JUDGMENT - CHAUDHARI M.G., J.:---This appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Judge of the Bombay City Civil Court on 15th March, 1983, rejecting the plaint filed by the appellant against the respondents under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant-plaintiff brought the suit against the respondents-defendants for declaration relating to the validity of the notice dated 22nd January, 1980. The prayer for declaration however was not coupled with any prayer for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from acting in furtherance of the said notice. Only prayer for interim relief of injunction was made in the plaint. The plaintiff took out Notice of Motion No. 4870 of 1981 for interim reliefs. He prayed that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the defendants, their servants, agents etc. be restrained by an order of injunction from demolishing or pulling down his structure admeasuring 20' x 20' approximately situated on and at Survey No. 71, Andheri, Juhu Road, near Lido Cinema, Santacruz (West), Bombay, in pursuance of the notice dated 22-1-1980 (challenged in the suit). The plaintiff moved for ad interim orders after notice to the defendants. The defendants were represented by their Advocate. After hearing the Advocates, the learned Judge was of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the Court to try and entertain the suit was taken away by section 8 of the Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition of Unauthorised Occupation and Summary Eviction) Act, 1975 ('Vacant Lands Act') and therefore the suit was not maintainable. He therefore rejected the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is this order that is challenged in this appeal. 2. The appeal was filed in this Court in April 1983. On appellant's civil application for similar interim injunction as was prayed for in the lower Court, interim injunction was granted, and it is in force till today. The Civil Application, however, is still pending. 3. At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Kothari, learned Counsel for the respondents, has raised the preliminary objection that this appeal from order is incompetent and is not maintainable inasmuch as, the order of the lower Court amounted to passing a decree and the proper remedy of the appellant was to file a regular first appeal against that decree. It was found that the objection raised by Mr. Kothari was right. Mr. It was found that the objection raised by Mr. Kothari was right. Mr. Vyas however, now applies for treating the appeal from order as first appeal, and to hear and decide it as a first appeal. Mr. Kothari submitted that such a course cannot be adopted in law as there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure enabling the Court to do so. He therefore submitted that the appeal from order cannot be heard as a first appeal, and should be dismissed. 4. Mr. Vyas submitted that in such matters this Court has been permitted conversion of appeal from order into first appeal and in support of this submission, Mr. Vyas states that such a course was adopted by Jamdar, J., in Appeal from Order No. 557 of 1981 which was allowed to be converted into First Appeal No. 526 of 1986 (Sadu Vithal Joshi v. Municipal Corporation and another)1, reported in 1986(3) Bom.C.R. 628 and was heard and decided as First Appeal on 8th August, 1986. From the proceedings of that matter which have been brought to my notice, it is seen that Jamdar, J., had passed the Order allowing the appeal from order to be converted into first appeal after hearing the Advocates of both the parties. But, it is not indicated as to under what provision of law it was so done. Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for any appeal from an order rejecting the plaint passed under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such an order would amount to a decree as it finally disposes of the suit and only a regular first appeal can lie therefrom under section 96 read with Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present appeal from order is therefore obviously incompetent. 5. It is however well settled that in the interest of justice it is open to this Court to hear such appeal from order which is otherwise not maintainable as a first appeal and grant necessary relief to the appellant. This can be done in exercise of inherent powers of this Court. 5. It is however well settled that in the interest of justice it is open to this Court to hear such appeal from order which is otherwise not maintainable as a first appeal and grant necessary relief to the appellant. This can be done in exercise of inherent powers of this Court. This course can be safely adopted in view of the following decisions :- In the case of (Nagendra Nath Dey and another v. Suresh Chandra Dey and others)2, A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 165, it was held by Their Lordships of the Privy Council that any application by a party to an Appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a Subordinate Court, its an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term (appeal) and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent. It was noted by Their Lordships that there is no definition of appeal in the Civil Procedure Code. In the case before the Privy Council an application to the High Court purporting to be an appeal "from the order" of the Subordinate Judge was presented. Objection was taken to the form of the appeal, it not being an appeal against the decree of the Subordinate Judge and being insufficiently stamped for that purpose. It was in that context that Their Lordships laid down the abovenoted ratio. This decision of the Privy Council was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Nagappa Bandappa Kadadi v. Gurushantappa Shankarappa Umarji)3, A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 255. It was held in that case after referring to the remarks of the Privy Council in the abovenoted case of Nagendra Nath Dey, that an appeal is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent. In the context of the case, it was stated that the appeal against an order granting the review would be included in the definition of appeal as explained by the Privy Council. These decisions clearly establish the position that an appeal if it is presented in the form of an appeal against an order where a regular first appeal should have been filed can be treated and heard as if it were a properly presented appeal. The settled position therefore is that an appeal from order can be heard and disposed of as a First Appeal. The settled position therefore is that an appeal from order can be heard and disposed of as a First Appeal. However, this power, in my opinion, is exercised by the Court acting under its inherent power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In (Bahori v. Vidya Ram)4, A.I.R. 1978 Allahabad 299, the question of conversion of revision into appeal had fallen for consideration of the Allahabad High Court. It was held by the learned Single Judge of the said Court that there is no manner of doubt that the Court is empowered to convert an appeal into a revision or a revision into an appeal in exercise of its inherent powers under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was noted in that connection that the scope and ambit of exercise of power under an appeal is wider and that under a revision it is not so wide. The learned Judge felt that there was no impediment in the Court's power to make an order of conversion. It was also noted that the power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a discretionary power and is to be exercised provided the circumstances of the case warrant the same. It was also the view of the learned Judge that an order of conversion could be passed provided the appeal or revision had been filed within the time prescribed for filing of an appeal or revision as the case may be. I am in agreement with this decision and the said principles can be safely adopted while considering the question of covering an appeal from order into a first appeal. Such a course can be adopted by this Court in the absence of any specific provision being available in the Code. Mr. Vyas referred to a decision of the Orissa High Court in (Gadadhar Sahu v. Karsanbasta Patel and others)5, I.L.R. 1963 Cuttack 482. In that case a preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of the second appeal against an order of remand as it was found that the proper remedy was by way of a civil revision application. The Court directed the second appeal to be treated as civil revision application and to hear it. However, there is no discussion in that judgment for adopting that course. The Court directed the second appeal to be treated as civil revision application and to hear it. However, there is no discussion in that judgment for adopting that course. In the instant case after removal of all the objections the present appeal was admitted and had been pending for hearing. Thus, the question of limitation would not arise even if it is allowed to be converted into a first appeal. A technical difficulty however would arise because no copy of the decree has been filed by the appellant along with the memorandum of appeal. Filing a certified copy of the decree would be essential for presenting a first appeal. Mr. Vyas states that no decree has been drawn up by the lower Court. Having regard to the nature of the proceedings it is likely that a formal decree may not have been so far drawn up and in my opinion nothing much would depend on insisting on the formality of filing a certified copy of the decree or drawn up order. It is open to this Court to dispense with the filing of the decree. Hence, I would dispense with filing of the certified copy of the decree under Rule 1 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. As said above, although the present appeal from order could be heard as a First Appeal and disposed of, I would direct its formal conversion into a first appeal for the procedural purposes and also because such a direction is given in exercise of inherent powers, I therefore hear the appeal from order as a first appeal and direct Mr. Vyas to complete the formalities for converting the same into first appeal and to pay deficit Court Fee, subject thereto the arguments on merits have been heard. 7. Mr. Vyas submitted that the order under appeal has been passed without application of mind, inasmuch as, reference to section 8 of the Vacant Lands Act has been made by the learned Judge in the order, although, neither party had referred to or relied upon the said section in their pleadings. Hence, according to Mr. Vyas the learned Judge failed to exercise his jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit on some irrelevant consideration and therefore, this error of jurisdiction may be rectified in this appeal. Hence, according to Mr. Vyas the learned Judge failed to exercise his jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit on some irrelevant consideration and therefore, this error of jurisdiction may be rectified in this appeal. He submitted that as the plaintiff has been non-suited in this manner the order is patently bad in law and has resulted in enormous injustice to the appellant. 8. Mr. Kothari, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, found it difficult to support the order of the lower Court passed on the basis of section 8 of the Vacant Lands Act. He, however, submitted that even otherwise the ultimate decision of the learned Judge was right because the plaint contains extremely vague allegations and it is not clear from the plaint as to what particular notice he was challenging. The plaintiff cannot be said to have disclosed any cause of action in the suit for which the suit should have been kept alive. 9. It is true that it would be seriously required to be considered as to whether the plaint discloses any cause of action at all. The pleadings are extremely vague. The only relief sought in the plaint is declaration relating to a notice dated 22-1-1980. The prayer Clause (a) of the plaint does not even mention as to what authority had issued the said notice. Neither the notice nor even a copy of the notice appears to have been annexed to the plaint. It is therefore impossible to gather from the reading of the plaint as to which notice is challenged by the plaintiff and it is also difficult therefore to examine as to whether the notice was legal and valid or not. Mr. Vyas referred to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaint and attempted to suggest that the notice was issued by respondent No. 1. In paragraph 2 of the plaint only mention is made of a last notice dated 22nd January, 1980 having been received by the plaintiff. Likewise, all that is stated in paragraph 3 is that all of a studden, after receipt of the notice dated 22-1-1980 the plaintiff received threats from the employees/officers of defendant No. 1 to demolish his structure without notice. In paragraph 5 I find it stated that the notice issued by defendant No. 1 dated 22-1-1980 is mala fide, improper, illegal and bad in law. In paragraph 5 I find it stated that the notice issued by defendant No. 1 dated 22-1-1980 is mala fide, improper, illegal and bad in law. All this therefore amounts to making vague pleadings and it is really difficult to understand as to in respect of what particular notice the relief is sought and against whom. What I have discussed above is material from another point of view. If the impugned notice was not before the Court and some notice at the hearing of the Notice of Motion was shown to the Court as Mr. Vyas now states that some notice was shown to the Court, it is possible that the notice that may have been shown to the Court possibly may have contained some reference to Vacant Lands Act. If that were so, then it cannot be said that the learned Judge had acted under some misconception of law. It is however, unfortunate that the learned Judge has also not elaborated over the notice that was before him in his order. In the absence therefore, of anything that is on record which had reference to the provisions of the Vacant Lands Act, and in the absence of any such material having been referred to in the order specifically, the order passed by the learned Judge cannot be held to be proper and cannot be sustained. 10. In the result, the following order is passed:-- 1) The appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 15-3-1983 passed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court is hereby set aside; 2) The suit is restored to file and the City Civil Court shall proceed with the suit in accordance with the law from the stage at which the plaint was rejected; 3) The plaintiff's Notice of Motion No. 4870 of 1981 is also restored and shall be heard and disposed of in accordance with the law after hearing the parties; 4) Ad interim injunction in terms of prayer (a) of the Notice of Motion till the disposal of the Notice of Motion is granted; 5) The defendants are given liberty to file affidavit in reply to the notice of motion if it has not been already filed, on or before 22nd December, 1989. The plaintiff shall file his affidavit in rejoinder, if any, within two weeks thereafter; 6) The notice of motion shall be placed for hearing before the learned Judge to whom it may be assigned by the learned Principal Judge on 18th January, 1990, and shall be heard and disposed of thereafter as expeditiously as possible; 7) The appellant shall pay the costs of the appeal as well as the civil application to the respondents in one set; 8) The appellant's learned Advocate to carry out the amendment for converting the appeal from order into first appeal and pay the deficit Court fee to the Registrar within one week after the judgment is signed. Leave to amend granted. Filing of certified copy of decree is dispensed with; 9) Order to be communicated to lower Court immediately. The civil application is disposed of in terms of the above order on the appeal. Order accordingly. -----