JUDGMENT SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. :— This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad dated 16th December, 1976. 2. The question in this case was the valuation of goods for the purpose of levy of excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944 hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent company had submitted its price list in Form IV to the Superintendent, Central Excise containing the price at which five companies to which it sold its entire output (hereinafter referred to as the Customer Companies) sold those products. The customer companies thereafter sold their products. The respondent challenged the direction of the Superintendent and had contended that for the purpose of levy of excise duty the value of its products should be the prices at which it sold those products to the customer companies and not the prices at which these in turn sold those products to wholesale dealers or others. The respondent company was registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. At the relevant time, there were five shareholders of the company, namely, Bajaj Electricals Ltd., Bombay, Crompton Parkinson Ltd., London, N. V. Philips, Eindhoven (Holland), General Electricals Co. Ltd., London and Mazda Lamp Co. Ltd., Leicester, England, Except M/s. Bajaj Electricals Ltd., the aforesaid four companies are referred to as the foreign companies. The said Bajaj Electricals held 1,80,000 shares in the respondent company. It is called A shareholder The four foreign companies together held 1,80,000 shares. These are called B shareholders. The respondent company was engaged in manufacture of electric lamps, fluorescent lamps and miniature lamps. It sold its entire output of the products exclusively to the following customer companies: (a) Bajaj Electricals Ltd (b) Philips India Ltd. (c) Crompton Greaves Ltd. (d) General Electricals Co. of India Ltd. (e) Mazda Lamps Co. Ltd. 3. On the lamps manufactured by the respondent company it put the brand names or trade marks like Philips, Osram, Mazda, Crompton and Bajaj of the respective Customer Companies according to their directions. The customer companies in turn sold these lamps under their names at prices higher than the prices charged by the respondent company. Excise duty on electric lamps and fluorescent lamps was levied for the first time in the year 1965. At first excise duty on lamps was a specific duty. The customer companies in turn sold these lamps under their names at prices higher than the prices charged by the respondent company. Excise duty on electric lamps and fluorescent lamps was levied for the first time in the year 1965. At first excise duty on lamps was a specific duty. Later, excise duty on them was changed from specific to ad valorem duty. After such change, there was a controversy between the respondent company and the Central Excise authorities as to whether the prices charged by the respondent company to its customer companies for its products or the prices charged by the customer companies when they sold them to wholesale dealers and others, should be the basis for determination of the value for levy of excise duty. Being aggrieved by the insistence of the Central. Excise authorities that the latter prices should be the value for levy of excise duty, the respondent company approached the High Court of Allahabad by Civil Misc. Writ No. 2189 of 1973. The High Court by its order dated 14th May, 1974, allowed the writ petition and held that the prices at which the respondent company sold its products to the customer companies, should be the value for levy of excise duty and not the price at which the customer companies sold these to wholesale dealers and others. The Central Excise authorities, however, had taken the view that the aforesaid decision of the High Court which was rendered on the basis of the old section 4 as it stood before it was amended by the Amendment Act of 1973 did not apply to the levy of excise duty subsequent to the Amendment Act coming into force on lst October, 1973 . On the other hand, the contention on behalf of the respondent company was that the aforesaid amendment of the Act had not altered the legal position so far as the respondent company was concerned and that the decision of the High Court would be binding. It appears that the Central Excise authorities were wrong in view of the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. (1984) 1 SCR,347, where this Court observed that it was not the intention of the Parliament while enacting the new section to create a scheme materially different from that embodied in the superseded S. 4. The object and purpose remained the same,. The object and purpose remained the same,. and so did the central principle of the scheme. The new scheme was merely more comprehensive and the language employed more precise and definite. As in the old S. 4, the terms in which the value was defined remained the price charged by the assessee in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal. See the observations at pages 377 and 378 of the said report. The High Court referred to the decision of this Court in A. K. Roy v. Voltas Ltd., (1973) 2 SCR 1089 , and also in Union of India v. Atic Industries Ltd., (1984)3 SCR930. 4. The real question that arose in this case is whether the five customer companies can be regarded as related persons as defined in Sr. 4(4)(c). The definition of that consists of two parts. The first part refers to a person who is so associated with the assessee that each has interest, directly or indirectly in the business of the other and the second part of that definition refers to a holding company, a subsidiary company, a relative and a distributor of the assessee and any sub-distributor of such distributor. The High Court held that in order for the respondent company to come within the first part of the definition, the respondent company and the customer companies must have interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other. Such of the customer companies which held shares in the respondent company could be said according to the High Court to have interest in the business of the respondent company. But only one of the customers companies, namely, Bajaj Electricals Ltd., Bombay, held shares in the respondent company. The remaining four customer companies did not hold any shares in the respondent company. 5. It was further contended before the High Court that those four customer companies were respectively associated companies of the four foreign companies and. that hence those four customer companies must also be held to have interest indirectly if not directly, in the business of the respondent company. The High Court found that in the absence of material it was not possible to accede to the contention of the company. What is interest, directly or indirectly, has been explained in Union of India v. Atic Industries Ltd, ( AIR 1984 SC 1495 ) (supra). The High Court found that in the absence of material it was not possible to accede to the contention of the company. What is interest, directly or indirectly, has been explained in Union of India v. Atic Industries Ltd, ( AIR 1984 SC 1495 ) (supra). In that case, the respondent-assessee, a limited company, was engaged in the business of manufacturing dyes. Its 50 per cent share capital was held by Atul Products Ltd. and the remaining 50 per cent by Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., London which also had a subsidiary company fully owned by it, called Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. The Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. ceased to be a subsidiary company wholly owned by the Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd, London on 13th March, 1978, since 60 per cent of the share capital of Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd., was offered to the public in pursuance of the policy of the Government of India requiring that not more than 40 per cent of the share capital of an Indian company should be held by a foreign shareholder. Consequent upon this dilusion of foreign shareholding the name of Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. was changed to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. The assessee in that case at all material times sold the large bulk of dyes manufactured by it in wholesale to Atul Products Ltd. and Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. which subsequently came to be known as Crescent Dyes and Chemicals at a uniform price applicable alike to both these wholesale buyers and those wholesale buyers sold these dyes to dealers and consumers at a higher price which inter alia included the expenses incurred by them as also their profit. The transactions between the assessee on the one hand and Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. on the other were as principal to principal and the wholesale price charged by the assessee to Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. was the sole consideration for the sale and no extra-commercial considerations entered in the determination of such price. In that case, this Court held that on a proper interpretation of the definition of "related person" in sub-sec. (4)(c) of S. 4. In that case, this Court held that on a proper interpretation of the definition of "related person" in sub-sec. (4)(c) of S. 4. the words "relative and a distributor of the assessee" do not refer to any distributor but these were limited only to a distributor who is a relative of the assessee within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956. It was held that the definition of "related person" is not unduly wide and does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. 6. Reliance was also placed on the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd.. ( AIR 1984 SC 420 ) (Supra). The first part of the definition defined "related person" to mean a person who is so associated with the assessee that each has interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other. It is not enough that the assesses has an interest, director indirect in the business of the person alleged to be a related person nor is it enough that the person alleged to be a related person has an interest. direct or indirect in the business of the assessee. To attract the applicability of the first part of the definition. the assessee and the person alleged to be a related person Must have interest direct or indirect in the business of each other. Each of them must have a direct or indirect interest in the business of the other. The quality and degree of interest which each must have in the business of the other may be different: the interest of one in the business of the other may be direct while the interest of the latter in the business of the former may be indirect. After analysing the facts. this Court came to the conclusion that there was no relationship. 7. Shri Sibal placed before us a chart indicating the similarity of the facts of Atic Industries case, ( AIR 1984 SC 1495 ) (supra) and the facts of the present case. In Atic Industries case, 50 per cent of share capital belonged to Atul Products Ltd. and 50 per cent to the Imperial Chemicals (London) Ltd., a foreign company. 7. Shri Sibal placed before us a chart indicating the similarity of the facts of Atic Industries case, ( AIR 1984 SC 1495 ) (supra) and the facts of the present case. In Atic Industries case, 50 per cent of share capital belonged to Atul Products Ltd. and 50 per cent to the Imperial Chemicals (London) Ltd., a foreign company. In the case of the respondent herein, 50 per cent share capital belonged to the Bajaj Electricals Ltd. (Indian Company) and 50 percent belonged to Philips ( 17/.67 ), Mazda (14.86 ), G.E.C. (10.59 ) and Crompton (6.88 ), all foreign companies. In case of Atic Industries, the sale of goods was on principal to principal basis and to a share holding company and to another company. which was initially a subsidiary of the foreign shareholding company and to which subsequently became "associate" company of the foreign shareholding company. In the instant case also it was on principal to principal basis and to a shareholding company (Bajaj Electricals Ltd.) and so called to associate companies of the foreign shareholding companies. Goods were supplied to customers in their brand name in the case of Atic Industries as in the instant case. In Atic Industries case, there was no allegation of extra commercial consideration and in the instant case also there was no allegation of extra-commercial consideration. In Atic Industries case. same prices were charged from all the customers, similar is the position in the instant case. 8. In the aforesaid view of the matter and in view of the ratio of the said decision, Shri Sibal sought to urge that the High Court was right in the view it took. In our opinion, Shri Sibal is right. There is a lurking doubt that the five customer companies were the favoured customers, but no investigation seems to have been carried out. The High Court while allowing the writ petition held that it was open to the Central Excise authorities to examine whether or not the five customer companies were the favoured customers and whether the price at which the respondent company sold its products to these were the normal prices at which such goods were ordinarily sold by a manufacturer in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal. Apparently no such scrutiny was done. 9. Apparently no such scrutiny was done. 9. In that View of the matter, the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad must be upheld and in view of the ratio of the decision in Civil Appeal No. 859, this appeal must fail without order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND N.D. OJHA, JJ. Dibyasingh Malana, Appellant Versus State of Orissa and others, Respondents. Civil Appeals Nos. 2436 to 2438 of 1989. Decided on 19-4-1989. (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil Nos. 9263, 9268 and 9079 of 1986). AND Trivikram Malana and another, Appellants Versus State of Orissa and others, Respondents. AND Dr. Saktidhar Jena and another, Appellants Versus The State of Orissa, Respondent. JUDGMENT OJHA, J.:— Special leave granted. 2. These three appeals raise a common question about the interpretation of the term " family" in S. 37(b) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). According to Cl. (a) of S. 37 of the Act the term "person" includes inter alia family. Clause (b) of S. 37 being the clause under consideration may usefully be reproduced. It reads : "(b) "family in relation to an individual, means the individual, the husband or wife, as the case may be, of such individual and their children, whether major or minor, but does not include a major married son who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before the 26th day of September, 1970." 3. According to the appellants in these three appeals partition in their respective families had taken place in the year 1965. The Act except Chapters III and IV came into force on 1st October, 1965. Chapter IV of the Act which contains the provisions relating to ceiling and disposal of surplus -land came into force on 7th January, 1972. Suo motu proceedings under S. 42 of the Act for declaration of surplus land and consequential purposes were initiated in the year 1974. Objections were filed asserting inter alia that in view of the partition in the families of the appellants in the year 1965 the land in the ancestral properties which fell in the share of the appellants could not be clubbed with those of their father. This contention, however, was not accepted on the definition of the term "family" contained in S. 37(b) of the Act. This contention, however, was not accepted on the definition of the term "family" contained in S. 37(b) of the Act. Such of the major married sons who as such had separated by partition before the 26th day of September, 1970 as contemplated by the definition of the term "family" were allotted separate ceiling units but so far as the appellants are concerned their shares were clubbed with those of their father and only one ceiling unit was allotted as contemplated by the relevant provision of the Act. 4. The appellants having failed to get relief in the appeals and revisions filed by them under the Act challenged the orders passed by the various authorities under the Act in writ petitions before the High Court of Orissa. These writ petitions were dismissed relying on the decision of a Full Bench of that Court in Nityananda Guru v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 Ori 54 . It is these orders of the High Court which have been challenged in these appeals. The validity of S. 37(b) of the Act does not appear to have been challenged. before the High Court nor has it been seriously challenged even before us except by making a faint submission that even if by virtue of the said provision being incorporated in the 9th Schedule, it may be immune from challenge in view of Art. 31B of the Constitution, the protection under Art. 31C would not be available to it and it would be hit by Art. 14 unless it was established that it had nexus with the policy of the State towards securing any of the principles laid down in Part IV of. the Constitution. This submission even if it is permitted to be raised for the first time in this Court has obviously no substance in view of the undisputed position that the Act aims at agrarian reform and the provisions with regard to declaration of surplus land and its distribution among the have-nots namely landless persons is apparently to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principle laid down in Art. 39(b) of the Constitution occurring in Part IV thereof and S. 37(b) has a clear nexus with that policy. The aforesaid submission has, therefore, no substance. 5. The aforesaid submission has, therefore, no substance. 5. At this place it may also be pointed out that validity of analogous provisions dealing with laws for declaration and distribution of surplus land framed by the States of Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and Maharashtra have already been upheld by this Court after rejecting challenges to them on various grounds in Thumati Venkaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1980) 3 SCR 1143 ; Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, (1980) 3 SCR 1181 and Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCR 1 . 6. The main attack against the judgment of the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Nityananda Guru, (AIR 1983 Ori (4) (supra) relying on which the writ petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed by the High Court has been on the ground that partition in the respective families of the appellants in the year 1965 having been accepted, S. 37(b) of the Act had to be read in such a manner as to exclude the land which had fallen to the share of the appellants even though they did not fall within the category of "a major married son who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before the 26th day of September, 1970" as contemplated by the definition of the term "family" in the said section. It was urged that his purpose could be achieved by adding the word "or" between the words "major" and "married". According to learned counsel if that is done the term "individual" would not include a major son who had separated by partition before the 26th day of September, 1970 even if he had not married prior to that. date. We find it difficult to take recourse to this mode of interpretation of S. 37(b) in view, of its plain language. In British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Itbar Singh, (1960) 1 SCR 168 : ( AIR 1959 SC 1331 ) sub-sec.. (2) of S. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was sought to be interpreted by the learned Solicitor General in 4 manner which involved addition- of certain words, The submission was repelled and it was held (para 13) : "The learned Solicitor General concedes this and says that the only word that has to be added- is the word "also" after the words "grounds". But even this the rules of interpretation do not permit us to do unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning, neither of which we think it is." 7. On a plain reading of the definition of the term "family" in S. 37(b) of the Act we are of the view that the said definition as it stands is neither meaningless nor of doubtful meaning. In this connection, it may be pointed out that keeping in view the agrarian reform which was contemplated by the Act and particularly the provisions of Chapter IV relating to ceiling and disposal of surplus land which were calculated to distribute the surplus land of big tenure holders among the overwhelming have-nots of the State the Legislature in its wisdom gave an artificial meaning to the term "family". The main provision containing the definition of the term is to be found in the first part of S. 37(b) namely "family in relation to an individual means the individual, the husband or wife as, the case may be of such individual and their children whether major or minor". The later part of S. 37(b) namely "but does not include a major married son who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before the 26th day of September, 1970" does not on -the face of it contain a matter which may in substance be treated as a fresh enactment adding something to the main provision but is apparently and unequivocally a proviso containing an exception. This admits of no doubt in view of the words but does not include". In the Commr. of Income-tax, Mysore v. The Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., 1959 Supp (2) SCR 256it was held: "Ordinarily the effect of an excepting or a qualifying proviso is to carve something out of the preceding enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be in it and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of an enactment when it can be fairly and properly construed with-out attributing to it that effect." (Emphasis supplied) 8. That apart the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants would also lead to an anomalous situation if the word "or" is added between the words "major" and "married". That apart the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants would also lead to an anomalous situation if the word "or" is added between the words "major" and "married". Not only a major unmarried son who had separated by partition before the 26th day of September, 1970 would get excluded from the definition of the term "family" even a minor married son would get so excluded. The result would be that even though marriage of a minor son is prohibited by law such son would be placed at an advantageous position to a minor son who was law-abiding and had not married. Further .the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants completely ignores the words as such used in the later part of S. 37(b) which contains the exception referred to above. Given its proper meaning the words "as such" can only be interpreted to mean that it is only such son who would get the benefit of the exception who had separated by partition or otherwise before the 26th day of September, 1970 as "major married son". 9. The submission by counsel for the appellants that the words "as such" qualify only "son- and not "major married son" and are meant to distinguish son from brother or uncle etc. is misconceived on the plain language of S. 37(b) which contemplates clubbing of land of spouse and children only and not of brother and uncle etc. So, the question of using the words "as such" to distinguish son from brother or uncle etc. does not arise. Further. for accepting this submission the words "major married will have to be omitted as superfluous which cannot be done in the garb of interpretation. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants also urged that a son who had separated by partition or otherwise from his father was himself an "individual" and if his land was clubbed with that of his father, he will be subjected twice to the provisions relating to declaration of surplus land. This submission too is equally untenable. Land of such son alone who does not fall within the exception is to be clubbed with that of his father and with regard to land which has been so clubbed the son obviously cannot be treated as another "individual" in his own right for purposes of declaration of surplus land. This submission too is equally untenable. Land of such son alone who does not fall within the exception is to be clubbed with that of his father and with regard to land which has been so clubbed the son obviously cannot be treated as another "individual" in his own right for purposes of declaration of surplus land. Only such son who falls within the exception will be liable to be dealt with as an" individual" in his own right, as his land has not been clubbed with that of his father. Even on the facts of these appeals nothing has been brought to our notice to indicate that the land of the appellants which was clubbed with that of their father was subjected twice to the provisions relating to declaration of surplus land treating the appellants also as individuals. 11. It was then urged by learned counsel for the appellants that according to the definition of the term "family" as contained in S. 37(b) of the Act, land of a married daughter is liable to be clubbed twice; firstly, with that of her father and secondly, with that of her husband. According to him it is against the spirit of the law dealing with the question of declaration of surplus land. Suffice it to say, so far as this submission is concerned that none of appellants in these appeals is a married daughter and as such we do not find it necessary to go into this question. We may also point out that dealing with an almost similar submission with regard to interpretation of S. 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 it was held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh. (1955) 1 SCR671 at p. 676. "The learned advocate, however, contended that such a construction would be against the spirit of the election laws in that candidates who have rich friends or relations would have an unfair advantage over a poor rival. The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act and the rules made thereunder. The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act and the rules made thereunder. If all that can be said of these statutory, provisions is that construed according to the ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning of their language they work injustice by placing the poorer candidates at a disadvantage the appeal must be to Parliament and not to this Court." 12. In view of the foregoing discussion we are of the opinion that the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Nityananda Guru (supra) lays down the correct law. 13. One more submission has been made by learned counsel for the appellants in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9079 of 1986. It has been urged that certain home-stead urban land of the appellants not connected with agriculture lying inside Udala Notified Area Council has wrongly been included as agricultural land in the draft statement. This submission does not appear to have been made either before the High Court or before the authorities under the Act. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Reforms), Mayurbhanj, Orissa it has been stated in reply to paragraphs 21 to 24 of the SLP that there is no Home-Stead land and no non-agricultural land belonging to the appellant-land holders in the Notified Area Council of Udala. It has also been stated in paragraph 3(c) of the said counter- affidavit that no Notification as contemplated by S. 73(c) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act has been made by the State Government. It has further been stated therein that the Urbala Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has not been made applicable so far to the Udala Notified Area Council. In this view of the matter it is not possible for us to record any finding with regard to this submission and consequently we express no opinion in this behalf. 14. In the result, we find no merit in any of these -appeals and they are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ. Union of India and another, Appellants Versus Hind Lamp Ltd., Respondents. 14. In the result, we find no merit in any of these -appeals and they are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ. Union of India and another, Appellants Versus Hind Lamp Ltd., Respondents. Civil Appeal No. 2858 of 1977 Decided on 2-5-1989. JUDGMENT SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. :— This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad dated 16th December, 1976. 2. The question in this case was the valuation of goods for the purpose of levy of excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944 hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent company had submitted its price list in Form IV to the Superintendent, Central Excise containing the price at which five companies to which it sold its entire output (hereinafter referred to as the Customer Companies) sold those products. The customer companies thereafter sold their products. The respondent challenged the direction of the Superintendent and had contended that for the purpose of levy of excise duty the value of its products should be the prices at which it sold those products to the customer companies and not the prices at which these in turn sold those products to wholesale dealers or others. The respondent company was registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. At the relevant time, there were five shareholders of the company, namely, Bajaj Electricals Ltd., Bombay, Crompton Parkinson Ltd., London, N. V. Philips, Eindhoven (Holland), General Electricals Co. Ltd., London and Mazda Lamp Co. Ltd., Leicester, England, Except M/s. Bajaj Electricals Ltd., the aforesaid four companies are referred to as the foreign companies. The said Bajaj Electricals held 1,80,000 shares in the respondent company. It is called A shareholder The four foreign companies together held 1,80,000 shares. These are called B shareholders. The respondent company was engaged in manufacture of electric lamps, fluorescent lamps and miniature lamps. It sold its entire output of the products exclusively to the following customer companies: (a) Bajaj Electricals Ltd (b) Philips India Ltd. (c) Crompton Greaves Ltd. (d) General Electricals Co. of India Ltd. (e) Mazda Lamps Co. Ltd. 3. These are called B shareholders. The respondent company was engaged in manufacture of electric lamps, fluorescent lamps and miniature lamps. It sold its entire output of the products exclusively to the following customer companies: (a) Bajaj Electricals Ltd (b) Philips India Ltd. (c) Crompton Greaves Ltd. (d) General Electricals Co. of India Ltd. (e) Mazda Lamps Co. Ltd. 3. On the lamps manufactured by the respondent company it put the brand names or trade marks like Philips, Osram, Mazda, Crompton and Bajaj of the respective Customer Companies according to their directions. The customer companies in turn sold these lamps under their names at prices higher than the prices charged by the respondent company. Excise duty on electric lamps and fluorescent lamps was levied for the first time in the year 1965. At first excise duty on lamps was a specific duty. Later, excise duty on them was changed from specific to ad valorem duty. After such change, there was a controversy between the respondent company and the Central Excise authorities as to whether the prices charged by the respondent company to its customer companies for its products or the prices charged by the customer companies when they sold them to wholesale dealers and others, should be the basis for determination of the value for levy of excise duty. Being aggrieved by the insistence of the Central. Excise authorities that the latter prices should be the value for levy of excise duty, the respondent company approached the High Court of Allahabad by Civil Misc. Writ No. 2189 of 1973. The High Court by its order dated 14th May, 1974, allowed the writ petition and held that the prices at which the respondent company sold its products to the customer companies, should be the value for levy of excise duty and not the price at which the customer companies sold these to wholesale dealers and others. The Central Excise authorities, however, had taken the view that the aforesaid decision of the High Court which was rendered on the basis of the old section 4 as it stood before it was amended by the Amendment Act of 1973 did not apply to the levy of excise duty subsequent to the Amendment Act coming into force on lst October, 1973 . On the other hand, the contention on behalf of the respondent 1735 company was that the aforesaid amendment of the Act had not altered the legal position so far as the respondent company was concerned and that the decision of the High Court would be binding. It appears that the Central Excise authorities were wrong in view of the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. (1984) 1 SCR,347, where this Court observed that it was not the intention of the Parliament while enacting the new section to create a scheme materially different from that embodied in the superseded S. 4. The object and purpose remained the same,. and so did the central principle of the scheme. The new scheme was merely more comprehensive and the language employed more precise and definite. As in the old S. 4, the terms in which the value was defined remained the price charged by the assessee in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal. See the observations at pages 377 and 378 of the said report. The High Court referred to the decision of this Court in A. K. Roy v. Voltas Ltd., (1973) 2 SCR 1089 , and also in Union of India v. Atic Industries Ltd., (1984)3 SCR930. 4. The real question that arose in this case is whether the five customer companies can be regarded as related persons as defined in Sr. 4(4)(c). The definition of that consists of two parts. The first part refers to a person who is so associated with the assessee that each has interest, directly or indirectly in the business of the other and the second part of that definition refers to a holding company, a subsidiary company, a relative and a distributor of the assessee and any sub-distributor of such distributor. The High Court held that in order for the respondent company to come within the first part of the definition, the respondent company and the customer companies must have interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other. Such of the customer companies which held shares in the respondent company could be said according to the High Court to have interest in the business of the respondent company. But only one of the customers companies, namely, Bajaj Electricals Ltd., Bombay, held shares in the respondent company. Such of the customer companies which held shares in the respondent company could be said according to the High Court to have interest in the business of the respondent company. But only one of the customers companies, namely, Bajaj Electricals Ltd., Bombay, held shares in the respondent company. The remaining four customer companies did not hold any shares in the respondent company. 5. It was further contended before the High Court that those four customer companies were respectively associated companies of the four foreign companies and. that hence those four customer companies must also be held to have interest indirectly if not directly, in the business of the respondent company. The High Court found that in the absence of material it was not possible to accede to the contention of the company. What is interest, directly or indirectly, has been explained in Union of India v. Atic Industries Ltd, ( AIR 1984 SC 1495 ) (supra). In that case, the respondent-assessee, a limited company, was engaged in the business of manufacturing dyes. Its 50 per cent share capital was held by Atul Products Ltd. and the remaining 50 per cent by Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., London which also had a subsidiary company fully owned by it, called Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. The Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. ceased to be a subsidiary company wholly owned by the Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd, London on 13th March, 1978, since 60 per cent of the share capital of Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd., was offered to the public in pursuance of the policy of the Government of India requiring that not more than 40 per cent of the share capital of an Indian company should be held by a foreign shareholder. Consequent upon this dilusion of foreign shareholding the name of Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. was changed to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. The assessee in that case at all material times sold the large bulk of dyes manufactured by it in wholesale to Atul Products Ltd. and Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. which subsequently came to be known as Crescent Dyes and Chemicals at a uniform price applicable alike to both these wholesale buyers and those wholesale buyers sold these dyes to dealers and consumers at a higher price which inter alia included the expenses incurred by them 1736 as also their profit. The transactions between the assessee on the one hand and Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. on the other were as principal to principal and the wholesale price charged by the assessee to Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. was the sole consideration for the sale and no extra-commercial considerations entered in the determination of such price. In that case, this Court held that on a proper interpretation of the definition of "related person" in sub-sec. (4)(c) of S. 4. the words "relative and a distributor of the assessee" do not refer to any distributor but these were limited only to a distributor who is a relative of the assessee within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956. It was held that the definition of "related person" is not unduly wide and does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. 6. Reliance was also placed on the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd.. ( AIR 1984 SC 420 ) (Supra). The first part of the definition defined "related person" to mean a person who is so associated with the assessee that each has interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other. It is not enough that the assesses has an interest, director indirect in the business of the person alleged to be a related person nor is it enough that the person alleged to be a related person has an interest. direct or indirect in the business of the assessee. To attract the applicability of the first part of the definition. the assessee and the person alleged to be a related person Must have interest direct or indirect in the business of each other. Each of them must have a direct or indirect interest in the business of the other. The quality and degree of interest which each must have in the business of the other may be different: the interest of one in the business of the other may be direct while the interest of the latter in the business of the former may be indirect. After analysing the facts. this Court came to the conclusion that there was no relationship. 7. Shri Sibal placed before us a chart indicating the similarity of the facts of Atic Industries case, ( AIR 1984 SC 1495 ) (supra) and the facts of the present case. After analysing the facts. this Court came to the conclusion that there was no relationship. 7. Shri Sibal placed before us a chart indicating the similarity of the facts of Atic Industries case, ( AIR 1984 SC 1495 ) (supra) and the facts of the present case. In Atic Industries case, 50 per cent of share capital belonged to Atul Products Ltd. and 50 per cent to the Imperial Chemicals (London) Ltd., a foreign company. In the case of the respondent herein, 50 per cent share capital belonged to the Bajaj Electricals Ltd. (Indian Company) and 50 percent belonged to Philips ( 17/.67 ), Mazda (14.86 ), G.E.C. (10.59 ) and Crompton (6.88 ), all foreign companies. In case of Atic Industries, the sale of goods was on principal to principal basis and to a share holding company and to another company. which was initially a subsidiary of the foreign shareholding company and to which subsequently became "associate" company of the foreign shareholding company. In the instant case also it was on principal to principal basis and to a shareholding company (Bajaj Electricals Ltd.) and so called to associate companies of the foreign shareholding companies. Goods were supplied to customers in their brand name in the case of Atic Industries as in the instant case. In Atic Industries case, there was no allegation of extra commercial consideration and in the instant case also there was no allegation of extra-commercial consideration. In Atic Industries case. same prices were charged from all the customers, similar is the position in the instant case. 8. In the aforesaid view of the matter and in view of the ratio of the said decision, Shri Sibal sought to urge that the High Court was right in the view it took. In our opinion, Shri Sibal is right. There is a lurking doubt that the five customer companies were the favoured customers, but no investigation seems to have been carried out. The High Court while allowing the writ petition held that it was open to the Central Excise authorities to examine whether or not the five customer companies were the favoured customers and whether the price at which the respondent company sold its products to these were the normal prices at which such goods were ordinarily sold by a manufacturer in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal. Apparently no such scrutiny was done. 9. In that View of the matter, the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad 1737 must be upheld and in view of the ratio of the decision in Civil Appeal No. 859, this appeal must fail without order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. For Citation : AIR 1989 SC 1733