JUDGMENT Roy, A.C.J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 3rd February, 1988, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, in a proceeding arising out of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the case of (1) Satipati Chatterjee & Anr. v. The University of Calcutta & Ors. since reported in 1988 (1) Cal LJ 238. By the said judgment and order, the concerned application was allowed and the election of Shri Kamal Kumar Ghosh, Respondent No. 4/Applicant, to the Syndicate of the University of Calcutta, (hereinafter referred to as the said University), from the constituency of Readers and Lecturers (hereinafter referred to as said Constituency), who are the members of the Faculty Council for the Post Graduate Studies (hereinafter referred to as the said Faculty), has been set aside. 2. The challenge to the concerned election, which was held on 4th December, 1957, was by two petitioners and the first of them Shri Satipati Chatterjee was a Reader and the second one Shri Swapan Kumar Pramanik was the Head of the Department of Sociology of the said University. It should also be noted that the Petitioner No.1 was the Head of the Department of Physiology and the second one was the Head of the Department of Sociology of the said University and they were members of the said Council from their respective streams viz., Science and Arts and both of them were in the electoral rolls of the electors for election of two members of the Syndicate of the said University from the respective Constituencies of Readers and Lecturers in terms of section 21 (1) (b)(ix)(a)(ii) of the Calcutta University Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the relevant provisions whereof are as under : Section 21 (J). The Syndicate shall consist of the following: Ex-officio Members : (i) the Vice-Chancellor; (ii) the Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs; (iii) the Pro- Vice-Chancellor for Business Affairs and Finance; (iv) the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal; (v) the Deans of the Faculty Councils for Post Graduate Studies in Arts, Science, Law, Medicine and Dental Science and Engineering and Technology; (vi) the President, West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education; (vii) the President, West Bengal Board of Secondary Education; (viii) the President, West Bengal Madrassa Education Board. (b) Other Members: (ix)(a)(i)... .................... ...... .............. ........... ...... ...... (b) Other Members: (ix)(a)(i)... .................... ...... .............. ........... ...... ...... (ii) two Readers or Lecturers (one or both of whom may either be Readers or Lecturers) of the University elected by such Readers of the University as are members of the Faculty Councils for Post Graduate Studies from amongst themselves. 3. The Registrar of the said University, by a notification fixed the election of the Syndicate to be held at 3 p.m. on 4th August, 1967, wherein the electors were the Readers and Lecturers of the said University and who were to elect two representatives to the Syndicate. For such election, Dr. Satya Kinkar Pal, Dr. Asis Roy and Shri Kamal Ghosh, duly filed their nomination papers and on scrutiny, their nomination were found to be valid and in order and on the date as mentioned earlier, the election in question, took place. The writ petitioners also claimed to be present at Darbhanga Hall, at the time of such election and it has been alleged by them that at the time of the concerned election, Dr. Santosh Kumar Bhattacharya, then the Vice-Chancellor of the said University was also present there and that too, at the time when votes were cast even though, according to them, only members concerned of the said Council were entitled and authorised to be present under the said Act or the provisions of the Calcutta University First Statutes, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the said Statutes), for casting their votes. 4. There is also no dispute that at such election, which was held in terms of section 21(1)(ix)(a)(ii) of the said Act, 62 out of 63 ejectors participated and after counting of the valid votes as polled, it appeared that Dr. Satya Kinkar Pal was elected having secured the maximum vote, but there was difficulty in respect of the election of the other two candidates viz., Dr. Asis Roy and Shri Kamal Ghosh, as they had secured equal number of votes viz., 23 votes each. 5. It was claimed by the writ petitioners that in such circumstances of the tie between the two candidates, the Registrar of the said University, being the Presiding Officer, should have exercised and gave the casting vote instead of the Vice-Chancellor, who as mentioned earlier, was present. 5. It was claimed by the writ petitioners that in such circumstances of the tie between the two candidates, the Registrar of the said University, being the Presiding Officer, should have exercised and gave the casting vote instead of the Vice-Chancellor, who as mentioned earlier, was present. In fact, the Vice-Chancellor in this case had cast the casting vote in favour of Shri Kamal Ghosh and declared him to be elected to the Syndicate. Such action of the Vice-Chancellor, was claimed by the writ petitioners to be void, bad improper and unauthorised, since (i) he was not the Presiding Officer, (ii) he should not have cast any vote at all in the said election and (iii) he had also no right, authority, jurisdiction and competence to declare the results of that election as there was a Returning Officer and more particularly when, he was not so. 6. In this affidavit-in-opposition, which was filed in Dec, 1987, the then Vice-Chancellor of the said University, apart from claiming the proceedings to be misconceived, premature and not maintainable, has stated that the petitioners (i) had no cause of action for moving the writ petition nor does the writ petitioner disclosed any cause of action, (ii) they had no legally protected right or judicially enforceable right or had not suffered any legal grievance so as to enable them to invoke the high prorogative of writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, as they were only voters in the election & (iii) there is no allegation in the writ petition that they were denied any opportunity to cast their votes nor did they object at any point of time about presiding over the meeting of the Readers/Lecturers, who were members of the claim, Faculty Council to elect their representatives to the Syndicate. It was that the petitioners having allowed the said meeting from its commencement till the end under the Presidentship of the Vice-Chancellor and having participated in the meeting without raising any objection were estopped from challenging the out come of the said meeting in the matter of “casting vote” exercised by the Vice-Chancellor presiding in the said meeting, (iv) section 42 of the Calcutta University Act, 1979 provides that in all disputes relating to the election of candidates, the question shall be referred to the Chancellor, whose decision will be final. The purported dispute purportedly raised by the petitioners, which however, were without any foundation, being a matter relating to election, was not maintainable without raising any dispute in the manner provided in the Act and as such, the writ petition was premature and was liable to be dismissed In limine, and (v) the election procedure having already commenced in terms of and/or under the provisions of the Calcutta University Statutes, any person aggrieved in regard to the procedure otherwise in from provided under the Act for redressal of any alleged grievance, this Court has not jurisdiction and/or authority unless the remedies under the statutory forms are exhausted and a final decision is taken in the matter by the Competent Authority as provided under the Act and the proceeding was otherwise bad in law and on fact and as such liable to be dismissed. Apart from the facts as stated hereinbefore, the Vice-Chancellor, in the affidavit under consideration, has also given the circumstances and the back-ground, in which the election in question, was held and the procedure relevant for holding the same and has also indicated how he was empowered to cast the casting vote. It was his further case that on 4th December, 1987, meetings were called for all the Faculty Councils for Post Graduate Studies, for election of three members of Syndicate and at first, a separate meeting of the Professor members of all the Faculties of Post Graduate Studies was held, to elect one member of the Syndicate and then another meeting of Readers/Lecturers of the Faculty Council was held for electing two representatives to the Syndicate and he, as Vice-Chancellor and Ex-officio Chairman of all the Faculty Councils presided over both the meetings. It was the case of the deponent that he presided over the meeting in question and the Registrar of the said University, in his capacity as Ex-officio Returning Officer, distributed the ballot papers and performed other acts in the said election in terms of the requirements of the said statutes. It was admitted by him that there was a tie of votes between Shri Kamal Ghosh and Dr. Asis Roy and the said statute provides that in case of tie, the officer providing over the meeting shall decide the matter by a casting vote. It was admitted by him that there was a tie of votes between Shri Kamal Ghosh and Dr. Asis Roy and the said statute provides that in case of tie, the officer providing over the meeting shall decide the matter by a casting vote. He has also referred to section 6 of the said Act, for establishing, who are considered to be the officers of the said University. The said section in fact, provides as under : (i) The Vice-Chancellor. (ii) The Pro-Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs. (iii) The Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Business Affairs. (iv) Registrar. (v) Such other posts as may be declared by the Statute to be posts of Officers of the University. 7. It was also the case of the deponent concerned that he was presiding over the meeting in question, of the Professor members of all the Faculty Councils of Post-Graduate Studies as well as the meeting of the said Constituency. He pointed out that clause 71(c)(2) of the said statute which is quoted as under : 71 (c)(1) ... ... ... ... ... ... . .. ...... ... ... ... ...... ... ... ... ...... ... .... .......... ... (2) In the matter of scrutinising ballot papers counting of votes and declaring the results the procedures laid down in Statutes 65, 66 and 67 shall mutatis mutandis apply subject, however, to the condition that in the cases at equality of votes in the last seat to be filed, the decision shall be made by the casting vote of the Officer presiding at the meeting. Provides that in case of any equality of votes in connection with the last seat to fill up, the decision shall be made by the casting vote of the officer presiding over the meeting. As mentioned earlier, he has agreed that Dr. S.K. Pal, having declared the highest numbers of votes was elected and there was equality of votes in the cases of Shri Kamal Ghosh and Dr. Asis Roy. It was his case that since he was officer presiding over the meeting in question, he had to give his casting vote. As mentioned earlier, he has agreed that Dr. S.K. Pal, having declared the highest numbers of votes was elected and there was equality of votes in the cases of Shri Kamal Ghosh and Dr. Asis Roy. It was his case that since he was officer presiding over the meeting in question, he had to give his casting vote. It was the further case of the deponent that he not only presided over in the meeting of the Professor members of the said Constituency but he had also presided over the meeting of the Faculty Council to elect Deans and prior to his appointment as Vice-Chancellor he was a Professor in the department of Economics of the said University and it was, therefore, member of the Faculty Council of Articles. He has indicated that in 1982, several meetings were held of the Professor members and also of Readers/Lecturers members if all the nine Faculties to elect three representatives from the two Constituencies concerned and those meetings were presided over by the then Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Ramendra Nath Poddar and the deponent himself participated in the meetings of the Professor members. It was his categorical case that he presided over two meetings concerned as Ex-officio, Vice-Chairman and member of the Faculty Council and no member either of the meetings had raised any objection since it was known to them, that was the true meaning of the Said Act as in the past meetings & the past meetings were held in such manner. The deponent has further stated that before he casted the casting vote no objections were raised against such action on the ground that he should have given the "casting vote" at the commencement of the voting and the same should have been kept in a sealed cover and such being the position, he duly exercised his casting vote in favour of Shri Kamal Ghosh after the tie was detected and thereafter, the objection as mentioned hereinbefore, was recorded In writing and handed over to him, which again was handed over by him to the Registrar of the said University who according to him, was the ex-officio Returning Officer. The deponent has also stated that no member participating in the meeting of the said Constituency including the writ petitioners ever raised any objection in the matter of his power to give the casting vote and he has indicated that the only objection which was sought to be raised was in respect of the time when he should have exercised his casting vote. 8. It was also the case of the deponent that in the election of the said Constituency, the writ petitioners duly participated and they were not denied their right of such participations or to take part in the election in question and that being the position, they cannot have any grievance. In the facts and background of the case, the deponent has further stated that thus, there could not have been any surprise to the writ petitioners as alleged now, on seeing him present in the meeting of the said Constituency or to find him presiding over the same and such allegations now are clearly an after thought made and intended to make for the purpose of moving this Court. It has been stated that the writ petitioners amongst others participated in the meeting of the said Constituency after going through the ejection proceeding and bad cast their vote without raising any objection as stated hereinbefore, at any stage. It was also the case of the said deponent that he being the ex-officio Chairman and member at all the Faculty Councils, had the right to preside over the meetings of all the Councils and there cannot be any force in the contentions that the Vice-Chancellor of the said University cannot take part in the ejection of persons in respect of the said Constituency and he cannot attend such meetings or that he had attended the meeting in question, without any authority or as trespassers as alleged and that for influencing the electorate in the matter of exercising their franchise. He has denied the allegations as made to the effect that he was canvassing for any candidate and had denied that clause 67(1) of the said Statute which is quoted as under : 67(1) : When the counting of votes has been completed the Returning Officer shall, subject to the provisions of Statute 48, forthwith declare the candidate or candidates to whom the largest number of valid votes has been given duly elected. When two or more candidates received equal number of votes and they cannot be declared elected, the final selection shall be made by the Returning Officer by drawing lots, has any application in this case and that too, in view of the specific provisions of clause 71(C)(2) of the said Statute as quoted hereinbefore, or the powers thereunder as mentioned earlier. It was the case of the deponent that under or in terms of such powers as indicated above, he was presiding over the meeting of said Constituency and any statements contrary to the above, were and are motivated and designed with the malafide intention of misleading this Court. It was his further case that the Returning Officer as in this case, was to process the election and discharge of his statutory duties of the meeting in question and he presided over the same. 9. The deponent has further denied that he did not allow the Returning Officer to discharge his duties or that he had influenced the election process or had acted illegally or arbitrarily in the matter and that he acted as Presiding Officer as alleged. It was his case that he had the necessary lawful right to act as Returning Officer and he never acted usurpation of authority in the instant case or in the manner in which the casting vote was given. It was his case that there could not be any question of appointment of Presiding Officer when the Returning Officer himself was conducting the election of the said Constituency and he in his capacity as Vice-Chancellor and ex-officio Chairman of the Faculty Councils of the Post Graduate Studies was presiding over the meeting in question. He has stated that the vote as cast by him in favour of Kamal Ghosh was due, lawful, proper and such authority was exercised by him due exercise of his powers and the power to cast such vote in favour of Shri Kamal Ghosh was within his domain. It was his case that the writ petitioners deliberately tried to confused the word "Presiding Officer" with the word "The officer presiding over the meeting" as used in the said Statute and in fact, those words have been used in the said Statute in various places and for different contexts. It was his case that the writ petitioners deliberately tried to confused the word "Presiding Officer" with the word "The officer presiding over the meeting" as used in the said Statute and in fact, those words have been used in the said Statute in various places and for different contexts. For establishing such contexts reference was made by the deponent to clauses 50(A), 52(2) and 56(8) of the said Statute which are quoted seriatim : 50(a): For the purpose of election of members of the Senate from the Registered Graduates' Constituency described in clause (xxxiii) of sub-section (1) of section 18, the qualified electors shall cast their votes in person at the polling centres allotted to them as per option exercised by them in writing in the presence of the Presiding Officer appointed for the purpose. The Returning Officer shall, by a notification posted or: the Notice Board of Registrar's Office as well as by insertion in at least two leading daily newspapers-one in English and one in Bengali, intimate the electors at least a fortnight before the date of polling about the allotment of polling centres. Provided, that subject to Statute 51A(c) hereinafter, no authorisation to person by an elector shall be allowed for the purpose of voting. 52(2) :- For the purpose of conducting election, the Returning Officer shall appoint Presiding Officer from amongst the Teachers or Officers of the University or a Principal and/or a Teacher of an affiliated college and the polling assistants from amongst the employees of the University or of the affiliated colleges respectively. The Returning Officer shall arrange for transportation of the ballot papers and ballot boxes to the polling centres. He shall also supply a copy of instructions relating to rules and procedure for the conduct of election to each of the Presiding Officers. 56(8) - A student whose name appears in the final electoral roll shall cast his vote in person in the presence of the Presiding Officer appointed by the Principal for the purpose. The polling centre shall remain open from 10 A.M. to 4 P.M. As soon as the clock strikes 4 O'clock in the afternoon the gates of the polling stations shall be closed, but the voters standing at the queue at that time shall be allowed to enter inside the polling station and case their votes. The polling centre shall remain open from 10 A.M. to 4 P.M. As soon as the clock strikes 4 O'clock in the afternoon the gates of the polling stations shall be closed, but the voters standing at the queue at that time shall be allowed to enter inside the polling station and case their votes. The Presiding Officer shall not allow any voter to cast his vote if he arrives at the polling station after 4 P.M. Every voter shall receive the ballot paper by affixing the signature in its counterfoil and record his vote in the ballot paper in accordance with the instructions contained therein and drop the same in the ballot box provided for the purpose and has stated, but the Situation envisaged in clause 71(c)(2) as mentioned hereinbefore, is a completely different one where the meeting is presided over by an Officer of the said University in his capacity as ex-officio Chairman or ex-officio Vice-Chairman as the case may be and the election is conducted by the Returning Officer and in case there is tie, the Chairman of the meeting, to cast his casting vote to decide the further. The deponent has reiterated that he has casted his casting vote by writing his name on the paper in which the election results were written by the Returning Officer and the decision was made on the basis of such casting vote and necessary declaration was given to the effect that Shri Kamal Ghosh was elected. It has been denied by the deponent that the election of the representatives from the said Constituency to the Syndicate of the said University was held or conducted in violations of the statutory provisions or in any mala fide manner as alleged or that the election of the said Sri Ghosh was vitiated on or any ground as mentioned or that there was any illegality or Irregularity in having the said Shri Ghosh elected. He has stated that in such view of the matter the allegation that the said Sri Ghosh had no authority to be a member of the Syndicate, was baseless. He has stated that in such view of the matter the allegation that the said Sri Ghosh had no authority to be a member of the Syndicate, was baseless. He has further denied that any of his action in the matter of presiding over the meeting in question, was malafide and he has stated that the writ petition as filed, was not bonafide one and the submissions an made therein or in support of the claims and contentions as raised, were of no effect in the facts and circumstances of the case. 10. The affidavit-in-reply to the affidavit-in-opposition as mentioned hereinbefore, was filed through Swapan Pramanik in December, 1987 and it was his case that the Writ petition in question was moved duly and in proper exercise of powers and competence and that too, for enforcing the rights of the writ petitioners as envisaged or given under the provisions of the said act of the said Statute. He has stated that writ petitioners were ex-members of the out-going Senate but were also heads of the respective departments of the said University and as such, were interested in the election of the two members of the Syndicate by the members of the said Constituency, who are also members of the Faculty Councils of the Post Graduate Studies. It has also been stated that since the writ petitioners were electors in the election in question to the Syndicate so they were vitally interested in the results of the concerned election and has stated that the Respondent No.3 i.e., the then Vice-Chancellor of the said University could not have presided over the meeting in question viz., of Readers and Lecturers of the said University who are members of the Faculty or the Council of Post Graduate Studies and were participated to elect their representative to the Syndicate. It was his case that all throughout objections were raised by the participants of the meeting of the said Constituency in respect of the presence of the Vice-Chancellor concerned in the meeting and according to him, the said Vice-Chancellor illegally declared himself as the President of the meeting only after the counting of the votes and the writ petitioners never knew that he will exercise such illegal claim at the end of the election in question, when, admittedly he had no right in this matter. It has been reiterated that the Vice-Chancellor in question, had no right or authority to act as the Presiding Officer in the election of the said Constituency and in fact, he never presided over the same and the Registrar of the said University conducted the entire election and issued the ballot papers to the voters. Section 42 of the said Act deals with the Chancellor's power to decide question as to eligibility for being chosen as or for being members and to annual election proceedings in certain cases and the deponent his stated that those provisions have no application in this case. It was his case that the writ petition was moved duly since the writ petitioners had no other forum for having their grievances to redress and such being the position, this Court had jurisdiction and authority in the matter of adjudicating the grievances as raised. To avoid the prolixity, we feel that we are not required to restate the defence of the writ petitioners as pointed out in their affidavit-in-reply the more so when, from the statements as made therein, it would appear that the writ petitioners have categorically denied the allegations as made by the Respondent No. 3 i.e., the then Vice-Chancellor in his affidavit-in-opposition. One thing is certain that it was the case of the writ petitioners that the Respondent No.3 was not presided over the meeting in question, of the Readers and Lecturers, who are members of the Faculty Councils for Post Graduate Studies and he was not the officer presiding over the meeting In question, which was held on 4th December, 1987 and that apart, it has also been stated that the said Respondent No.3, had no authority to cast vote in the meeting of the said Constituency and in fact it has been stared that the said Respondent No.3 had not casted any vote duly. It has also been claimed that the said Respondent No.3 illegally and wrongfully pretended to declare himself as the Presiding Officer after counting of the ballots and expressed his desire to extend support in favour of the said Shri Kamal Ghosh and it has been alleged that he did not even formally cast any vote in favour of the said Shri Ghosh. It has been categorically stated that the said Respondent No.3 only after counting of the ballots illegally claimed himself as Presiding Officer and expressed his desire to extend the support before the members who are assembled and surrounded him, in favour of the said Shri Ghosh to which exceptions were duly taken by all who were present to the concerned meeting of 4th December, 1987 has been claimed by the deponent to be not formal meeting of the Faculty Councils of Post-Graduate Studies and he has stated that the Respondent No.3 had no authority to attend the same. It was also his case that there is no provisions either in the said Act or in the said Statute which can authorise the Respondent No.3 to preside over the meeting in question and since the said meeting was not a formal one of the Faculty Councils so the presiding over the same by the Vice-Chancellor or the ex-officio Chairman of the Faculty Councils cannot and does not arise. It has also been stated that the said Respondent No.3 illegally and wrongfully, not only expressed his desire but extend support to the said Shri Ghosh but also illegally declared the results which under the provisions of the said Act and the said Statute could only be declared by the Returning Officer. 11. On the basis of the above pleading, it thus appears that the members of the constituents of the said Constituency, who were members of the said Council, were to elect two members to the Syndicate of the said University and the concerned election was held on 4th December, 1987. In such election, out of 63 electors, 62 were present and in fact, for the concerned two seats, there were three candidates viz., Dr. Satyakinkar Pal, Dr. Asis Roy and Mr. Kamal Ghosh. There was no doubt that out of the said three candidates, Dr. Pal secured the maximum vote of 35 and the tie was between Dr. Asis Roy and Mr. Kamal Ghosh, who secured 33 votes each. Such tie was also dissolved by the Vice-Chancellor concerned, who was claimed, not to be the Presiding Officer, by his casting vote and the question arose as to whether the Vice-Chancellor concerned had such or necessary power. 12. Asis Roy and Mr. Kamal Ghosh, who secured 33 votes each. Such tie was also dissolved by the Vice-Chancellor concerned, who was claimed, not to be the Presiding Officer, by his casting vote and the question arose as to whether the Vice-Chancellor concerned had such or necessary power. 12. The validity of such selection by tie was challenged on the ground that the meeting in question, was not a meeting of the said Council and the Vice-Chancellor, who had cast the casting vote was not an elector and as such, he could not be present at the said meeting It was also claimed that the tie as happened, was required to be dissolved by the Returning Officer under Statute 67(1) of the said Statutes, which is to the following effect: 67(1) : When the counting of votes has been completed, the Returning Officer shall, subject to the provision of Statue 48, forthwith declare the candidate or candidates to whom the largest number of valid votes has been given duly elected When two or more candidates received equal number of votes and they cannot be declared elected, the final selection shall be made by the Returning Officer by drawing lots or alternatively under Statute 71C(2) of the said Statutes the, tie in question, was required to be dissolved by the Presiding Officer at the meeting. It was also claimed that the Vice-Chancellor should not have cast any vote and in fact, he merely expressed his verbal support in favour of Shri Kamal Ghosh and the said Vice-Chancellor, was never appointed as the Presiding Officer of the concerned meeting by the Registrar of the said University. Such being the position, it was also contended that the casting vote In the instant case, was given by the Vice-Chancellor without any authority and be unauthorisedly declared the results of the concerned election, instead of the said being done by the Registrar of the said University. 13. The hearing of the proceedings before the learned Trial Judge was admittedly concluded and the judgment was reserved in December, 1987 and thereafter, the said judgment was delivered, it has been stated at 3 p.m. on 3rd February, 1988. It is also true that immediately thereafter and on the same day, the Registrar of the said University took steps and appointed a Presiding Officer. This act or such expeditious steps as taken, was claimed by Mr. It is also true that immediately thereafter and on the same day, the Registrar of the said University took steps and appointed a Presiding Officer. This act or such expeditious steps as taken, was claimed by Mr. Ganguly to be not bona fide. In paragraph 19 of the judgment under consideration and which, as indicated earlier, in Satipati Chatterjee & Anr. Vs. The University of Calcutta & Ors. (Supra). The learned Judge after allowing the application set aside the election of the said Shri Kamal Ghosh to the Syndicate on the grounds that the casting vote in question, could not be validly exercised by the Vice-Chancellor who was not and could not be the Presiding Officer and he directed that on such setting aside of the election, the only part of the same which was to be re-done, was the exercise of the casting vote by the Presiding Officer and in that view of the matter, the Registrar of the said University who was the Returning Officer, was directed to appoint a presiding Officer for the purpose of exercising the casting vote in the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly because of the tie between Dr. Asis Roy and Shri Kamal Ghosh. That apart, the learned Judge has also directed that such Presiding Officer be appointed and the meeting be convened by the Returning Officer being the Registrar of the said University, within a week from the date of the judgment and it has also been directed that the casting vote shall be exercised by the Presiding Officer in presence of the two candidates as mentioned hereinbefore, who again has also been directed to be present when such vote will be cast for the purpose of completing the election. The learned Judge has further directed that other voters of the said Constituency, if they so desire, will be liberty to attend the concerned meeting and upon casting vote being exercised, the Returning Officer shall declare the results of the election then and there Bona fide and validity of such directions as given by the learned Judge, was challenged by Mr. Ganguly and he claimed them to be wrong and without authority and jurisdiction. Ganguly and he claimed them to be wrong and without authority and jurisdiction. It was also claimed by him amongst others that since the dispute in question, related to election, so without exhausting the other remedies as available under the said Act and the said Statutes, the writ petitioners could not move the concerned application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. Before dealing with the submissions as made by Mr. Ganguly and so also by Mr. Ghosh, who appeared for the Vice-Chancellor concerned, we think that some provisions of the said Act and the said Statutes, apart from those which have been indicated hereinbefore, should also be restated : Section 9(1) of the said Act states that the Vice-Chancellor shall be principal executive and academic officer of the University and shall, in the absence of the Chancellor, preside at the meeting of the Senate. He shall, by virtue of his office, be member and the Chairman of the Syndicate and the Faculty Councils for Post Graduate Studies and also the Chairman of any other authority or body of the University of which he may be a member. He shall be entitled to be present at and to address any meeting of any other authority or body of the University of which he may not be a member, but shall not be entitled to vote there at. In fact, the section as indicated hereinbefore, states about the authority of the Vice-Chancellor in certain specified cases. Section 43 of the said Act postulates that the casting vote by the Chairman and states that at a meeting of the Senate, the Syndicate, the Faculty Councils for Post Graduate Studies, the Councils for Under Graduate Studies or any other authority or body of the University, the person presiding at the meeting shall not vote in the first instance, but shall have and exercise a casting vote in the case of an equality of votes. Construing the said section, it was Mr. Ganguly's contentions that it was the "person presiding" who was to cast the casting vote in the facts and circumstances of the case. Construing the said section, it was Mr. Ganguly's contentions that it was the "person presiding" who was to cast the casting vote in the facts and circumstances of the case. Section 23(1) of the said Act gives an idea about the composition of the Faculty Councils for Post Graduate Studies and sub-section 2(i) of the same indicates that the Chairman will be the Vice-Chancellor and section 6 of the said Act slated that the officers of the University will be (1) The Vice-Chancellor; (2) The Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs; (3) The Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Business Affairs and Finance; (4) The Registrar and (5) Persons holding such other posts as may be declared by Statutes to be post of officers of the University. Section 14 of the said Act states that (1) The Registrar shall be a whole-time officer of the University and shall be a appointed by the Syndicate on the recommendation of a Committee consisting of the Vice-Chancellor as Chairman, a nominee of the Chancellor, two nominees of the Syndicate and a nominee of the State Government. (2) The Registrar may resign his office by writing under the hand addressed to the Vice-Chancellor. (3) If the Registrar is for any reason temporarily unable to exercise the powers or perform the duties of his office, the Vice-Chancellor may with the approval of the Chancellor appoint a Teacher of the University or an officer of the University, temporarily for a period not exceeding six months, to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Registrar and Mr. Ganguly claimed that such powers of the Registrar concerned can be exercised and used subject to the powers and directions of the Vice-Chancellor. in fact, section 15 of the said Act states that the powers and duties of the Registrar shall be exercised and performed in terms of the necessary prescriptions or delegations as made to the Registrar by or under the said Act subject to the supervision, directions and general control of the Vice-Chancellor and the said Registrar shall act as the Secretary of the Senate as also of the Syndicate. Section 21 of the said Act lays down the composition of the Syndicate and sub-section (b) deals with other members. Section 21 of the said Act lays down the composition of the Syndicate and sub-section (b) deals with other members. In fact, in this case as indicated earlier, we are concerned with section 21(b) (ii) of the said Act which is to the effect that two Readers or Lectures (one or both of whom may either be Readers of Lecturers) of the University elected by such Readers and Lecturers of the University as are members of the Faculty Councils for Post Graduate Studies from amongst themselves i.e., such provisions have laid down the manner how elections for the concerned seats will have to be performed. 15. Section 7(1) of the said Act states that the Governor shall, by virtue of his office, be the Chancellor of the University. He shall be the head of the University and the President of the Senate and shall, when present, preside at the meetings of the Senate and the said Chancellor is to exercise such power as may be conferred on his by or under the provisions of the said Act. The said section and more particularly under sub-section (4) has stated that where power is conferred upon the Chancellor to make nominations to any authority or body of the University, he shall, to the extent necessary, nominate persons to represent interests not otherwise adequately, represented and Sub-section (5) postulates that every proposal to confer any honorary degree shall be subject to confirmation by the Chancellor. Clause 7(i) of the said Statutes requires that the Registrar shall be under the direct control of the Vice-Chancellor and the Syndicate and sub-clause (v) indicates that the Registrar shall conduct election of all the academic authorities or bodies of the University as may be prescribed by the Statutes or the Ordinances and shall act as the Returning Officer for conducting such elections. On the basis of such provisions, Mr. Ganguly indicated that we should give or judicate the meaning of the word "conduct" as used in clause 7(i) (v) of the said Statutes. 16. Apart from the above, references were made to Statutes 65(1) (2); 67(1), 69, 70, 71, 71A, 71B, 71C and on construction of them Mr. On the basis of such provisions, Mr. Ganguly indicated that we should give or judicate the meaning of the word "conduct" as used in clause 7(i) (v) of the said Statutes. 16. Apart from the above, references were made to Statutes 65(1) (2); 67(1), 69, 70, 71, 71A, 71B, 71C and on construction of them Mr. Ganguly sought to argue that thus there has been no provisions for appointment as claimed In this case, in relation to the election of the members of the Syndicate of the said University and for election of members of the Senate from registered Graduates' constituency, he referred to Statute 50 of the said Statutes and also of the Statutes 72(1) and (2) of the same, for election of Teachers' constituency. Mr. Ganguly made further reference to Statute 51(1), (2), (3) of the said Statutes for the provisions, of elections of members from Post Graduate Students Constituency and for election of student members of the Senate from degree classes of affiliated college, he referred to Statutes 57(1) and (3) of the said Statues. 17. In paragraph 14 of the decision as reported, the learned Judge has observed that the Returning Officer in this case was the Registrar. Such observations of the learned Judge have been denied and disputed by Mr. Ganguly and on a reference to the provisions of the Statutes 71B and 71C, he pointed out that under those provisions, there has been no provision, for appointment of a Presiding Officer which according to the Statute 71 K(6) means a person appointed by the Returning Officer for the purpose of conducting election of any authority or academic body or University. In fact, it was Mr. Ganguly's contentions that those provisions were intended for controlling and concluding election and they must be read with the provisions of Statutes 7 and 7(5) as quoted hereinbefore. It is no doubt true and that too, according to Mr. Ganguly that in terms of Statutes 50(b), 52(2), 55(2), (3) and 57(3) as quoted hereinbefore, Presiding Officer are appointed for conducting election and casting vote, which powers again, were and are two different powers and such powers according to Mr. Ganguly, at all material times lay and still lies with the Vice-Chancellor and that too, for the purpose of finding out as to who will go to the Syndicate of the said University. Mr. Ganguly, at all material times lay and still lies with the Vice-Chancellor and that too, for the purpose of finding out as to who will go to the Syndicate of the said University. Mr. Ganguly further claimed and contended on a reference to Statutes 69 and 71B of the said Statutes that the words "meeting" as used would have great significance and those provisions according to him, also empower the Vice-Chancellor in the instant case read with section 9 of the said Act, with the authority to cast the casting vote in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 18. Mr. Ganguly claimed that the Registrar is a creature of the Statutes and thus he was and is required to act within the four corners of the said Act and more particularly in terms of Statute 71 B of the said Statutes the particulars whereof, have been indicated hereinbefore and according to Mr. Gauguly, the Registrar in the instant case had the power to conduct or discharge his obligations only in respect of (a) supply of ballot papers, (b) collection of ballot papers, (c) scrutiny of them, (d) counting of votes and (e) declaration of results in case there was no doubt or any difficulty and such powers will not include the power to give casting vote as in this case. It was also claimed by him that the Vice-Chancellor had and has in the instant case, all powers and authority to give directions to the Returning Officer to appoint a Presiding Officer to give a casting vote or he could have cast the concerned casting vote as has been in the instant case. Mr. Ganguly claimed that the meaning of the words "casting vote" will be the deciding vote in some contingencies and the same according to him would mean to cast the casting vote to break a tie. Such submissions were made by Mr. Ganguly on a reference to Black's Law Dictionary and he also referred to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, which indicates such vote as the determining factor, when there is an actually ascertained equality of votes. 19. Such submissions were made by Mr. Ganguly on a reference to Black's Law Dictionary and he also referred to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, which indicates such vote as the determining factor, when there is an actually ascertained equality of votes. 19. Section 23(1) of the said Act lays down and mentions the different Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies and sub-section (2) thereunder, indicates that each Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies shall consist of (i)...............; (ii)..................; (iii) ...............;(iv) ...................; (v) .................; (vi) ten Teachers participating in Post Graduate teaching in the subject or subjects concerned of whom five shall be from constituent colleges or professional colleges, nominated by the Vice-Chancellor, and five shall be Teachers of the University, other than Professors to be elected by such Teachers from amongst themselves; (vii) not more than three persons having special knowledge in the subject or subjects concerned nominated by the Vice-Chancellor. On a reference to those provisions, Mr. Ganguly wanted to argue and establish that the power of nomination shall thus be with Vice Chancellor in respect of the Faculty Council of Post Graduate Studies and that too in the manner as indicated hereinbefore. Mr. Ganguly further made a reference to clause 71K(6) of the said Statute, which as mentioned earlier, has laid down that" Presiding Officer", would mean a person appointed by the Returning Officer, for the purpose of conducting election of any authority or academic body of the said University and that being the position, he claimed that the two authorities viz., "Presiding Officer" and "Returning Officer" cannot be she said person. He also indicated that under clause 71K(5) "Returning Officer" would mean, except in the case of an election under clause (xxvi) of section 18 and under clause (xi)(c) of section 21, the Registrar would also include any other person appointed by the Vice-Chancellor as the Returning Officer in connection with any election by general or special order. It was argued by Mr. Ganguly that the Presiding Officer in the instant case, was the Respondent Vice-Chancellor and he thus appointed the Registrar of the said University as the "Returning Officer" and that too duly It was then pointed out by Mr. It was argued by Mr. Ganguly that the Presiding Officer in the instant case, was the Respondent Vice-Chancellor and he thus appointed the Registrar of the said University as the "Returning Officer" and that too duly It was then pointed out by Mr. Ganguly that under clause 7(v) of the said Statute, the Registrar concerned shall only conduct or he is really vested with the conduction of the election in question, with the permission of the Presiding Officer viz., the Vice-Chancellor and according to him, section 43 of the said Act, which deals with the provisions as to who shall cast the casting vote, there would be no difficulty in returning a verdict that such power of casting vote, at all material times was and still is with the Officer presiding at the meeting viz., the Vice-Chancellor and it was also pointed out by him that clause 65(2) of the said Statute, makes it also amply clear that at such meeting as in this case, the person competent to be present would be the Vice-Chancellor, the persons appointed to assist the Returning Officer in counting the votes and the candidates of, in their absence, their agents duly authorised by them in writing and similar would also be the position under clause 71C(1) of the said Act which indicates that after ballot papers are collected under clause 71B(2) of the said Statute, the Returning Officer shall preside to scrutinise the ballot papers or cause them to be scrutinised and to count or cause to be counted the votes recorded in favour of each candidate and thereafter, the results of the election would be declared by the Returning Officer. 20. Mr. Ganguly's further contention was that tile election in the instant case, was held under clause 71B of the said Statute and under clause 71K(3) of the said Act, elector would mean with reference to any constituency, a person entitled to vote at an election by the constituency. 20. Mr. Ganguly's further contention was that tile election in the instant case, was held under clause 71B of the said Statute and under clause 71K(3) of the said Act, elector would mean with reference to any constituency, a person entitled to vote at an election by the constituency. It was also claimed and contended by him that under section 56 of the said Act, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor had the necessary power of delegation, subject to the provisions of the said Act, such of his powers or duties as conferred or imposed by or under the said Act and as may be prescribed by the Statute to an Officer of the University, under his direct administrative control and in exercise of such powers, the delegation of the necessary power as in the instant case, was made by the Vice-Chancellor in favour of the Registrar concerned. 21. Section 42 of the said Act deals with Chancellor's power to decide question as to eligibility for being chosen as or for being members and to annual election proceedings in certain cases and the provisions of the said section are to the following effect :- 42(1) :- It any question arises whether any person is legible for election or nomination or has been duly ejected or nominated as, or is entitled to be, a member of any authority or body of the University, the question shall be referred to the Chancellor, whose decision thereon shall be final. (2) :-If, during the progress of any election of members to any authority or body of the University, the Chancellor is satisfied that such election is citiated by fraud or corrupt practice, the Chancellor may make an order annulling the proceedings in respect of such election or any part thereof and directing fresh proceedings to be started, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Statutes, the Ordinances and the Regulations, from such stage as may be specified in the order and such order of the Chancellor shall be final. (3) : No suit or proceeding shall lie in any civil court against a decision or an order of the Chancellor under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) as the case may be. Reference to these provisions were made by Mr. (3) : No suit or proceeding shall lie in any civil court against a decision or an order of the Chancellor under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) as the case may be. Reference to these provisions were made by Mr. Ganguly, to establish his objection that there was other adequate and alternative remedy available to the writ petitioners in the present case and they having elected not to avail of such remedies, would not be entitled to move this Court and to maintain the petition. In support of his submission to the above effect, Mr. Ganguly referred to the case of (2) Gujarat University v. Shri N.U. Rajguru & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 66 , where it has been observed by the Supreme Court that it is well-settled that where a statute provides for election to an office, or an authority or institution and if it further provides a machinery or forum for determination of dispute arising out of election, the aggrieved person should pursue his remedy before the forum provided by the statute. While considering an election dispute it must be kept in mind that the right to vote, contest or dispute election is neither a fundamental or common law right instead it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory provisions. It is not permissible to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by-passing the machinery designated by the Act for determination of the election dispute. Ordinarily the remedy provided by the statute must be followed before the authority designated therein. But there may be cases where exceptional of extra-ordinary circumstances may exist to justify by-passing the alternative remedies. Ordinarily the remedy provided by the statute must be followed before the authority designated therein. But there may be cases where exceptional of extra-ordinary circumstances may exist to justify by-passing the alternative remedies. In that case it has also been indicated that where the teachers of the colleges affiliated to the Gujarat University, in spite of the mandatory provision in section 58 of the Gujarat University Act for reference of dispute relating to election to any Authority of the University to the State Government challenged the election of certain members to the ‘Court’ of the University by writ petition and the High Court set aside the election and directed holding of fresh election the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petition and interfering with the election, apart from indicating that under section 58 of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 as amended by Gujarat Act 9 of 1983, if a dispute arises with regard to the constitution of any of the authorities of the University, it should be referred to the State Government for determining the same. It firstly provides that where any question arises as to the interpretation of any provision of the Act, or of any Statute Ordinance, Regulation or Rules, it may be referred to the State Government. Secondly, it lays down that if a question arises whether a person had entitled to be or ceases to be entitled to be, been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be or ceases to be entitled to be, a member of any authority or other body of the University. It shall be referred to the State Government. Section 58(2) provides that the dispute relating to interpretation of any provision of the Act or State Ordinance. Regulation or Rules may be referred to the Government while clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 58 contains 8 mandatory provision that if the dispute relates to the question whether a person has been duly elected or appointed to any authority of the University such a dispute shall be referred to the State Government. There is no option of discretion. If such a dispute arises, it has to be referred to the State Government for determining the same. There is no option of discretion. If such a dispute arises, it has to be referred to the State Government for determining the same. If 20 members of the Court raise a dispute relating to a matter specified in clause (I) or clause (II) of section 58 it shall be referred to the State Government and thereupon the State Government shall after making such enquiry as it may deem fit, decide the question. The legislative intent is manifestly clear that any dispute relating to the matters covered by section 58 should be referred to the State Government for its decision and such decision shall be final. By enacting section 58, the legislature has constituted a forum for the determination of the dispute in respect of matters specified therein since the ‘Court’ is an authority of the University as declared by section 15 of the Act. Section 58 provides an effective remedy for challenging the election of member to the court of the University. Any person aggrieved by the election of any manner to the Court has right to challenge the same before the State Government by raising a dispute in accordance with section 58. In that case a challenge was thrown to the election of certain members to "Court" by Gujarat University and it has been observed that in view of the mandatory provisions of section 58 of the Act as mentioned hereinbefore, the writ petition was not maintainable. Mr. Ganguly claimed that the said section 58 of the Gujarat Act is in the line or peri materia with section 42(1) of the said Act, if not the whole of the same. 22. Mr. Ghosh appearing for the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, more or less argued and made his submission in the same line as that of Mr. Ganguly. He also pointed out that under section 71 K(6) of the said Statute, the Vice-Chancellor as the Presiding Officer and was to preside over the concerned ejection meeting and it was his further submission that even under clause 71C(2) of the said Statute, the particulars whereof, have been indicated hereinbefore, "the Officer presiding" at the meeting in this case, was the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. It was submitted by him that such result can also be deduced on the basis of or on consideration of the authorities as mentioned under sections 16 and 17 of the said Act. 23. It was submitted by him that such result can also be deduced on the basis of or on consideration of the authorities as mentioned under sections 16 and 17 of the said Act. 23. On a reference to the provisions of sections 68A and B of the said Statute and more particularly on consideration of the two clauses of the: said section 68, Mr. Ghosh pointed out and argued that in clause B there is no role of the Presiding Officer and such role, if any, is only in clause A. He then referred to Statutes 35 to 68 and submitted that the first part of those Statutes viz. Statutes 35 to 46 deals with or postulates the pre-election stage. Statutes 47 to 64 deals with the conduct of election and Statutes 65-67 deals with counting of votes and declaration of results on such counting and at the preliminary stage, under the provision either of the said Act or the said Statutes, there is no mention of a Presiding Officer and such Presiding Officer according to him, comes in the scene from the second and third stages as mentioned hereinbefore. 24. According to Mr. Ghosh, under the provisions of Statute 63B, there is no provision of any part being played by the Presiding Officer concerned and further submitted that the officer presiding at the meeting as mentioned in the provisions of the said Act and the said Statute, cannot be treated or equated with the term "Presiding Officer", who in the instant 'case, was the Vice-Chancellor and in making his determinations as he did, the learned Judge according to Mr. Ghosh, misread the provisions as indicated hereinbefore. As mentioned earlier, section 17 of the said Act lays down the authorities of the said University and Mr. Ghosh pointed out that in the instant case, we are concerned with section 17(3), which defines Faculty Council of Post Graduate Studies as one of such authorities. It should be noted here that the constitution of the Senate of the said University has been mentioned in section 18 of the said Act and section 21 of the same deals with necessary constitution of the Syndicate and section 18(2) lays down the manner of elections to the Senate and has categorically stated that such election shall be held in the manner as prescribed by the said Statute. Similarly, section 21(2) indicates the relevant manner by which the election to the Syndicate shall be held. There is also no doubt that under section 23(2) of the said Act it has been postulated that each Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies shall consist of the members as indicated thereunder and that being the position, Mr. Ghosh submitted that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, by virtue of his position, is the member of each Faculty Council and a Chairman designate of such Council and under sec. 9(1) the said Act, he shall also be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and shall, in the absence of Chancellor, preside at the meeting of the Senate. He shall, by virtue of his office, be a member and the Chairman of the Syndicate and the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies and also the Chairman of any ether authority or body of the University of which he may be a member. He shall also be entitled to be present at and to address any meeting of any other authority or body of the University of which he may not be a member, but shall not be entitled to vote thereat. 25. Clause 69 of the said Statute postulates that for the purpose of an election in any of the constituency referred to above, the Vice-Chancellor shall, as soon as may be after the constitution of the Senate or the Faculty Council for the Post 'Graduate Studies or the Council for Under Graduate Studies, as the case may be, by order in writing fix a date or dates (a)............(b)............(c).........; (d) on which a meeting of the members concerned of the Senate or the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies or the Council for Under Graduate Studies, as the case may be, shall be held for the purpose of the election, such date not being earlier than five days from the last date for withdrawal of candidature fixed under clause (c). The provisions of Statute 69 as quoted hereinbefore, undoubtedly mentions or means the election as indicated in Statutes 68A and B, by the me of the words "as the case may be". It was Mr. The provisions of Statute 69 as quoted hereinbefore, undoubtedly mentions or means the election as indicated in Statutes 68A and B, by the me of the words "as the case may be". It was Mr. Ghosh's further and specific submissions that in respect of the election from the constituency as mentioned in clause 68B, thus there must be a meeting and the same is a condition precedent, but under clause 68A there is no such provision and such fact would also be clear from Statute 47(c) of the Statute, which indicates that if the member of such candidates exceeds the Number of Person to be elected, the Returning Officer shall forthwith publish in his office a list of the candidates for election, arranged alphabetically according to surname and a poll shall be taken. 26. On a reference to Statutes 71A and B of the said Statute, Mr. Ghosh submitted that the meeting of the members concerned under the scheme of the chapter will mean the meeting of the three authorities under Statute 69(d) as mentioned earlier. 27. Mr. Ghosh further submitted that the term “Officer Presiding” and “Presiding Officer” cannot be or mean the one and the same person and to establish such submissions, he referred to the definition of the word “Presiding Officer” in the statute 71K(6) and the meaning of the word "Returning Officer" as mentioned in Statute 71K(5). According to him, that they none else than the Returning Officer and certainly not the Presiding Officer could have authority to conduct the election and only he can under the provisions of the said Statute, the particulars whereof, have been mentioned hereinbefore, give his casting vote and he can also be present. Thus, the casting vote as has been claimed to have been allegedly given by the Vice-Chancellor, would be of immaterial consideration. 28. On a reference to the relevant sections of the said Act and the clauses of the said Statute, Mr. Ghosh, submitted that the question in the instance case would not be as to who casted the vote, but the real question to be determined is who presided over the concerned meeting or who was empowered to do so and if the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was the Presiding Officer, whether he had the power to cost the casting vote. Ghosh, submitted that the question in the instance case would not be as to who casted the vote, but the real question to be determined is who presided over the concerned meeting or who was empowered to do so and if the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was the Presiding Officer, whether he had the power to cost the casting vote. It was further claimed and pointed out by him that the Presiding Officer is appointed by the Returning Officer and the Vice-Chancellor concerned appoints such Presiding Officer and thus the Vice-Chancellor cannot be appointed as the officer in the concerned meeting, which incidentally was the claim of the Writ Petitioner-Respondents 29. On a further reference to the affidavit-in-opposition as filed by the Respondent Vice-Chancellor and more particularly to those in paragraph 3(iv), which is to the effect that section 42 of the Calcutta University Act, 1979 provides that in all disputes relating to the election of candidates, the question shall be referred to the Chancellor whose decision will be final. The purported dispute purportedly raised by the petitioners, which however are without any foundation, being a matter relating to election, is not maintainable without raising any dispute in the manner provided in the Act and as such the writ petition is premature and is liable to be dismissed in limine, Mr. Ghosh further submitted that the writ petition would not be maintainable and in fact, by those statements and submissions, he really intended to supplement or supplant the submissions as were made by Mr. Ganguly, on the preliminary point regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. In support of his submissions as above, Mr. Ghose, also made a reference to the case of Gujarat University v. Shri N.U. Rajguru & Ors. (Supra), the relevant particulars whereof have been indicated earlier. It was then submitted by Mr. Ghosh and that too in the line of Mr. In support of his submissions as above, Mr. Ghose, also made a reference to the case of Gujarat University v. Shri N.U. Rajguru & Ors. (Supra), the relevant particulars whereof have been indicated earlier. It was then submitted by Mr. Ghosh and that too in the line of Mr. Ganguly, that the submissions of the writ petitioners that the Presiding Officer and the officer presiding were the same person, was wrong and he claimed that such Presiding Officer unless appointed by the Returning Officer, whom he indicated to be the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, cannot preside and such being the position, in terms of the submissions as indicated hereinbefore, he indicated that the Registrar of the said University could not have been claimed to be the Presiding Officer of the concerned meeting, which was being held for the holding of the election of the said Constituency and that too in terms of the provisions as indicated hereinbefore. It was further pointed out by him that the said Statute by itself has laid down or indicated the power or the area where the Presiding Officer should discharge his functions and under the provisions as indicated hereinbefore, there would thus be no doubt or any dispute that the Returning Officer viz., the Vice-Chancellor, should appoint a Presiding Officer and the casting vote, not only under the provisions of the said Act or the said Statute, but a also under the general rule and law, was required to be given, not when the counting was on but at the time when after such counting, a tie is detected. It was also pointed out by Mr. It was also pointed out by Mr. Ghosh that under Statute 65(1) of the said Statute, which indicates that on the day fixed under clause (f) of paragraph (1) of Statute 35, for commencement of counting of votes the Returning Officer, shall at such time and place as may be determined by the Vice-Chancellor and notified in the Notice Board in the office of the Registrar in this behalf, proceed, in such manner as the Returning Officer may determine and with the help of such persons as the Vice-Chancellor may appoint to assist the Returning Officer in the counting of votes, to open all covers received by post, to open the envelopes containing the ballot papers, to open the ballot boxes and after scrutiny, to separate the ballot papers which the Returning Officer considers valid from those which he considers invalid and finally to count the valid votes given to each candidate and to record in a statement of the total number of valid votes so given to each candidate; Provided that the Returning Officer may adjourn, at any stage, the proceedings referred to in this Paragraph until such time or date as he may consider fit and proper, the Returning Officer cannot be present or was required to be present himself and that too, during the election. It was then submitted by him that there was no justification of the findings of the learned Trial Judge that the Vice-Chancellor concerned was not a member and as such he was not competent to vote in the instant case and that too where the power to cast a casting vote is not a common law right, but the same is a special one, concerned by the provisions of Statute 71C (2) of the said Statute, the particulars whereof, have been indicated earlier. 30. Mr. Ghosh further pointed out that under the provisions of Statute 71C of the said Act, the Vice-Chancellor concerned being the Returning Officer, was competent to cast his casting vote and such power of the Vice-Chancellor, would also be available or can be deduced from or in terms of the provisions of section 6 and sections 9 to 23 of the said Act and more particularly when under the provisions of section 23(2) of the said Act, the Vice-Chancellor is the member and Ex-officio Chairman of the Faculty Councils. 31. It was then claimed and contended by Mr. 31. It was then claimed and contended by Mr. Ghosh that even if the Vice-Chancellor concerned was not the elector and therefore, he had no right to vote as claimed by the writ petitioners, he was empowered by the provisions of the said Act and the said Statute, to give his casting vote, which according to Mr. Ghosh, was a deliberative one. Lastly, Mr. Ghosh contended and claimed that the findings of the learned Trial Judge that Vice-Chancellor concerned should not have declared the results and the same should have been done by the Presiding Officer, was wrong and those submissions were sought to be supported by Mr. Ghosh, on a reference to the provisions of Statute 71C (2) of the said Statute as quoted hereinbefore. 32. On the basis of the submissions of Mr. Pal, appearing for the writ petitioner Respondents, it would appear that the members of the Syndicate were sought to be elected and for the purposes and how they are to be elected or who is to elect them, reference was made by him to section 21(1)(v)(ii) and also to clauses (ix)(a)(ii) of section 21 of the said Act. On a reference to those provisions, Mr. Pal contended and claimed that thus the electorate in case of the present nature would be such Readers and Lecturers as mentioned and not all and they were to be elected, according to him, at a meeting of the member concerned and to establish as to who were such member concerned, he referred to Statute 68B of the said Statute and more particularly to the provisions in the clauses (ix)(a)(ii) of section 21 of the said Act as mentioned earlier. 33. On a reference to statute 69(d), relevant particulars whereof have been indicated earlier, Mr. Pal submitted that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was thus to fix a date, on which a meeting of the members concerned of the Syndicate or the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies or the Council for Under Graduate Studies as the case may be, shall be held for the purpose of the election and such date should not be earlier than five days from the last date for withdrawal of candidature fixed under clause (c) of the Statute 69 and that being the position, according to Mr. Pal, therefore, the two members concerned were to be elected at a meeting of the members concerns viz. Pal, therefore, the two members concerned were to be elected at a meeting of the members concerns viz. the Readers and Lecturers of the said University, who were the members of the Faculty Councils. It was so claimed by Mr. Pal on a reference to the effect of the combined reading of section 2I(ix)(a)(ii) and Statute 68 as mentioned earlier. 34. Mr. Pal then pointed out that in a meeting for the purposes as involved in this case, many members were there or may be present, but all of them would not be authorised to vote and only Readers and Lecturers would form the electorate and not all. To establish as to the members who could be present or who could form the electorate, reference was made by him to the provisions under section 23(1) of the said Act and on a reference to sub-section (2) thereunder, he pointed out as to who should consist or form the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies. It was then pointed out by Mr. Pal that each Faculty Council would thus consist of many persons, but all of them, according to him, would not form the electorate, to have the election of two said Constituency under section 21(ix)(a)(ii) of the said Act. It was posed and pointed out by him that thus the real question in the instant case would be, who was the "officer presiding" on the date of election, which was admittedly held on 4ih December, 1987 and such question according to him, would arise in view of the provisions of Statute 71C(2) of the said Statute as quoted earlier. It was claimed by Mr. Pal that such meeting would mean any of the meetings of the members concerned to' elect as per under section 21 of the said Act, which again speaks of various constituencies including those of the said constituency. Mr. Pal pointed out that in his affidavit as filed in the in the proceedings, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor has not claimed that he was a member of the concerned electorate or he had a right to vote. The said Act and the said Statute according to Mr. Pal, creates a dichotomy in relation to Faculty Council meetings. 35. It was Mr. Pal pointed out that in his affidavit as filed in the in the proceedings, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor has not claimed that he was a member of the concerned electorate or he had a right to vote. The said Act and the said Statute according to Mr. Pal, creates a dichotomy in relation to Faculty Council meetings. 35. It was Mr. Pal's contentions that to find out who was the 'Officer Presiding' in the instant case, we have got refer to Statute 71C(2) of the said Statute and to get the answer as to, to what meetings the said provisions refer to. According to him, on a reference to those provisions it would be clear that they refer to the meetings of each Faculty Council for discharging the functions under section 24 of the said Act, which deals with powers and duties of the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies. It was also pointed out by him that the meeting of the Faculty Councils may also be held for election of Deans of the respective departments. According to Mr. Pal, section 23 of the said Act initially deals with the first of meetings and sub-clause (2) of the said section would establish that the Faculty Councils will have the necessary type and number of members as mentioned therein. He also pointed out that under sub-section (4) of section 23, one-third of the total number of members of a Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies shall form a quorum for a meeting of the Faculty Council. It was then pointed out by him that thus, the reasonable conclusion would be that the meeting as meant by or under section 23(2) of the said Act, would mean a meeting as a whole of the Faculty Councils and the quorum would be of one-third of the members, in terms of section 23(4) of the said Act. It was his contentions that Faculty Council is a much larger body and includes various category of persons. It was also his submissions that the meeting of the said constituency can not thus be a meeting of the Faculty Council as a whole and such meeting cannot be equated to be a meeting of designated members of the Faculty Council viz., Readers and Lecturers and it was Mr. It was also his submissions that the meeting of the said constituency can not thus be a meeting of the Faculty Council as a whole and such meeting cannot be equated to be a meeting of designated members of the Faculty Council viz., Readers and Lecturers and it was Mr. Pal's further submission, that section 24 of the said Act, would thus relate to and mean the entire body of the Faculty Councils and the provisions of section 23(4) of the said Act would mean electors different than those mentioned in Statute 71(d) of the said Statute, the particulars whereof have been indicated earlier. 36. Mr. Pal contended and claimed that the casting vote of the Chairman as mentioned in section 43 of the said Act, would mean and include a right to such vote at a meeting of the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies and according to him, the provisions of section 21(1) (b)(ii) would not mean a meeting of the Faculty Councils. He of course, stated that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor could claim himself to be the Chairman of the Faculty Councils under section 710(5), which postulates that when the vote is complete. the Chairman shall cause the voting papers to be collected and the votes counted and according to him, the reference to the said meeting would mean a meetings under Statute 69D, 71B(1) and 71C(2) and not a meeting or meeting of the Faculty Councils as a whole or at all. The constituency in the instant case, according to Mr. Pal, would mean a group or category of the electors as indicated in Statute 71 K(1) of the said Statute i.e., the category of Readers and Lecturers in this case and the electors according to him in terms of Statute 71K(3), will thus have reference to any constituency and would mean a person entitled to vote at an election by the concerned constituency. He also referred to Statute 69(d) of the said Statute and claimed that the same should be read and considered along with the provisions in Statute 71B and further submitted that the reference to the words "at the meeting as in Statute 71C. He also referred to Statute 69(d) of the said Statute and claimed that the same should be read and considered along with the provisions in Statute 71B and further submitted that the reference to the words "at the meeting as in Statute 71C. would mean the same meeting as in Statute 69(d) and Statute 68(a)(b) and there would be no doubt in holding that those provisions would mean the meeting of a specific class of members of the Faculty Councils, which constitutes a constituency under or in terms of the provisions of the Statute as indicated earlier. It was submitted by Mr. Pal that if such construction as mentioned hereinbefore, is not given, then that would mean enlarging the scope and the ambit of the concerned constituency, which cannot and should not be done in a proceeding of the present nature and the meeting of the Readers and Lecturers of the Faculty Councils. The meeting in question, was further claimed by him not to be a meeting of the Faculty Councils and as such, be claimed that section 43 of the said Act, has no application in this case. He also stated that the said section will not apply as the same postulates that Chairman as a whole will not cast the vote unless there is a tie. It was then submitted by him that those provisions will not also apply here, as the Chairman of the Faculty Councils is not a member concerned at such a meeting or an elector at such meeting and therefore, the relevant question which is required to be answered in this case and as pointed out earlier, as to who was the Officer Presiding". Mr. Pal pointed out that the Respondent Vice-Chancellors's vote in a meeting of the constituency as referred in section 21 (ix)(a)(ii) is a limited one and thus, we shall have again to find out as to what are the limits or constraints of such power. Under Statute 69 of the said Statute, according to Mr. Mr. Pal pointed out that the Respondent Vice-Chancellors's vote in a meeting of the constituency as referred in section 21 (ix)(a)(ii) is a limited one and thus, we shall have again to find out as to what are the limits or constraints of such power. Under Statute 69 of the said Statute, according to Mr. Pal, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor had or has four functions and in Statute 70, according to him and which is to the following effect :- 70 :- Forthwith upon the receipt of an order of the Vice-Chancellor under Statute 69, the Returning Officer shall issue a notice, in such manner as the Vice-Chancellor may direct inviting nomination for election and specifying the last dale fixed for making nomination, the date for scrutiny of nomination, and the last date for withdrawal of candidature as well as the date fixed for the meeting of members concerned of the Senate, the Faculty Councils for Post Graduate Studies and the Council's for Under Graduate Studies, as the case may be, for the intended election and the time and place at which, and the persons to whom nominations papers are to be delivered, lays down the manner in which notice for nominations are to be given and Statute 71 which states that the issue of the notice under Statute 70 by the Returning Officer, provisions of Statutes 44, 45 and 46 relating to nominations, scrutiny and withdrawal of candidature shall mutatis mutandis apply, there is no mention or any reference to the Vice-Chancellor. Same was also his submissions in respect of Statute 71A, which states that the Returning Officer shall not less than seven days before the date fixed under clause (d) of Statute 69 forward to each member concerned of the Senate fur Under Graduate Studies, as the case may be, a list of duly nominated candidates proposed for selection, who have not withdrawn their candidature and shall call for a meeting of the Senate or the Faculty Councils for Post Graduate Studies or the Council for Under Graduate Studies as the case may be, for election on the day fixed in this behalf under clause (d) of Statute 69. Then, Mr. Then, Mr. Pal on a reference to Statute 71B(1)(2) pointed out under those provisions, the Vice Chancellor has only the right and authority to approve the forms and be also pointed out that in Statute 71C(2), the relevant particulars whereof, have been quoted hereinbefore, there has been no mention about the Vice-Chancellor. Mr. Pal claimed and contended that the provisions of Statutes 65, 66 and 67 have been stated to be applying mutatis mutandis and if those provisions, which really deal with the counting of votes, are read along with the provisions of Statute 71C(2) of the said Statute, there will be no doubt that the Returning Officer has just the power to scrutiny and count. Then, Mr. Pal claimed that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor in the instant case had a limited role in the matter of selection only. He claimed that Statute 71C(2) lays down the practice or procedure and under those provisions, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, at best had in the facts of this case, the right to be present at the time of counting. 37. It was thus contended by Mr. Pal that Statute 67 of the said Statute, the particulars whereof have been indicated earlier, deals with or speaks of a contingency of equality as in this case, but the said Statute according to him, will not apply in the facts of this case and more particularly where the question of "Officer Presiding" is involved, Mr. Pal argued that in any event, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was not entitled to participate in the meeting of the Readers and Lecturers constituency, since be was not an elector of the same. Chapter IV of the said Statute deals with election of members of authorities of the said University and on a reference to that Chapter, Mr. Pal pointed out that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was not a member of the various constituencies as referred to therein and it was also submitted by him even if the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was a member of each Faculty Council, be could not participate in all elections and he could only, if so intented, participate in the election of Deans of the respective Department. 38. It was ten suggested by Mr. 38. It was ten suggested by Mr. Pal that whenever the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of such a meeting as in this case, is given the necessary power, the reference to the provisions of Statute 71D(6) would make it clear that the Chairman of the Faculty Council, as a whole has the right to decide the lis between the candidates having equal votes by drawing lost and Statute 71E(5)(c), which is to the following effect : Greater than the number of members to be so chosen in the category, a poll shall be taken by ballot, and the persons securing the largest number of valid votes shall, up to the number of members to be shown in the category, he declared by the Vice-Chancellor to be duly elected. In the event of an equality of votes in respect of the last seat to be filled in any category the choice between the candidates securing' such equal number of votes shall be made by the Vice-Chancellor by giving his casting vote, makes it amply and abundantly clear, that in the event of such an eventuality of equality of votes in respect of the last seat to be filled in, in any category, choice between the candidates seeking such number of votes, shall be made by the Vice-Chancellor by giving his casting vote. On such submissions, Mr. Pal again posed the question that therefore, in this proceeding the main and real question would be, to find out as to who was the "Officer Presiding"? He submitted that in terms of Statute 71K(5), the Registrar of the said University would thus be the Returning Officer also, unless any other officer is appointed. It is needless to point out that under Statute 71(v), the Registrar concerned is to conduct election of all the academic authorities of bodies of the said University as may be prescribed by the said Statute or the Ordinances and shall act as the Returning Officer in conducting such elections. In fact, Mr. Pal also made a reference to those provisions. 39. For election to the Syndicate, Mr. In fact, Mr. Pal also made a reference to those provisions. 39. For election to the Syndicate, Mr. Pal stated, that necessary provisions have been made under Statute 69 to 71B(2) of the said Statute and under those provisions, there was or has been no express obligation on the Registrar of the said University to appoint a Presiding Officer, who in terms of the requirements of the Statute, would be an appointee of the Registrar concerned, for conducting the election and according to him, under the provisions of the Statute as mentioned hereinbefore, the actual fact or act of conducting the concerned election was and is on the Returning Officer and under the provisions of the said Statue, the Registrar alone, was the Returning Officer, who was required to conduct the concerned election and under Statutes 71B to 71C(2) of the said Statute, the Returning Officer is also the person, who conducts of was required to conduct the concerned election. In any event, Mr. Pal submitted that the person who conduct the election should be the "Officer Presiding" and any findings contrary to such, would be contrary to the provisions of the said Statute. Thus, Mr. Pal claimed that the casting vote in the instant case should have been given by the "Officer Presiding" viz., the Registrar of the said University, as he was the Returning Officer and was conducting the election in question. In fact, he claimed that there would be no different in meaning between the words "Officer Presiding" and "Presiding Officer" and such officer is required to be appointed at the time of casting the casting vote and that too, to break the dead lock and such was the only power given to the "Officer presiding" or "Presiding Officer", for the purposes as indicated hereinbefore and he claimed further, that the Returning Officer viz., the Registrar in !he instant case could thus authoritatively appoint a "Presiding Officer" or an "Officer Presiding. 40. Mr. Pal further claimed that the submissions of Mr. 40. Mr. Pal further claimed that the submissions of Mr. Ganguly that the meeting in question was the meeting of the Faculty Councils under Statute 69(d) of the said Statute, had no basis, since the meeting in question, was not a meeting of the said Faculty Council and he submitted that in any event, conducting an election would not mean or include the power to give a casting vote as in this case or as was done by the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. 41. On a reference to Statutes 69 to 71C, Mr. Pal stated that those provisions lay down the scheme as to how the election in question, should be conducted or must be held and according to him, since there has been no express obligation to appoint a "Presiding Officer" or "Officer Presiding" under Statute 71C(2), and the real question which is required to be decided and as pointed out by him earlier, is to find out who was the "Officer Presiding" in the instant case and on a further scrutiny of the provisions of the Statute, Mr. Pal stated that such "Officer Presiding," in any event, could not be the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, since the meeting in question, was not one of the Faculty Councils. It was further pointed out by him that since the meeting in question as mentioned earlier, was not a meeting of the Faculty Councils as a whole, therefore, the Chairman viz. the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was not a part of that meeting. Mr. Pal made a further reference to Statute 71B apart from referring to Statute 71(d), and pointed out, that the members concerned in this case would be the Readers and Lecturers and under the provisions as indicated hereinbefore, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor had no function or such functions as he performed in the instant case. It was it was in short, submitted by Mr. Pal that at such election meeting as in this case, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor had no function at all and a such, he cannot be termed to be or termed as "an Officer Presiding" at that meeting. It was then submitted by him that the 'Officer Presiding' as mentioned or indicated in Statute 71C, must be such an officer who is required to act within the scheme of the said Statute and that officer would also mean the Returning Officer himself and none else. 42. It was then submitted by him that the 'Officer Presiding' as mentioned or indicated in Statute 71C, must be such an officer who is required to act within the scheme of the said Statute and that officer would also mean the Returning Officer himself and none else. 42. This cannot be doubted or disputed that Statute 7 of the said Statute deals with the general power of the Registrar of the said University. in the matter of conducting the elections and under sub-clause (v) thereunder, the said Registrar admittedly has a dual capacity and in terms of Statutes 69 to 71C, he was the only person, who was authorised to conduct such an election as in this case, and there cannot also be any dispute or any doubt that under Statute 71K(6), the Registrar was required to appoint a "Presiding Officer", but when such an officer is not appointed, he as the Returning Officer, was required to conduct the election and therefore, he should be deemed to be to "Presiding Officer" and there can not also be any doubt that under Statute 71K(5), the person who conducts the election in question. should be considered to be the "Officer Presiding". 43. Mr. Pal then pointed out that the meeting in the instant case, was not a meeting of the Faculty Councils as a whole and such being the position, the arguments and submissions as advanced by the appellants will and should fail. We feel that conducting election and that too, in agreeing with Mr. Pal, will not include the power to cast the casting vote as in this case. There is also no doubt that the necessary consideration of the relevant provisions of the said Statute would make it clear, that whenever She same wanted to clothe the Respondent Vice-Chancellor with due and necessary powers, provisions have been made, but under the provisions as indicated hereinbefore, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was not clothed with such powers of casting a casting vote as in this case. 44. While replying to Mr. Ghosh's submissions, Mr. Pal pointed out that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, no doubt provides for holding the meeting, but be election meeting as in this case must be deemed to be a different one and such being the position, the powers of the said Respondent Vice-Chancellor in claiming the meeting in question, would not arise. 44. While replying to Mr. Ghosh's submissions, Mr. Pal pointed out that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, no doubt provides for holding the meeting, but be election meeting as in this case must be deemed to be a different one and such being the position, the powers of the said Respondent Vice-Chancellor in claiming the meeting in question, would not arise. It was pointed out by him on a reference to the provisions of the judgment as impeached, that there would also be no legal evidence to evidence to establish that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor really and in fact chaired the meeting in question and reference to such provisions by Mr. Ghosh was thus wrong and misleading and he submitted, that the Registrar of the said University was also hovering with or in such misconception and allowed the Respondent Vice-Chancellor to cast his casting vote. Mr. Pal submitted that there was no doubt or any dispute that under the provisions of the said Statute, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was the Chairman of the Faculty Councils but he claimed that the issue here being, who was the "Officer Presiding", on consideration of the provisions of the said Statute there would be no other way but to hold that the said Respondent Vice-Chancellor was not the "Presiding Office." or the "Officer Presiding" of the concerned meeting. Mr. Pal pointed out on a reference to the determinations in the case of (3) The Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh v. Benehampur Tapti Mills Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1687 as cited by Mr. Ghosh, that the determinations made therein, would not be relevant or will have any application in the instant case. 45. There was a common argument put forward by the answering Respondents on the question of alternative remedy as provided under section 42 of the said Act, the particulars whereof, we have indicated earlier, Mr. Pal submitted that such remedy as mentioned in section 42, was really not an alternative remedy and these provisions would apply in case of exercise of a jurisdiction not vested in law by the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. Pal submitted that such remedy as mentioned in section 42, was really not an alternative remedy and these provisions would apply in case of exercise of a jurisdiction not vested in law by the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. He claimed and submitted that such existence of an alternative remedy would not be a justification or a bar in a matter of the present nature and to establish such submissions, reference was made by him to the case of (4) Dr.(Sm) Juntesh Gupta V. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P. ) & Ors., (1987)4 SCC 522, where it has been observed that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi-judicial authority. The provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power of review on the Vice-Chancellor. In the circumstances, it must be held that the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in reviewing his/her earlier order. The review order of the Vice-Chancellor was, therefore, a nullity, apart from holding that the review in that case of the Vice-Chancellor, being without jurisdiction and a nullity, could surely be challenged before the High Court by a petition under Article 226 and the same cannot be dismissed by the High Court on ground that an alternative remedy was available to the agitated person (the appellant-Principal) under section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. An alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. On the basis of those determinations, Mr. Pal claimed that the arguments. as put forward by the answering Respondents, on the question of availability of other and alternative remedies, would not be a bar in the present case and the more so when, in the instant case, the act of the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, since he was not the "Officer Presiding", was wholly without jurisdiction. In the case of (5) State of U.P. v. Md. In the case of (5) State of U.P. v. Md. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , it has been observed that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will be only where there is no other equally effective remedy. Provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should in exercise of the discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings, and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily (he superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. The superior court will readly issue a certiorari in a case where there has been a denial of natural justice before a court of summary jurisdiction, apart from holding that if therefore, the existence of other adequate legal remedies is not per se a bar to the issue of a writ of certiorari and if in a proper case it may be the duty of the superior court to issue a writ of certiorari to correct the errors of an superior court or tribunal called upon to exercise judicial or quasi judicial functions and not to regulate the petitioner to other legal remedies available to him and if the superior court can in a proper case exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a petitioner who has allowed the time to appeal to expire or has not perfected his appeal, e.g., by furnishing security required by the state, it cannot then be laid down as an inflexible rule of law that the superior court must deny the writ when an inferior court or tribunal by discarding all principles of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure arrived at a conclusion which shocks the sense of justice and fair play merely because such decision has been upheld by another inferior court or tribunal on appeal by revision and that there may conceivably be cases where the error, irregularly or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal revision. If an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all, accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court's sense of fair play the superior court may, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ or certiorari to the correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the note if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to the notice of the Supreme Court. On the basis of such submissions, Mr. Pal, after making a reference to the prayers in the writ petition, claimed that since there was a prayer for the issue of a writ of or a writ in the nature of Certiorari and lack of jurisdiction in the matter of exercise of power not vested in the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, has been established, so the availability of an alternative remedy as claimed, would not be an absolute bar, in maintaining this proceedings. In support of his submissions as above, Mr. Pal also made a reference to the case of (6) L. Hridayanarayan Vs. Income Tax Officer, Berrily, AIR 1971 SC 33 , where it has been observed that when a petitioner has filed a writ petition without availing of the statutory remedy and the High Court entertained such petition by giving the petitioner hearing on merits, the petition cannot thereafter be rejected on the ground that statutory remedy was not availed of. 46. In reply to Mr. Ganguly's submissions on the basis of the determinations in the case of Gujarat University v. Shri N.U. Rajguru & Ors. (Supra), Mr. 46. In reply to Mr. Ganguly's submissions on the basis of the determinations in the case of Gujarat University v. Shri N.U. Rajguru & Ors. (Supra), Mr. Pal pointed out that the said determination would not appropriately be applicable in this case in view of the provisions of the said Act and the said Statute and the more so who they differed from the provisions as involved in the case under consideration and more particularly when, the body as referred to therein, cannot claim to be or said to be an officer of the University. The same answer as above, was given by Mr. Pal in respect of the determinations in the case of (7) S.T. Muthysami v. K. Nataraj & Ors., (1988)1 SCC 672 and more particularly when in an election matter if the present nature, the writ petitioners required an order of injunction to be expeditiously issued. It has been claimed that since the Chancellor in the instant case was and could be claimed to be an officer of the said University, so no useful purpose could also serves by preferring an appeal to him and that would only meant a proceeding taken from career to career. It was also pointed out that such other or alternative remedy as mentioned in section 42, would be of no help or any assistance in maintaining the preliminary grounds as soughs to be urged by the answering Respondents, because under the provisions of section 42, the Chancellor had or has no power to grant any interim order and for that only, this Court could be approached. In short, Mr. Pal, submitted that the provisions of section 42 as indicated hereinbefore, would not mean or afford to give adequate efficacious relief in a case of this nature and the being the position, the submissions on the availability of other or alternative remedy as put forward, would be of no avail or any assistance. It was also pointed out by him that the submissions on the availability of other or alternative remedy would not also be helpful to the answering Respondents in the instant case, because in the facts and circumstances of the case, an expeditious order was necessary, and the writ petitioners could not wait indefinitely, for having an order on their appeal, if they were required to file the same before the Chancellor, as that would not also be waisted. In an election matter of the present nature 47. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the University, on a reference to the provisions of the said Act and the said Statute pointed out that there are really two types of meeting (1) meeting of the elected bodies or authorities and (2) meeting for election of bodies or authorities and according to him, under section 9 of the said Act, laying down the power and duties of the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, he had no such power as was exercised by him in the instant case. It was further claimed by him that the election meeting in the instant case, was one under Statute 71B(1) and admittedly, the Vice-Chancellor was not an elector and apart from declaration of results, according to Mr. Mukherjee, he had no power with regard to the actual conduction of the concerned election. Mr. Mukherjee then placed the provisions of Statute 7 of the Slid Statute, for the purpose of establishing the powers and functions of the Registrar of the said University and pointed out that under Statute 7(i) the Registrar would be under the direct control or the Vice-Chancellor. He indicated that Statute 7(ii) speaks of the Registrar and he shall be the Secretary of the concerned committees and will be the Secretary of any committee constituted by the Senate or the Syndicate except as otherwise specifically provided. It was further pointed out that under those provisions, the said Registrar is required to keep minutes of the meeting and under sub-clause (iii) of Statute 7, he is the custodian of certain records. Mr. Mukherjee then pointed out that under statute 7(iv) the Registrar has the right and authority to enter into or do correspondence on behalf of the said University or its authorities like the Senate and Syndicate. Mr. Mukherjee then categorically referred to Statute 7(v) and stated with all force that conduction of election of all the academic authorities or bodies lay with the Registrar of the said University and under those provisions, he was the Returning Officer. Such being the position and in terms of the definition of "Returning Officer" as in Statute 71K(5), Mr. Mukherjee claimed that thus the Registrar was not required to be appointed by any special order and in case of appointment of any officer thin the Registrar, the Vice-Chancellor may have such power. Mr. Such being the position and in terms of the definition of "Returning Officer" as in Statute 71K(5), Mr. Mukherjee claimed that thus the Registrar was not required to be appointed by any special order and in case of appointment of any officer thin the Registrar, the Vice-Chancellor may have such power. Mr. Mukherjee, on a reference to Whartson's Law Lexicon (14th Edition) at page 881. pointed out that the "Returning Officer" in this case, would mean the official who conducted the election and that being the position there was on difficulty in holding that the Registrar in the instant case, duly conducted the election and as such, he could give the casting vote and not the Respondent Vice-Chancellor Mr. Mukherjee further pointed out that the word “conduct” should be given a wide meaning and it must be observed that the said word should not be meant or use for a limited purpose or for a limited job. In support of such submissions, Mr. Mukherjee referred to Legal Thesaurus (Deluxe Edition) page 98 and pointed out that the word "conduct" would mean administer, administrate, assume responsibility. carryon, carry out, comment, control, deal with, direct, direct affairs, discharge, despatch, do indicate, execute, guide, handover, have control, lead, look-after, manage, ensure, act, operate and over-see. On the basis of such meaning of the word "conduct", Mr. Mukherjee submitted that since the Registrar of the said University was conducting the election in this case or managing the affairs of the concerned election, so, in terms of the meaning of the word "conduct" as mentioned above, which has also been appropriately covered by the meaning of the said word in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition), it must be held and observed that the Registrar of the Said University was really conducting the election and as such, he was authorised to cast the casting vote only and not the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. 48. Then, Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that under Statutes 47-71C the Registrar of the said University, while acting as Returning Officer acts as an independent authority conducting the concerned election and that being the position, he had also the power to cast the casting vote in the instant case and in any event, such power of the Registrar could not be curtailed. Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that under Statutes 47-71C the Registrar of the said University, while acting as Returning Officer acts as an independent authority conducting the concerned election and that being the position, he had also the power to cast the casting vote in the instant case and in any event, such power of the Registrar could not be curtailed. Mr. Mukherjee however, pointed out that powers of the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, if any, in the facts and circumstances of the case, were prospective i.e., after the election and not before that and as such also, the casting vote as given by him, was improper. It was then pointed out by him that under Statute 35 of the said Statute, Respondent Vice-Chancellor had powers to fix date for application for enrolment of voters, nominations, scrutiny of nominations, withdrawal of candidature and poll and he had no power to appoint a Presiding Officer and only the "Returning Officer", who was the Registrar in the instant case, had such power to appoint a "Presiding Officer". Mr. Mukherjee, on a reference to the associated concepts of the word "preside" as mentioned in Legal Thesaurus (Deluxe Edition) page 400, submitted that the Registrar in the instant case, had really acted within his power, competence and jurisdiction, to hold the ejection and he, as such Presiding Officer, could have casted the casting vote, instead of the saide being allowed to be casted by the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. 49. Mr. Mukherjee also made a specific reference to the provisions of 71K(6) for the meaning of the of Presiding Officer" and he argued in the same line as was urged by Mr. Pal. It should further be noted that the arguments of Mr. Mukherjee, on the provisions of the Statute 71A(2) of the said Statute were also in the line of Mr. Pal. 50. While on the question on submissions or alternative remedy, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision in the case of (8) Balinada Banerjee & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. Mukherjee, on the provisions of the Statute 71A(2) of the said Statute were also in the line of Mr. Pal. 50. While on the question on submissions or alternative remedy, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision in the case of (8) Balinada Banerjee & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. 89 CWN 89 and stated, that since in the instant case also there could be no cause of any apprehension in the manner of using the power by the Registrar of the said University, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor acted irregularly and without jurisdiction in purporting to cast his casting vote and since he had acted absolutely without his jurisdiction, so the availability of other or alternative remedy, would not be an absolute bar. 51. The submissions of both Mr. Pal and Mr. Mukherjee, on the question of the availability of other alternative a available remedy, not to be a jurisdictional bar, that since the act complained of was without jurisdiction the submissions of the appellant, would not be available to them such submissions was made on the basis of the determination in the case of (9) Kashi Ram v. Rakesh Arora, (1987)4 SCC 84 . 52. Mr. Ganguly in reply, referred to section 21(2) of the said Act, which apeaks about all elections to the said Syndicate to be held in the manner prescribed by Statute and submitted that such manner as prescribed, would mean two Stages, firstly, the preparatory stage and secondly, the election proper and further submitted, that in this case, we are really concerned with the second stage. According to him, Statute 69 of the said Statute would mean preliminaries for holding the election proper and the two stage, as mentioned hereinbefore, are co-related. He also submitted that the members concerned under Statutes 69 and 70 of the said Statute, would mean those specifically mentioned and not the concerned members only as claimed and as such, there was no justification or basis for the submissions as put forward by the writ petitioner Respondents that the meeting in question, was a not a meeting of the Faculty Councils, but the same was of the concerned members. 53. 53. He then pointed out that under Statute 71A of the said Statute, the words members concerned has been dropped and according to him, under Statute 71B of the said Statute, the meeting takes place for finding out the meaning of the word "elector”, and for that reference was made by Mr. Ganguly to Statute 71B(2) and Statute 71(B)(3) of the said Statute and thus he submitted that the word "elector" should mean, with reference to any constituency and person entitled to vote at an ejection by the constituency. 54. While on the question of the submissions of dichotomy as put forward by the writ petitioner Respondent on a reference to section 24 of the said Act, Mr. Ganguly submitted that in terms of the provisions of that section, there cannot be any basis or justification on the submission on dichotomy as claimed and put forward by the writ petitioner-respondents. Since the opening words of that section 24 is "subject to the provisions of the said Act". It was then claimed and pointed out by him that if the meeting in question, is not held or considered to be a meeting of the Faculty Councils, that would mean, that some extension to the terms "electorate" will have to be given under Statute 71B(2) and the necessary disputes as may be raised or could be raised or any situation arising therefrom have been covered. He, of course, in his usual fairness stated that if the meeting in question, was not one of the Faculty Councils, then of course !he Respondent Vice-Chancellor could not preside. 55. The interpretation given to the word "electorate" by the learned trial Judge has been claimed by Mr. Ganguly to be one of a restricted one and according to him, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, even though was not an elector, was really the Officer presiding of the concerned meeting and the claimed that in terms of Statute 63(2) of the said Statute, a person whose name appears in the final electoral roll of a constituency shall be entitled to vote in that constituency only and in no other. Similarly, reference was made by Mr. Similarly, reference was made by Mr. Ganguly to Statute 63(4) of the said Statute which lays down that every elector shall have as many votes as there are persons to be elected in the constituency, but shall not have the right to record more than one vote in favour of any candidate, On a further scrutiny and interpretation of Statutes 69, 70 and 71 of the said Statute, Mr. Ganguly claimed that the power as was exercised in this case or of the present nature, was really with the Presiding Officer or the Officer Presiding and in case of dead-lock as in this case, the casting vote was required to be given by the authority and such being the position, the Respondent Vice-Chancellor had duly exercised his power and that too authoritatively. It was submitted by Mr. Ganguly that the Presiding Officer in the instant case being the Respondent Vice-Chancellor himself under Statute 71K(6) of the said Statute, the submissions of Mr. Pal on the basis of the Returning Officer being empowered and authorised to appoint the said Presiding Officer, would not hold good. It was then pointed out by him that if the Respondent Vice-Chancellor in terms of Statute 7, (v) of the said Statute, cannot use and exercise such power of casting vote in a case of the present nature, his delegate could not be authorised to exercise such power and under the provisions of the said Statute, a Presiding Officer cannot be appointed for the election to the Syndicate. 56. It was pointed out further by him that under Statute 69 of the said Statute, time-table is fixed by the Respondent Vice-Chancellor and as contended by him earlier, the second part of Statute 71A as indicated would and include the part of Statute the Faculty Council of the Post Graduate Studies. It was then submitted by him that under part A as mentioned hereinbefore and if the provision therein are read along with Statutes 49, 52 and 55 of the said Statute, they would mean, meeting of the constituency and part B would also make in clear that provisions have not been made for such meeting and according to Mr. Ganguly the concerned members as used in the said Statute should mean or relate to the bodies only. 57. On the question as to who can give the casting vote, Mr. Ganguly the concerned members as used in the said Statute should mean or relate to the bodies only. 57. On the question as to who can give the casting vote, Mr. Ganguly, firstly referred Statute 71K(iii) of the said Statute, for establishing as to the right of the electors and it was submitted by him further, that the Returning Officer in a case of this nature, would be the Registrar and under Statute 7(v), he could only conduct the election in terms of the manner as prescribed and such right cannot be an implied one and under Statute 71B, he has only the right to conduct the ejection, which again would not mean participating in any manner. Under Statute 71 K(6), It was Mr. Ganguly's further submissions that the Presiding Officer in a case of the present nature could only conduct the ejection and there was no doubt that he is a delegate of the Returning Officer, who in the instant case, according to Mr. Ganguly, was none else than the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. Statute 69 makes provisions as to when and where the Registrar can be appointed and by whom, Mr. Ganguly pointed out that such appointment can only be made or given by the Returning Officer i.e. the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. He, however, pointed out that Section 43 of the said Act makes it clear as to who can give the casting vote and on interpretation of the provisions of that section, Mr. Ganguly reiterated that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor in the facts of this case had power, competence and jurisdiction under the said section 43 he case his casting vote, which right again, has only be given to the Chairman, who in the instant case, was none else than the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. Mr. Ganguly further pointed out that the Presiding Officer, in terms of the relevant provisions of the said Statute, was only a delegate of the Returning Officer, for conducting the election and as indicated earlier, Mr. Ganguly further reiterated that when under Statute 2(8) of the said Statute which gives the guideline to the effect that "words and expression used but not otherwise defined shall have the same meaning as in the Act", so the casting vote as in this case, could only be given by the Chairman, who as indicated earlier, was none else than the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. The Guideline as mentioned hereinbefore, was also claimed by Mr. Ganguly to be applicable in the meetings under Statute, 71A and 718 of the said Statute. 58. The cases as cited by Mr. Pal on the question of alternative remedy were claimed by Mr. Ganguly to be not appropriately applicable in the facts of the present case and that too in view of the specific challenge as involved in them. While dealing with the other cases, they were also claimed by Mr. Ganguly to be not applicable in this case, since some of them were not cases involving election matters or disputes. He, of course, claimed that in terms of the Supreme Court determination a, indicated earlier in the Gujarat's case, the question of availability of other and alternative remedy should be strictly construed and that too at least in cases of election and according to him, in the present case, since there has been, no other extra ordinary circumstances established for not availing of the provisions under section 43 of the said Act, this Court should not have interfered while dealing with the Writ petition and no interference should also be made in this appeal. 59. On consideration of the relevant provisions as indicated earlier, we feel that the meeting as involved in this case was not a meeting of the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies, but the same was a meeting of the members concerned of the said Council and thus, the election meeting in this case was not a meeting of the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies and the word "concerned members" should mean and imply the constituent members only and not all the members of all the Faculty Council. Such members, Should thus be those of the said constituency viz., from the constituency of Readers and Lecturers. The electorate in this case was the Readers and Lecturers. 60. Even on construction and consideration of the provisions of section 24 of the said Act, in the light of the submissions as made by Mr. Such members, Should thus be those of the said constituency viz., from the constituency of Readers and Lecturers. The electorate in this case was the Readers and Lecturers. 60. Even on construction and consideration of the provisions of section 24 of the said Act, in the light of the submissions as made by Mr. Ganguly, we find that there is really a conflict between the said Act and the said Statute, regarding the election meeting and a meeting under that section or more particularly with regard to the meeting of the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies and this election meeting under the said Statute and really, if we are to equate the two meetings as indicated above, together an extended meaning of the term electorate will have to be given. 61. There is no doubt or any dispute that the elector can only vote in an election of the present nature and there is or would be a gulf of difference between a vote and a casting vote, which is not case ordinarily, but such contingency for, a casting vote appears only when there is a tie number of votes secured by the contesting candidates creating a dead lock. Thus a dead lock or a tie is condition precedent for the purpose of exercising a casting vote. Such casting vote has certainly the desirable and necessary effect of clinching the issue or to have the effect of dedicing the lis or contest, finally. There is also no doubt that in the facts of the case, casting vote was required to be given to resolve the tie. Such casting vote, was also required to be given, as the contesting candidates failed to get themselves elected in the normal manner and process. 62. Thus, the moot question in the instant case would be, who could give such casting vote under the provisions as referred to hereinbefore and on the basis of the submissions of Mr. Ganguly, whether such Vote could be given by the electors or the Returning Officer viz., the Respondent Vice-Chancellor more particularly when the Registrar's power in conducting the election has been laid and will defined? In fact, Mr. Ganguly, whether such Vote could be given by the electors or the Returning Officer viz., the Respondent Vice-Chancellor more particularly when the Registrar's power in conducting the election has been laid and will defined? In fact, Mr. Ganguly contended that the Registrar has powers (1) to supply ballot papers, (2) collection, scrutiny and counting of them and then (3) to declare the results and such power is not extended thereafter viz., to cast a casting vote, which requires a different procedure to be followed by the "Officer Presiding" at the meeting, who in this case was none else than the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. As stated earlier, Mr. Ganguly also indicated that the two authorities viz., 'Presiding Officer' and 'Officer Presiding' cannot be the same person and according to him, if the same person was meant, then these two expressions would not be necessary. Let us now consider further if the "Officer Presiding" and the "Presiding Officer" could mean the same person? The appearing Respondents claimed that the answer should be in the negative. The word 'Presiding Officer" has been defined in Statute 71K(b), and on scrutiny and scanning of those provisions, Mr. Ganguly claimed that such "Presiding Officer" is appointed by the Returning Officer and the former being the delegate of the latter, he cannot regulate his powers, for completion of the election. The Respondent Vice-Chancellor in this case was only to fix a date, on which the meeting in question of the members concerned, shall be held and such members were to be elected from the Readers and Lecturers, who again were to members of the Faculty Councils, and the above should in our view will be the effect of the reading of section 21(ix)(o)(ii) of the said Act and Statute 68 of the said Statute. It should further be noted that all the members who were present at the meeting were not entitled to vote and only the Readers and Lecturers forming the electorate could vote. A reference to Statute 71C(2) would be relevant to find out the answer to the question as put forward or posed by the learned Advocates appearing before us viz., who was the "Officer Presiding" or the" Presiding Officer". A reference to Statute 71C(2) would be relevant to find out the answer to the question as put forward or posed by the learned Advocates appearing before us viz., who was the "Officer Presiding" or the" Presiding Officer". The provisions as mentioned above, would make it clear that they refer to the meanings of each Faculty Councils for discharging the functions under section 24, which deals with powers and duties of the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies. There is also no doubt that the meeting of the Faculty Councils may also be held for election of Deans of the respective Departments. The Faculty Council being a much larger body and since the same consists of various category of persons, the meeting of the said Constituency cannot thus be a meeting of the Faculty Council as a whole and such meeting cannot thus be equated to be a meeting of the Readers and Lecturers. 63. On the analogy of the above, Mr. Ganguly also claimed that thus the “Presiding Officer" and the "Officer Presiding" at the meeting, cannot be the same person and the provisions of section 43 of the said Act would be contravened, if the power to give casting vote is delegated to the Presiding officer, as such power under the said section can only be exercised by the Chairman i.e., the Respondent Vice-Chancellor. These submissions of Mr. Ganguly are very difficult to be accepted on appropriate construction and consideration of the relevant provisions as indicated hereinbefore. It is true, at the time of counting votes the persons or authorities, who could be present are (1) the Vice-Chancellor, (2) Persons to assist the Returning Officer in counting the votes viz., the Presiding Officer or the Officer Presiding i.e., the Registrar in this case, in counting the votes, (3) candidates and (4) in their absence, their agents. 64. It also an undisputed fact that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was not present during the casting of votes or the counting and at a point of time when the tie was detected. 64. It also an undisputed fact that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was not present during the casting of votes or the counting and at a point of time when the tie was detected. Since, like the cases of election of members of the Board of studies attached to Councils for Under Graduate Studies, such power has not been mentioned in the case of the Respondent Vice-Chancellor, then it can will be deduced that he had no such power to give casting vote, as if such power was there, the same could have been specifically indicated like the case of the other authorities, In any event, we hold that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor was not the "Officer Presiding" in the concerned election meeting and since, there is, according to us, no difference between the two terms "Presiding Officer" and the "Officer Presiding", so the Registrar, who was presiding over the meeting was the authorised person or officer, who could give the casting vote. Such casting vote by the Chairman would mean a right to a vote at a meeting of the Faculty Council for Post Graduate Studies and the provisions of section 21(1)(b)(ii) of the said Act would not mean a meeting of the Faculty Councils. The Respondent Vice-Chancellor under Statute 71D(5) can claim to be the Chairman of the Faculty Councils at the meeting under Statutes 69D, 71B(1) and 71C(2) and certainly in respect of all the meetings of the Faculty Councils as a whole, or at least in respect of the meeting of the said constituency, which again would mean and include the group or category of electors as mentioned or indicated in Statute 71K(1) and there cannot be any doubt in holding on construction of the relevant provisions of the said Statute as involved in this case, that they would mean and include the meeting of a specific and specified class of members of the Faculty Council viz., the Readers and Lecturers. 65. 65. There cannot be further or any doubt that the Respondent Vice-Chancellor's vote in a meeting of the said constituency as referred to in section 21(ix)(a)(ii) of the said Act is a limited role and furthermore he had a limited role and that too in the matter of election only and under Statute 71C(2), he had at best, the right to be present at the counting and furthermore, he was not entitled to participate in the meeting of the Readers and Lecturers constituency i.e., in the said constituency, as he was not an ejector of the same. We feel and hold that in terms of Statute 71K(5) the Registrar was also the "Returning Officer" and that too in the facts of this case and in terms of Statute 7(v), he was to conduct the concerned election as he is to conduct the elections of all the academic authorities/bodies of the said University as may be prescribed by the said statutes and he shall act as the “Presiding Officer" in conducting such election There cannot also be any doubt, on the basis of the provisions as indicated hereinbefore or the meaning of the words that a person who conducts the election, can and should be deemed to be the “Officer Presiding” and as such the casting vote in this case should have been given by him viz., the Registrar concerned, as he was the "Presiding Officer" and was conducting the election in question. The Respondent Vice-Chancellor, since the meeting in question was not one of the Faculty Councils could not claim to be the “Officer Presiding” and in the election meeting in question, in terms of there requirements of the Statute, he had no function at all and for that reason also, he could not claim or deemed to be the “Officer Presiding”. 66. On the question of maintainability of the writ proceedings for not availing of the other and alternative remedy we feel the submissions as made by Mr. Pal or the reasons as given by him for not availing of such remedy, are of substance and as such we uphold them and on the basis of such findings, we find that the determinations in the case of Gujarat University Vs. Shri N.U. Rajguru & Ors. (Supra) are not appropriately applicable here. We also uphold Mr. Pal or the reasons as given by him for not availing of such remedy, are of substance and as such we uphold them and on the basis of such findings, we find that the determinations in the case of Gujarat University Vs. Shri N.U. Rajguru & Ors. (Supra) are not appropriately applicable here. We also uphold Mr. Mukherjee’s submissions on this point and since on the other points his submissions were practically on the same line as that of Mr. Pal, we are not dealing them separately. 67. For the views as above, we feel that the determination of the learned Trial Judge is not required to be interfered with as such we dismiss this appeal. 68. Before we conclude, we want to make certain observations as regards modalities for declaration of results in the case of equality of votes in respect of last seat to be filled. We have discussed in detail the modalities prescribed in the Statute 71C(2) for counting of votes and declaring the results. We have also decided the status of the Officer Presiding at the meeting, who is required to resolve the stalemate condition in case of equality of votes in the last seat to be filled. In the Statute, under 71(D)(6), in case of election of Dean, Chairman has been authorised to drew the lost to make a choice between the candidates securing equal number of votes. Similar modalities for the purpose of election of members of Board of Studies attached to Councils for Under Graduate Studies, are prescribed in Statute 71(E)(5)(c). In such, case, Vice-Chancellor has been authorised to use his discretion by giving his casting vote in case of equality of votes. In order to maintain uniform modalities in case of such exigency of an equality of votes, Vice Chancellor may be given an authority to use his discretion by giving his casting vote in the event of equality of votes in the election of the member of the Syndicate as referred to in Chapter IV Part-I-B of the Calcutta University First Statute, 1979. In Statute 71C(2), it is provided that the decision shall be made by the casting vote of the officer presiding at the meeting. The dispute raises as to the identity of the 'Officer Presiding at the meeting'. In Statute 71C(2), it is provided that the decision shall be made by the casting vote of the officer presiding at the meeting. The dispute raises as to the identity of the 'Officer Presiding at the meeting'. As in other election modalities prescribed in 71(D) (6) & 71(E)(5)(c), the Vice-Chancellor has been authorised to give his casting vote in the event of an equality of votes, the University can amend the Statute 71C(2) accordingly, as it has been prescribed in Statutes 71D(6) and also 71(E)(5)(c). 'Officer Presiding', 'Chairman' & 'Vice-Chancellor' designations were mentioned in the Statutes in 71(c)(2), 71(0)(6) and 71(E)(5)(c) respectively to evolve a mechanism for resolving ties. This nomenclature requires consistent meaning. This is not a direction, but this is a judicial advice to the University so that the identical issue can be resolved by allowing the Vice-Chancellor, to use his casting vote, solely and exclusively in case of an equality of votes the last seat to be filed. There will be no order as to costs. Stay of operation of this order, as prayed for, is granted for 4 weeks Basu, J.: I agree.