JUDGMENT - QUAZI M.M., J.:—The applicant is the landlord. He initiated the proceedings before the Rent Controller, Akola, for permission to terminate the tenancy of the non-applicant/tenant. The Rent Controller, Akola, granted permission vide order dated 23-11-1972. In pursuance of that permission, the landlord terminated the tenancy of the tenant vide notice dated 1-12-1972 with effect from 31-12-1972 and thereafter filed Civil Suit No. 2 of 1973 for ejectment in January 1973. The tenant challenged the order of the Rent Controller by way of any appeal before the Resident Deputy Collector, Akola. While the appeals was pending before the Resident Deputy Collector, the landlord withdrew the civil suit on 24-7-1973. The Resident Deputy Collector dismissed the appeal of the tenant on 29-8-1973. The tenant filed a review petition, but the same also came to be dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 25-2-1974. Writ petition was filed thereafter which came to be dismissed on 30-9-1980. 2. The landlord accepted the rent from the tenant from January, 1973 to July 1973. He withdrew the suit in view of the pendency of the appeal by the tenant before the Resident Deputy Collector, and after the appeal was decided on 29-8-1973 the landlord again gave a notice to the tenant on 30-8-1973; terminating his tenancy with effect from 30-9-1973 and thereafter filed Civil Suit No. 517 of 1973 on 1-10-1973. The tenant contended that fresh suit was not tenable since the permission granted by the Rent Controller vide order dated 23-11-1972 was exhausted in view of the acceptance of rent subsequent to the notice dated 1-12-1972. However, the trial Court negatived the defence, decree the claim of the landlord and directed enquiry into mesne profits. This order was challenged by way of an appeal. The Appellate Court, however, allowed the appeal vide judgment dated 3-2-1984 and reversed the judgment and decree passed by trial Court. Hence, this revision. 3. The question which falls for consideration is whether the second suit was barred in view of the acceptance of rent and withdrawal of the earlier Civil Suit No. 2 of 1973. The Appellate Court, however, allowed the appeal vide judgment dated 3-2-1984 and reversed the judgment and decree passed by trial Court. Hence, this revision. 3. The question which falls for consideration is whether the second suit was barred in view of the acceptance of rent and withdrawal of the earlier Civil Suit No. 2 of 1973. The Appellate Court has found that the permission granted by the Rent Controller on 23-11-1972 stood exhausted in view of the withdrawal of the suit and, therefore, it was necessary for the landlord to obtain fresh permission from the Rent Controller before issuing the quit notice and before filing the present suit, for evicting the tenant. In order to appreciate the above finding it is necessary to keep in mind the circumstances under which the earlier suit came to be withdrawn The landlord while withdrawing the suit specifically stated that he was withdrawing the same since the tenant had filed an appeal against the order of the Rent Controller. The landlord entered the witness-box and deposed that he accepted the rent due to oversight and that there was no intention to create tenancy. The tenant has not entered the witness-box to substantiate his claim that the notice dated 1-12-1972 was waived and fresh tenancy was created. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the suit, the tenant continued to pursue his appeal before the Appellate Court without, a whisper that the same had become infructuous in view of the alleged fresh tenancy. Not only the tenant pursued the appeal, but when he lost the same he further challenged that order of dismissal by way of review petition and a writ petition. In view of these facts, Mr. Daga contended that acceptance of rent and withdrawal of suit only revived the old tenancy and, therefore, it was not necessary for the landlord to obtain fresh permission from the Rent Controller to determine the tenancy. He further contended that during the cross-examination of the landlord the tenant did not even suggest that fresh tenancy was created. 4. However, according to Mr. Mohta, admittedly the notice dated 1-12-1972 was waived by the landlord and consequently the earlier permission granted by the Rent Controller would be deemed to have been exhausted. He laid great stress on the acceptance of rent by the landlord for several months. 4. However, according to Mr. Mohta, admittedly the notice dated 1-12-1972 was waived by the landlord and consequently the earlier permission granted by the Rent Controller would be deemed to have been exhausted. He laid great stress on the acceptance of rent by the landlord for several months. He further contended that the earlier notice was a valid one and, therefore, there could be no doubt that the waiver of such a notice would exhaust the permission. 5. It is well settled now that waiver is a question of intention which has to be gathered on the facts of each case. It means abandonment of a right and it may be either express or implied from conduct, but its basic requirement is that it must be an intentional act with knowledge. If we examine the facts of the present case on the touchstone of the above well settled principles, then it does not appear that the intention of the landlord was to create a fresh tenancy. As I have already pointed out, the landlord withdrew the suit in view of the pendency of the appeal before the Resident Deputy Collector. May be unwittingly, but he though that it would create complications when the order of the Rent Controller granting permission was under challenge. It is also significant that the tenant did not agree that his tenancy was legally terminated. On the other hand, he asserted that the suit was not tenable in view of the pendency of the appeal. He continued the appeal notwithstanding the withdrawal of the suit without a whisper that the appeal had become infructuous in view of the alleged fresh tenancy. He fought right upto High Court. The landlord also contested the proceedings even after the withdrawal of the civil suit. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to think that his intention could be to create a fresh tenancy. The acceptance of rent only revives the old tenancy and, therefore, no fresh permission from the Rent Controller was necessary for giving the second quit notice dated 30-8-1973. The decision reported in 1974 Mh.L.J. 637, (Hari Prasad and another v. Nathmal Chunilal)1, fully supports the contention of Mr. Daga. The decision in Second Appeal No. 218 of 1972, decided on 5th January, 1987 (Chandrabhagabai v. Mandanlal and others)2, by this Court is also rightly relied upon by Mr. Daga. 6. Mr. The decision reported in 1974 Mh.L.J. 637, (Hari Prasad and another v. Nathmal Chunilal)1, fully supports the contention of Mr. Daga. The decision in Second Appeal No. 218 of 1972, decided on 5th January, 1987 (Chandrabhagabai v. Mandanlal and others)2, by this Court is also rightly relied upon by Mr. Daga. 6. Mr. Daga has also relied on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1283, (The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and another)3, Para 8 of the said judgment reads as under : "8. It is well known that the doctrine of res judicata is codified in section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure but it is not exhaustive. Second 11 generally comes into play in relation to civil suits. But apart from the codified law the doctrine of res judicata or the principle of res judicata has been applied since long in various other kinds of proceedings and situations by Courts in England, India and other countries. The Rule of constructive res judicata is engrafted in Explanation IV of section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure and in many other situations also principles not only of direct res judicata but of constructive res judicata are also applied. If by any judgment or order any matter in issue has been directly and explidity decided the decision operates as res judicata and bars the trial of an identical issue in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. The principle of res judicata also comes into play when by the judgment and order a decision of a particular issue is implicit in it, that is, it must be deemed to have been necessarily decided by implication; then also the principle of res judicata on that issue is directly applicable. The principle of res judicata also comes into play when by the judgment and order a decision of a particular issue is implicit in it, that is, it must be deemed to have been necessarily decided by implication; then also the principle of res judicata on that issue is directly applicable. When any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceeding but was not so made, then such a matter in the eye of law, to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to bring about finality in it is deemed to have been constructively in issue and, therefore, is taken as decided." In view of the above decision, it was necessary for the tenant to have raised a plea of fresh tenancy before the Appellate Court (R.D.C.) and he having failed to do that, is now estopped from raising the same in the second suit. Having regard to these facts, it is not possible to sustain the impugned order. The same is accordingly set aside and the order of the trial Court is restored. The revision application is accordingly allowed. Revision application allowed. -----