor. We must also keep it on record that such a surveyor was not appointed in this case. 42. For the views as expressed by us, we feel that no interference, by issuing a Rule in this case need or should be made and as such, we dismiss this application without any order as to costs. The order as made by the learned Court below is affirmed, Prayer for order of stay is refused. Ganguly, J. : I agree.