V. D. GYANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner Society Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, mhow has filed this petition praying for quashing the orders Annexures P-2 and P-3, as without jurisdiction and further praying for a Mandamus that the office-bearers of the petitioner-Society cannot be committed to civil prison, ( 2 ) FACTS necessary for disposal of this petition are that the caveater respondent No. 3, who was in the employment of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, as its Secretary , was removed from service and his services stood terminated by the order dated 15-3-89. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 challenged his removal from services by filing a civil suit. A declaratory decree was passed by the trial Court in his favour. An appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by the lower appellate court on 21-1-88. The petitioner has now filed a second appeal before this Court. It is an admitted position that initially an ex-pane stay order was granted in the said appeal No. 139/88 subject to certain conditions but it was later vacated by this Court vide order dated 19-7-88. On appearance of the respondents who made a grievance for the non-compliance of the conditions imposed at the appellant while passing the stay order. The respondent No. 3 was not reinstated in service for which he was required to file a contempt petition and till this Court passed an order on 19-7-88, in the said order no counter reply was filed by the petitioner-Society. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the circumstances vacated the stay order saying :"in the circumstances, the conduct of the appellant is such that it does not warrant the continuation of the stay order passed by me. Though in the order it was observed, that if the condition is not complied with it will be automatically vacated. It is further made clear that the stay order passed by this Court on 9-6-88 is vacated and now the respondent No. 1 is free to release the arrears of salary and to execute the decree. "without going into the merits of the case, this conduct as noted by the learned single Judge of this Court is sufficient to disentitle the petitioner from invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not merely legalism of the matter. "without going into the merits of the case, this conduct as noted by the learned single Judge of this Court is sufficient to disentitle the petitioner from invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not merely legalism of the matter. It is the conduct of the petitioner, who comes to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court which is more important. And now that it has come to our notice it cannot be overlooked. The petition is liable to be thrown on this ground alone. ( 4 ) CONSIDERING now the only point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner namely whether a declaratory decree is executable ? It this connection a reference was also made to Order 21, Rule 33, C. P. C. Parties seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands and must also make all full and candid disclousure of material facts. True it is, as pointed by the learned counsel for the petitioner as in his petition stated the fact that the stay order was vacated. This cannot be said to be full disclosure of the fact. A material fact is omitted that the stay order was vacated because of non-compliance of conditions on the part of the petitioner. [see AIR 1970 SC 1742 ]. ( 5 ) THE caveater has filed a copy of the decree. A mere reading of this decree, as passed by the trial Court in Livil original Suit No. 65/78-A, would go to show that it is not a mere declaratory decree. There are directions to the effect that the Respondent No 3 would be deemed to be in continuous service from October, 1977 onwards and would be entitled to all the benefits of service such as salary etc. The decree itself contains specific directions. It is thus wrong to contend that it is a mere declaratory decree. ( 6 ) EVEN assuming it to be so for the sake of arguments, a declaratory decree enjoins the employer to reinstate the decree-holder and grant him all the benefits and privileges including his past and future emoluments and it is obvious that a specific direction to that effect merely makes pointedly explicit, what is plainly implicit in the decree. Such directions only clothe in parentary term what has been enjoined to the terms of the decree itself. Such directions only clothe in parentary term what has been enjoined to the terms of the decree itself. Once the relief of setting aside or quashing of the order of termination is granted or a declaratory decree has been passed, to the similar effect it necessarily follows that the employee in the eye of law continues to be in service and as a necessary corollary and consequence thereof would also entitle to all the emoluments flowing from that circumstances of being in service. He is and must be deemed to be in the position as it existed and obtained prior to the passing of the order of termination of bis service. The logical consequence of such quashing may be specified or made in the same case or may not be specified. It would not make any material difference. In fact as a result of setting aside the order of termination in the instant case, there are specific directions. It is therefore futile to contempt for the non-executability of the decree as passed in favour of the caveater respondent No. 3. ( 7 ) IN the result the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. In fact it is a case where the cost should have been awarded to the caveater respondent No. 3; but considering the fact that the learned counsel at the end of his argument, having dodged our view, stated that he would not press the petition, we do not pass any order as to costs. Despite the statement having been made by the petitioner's counsel we thought it proper to pass the order, that we have passed, so as to clarify the issues touching merits or demerits of the case. Petition dismissed. .