JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - The notification dated 30th of May, 1989, issued by the Government of Orissa in the Commerce and Transport Department in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (1) of Section 43 A of the M.V. Act, 1939, has been assailed in this writ application, inter alia on the ground that the State Govt. has no jurisdiction u/s 43A to encroach upon the quasi judicial power of the permit-granting authority. The petitioner's case briefly stated, is that no doubt Section 43 A confers power on the State Govt. to issue such directions of a general nature as it may consider necessary in the public interest in respect of a matter relating to road transport of the State, but in exercise of such power, the quasi judicial function of the authorities under the M. V. Act cannot be infringed in any manner. In words, it is the case of the petitioner that the Govt. cannot issue any instruction in the purported exercise of power u/s 43 A to control the discretionary jurisdiction of any statutory authority under the Act and since by the impugned notification the State Govt. has encroached upon the discretionary jurisdiction of the permit-granting authority conferred under the said authority under the statute, the said notification must be struck down. 2. In the counter affidavit on behalf of the opposite parties, there has\been a denial to the aforesaid allegation made in the writ application. 3. Section 43 A of the M. V. Act, 1939 has come up for consideration earlier in different Courts and there is a unanimity on the point that the said section confers a power on the State Govt. to issue administrative directions, but such administrative directions cannot in any manner abridge or enlarge the statutory power of a quasi judicial authority under the Act. But in course of hearing of the writ application, Mr. to issue administrative directions, but such administrative directions cannot in any manner abridge or enlarge the statutory power of a quasi judicial authority under the Act. But in course of hearing of the writ application, Mr. Roy appearing for the petitioner submits that it is not necessary to enter into an enquiry on the question whether the impugned direction under Annexure-2 can be said to be an encroachment on the quasi judicial power of an authority under the Act, or not, since the M. V. Act, 1939 having been repealed and being substituted by the M.V. Act, 1988, and there being no corresponding provision in the new Act corresponding to Section 43 A of the M. V, Act, 1939, the saving clause in question would not save the notification and, therefore, the notification must be held to be non-existent in the eye of law. The learned Standing Counsel for the Department, on the other hand, contends that in view of Section 217 of the new Act the existing notification issued must be held to be valid and continuing in force. The short question for our consideration, therefore is whether in view of the fact that the M.V. Act, 1939, having been repealed and being replaced by the M.V. Act, 1988, a notification issued under a provision of the old Act can be said to have-been saved by virtue of the saving clause. 4. It is necessary to extract the saving provision contained in Section 217 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988: 217. Repeal and savings. (1) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) and any law corresponding to that Act in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in that State (hereafter in this Section referred to as the repealed enactments) are hereby repealed. Repeal and savings. (1) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) and any law corresponding to that Act in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in that State (hereafter in this Section referred to as the repealed enactments) are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding the repeal by Sub-section (1) of the repealed enactments,: (a) any notification, rule regulation, order or notice issued, or any appointment or declaration made or exemption granted or any confiscation made or any penalty or fine imposed, any forfeiture, cancellation or any other thing done, or any other action taken under the repealed enactments and in force immediately, before such commencement shall, so far as it not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been issued, made, granted, done or taken under the corresponding provision of this Act; (b)any certificate of fitness or registration or licence or permit issued or granted under the repealed enactments shall continue to have effect after such commencements under the same conditions and for the same period as if this Act had not been passed; (c) any document referring to any of the repealed enactments or the provisions thereof, shall be construed as referring to this Act or to the corresponding provision of this Act; (d) the assignment of distinguishing marks by the registering authority and the manner of display on motor vehicles in accordance with the provision of the repealed enactments shall, after the commencement of this Act, continue to remain in force until a notification under sub-Section (6) of Section 41 of this Act is issued; (e) any scheme made u/s 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), or under the corresponding la w, if any, in force in any-State and pending immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of this Act; (f) the permits issued under Sub-section (1-A) of Section 68-F of M.V. Act, 1939(4of 1939),or under the corresponding provision, if any, in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to remain in force until the approved scheme under Chapter VI of this Act is published. (3) Any penalty payable under any of the repealed enactments may be recovered in the manner provided by or under this Act, but without prejudice to any action already taken for the recovery of such penalty under the repealed enactments. (4) The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or effect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals. 5. In view of Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 217, a notification issued under a repealed enactment and in force immediately before such enactment shall be deemed to have been issued, made, granted or taken under the corresponding provision of the new enactment. But where there is no corresponding provision in the new enactment, the question of continuing a notification does not arise. Admittedly, there is no provision in the 1988 Act corresponding to Section 43A of the old Act. Therefore, a notification issued by the State Government in exercise of power u/s 43 A of the old Act does not survive by operation of sub-Section (2)(a) of Section 217 of the new Act. Consequently, in the eye of law, the notification under Annexure-2 is no longer operative and the same is accordingly quashed, 6. The writ application is allowed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.