JUDGMENT Couto, J. - The short question that this petition under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code gives rise to is whether a case under a private complaint initiated under the procedure laid down for warrant cases, can, at a later stage be converted into a summons case and disposed of in accordance with the provisions relating to the latter cases. 2. The first respondent filed a criminal complaint in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class. Sangumem against the petitioners for offences punishable under sections 447, 379 and 323 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The case of the complainant as brought in his complaint is that on 17th July, 1975, at about 11.30 a.m. the petitioners tresspassed into the property "Pedepodavoril Xir" bearing the matrix No. 239, which is in possession and enjoyment of the complainant, thereafter took away 50 cocanuts therefrom. They also caused injuries to the complainant. The learned Magistrate issued process under sections 447,323 and 392 read with section 34 IPC by his order dated 19th July, 1975. Thereafter, inquiry was held and finally charge was framed against the petitioners only under section 323 read with section 34, I.P.C. Trial of the matter was fixed and after several adjournments, the 18th June, 1987 was given as the date for the cross-examination of the complainant and of his witnesses after the charge. However, on that occasion the complainant was absent and therefore, by his order dated 18th June, 1987, the learned Magistrate dismissed the case for want of prosecution and acquitted the petitioners. Being aggrieved, the complainant moved the Sessions Court Margao, in a revision application. This application was disposed of by the learned Additional Sessions Judge by his judgment dated 15th October, 1987. The learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed the revision application and therefore, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate dated 18th June, 1987. It is against aforesaid judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge that this petition under section 482, Cr.P.C. is directed. 3. Mr. Borkar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, contends before me that learned Additional Sessions Judge was in error in dealing with the revision application, since a revision does not lie against an order of acquittal. It is against aforesaid judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge that this petition under section 482, Cr.P.C. is directed. 3. Mr. Borkar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, contends before me that learned Additional Sessions Judge was in error in dealing with the revision application, since a revision does not lie against an order of acquittal. He submits that after inquiry, a charge was framed against the petitioners only for offences punishable under Section 323, I.P.C. and therefore, the trial of a case under such offences has to follow the summons proceeding. Consequently, according to the learned counsel, the learned Magistrate First Case, passed his order under section 256, Cr.P.C. The learned Additional sessions Judge could not therefore, have interfered with the said order in a revision application holding that the order was passed under section 249 Cr.P.C. This finding of the learned Judge is manifestly erroneous, as the order was not passed prior to the framing of the charge, but only after the charge was framed. 4. Mr. Rebello, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, however joins issue. He contends that there is provision in the Criminal Procedure Code permitting to change the procedure already started as warrant procedure to one regulating the summons cases unlike what happens with the procedure started as summons cases which can be converted in a given case to a warrant procedure. Admittedly, the inquiry started following the procedure as laid down for warrant cases and the charge was duly framed although only under Section 323. Since there is no provision to convert the warrant procedure into a summons procedure, it necessarily follows that once a case started following the warrant procedure it has to be disposed of following the same procedure. Therefore, the learned counsel submits the order passed by the learned Magistrate could never have been passed under Section 256, Cr PC and in passing such order the learned Magistrate has exercised the jurisdiction vested in him with material and substantial irregularity which was entirely warranting the interference by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction. That apart, the learned counsel further contends that an order under section 249 can be passed only before the framing charge. That apart, the learned counsel further contends that an order under section 249 can be passed only before the framing charge. In any event, there is no reason for interference of this Court with the impugned order as ultimately, the effect of it was to set aside an order which was passed without jurisdiction by the trial Magistrate. 5. Admittedly, the complaint was filed for offences punishable under Sections 447, 379 and 323, I.P.C. and therefore the case has to follow the provisions relating to the warrant cases. After the inquiry was held, charge was framed only for an offence punishable under section 323, I.P.C. which could be disposed of in a summons trial. But the question is different, namely whether once proceedings had been instituted following the warrant procedure, they can be changed to proceedings following the summons procedure. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Rebello and by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code permitting such change of procedure, although the vice-versa is foreseen and permitted. In my view the reason appears to be obvious. Indeed, if warrant procedure was followed, the most solemn procedure has been adopted and no prejudice would be caused to the accused persons or to the complainants. The vice-versa i.e. if the procedure followed initially was summons and the inquiry disclosed an offence that has to be disposed of by following the warrant procedure, naturally, if such procedure is not adopted, prejudice may be caused to the parties. Mr. Rebello is therefore right in his submission that the learned Magistrate could not have passed his order acquitting the petitioners under section, 256 Cr.P.C. He could not also have passed any order under Section 249, since such order can be passed up to the time of the framing of the charge and never after it. This being so, it is obvious that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was entitled to interfere with the order of the Magistrate in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction. I may also mention that in any event the order of the learned Magistrate appears to be grossly erroneous, since the very records of the case apparently were disclosing that the case has been fixed for the afternoon session and not for the morning session when the learned Magistrate passed his order. 6. I may also mention that in any event the order of the learned Magistrate appears to be grossly erroneous, since the very records of the case apparently were disclosing that the case has been fixed for the afternoon session and not for the morning session when the learned Magistrate passed his order. 6. The result therefore, is that this application fails and is consequently dismissed. Application dismissed