JUDGMENT Palok Basu, J. 1. This revision has been filed by Vijendra Kumar Jain, defendant/tenant, against the order dated 8-7-1987, passed by the 10th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, in Suit No. 27/85, thereby allowing an application of Smt. Shanti Devi, plaintiff landlady for striking off the defence of the applicant under Order XV Rule 5 CPC. It appears that Smt. Shanti Devi filed the suit before the Judge, Small Causes Court, against the applicant for a decree of arrears of rent and ejectment from an accommodation on the ground that the applicant who was a tenant at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month, was a defaulter for more than four months. 2. When this revision had come up for admission, notice was issued to the opposite party and on 15-9-87 the learned Counsel for both the sides had agreed that the revision be disposed of finally. When the matter came up today, both the learned Counsel stated that the lower court record need not be sent for as the relevant material is already available as annexures to the affidavits filed in this case and the time in deciding the interim matter may be the same as would be taken to dispose of this revision finally. Hence this Court proceeds to decide the revision finally. In the suit, summons were served on the applicant, who filed a written statement. It transpires that since the applicant did not deposit the entire arrears in Court, the landlady moved the said application. Objections were preferred on behalf of the applicant to the effect that Order XV Rule 5 CPC was not attracted since the suit itself was not maintainable as the initial contract of tenancy between the applicant and the opposite party was " illegal, invalid and against the public policy ". It was further alleged that since the applicant does not admit any liability of payment of rent or compensation, the question of depositing any rent or interest thereon or even payment of "monthly rent' did not arise. 3. The trial court after hearing counsel for the parties, allowed the application of the landlady and struck oft" defence of the tenant on the finding that the defendant could not be absolved of the liability of depositing the rent, once he has admitted his signature on the rent-receipt as also the contract of tenancy between him and the landlady. 3. The trial court after hearing counsel for the parties, allowed the application of the landlady and struck oft" defence of the tenant on the finding that the defendant could not be absolved of the liability of depositing the rent, once he has admitted his signature on the rent-receipt as also the contract of tenancy between him and the landlady. It further held that the said contract was not void and binds both ; the right to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses will be available to the applicant and the argument that Order XV Rule 5 was against the provisions contained in Sections 76 and 104 of the Indian Contract Act was also rejected. 4. The main argument of Sri P. K. Jain on behalf of the applicant relying upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Vimal Chandra Jain v. Sri Gopal Agrawal, 1981 ARC 463, is that the word 'may' used in sub-Rule (1) empowers the court to exercise its discretion but on facts and circumstances existing on record it may not strike off the defence on considering the representation of the tenant. It was argued that after the said case was remanded by the Supreme Court for fresh consideration, the tenant again lost it in this Court. But the tenant's case was accepted by the Supreme Court when he went there for the second time, and the order striking off his defence was set aside, though on some terms vide the judgment in Vimal Chandra Jain v. Sri Gopal Agrawal, 1983 ARC 203. He has also relied upon the case of Navin Chandra Sharma v. VIth Additional Sessions Judge, reported in 1983 ARC 50 for the argument that the initial contract of tenancy being illegal, no relief can be granted to the opposite party landlady finally. Sri A. K. Yog on the other hand has argued on behalf of the landlady that the three rulings referred to above apply to the facts of the said case alone and the instant case does not depend upon any representation of the tenant because even the "admitted rent" has not been deposited as required by Or. XV Rule 5 CPC. He has supported the trial Court's order. XV Rule 5 CPC. He has supported the trial Court's order. He has relied upon the decision of Division Bench in the case of Geep Industrial Syndicate v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1982 AWC 461 , for the argument that the contract of tenancy will bind the lessor and lessee even if it was arrived at ignoring the provisions contained in U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 hence the suit being maintainable, Order XV Rule 5 was also attracted. He also cited the case of Anandi Devi reported in 1988 (Supp. Vol.) SCC 527. 5. In the instant case the material on the record indicates that the applicant has not disputed the existence of the contract of lessor-lessee between him and the landlady through which he had entered upon the rented accommodation and continues to reside therein. What has been disputed by the tenant is that the rate of rent agreed was Rs. 100/- per month though he was getting wrongly a receipt for Rs. 400/- per month and since admittedly the landlady has filed an application under section 16 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of the tenanted accommodation, no further proof was required to show that the initial contract of tenancy was void and illegal and as such not enforceable. On these pleadings the applicability of Order XV Rule 5 was challenged. It may be mentioned here that at no point of time did the tenant make any representation under Sub-Rule (2). To appreciate the arguments, we may now have a look at the said Rule 5 :- "5-Striking off defence on failure to deposit admitted rent etc. On these pleadings the applicability of Order XV Rule 5 was challenged. It may be mentioned here that at no point of time did the tenant make any representation under Sub-Rule (2). To appreciate the arguments, we may now have a look at the said Rule 5 :- "5-Striking off defence on failure to deposit admitted rent etc. (1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percentum per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may subject to the provisions of Sub- Rule (2) strike off his defence. Explanation 1-The expression 'first hearing' means the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 2-The expression 'entire amount admitted by him to be due' means the entire gross amount, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account and the amount, if any, deposited in any Court under Section 30 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Explanation 3-The expression 'monthly amount due' means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deductions except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account. Explanation 3-The expression 'monthly amount due' means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deductions except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account. (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the Court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days, of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in sub-section (1), as the case may be. (3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be withdrawn by the plaintiff : Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudicing any claim by the plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount deposited : Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductible on any account, the court may require the plaintiff to furnish security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same." 6. From a close scrutiny of Sub-Rules (1) and (2) it is clear that in a suit covered by Sub-Rule (1), the lessor or tenant has no alternative but to deposit the admitted arrears of rent, if he wants that his defence be considered. The tenant has only a right to make a representation under Sub-Rule (2) against his defence being struck off. The law enjoins that when a representation is made, the court shall consider it on merits. Further it may be possible in a particular case that the landlord's claim about applicability of Order XV Rule 5 may fail on the tenant's showing that from the materials on record, the suit does not partake the character of a suit envisaged by Sub-Rule (1) and hence no case for striking out defence was made out. Therefore, the applicability of Order XV Rule 5 depends on the sole question whether the suit is by a lessor for eviction of a lessee for non-payment of rent or not. No other consideration arises at that stage in such a suit when the plaintiff invokes the said Rule, which stage is reached at a much earlier point of time than the beginning of actual hearing. No other consideration arises at that stage in such a suit when the plaintiff invokes the said Rule, which stage is reached at a much earlier point of time than the beginning of actual hearing. In other words, at such an stage the defendant can not refuse the payment of rent or damages as the case may be on the strength of his pleading in the written statement. The tenant will be entitled to rely upon his defence only when he crosses the legal hurdle created by Order XV Rule 5 and therefore, the court has to ensure that the tenant complies with the said requirements before permitting the defendant to rely upon his defence. In the instant case the challenge to the applicability of Order XV Rule 5 CPC is, as stated above, based solely upon the tenant's allegation in the written statement and objections that the agreement between him and the landlord through which the accommodation was handed over to him, was void. 7. It is further clear from the facts of the instant case that the two Supreme Court decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the applicant have no application. There is no representation by the tenant and as such Sub-Rule (2) was not at all attracted. As regards the case of Navin Chandra Sharma (supra), it may be stated that the said case was decided after a final decree was passed. That is not the case here. There is a long way to go between the said stage at which Order XV Rule 5 is attracted and the passing of the decree by the trial Court. Many more considerations on the question of a lessor-lessee agreement, even though entered into in violation of the provisions contained in Act No. XIII of 1972, may arise. We have other decisions also such as have been reported in 1988 ALJ page 989, 1989 AWC page 352, 1989 ALJ page 342, discussing some of the other considerations. For these reasons no useful purpose will be served by discussing the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the opposite party which are thus distinguishable. The order of the trial court is in accord with law and does not require interference. 8. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this revision has no force and is accordingly dismissed with costs. The interim order is vacated. ---- Revision dismissed.