Judgment :- 1. Appeal is by plaintiffs 1 and 2, husband and wife. They are the son-in-law and daughter of Kurian Puravath, lessee of the suit property under a private deveswom taken over by the Devaswom Board. The Board obtained an order for resumption under S.14 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act in O.A. No.761 of 1965. Appeal filed by Kurian Puravath was dismissed. In execution also, the property was ordered to be delivered rejecting his objection. His appeal against that order was also unsuccessful. Plaintiffs are claiming under Ext.Al executed by Puravath on 6-5-1963. They filed an original petition challenging the order for resumption. The original petition, being on disputed questions of fact, was dismissed without prejudice to their right to challenge the order. That is how this suit was filed for declaration of their lease-hold right and a further declaration that the orders of the Land Tribunal are null and void. They also sought permanent injunction against delivery. Devaswom contested the claim. Suit was dismissed and the decision was confirmed in appeal. 2. Both the courts found that during the life time of Puravath, plaintiffs had no right and Ext. Al is rather a will. The contention of the Devaswom that the suit is not maintainable for want of notice under S.55 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act was accepted by the trial court, but rejected by the appellate court. S.55 notice was issued. "Then a suit was filed in the District Court. It was returned for presentation before the Munsiff. That plaint was not re-presented. But a fresh plaint was filed on the same facts and cause of action. Devaswom took the stand that when a fresh suit is filed, a fresh notice is necessary. That is a hypertechnical stand overlooking the purpose of the notice. The notice is intended to alert the authority to negotiate a just settlement or atleast to have the courtesy of telling the potential outsider why his claim is being resisted after being informed of it. Just like the State, an institution like the Devaswom Board must have a litigative policy involving settlement of disputes in a sense of conciliation rather than in a fighting mood. Just like the State, an institution like the Devaswom Board must have a litigative policy involving settlement of disputes in a sense of conciliation rather than in a fighting mood. The purpose of the notice is that the Devaswom should be posted in advance with the necessary information without being taken by surprise so that all steps could be taken to avoid the litigation, if possible. When such an information on all necessary points is given, it may not be proper to contend that the notice worked out when the first suit is filed and a fresh notice is necessary when a fresh plaint is filed instead of representing the original plaint. We are more concerned with the substance of the claim than the form (State of Punjab v. M/s. Geetha Iron & Brass Works Ltd. - AIR 1978 SC 1608). The appellate court was correct in its finding that the notice is sufficient. A broad and practical outlook is necessary in such matters. If the facts and cause of action are different necessitating an independent approach the position may be different. 3. Then the only other two contentions are that appellants were not made parties before the Land Tribunal and the certificate of the District Collector under S.14 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act read with the Tenancy Rules regarding need of the land for the purpose of extending the place of public religious worship obtained under Act 4 of 1961 instead of Act 1 of 1964 is not proper. On the first question, both the courts found that the appellants had no interest in the property under Ext.A-1 till the death of Puravath, who filed appeals on the trial sides and in execution. That finding does not require interference. Further, even a person, who is not a party before the Land Tribunal, could file an appeal. It is true that in Velappan v. Thomas (1979 K.L.T. 412) it was held that such a right cannot be accepted as a right of appeal. The reason is that a person, who is not a party, may come to know of the order late and his right of appeal in such cases will only be subject to condonation of delay. I do not think that the effect of such a situation is to treat the right of appeal as a non-existent one. The reason is that a person, who is not a party, may come to know of the order late and his right of appeal in such cases will only be subject to condonation of delay. I do not think that the effect of such a situation is to treat the right of appeal as a non-existent one. Anyhow, we are not concerned with that aspect because appellants had no interest to file an appeal and their predecessor, who had the right of appeal, exercised it twice without success. Further, even if the appellants were necessary parties, the maximum they could say is that the order is not binding on them. They cannot seek a declaration that it is null and void. The order is one passed by a competent tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction. 4. Then the only question is sufficiency of the certificate of the District Collector. In Padmanabhan v. Appu and others (1966 K.L.T. 260), exercise of the power of the District Collector was held to be not a quasi judicial act, but a later Division Bench decision is Sree Aroor Ezhupunna Sree Narayanapuram Devaswom v. District Collector (1968 K.L.J. 97) held it to be a quasi judicial act and that he has to act judicially. In this case, there is no contention that he did not act judicially. Contention is only that when the old Act was repealed by the new Act, a fresh certificate was necessary under the new Act since the resumption proceedings were only under the new Act. That contention seems to be correct because the provisions for repeal and savings, contained in S.132 of Act 1 of 1964, is not having the effect of saving a certificate obtained under Act 14 of 1961 to be used for a proceeding under Act 1 of 1964. A fresh certificate was, therefore, necessary. 5. But the question is whether on that ground this court is justified in interfering with the proceedings taken with jurisdiction. There cannot be any dispute regarding the fact that the decision was rendered with jurisdiction by a competent tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction on a matter in which the jurisdiction of the civil court is specifically ousted. Even though the certificate had to be issued by the District Collector, the authority to consider the same on the merits for allowing or refusing resumption is the Land Tribunal. Even though the certificate had to be issued by the District Collector, the authority to consider the same on the merits for allowing or refusing resumption is the Land Tribunal. The certificate is only a record that has necessarily to be looked into by the Land Tribunal to decide the need for extension. In other words, that is only one of the items of evidence statutorily insisted for having the required satisfaction by the Land Tribunal. When such a satisfaction has been correctly arrived at, the technical defect in the document is at the best only a mistake or irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction. Before the appellate or revisional court that may be a good ground for challenging the order, but not in a fresh suit. Courts and tribunals invested with jurisdiction have the right to exercise the jurisdiction rightly or wrongly. To err within the limits of jurisdiction is the right inherent in every jurisdiction. A wrong decision with jurisdiction is equally binding as a right decision if it is allowed to become final and conclusive without challenge by methods allowed by law. It cannot be challenged collaterally. 6. The civil court has no right to sit in judgment over the decision of the Land Tribunal, especially when its jurisdiction is ousted. In such cases, the general powers of civil courts as guardian of civil rights of citizens is only to examine whether the provisions are complied with or the tribunal has acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In the exercise of such powers, the civil courts cannot go into the question whether any law on fact was correctly decided. A mistake committed by a tribunal on a matter of detail cannot be said to be violation of the provisions of the statute justifying interference in such a jurisdiction. Such errors are only to be rectified by the means and methods allowed by the statute itself. The areas in which the civil court is entitled to enter are those such as violation of natural justice, fraud, collusion, assumption of non-existent jurisdiction, excessive exercise of jurisdiction and other vitiating circumstances. The civil court cannot sit in judgment as an appellate forum (Kochunny v. State of Kerala -1988(2) K.L.T. 387). The suit is ill-conceived. It is only an attempt somehow or other to resist resumption when the predecessor failed. The civil court cannot sit in judgment as an appellate forum (Kochunny v. State of Kerala -1988(2) K.L.T. 387). The suit is ill-conceived. It is only an attempt somehow or other to resist resumption when the predecessor failed. Courts below were fully justified in dismissing the suit. Second appeal is dismissed. No costs. Memorandum of cross objection filed by the respondent against the finding of the appellate court on the question of notice under S.55 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act is also dismissed without costs for the reasons already stated.