Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision Petition is by the defendants-respondents against the ex Parte order dated 28-3-1989 granting interim injunction in I.A. 828 of 1989 in O.S. No 517 of 1989, on the file of the District Munsif court. Poonamallee, restraining them (defendants) from forming any road in the plaintiffs property, namely, 8 cents out of 64 cents in S. No. 113/1 and 5 cents out of 42 cents in S. No. 111/2 both in Chitlapakkam village, Saidapet taluk, Chingleput Dt. 2. After granting the said injunction ex parte and ordering notice to the respondents, the lower court adjourned the case to 27-4-1989. Aggrieved by the said ex parte order, the defendants filed counter affidavit in I.A. 828 of 1989 and also filed I A. 885 of 1989 to advance the hearing of I.A. 828 of 1989, to an early date from 27-4-1989. It appears from the grounds of revision that the lower court advanced the hearing and that, however, even on 27-4-1989. the lower Court did not hear the I.A. 828 of 1989, but adjourned it to 15-6-1989, after summer vacation, despite the fact that the defendants-petitioners herein were ready for enquiry. Expressing their inability to move the vacation court in the City Civil Court this civil revision petition has been filed contending inter alia that O. 39 Rr. 3 and 3-A, C.P.C. have not been observed at all in this case and that hence the injunction should be vacated. 3. According to O. 39, R. 3, C.P.C. only where the object of grant of injunction would be defeated by the delay in granting it, ex parte injunction order can be granted and that too, after the court (a) recording the reasons to that effect and (b) requiring the applicant (i) to furnish to the opposite party, immediately after the order, a copy of that application for injunction together with a copy of supporting affidavit, copy of the plaint and copies of the documents relied in and (ii) to file an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so furnished. The counsel for the petitioners herein submitted that such a course was not adopted by the court below. 4. Regarding the reason required to be recorded, the court has do doubt stated in passing the abovesaid order thus: “Question of forming road to petitioners land. Hence urgency (underlining mine). The counsel for the petitioners herein submitted that such a course was not adopted by the court below. 4. Regarding the reason required to be recorded, the court has do doubt stated in passing the abovesaid order thus: “Question of forming road to petitioners land. Hence urgency (underlining mine). This does not spell out the reason clearly particularly because of the use of the word ‘to’. However, from the allegation in the supporting affidavit stating that defendants 1 to 4 are trying to form a road by cutting trenches in the unsold portion of the lands of the respondents herein, one could make out the reason. Anyway, the learned counsel for the petitioners herein submitted that without conforming to the other formalities prescribed in O. 39, R. 3, C.P.C. the court has passed the order. Further, he contended that as per O. 39, R. 3-A, also, the court has not made endeavour to finally dispose of the interlocurory application within 30 days of the date of injunction, despite the petitioners grievance and anxiety to get the injunction vacated. In this connection, he referred to a decision reported in The Rajapalayam Industrial & Commercial Syndicate v. Vairaprakasam 1, where his Lordship has inter alia observed thus:— “Unfortunately, the members of the Subordinate judiciary do not take care to adhere to the rule contained either in the proviso (to O. 39, R. 3) or R. 3-A”. I also find that O. 39, R. 3-A is not observed in the present case also since reason contemplated there is not recorded. 5. I may also point out the following passage from the Civil Justice Committee quoted with approval of the Bench of this Court in Abdul Sukhoor v. Umachander 2, - “It appears to us that interlocutory injunctions are, throughout India, granted much too freely and without sufficient care to impose terms Such injunctions when granted at all should invariably be limited to hold good only until a specific and early date granting of an ex parte injunction is a serious responsibility; that haying granted the injunction they (Courts) are under duty to take the greatest pains to do everything possible to protect the absent defendants.” 6. However, one other aspect has also to be seen in this case. The abovesaid Bench decision of this Court has held that against the grant of such ex parte injunction order, only O. 39, R. 4. However, one other aspect has also to be seen in this case. The abovesaid Bench decision of this Court has held that against the grant of such ex parte injunction order, only O. 39, R. 4. C.P.C. alone could be invoked before the same Court, by the aggrieved party for vacating the order and an appeal cannot be filed against the said ex parte order under O. 43 R. 1(r)C.P.C. only in such a way, O. 43 R. 1(r) C.P.C. is interpreted by the Bench. It observed thus in page 356 column 1: — “We are of the view, that O. 43, R. 1(r) could be invoked only in cases where the lower appellate court after hearing the affected party makes a decision within the meaning of S. 2(9) and 14. C P.C. and so expressed itself formally so that its reasoning and the grounds on which its decision is based couldscrutinised by the higher Court.” (underlining mine). 7. S. 2(9) C.P.C. defines--”Judgment” as the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order.” S. 2(14) C P.C. defines ‘Order’ as ‘the formal expression of any decision of a civil Court which is not a decree.” With due respect to the learned Judge who decided the Rajapalayam Industrial & Commercial Syndicate v. Vairaprakasam 1, I find that in this respect the learned Judges observation ‘the normal course open to the opposite party in such a case is to approach the same court for vacating the injunction order or passing appropriate order’ as laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Shukhoor v. Umachander 2. may not be quite correct, because, it is not merely a ‘normal course’, but it is the only course as per the above said Bench decision in Abdul Sukhoor v. Umachander 2 No doubt, the present proceedings is only a civil revision petition. Obviously on the ground that an appeal does not lie against the order in question but not a civil miscellaneous appeal, under O. 43 R. 1(r) C.P.C. Any way, I think, the reasoning of the above referred to Bench of this court, set out particularly in paragraph 7 of the abovesaid judgment, would equally apply to a civil revision petition also. So this civil revision petition shall not lie and I dismiss it with the observation, however, that the lower court shall take up the above said I.A. 828 of 1989 dated 15-61989 and dispose it of in accordance with law, without any further delay.