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Gauhati High Court · body

1989 DIGILAW 33 (GAU)

N. C. Rawlley v. State of Assam

1989-03-01

B.P.SARAF

body1989
1. This petition has been filed for quashing the proceedings in C. R. Case No. 426-C/80 pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Tinsukia. 2. The petitioner No 1 at the relevant time was the General Manager of the Assam Oil Company Ltd. and the petitioner No. 2 was the Administrative Manager of the said company. A complaint was filed by the respondent No. 1, the State of Assam, against the petitioners for alleged violation of section 4 (2) of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act.' In the complaint it was alleged that the petitioners filled up the vacancy of the Deputy Chemical Engineer by appointing one Shri N. C. Ramesh without notifying to the local Employment Exchange, Digboi and thereby violated the provisions of section 4 (2) of the Act. It was also alleged that false information was given by letter dated 9.10.78 to the Assistant Employment Officer, Digboi to the effect that the said Shri Ramesh was appointed as Chemical Engineer with "effect from 31.7.78 although he was actually appointed as Deputy Chemical Engineer and on the aforesaid allegation it was stated that an offence under section 7 (2) (a) (ii) of the Act was committed. In the complaint it was mentioned that sanction for prosecution as required under section 8 of the Act was obtained from the Director of Employment and Craftsman Training, Assam, Guwahati, as per docu­ments filed with the complaint, which were Document Nos. 9 and 10 dated 27.9.80. On the basis of the aforesaid statement it was averred that the petitioners were liable to be prosecuted under section 7 (1) and section 7 (2) (a) (ii) of the Act. 3. On the aforesaid facts processes were issued by the Judicial Magistrate, Tinsukia against the petitioners. The petitioners by the present petitioner have challenged the issue of process by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Tinsukia on the ground, inter alia, that the Director of Employment and Craftsman Training, Assam, Guwahati, who accorded the sanction for prosecution was not a competent person to accord sanction under Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act and in that view of the matter, the case initiated on the basis of such sanction given by unauthorised person was without jurisdiction and the process issued by the learned Magistrate is liable to be quashed. Another ground of challenge is that the facts and circumstances of the case stated in the complaint and revealed from the documents filed therewith donot spell out the ingredients of the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioners and, as such, the criminal procee­dings initiated against the petitioners are liable to be quashed. The third point that was urged is that the complaint was barred by limi­tation and the delay was condoned by the Court ex-parte without hearing the petitioners and on that score also the proceedings are liable to be quashed. 4. I have heard Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the petitioners, and perused the records of the case. Taking up the objection regarding sanction first, it appears that in this case sanction for prosecution was given by Shri S.K.Barkataki, Director of Employment and Crafts man Training, Assam, Guwahati in exercise of powers conferred by section 8 of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. The order of sanction is Document No. 9 to the Writ petition. Section 8 of the Act which deals with cognizance of offence reads as follows : "No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the sanction of, such officer of Government as may be prescribed in this behalf or any person authorised by that officer in writing." From a bare reading of the aforesaid section it is clear that the power to accord sanction is vested in an officer of the Government as may be prescribed in that behalf or any person authorised by such officer in writing. Rule 8 is the relevant rule which reads as follows: "The Director of Employment of the State in which the establishment is located is hereby prescribed as the officer who may institute or sanction the institution of prosecution for an offence under the Act, or authorises any person in writing to institute or sanction the institution of such prosecution." 5. It may be mentioned herein that the aforesaid Rule 8 was amended by Notification No. GSR. 548 dated 16.3.68 and the words "the Director of Employment of the State in which the establishment is located" were substituted for the words "the Collector or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, of the district in which the establishment is located". It may be mentioned herein that the aforesaid Rule 8 was amended by Notification No. GSR. 548 dated 16.3.68 and the words "the Director of Employment of the State in which the establishment is located" were substituted for the words "the Collector or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, of the district in which the establishment is located". Thus on and from 16.3.68 the Director of Employment of the State was prescribed as the authority empo­wered to grant sanction for prosecution under the Act. In the instant case the sanction having been given by the Director of Employment and Craftsman Training, I do not find any infirmity in the same. The contention of the learned counsel on this score, therefore, fails. 6. The second submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee was that the facts stated in the complaint do not spell out the ingredients of the offence alleged to have been committed. I have gone through the complaint filed before the learned Magistrate by respondent No. 1. Section 7 of the Act reads as follows: "7 (1) If any employer fails to notify to the employment exchange prescribed for the purpose any vacancy in contra­vention of sub section (1) or sub-section (2) of section (4) he shall be punishable for the first offence with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees and for every subsequent offence with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (2) If any person - (a) required to furnish any information or return (i) refuses or neglects to furnish such information or return, or (ii) furnishes or causes to be furnished any infor­mation or return which he knows to be false, or (iii) refuses to answer, or gives a false answer to any question necessary for obtaining any information required to Be furnished under Section 5; or (d) impedes the right of access to relevant records or documents or the right of entry conferred by Section 6, shall be punishable for the first offence with fine which may extend to two hundred and fifty rupees and for every subsequent offence with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees." From the complaint and the documents annexed thereto it is apparent that the allegation against the petitioners was that one Shri N.C. Ramesh was appointed Deputy Chemical Engineer without notifying to the local employment exchange. Show cause was also issued prior to filing of the complaint to the petitioners. In reply thereto it appears from the documents annexed to the complaint that a reply was submitted by letter 20.2.80 to the Assistant Officer informing that the appointment in fact was to the post of Chemical Engineer, the person having fulfilled all the requisite qualifications for the said post, but in view of the fact that experience was slightly less, he was initially appointed as Deputy Chemical Engineer. It was also stated in reply that the designation "Deputy Chemical Engineer" was an internal designation of the company and, as such, it did not require any notification under the Act. By letters dated 30.7.80 and 25.7.80 (Documents 7 and 8 ) it was pointed out that the post was really the post of Chemical Engineer of the company which was duly notified and about which there is no dispute. The designation 'Deputy Chemical Engineer' was an internal nomenclature used for the purpose of classification of existing Executive, positions only and, as such, no separate notification to the employment exchange was necessary once the vacancy in the post of Chemical Engineer was duly notified. On the basis of the aforesaid factual position, which is evident from the complaint and the documents annexed hereto., it is stated that no case of violation of section 4 (2) or section 7(2) (a) (ii) has been spelt out and, as such, issue of process on the basis of such a complaint was not justified. 7. I have carefully considered this submission of the learned counsel in the light of the facts of the case. The legal position in regard to quashing of the proceedings at the initial stage is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. In the instant case I find that on the facts stated in the complaint and the various documents annexed thereto, no prima facie case of violation of the provisions of section 4 (2) and section 7 (2) (a) (ii) has been made out. In that view of the matter no fruitful purpose will be served by allowing the criminal prosecution to continue. In that view of the matter no fruitful purpose will be served by allowing the criminal prosecution to continue. I am, therefore, of the opinion that it is a fit case where the proceedings in C.R. Case No. 426-C/80 pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Tinsukia should be quashed. 8. In view of the aforesaid finding it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether it was incumbent on the - part of the Judicial Magistrate to pass order condoning the delay in filing the complaint only after hearing the accused persons and/or hearing the objection raised by the accused persons in regard to the cond­onation of delay giving an opportunity of hearing to them and to decide the matter afresh. 9. The petition is accordingly allowed and the proceedings ia C. R.Case No.426-C/80 are hereby quashed