JUDGMENT S. Mohan, C.J. 1. Based on the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission, the rules relating to the promotion of Assistant Directors of Town Planning were amended by virtue of the power under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. This was done in G.O.Ms.No.170, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 5.3.1984. In effect and substance, the amendment is as under: 3. A. Ratio of Appointment: Appointment to the post by recruitment by transfer shall be made from among the holders of the post of Architectural - Cum - planning Assistant/Supervisor in the ratio of 3:1 between Degree and Diploma holders. Out of every .unit of four vacancies, the first three vacancies shall be filed from among the holders of prescribed degree qualification and the remaining vacancy from among the holders of the prescribed post Diploma or Diploma qualification. If persons with the prescribed degree qualification as on the 1st September of the year for which the panel is prepared are not available, such vacancies are to be filled from among the holders of the Post Diploma Qualifications. 2. It was this rule which was successfully challenged before our learned brother Nainar Sundaram, J., who mainly relying on State of J. & K. v. T.N. Khosa A.I.R. 1974 S.C.I and Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India came to the conclusion that when both the Diploma holder and Degree holders constituted the feeder category, there cannot be any prescription of ratio of 3:1 concerning promotion. Accordingly, he set aside the prescription of ratio of 3:1 as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is as against this, the present writ appeals have been preferred by the affected parties as well as the state., 3. What is urged on behalf of the appellants is that the scope of the Rule has been misconstrued by the learned single judge; this is not a case of Diploma holders being denied any opportunity for promotion, but having regard to the superiority of educational qualifications in that the Degree-holders are better than the Diploma holders, notwithstanding the fact that both of them constituted the feeder category, there could be a discrimination under the Rule. In support of the same, reliance is placed on the decision in Roop Chand v. Delhi Development Authority. 4. In support of the same, reliance is placed on the decision in Roop Chand v. Delhi Development Authority. 4. In opposition to this, the learned Counsel for the respondents in the respective case stated that once Degree holders and Diploma holders have been absorbed into one category as a feeder category for the purpose of promotion, a further discrimination would amount to hostile discrimination, violative of Article 14; this has been precisely laid down in State of J & K v. T.M. Khosa and Mohd 'Shujet Ali v. University India ; and, therefore, no interference is called for. 5. We have given our careful consideration to the above arguments. It cannot be denied that both the Diploma holders and Degree holders do constitute the feeder category. However, to say that there cannot be a prescription of ratio based on educational qualifications, to our mind appears to be not correct. The very rulings in State of J & K v. T.M. Khosa and Mohad Shujel Ali v. University India came to be considered in the decision in Roop Chad v. Delhi Development Authority . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as follows at page 314 of the said decision: "..." Classification on the basis of educational qualifications made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstances and one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification'. Though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications the rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diplomas holders does not violate Arts. 14 and 16 of die Constitution and must be upheld. (Emphasis supplied). In Triloki Nath's case diploma holders were not considered eligible for promotion to the higher post. Here, in the present case, the possession of diploma, by itself and without more, does not confer eligibility. Diploma, for purposes of promotion, is not considered equivalent to the degree. This is the point of distinction in the situations in the two cases. In Triloki Nath's case diploma holders were not considered eligible for promotion to the higher post. Here, in the present case, the possession of diploma, by itself and without more, does not confer eligibility. Diploma, for purposes of promotion, is not considered equivalent to the degree. This is the point of distinction in the situations in the two cases. If Diploma holders - of course on the justification of the job requirements and in the interest of maintaining a certain quality of technical expertise in the cadre could validly be excluded from the eligibility for promotion to the higher cadre, it does not necessarily follow as an inevitable corollary that the choice of the recruitment policy is limited only to two choices, namely, either to consider them 'eligible' or 'not eligible'. State, consistent with the requirements of the promotional posts and in the interest of the efficiency of the service, is not precluded from conferring eligibility on Diploma-holders conditioning it by other requirements which may, as here, include certain quantum of service-experience. In the present case, eligibility-determination was made by a cumulative-criterion of a certain educational qualification plus a particular quantum of service experience. It cannot, in our opinion, be said as postulated by the High Court, that the choice of the state was either to recognise Diploma-"holders as 'eligible' for promotion or wholly exclude them as 'not eligible'. If the educational qualification by itself was recognised as conferring eligibility for promotion, then, the superimposition of further conditions such as particular period of service, selectively, on the Diploma-holders alone to their disadvantage might become discriminatory. This does not prevent the State from formulating a policy which prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the very eligibility that the candidate must have a particular qualification plus a stipulated quantum of service-experience. It is stated that on the basis of the "Vaish-Committee" report, the authorities considered the infusion of higher academic and technical quality in the personnel requirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering Services necessary. These are essentially matters of policy. 6. The situation obtainable here is precisely the same. As per the policy recommended by the Third Pay Commission, the ratio had to be so laid down, we do not think that, that would constitute any discrimination whatever. These are essentially matters of policy. 6. The situation obtainable here is precisely the same. As per the policy recommended by the Third Pay Commission, the ratio had to be so laid down, we do not think that, that would constitute any discrimination whatever. Equally, we are unable to accept the arguments of the respondents that because different length of experience had come to be prescribed, that would constitute again a discrimination since such a discrimination is held to be not violative of Article 14 in the reference cited above. For both the reasons, we set aside the judgment of the learned single judge and uphold the validity of the rule in question. 7. The writ appeals are allowed. No costs. 8. We place on record on the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. V.R. Rajasekharan who acted as Amicus Curise.