Judgment S.B.Sinha, J. 1. These writ applications involving common questions of law and arising out of the same award dt. 27.8.1979 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi directing payment of different amounts to the respondent No. 2 of each of the writ application in purported exercise of his power conferred upon him under Sec-lion 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. It is a common ground that the respondent No. 2 of each writ application along with various other persons filed an application for commutation of certain monetary benefits which had allegedly acquired in their favour by reason of a circular dt. 18.3.1963 as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application. According to the said workmen, they were appointed in the years 1968-69 as Horizontal or Vertical borers in the scale of pay Rs. 110-143 in contravention of the aforementioned circular (Annexure-2 which provided for a scale of pay of Rs. 140-175 (210-282 revised of year 1971) and as such they are entitled to their salary in terms of the aforementioned scale of pay. It was further the case of the concerned workmen that they have been making protests for non-transfer to them all benefit of the above circular (sic) of the year 1963 as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application and upon consideration thereof the petitioner revised their scale of pay to Rs. 210-282 in the year 1971. 3. In the said proceeding before the respondent No. 1 the petitioner, inter alia, contended that the respondents were appointed as Horizontal or Vertical borers in Grade F in the scale of pay of Rs. 110-143 and in the year 1971, they were promoted to higher scale in Grade E carrying a scale of pay Rs. 140-175. 4. By reason of the impugned orders the respondent No. 1 came to the conclusion that the concerned workmen who as stated hereinbefore, are respondent No. 2 in each of the writ application were entitled to the aforementioned scale of pay of Rs. 140-175 since the date of their appointment and on that basis directed the petitioner to pay different amounts to the said respondents in exercise of his power under Sec.33-C(2) of the Act. 5. Mr. A.K. Sinha the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner raised two contentions in support of these writ applications. 140-175 since the date of their appointment and on that basis directed the petitioner to pay different amounts to the said respondents in exercise of his power under Sec.33-C(2) of the Act. 5. Mr. A.K. Sinha the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner raised two contentions in support of these writ applications. 6. Learned counsel firstly submitted that in the circumstances of this case, an application under Sec.33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was not maintainable inasmuch as a Labour Court while exercising his power under the said Act cannot determine a question which may appropriately fall for consideration before a Labour Court or Tribunal in a reference made under Sec.10 of the said Act. In respect of this proposition the learned counsel has placed strong reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Curt in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. V/s. The Workmen reported in AIR 1947 SC 1604. 7. Learned counsel next contended that in any event the concerned workmen having accepted the scale of pay in Grade E in the year 1971, upon having been promoted to the said post, they must be deemed to have waived their right to obtain the scale of pay, if any, in terms of the circular as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ petition as they accepted the said order of promotion without any demur whatsoever. Learned counsel in this connection has placed strong reliance upon a decision of this court in Chandradip Paswan V/s. The Chairman and Managing Director, Allahabad Bank reported in 1983 Pat. LJR (HC) 161. 8. Mr. P.K. Sinha, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2 in each case, on the other hand, submitted that in the instant case, the concerned workmen had right to be placed in the scale of Rs. 140-175 in terms of the aforementioned circular dt. 18.3.1963 as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application and in this view of the matter the application under Sec.33-C(2) was maintainable. Learned counsel in this connection has placed strong reliance upon the decision of this court in Management of Bhagaband Colliery V/s. Presiding Officer, Central Government, Labour Court, Dhanbad, reported in, 1973 L.I.C. 403 as also upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Sahu Minerals and Properties Ltd. V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court reported, in : 1975 (2) LLJ 341 . 9. 9. The respondent No. 1 in his impugned order as contained in Annexure-8 to the writ application held as follows:- "By the letters Ext, C/10 dt. 3.4.1967, Ext. C dt. 18.4.1968 C/19 dt.10.12.1968 and C/27 dt.2.12.3968 applicant Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10 respectively, joined the posts offered to them by the Corporation in the scale of Rs. 110-143. By Ext.E office order No. 1447 ncl/ 22.6.71 applicant Nos. 1 to 4, 10, 11 and 15 were promoted to the post of Borers Grade E in the scale of Rs. 210-282 (revised) from the posts of Borers Grade F carrying the scale of Rs. 180-230 (revised). 10. These applicants were neither working as Mazdoors, Field Workers or Survey Khalasies in the Corporation, nor they were given re-orientation training in the C.T.I, run by the Corporation. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the scheme envisaged in Exts. 2, G and G/1 for appointment o Junior Operators in the scale of Rs. 110-143 does not apply to their case. These applicants were neither appointed as Turners whose minimum scale as shown by Ext. 2 was 110-143 according to the circular Ext. 1, nor they gave their consent to change their trades Vertical Borers in the same scales. They were neither Matia displaced person nor after giving them training for a short period of six months they were attached to senior Operators in their respective trades.Therefore, I am of the opinion that the terms of Exts. 2-G and G/1 do not apply to the case of applicant Nos. 1 to 4, 10, 11 and 15 Ext. 1 Circular No. 21 of 1963 dt. 18.3,1963 issued by the Corporation applies to them which provides Rs, 140-5-175 as the minimum scale for Borers. This minimum scale belongs to these applicants from the date of their joining." 11. Unfortunately the petitioner has not produced the copy of the aforementioned circular 21/63 dt. 18th March 1963 in its entirety. It is, however, admitted that the scale of pay of Rs. 110-143 was meant for Grade F workmen whereas the scale of pay of Rs. 140-175 was meant for Grade E workmen. 12. It is also admitted that in terms of letter of appointment addressed to the workmen as contained in Annexure 1 to the writ application, the said workmen were appointed in the scale of Rs. 110-143 was meant for Grade F workmen whereas the scale of pay of Rs. 140-175 was meant for Grade E workmen. 12. It is also admitted that in terms of letter of appointment addressed to the workmen as contained in Annexure 1 to the writ application, the said workmen were appointed in the scale of Rs. 110-143 in Grade F. It is, however, clear from Annexure 3 to the writ application i.e. office order dated 22nd June 1971 that the said workmen were promoted from the post of Miller Grade F to Miller Grade E. This fact is clear from the fact that they draw the pay of higher scale from the date of actual assumption of charge of the new post and they were to be on probation for a period of one year. 13. From the said office order, it is further clear that whereas the designation of concerned workmen was Miller Grade F their designation on upgradation of the scale of pay because Miller Grade E. 14. The petitioner-company in the written statement before respondent No. 1 had contended that the Chairman of H.E.C. has power to change the wage structure. It has further been asserted that the selection committee placed the workmen in Grade F after considering their qualification, experience and skill. 15. It may be true as has been held by the respondent No. 1 in his application impugned order that case of the concerned workmen in this application before him were different. 16. In so far as the concerned workmen of the writ application are concerned, they were direct recruits whereas the other applicants before him had been working from before they had no previous experience. 17. In these circumstances the short question that arises for consideration is as to whether the concerned workmen were entitled to get their alleged right computed in terms of money in a proceeding initiated under Sec.33-C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act. 18. From the facts stated hereinbefore it would thus appear that there existed a serious dispute as to whether the concerned workmen were entitled to the aforementioned scale of pay of Rs. 140-175 or not. In view of the fact that concerned workmen had been appointed in the scale of pay of Rs. 18. From the facts stated hereinbefore it would thus appear that there existed a serious dispute as to whether the concerned workmen were entitled to the aforementioned scale of pay of Rs. 140-175 or not. In view of the fact that concerned workmen had been appointed in the scale of pay of Rs. 110-143 in Grade F clearly shows that according to the management the said circular of year 1963 (Annexure 2) was not applicable to the case of concerned workmen and/or having regard to their qualification, skill and experience, etc. they were entitled to be placed in Grade F and not in a Grade E . 19. It is now well-known in view of various decisions of the Supreme Court that a proceeding under Sec.33-C(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding. 20. It is further well-known that while adjudicating upon the rival contention of the parties, the labour court in proceeding under Sec.33-C(2) of the Act can decide a question which may fall for his determination as incidental to the main question but the same does not mean that a question which is not incidental to computation of monetary benefit can be decided. 21. According to the petitioner while deciding a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act a labour court is not entitled to confer a new right upon the applicants. 22. Reference in this case may be made to Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, AIR 1974 SC 1604 : (supra) H.E.C. V, Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi, C.W.J.C. 926 of 1982, H.E.C. Ltd. V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi, reported in, 1988 BLT (Rep) 400 and General Manager Garden Reach Ship Builders Ltd. V/s. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, C.W.J.G. No. 1167 of 1985(R) disposed of on 16th Aug. 1989. 23. The decision of this court in Bhagabandh Collierys case, (1973 L.I.C. 403) (supra), is not applicable in this case. In that case it was held that concerned workman was appointed as Mining Sardar and as such he was entitled to the scale of pay attached to the said post in terms of recommendations of the Wage Board. In that case the management did not assert that it had not implemented the recommendations of the Wage Board with regards to various service conditions introduced thereby and in fact it was clearly admitted that the said recommendations were implemented. 24. In that case the management did not assert that it had not implemented the recommendations of the Wage Board with regards to various service conditions introduced thereby and in fact it was clearly admitted that the said recommendations were implemented. 24. In that case, therefore, the dispute was as to whether their recommendations of the Wage Board were implemented in the case of the concerned workman or not. It is in that context that it was held by the division bench that application under Sec.33-C(2) of the said Act was maintainable which will be evident from the following findings: "If there is a dispute in regard to the service conditions in the sense that the workman says that a particular service condition is applicable to him while the management asserts that it is not so I am of the view that the power to decide such a dispute is incidental to an inherent in the power which is expressly conferred by Sec.33-C(2) of the Act. If, however, the dispute is of a kind which calls for a change in the service conditions then such a matter can be the subject-matter of industrial dispute alone cannot be adjudicated under Sec.33-C(2).I want to make it clear that merely because a question can be the subject-matter of collective bargaining by raising an Industrial Dispute it cannot be taken out of the power of decision of the Labour Court under Sec.33-C(2). There may be such question which" can be agitated and decided in both forms. But there may be some questions I have indicated above which can only be decided by raising of an Industrial Dispute and that cannot form the subject- matter of the decision under Section 33-C(2). 25. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sahu Minerals case AIR 1975 SC 1945 (supra) is also of no assistance to the respondent No. 2. In that case it was held by the Supreme Court that the dispute as to whether it was a case of retrenchment compensation or the case falls under proviso Sub-section (1) of Sec.25 FFF or not may be decided under Sec.33-C(2) of the Act. In that case it was held that the question even according to the employer falls under Sec.25-FFF of the Act and therefore in deciding that question the Labour Court has to adjudicate as to whether the proviso thereof was satisfied or not. 26. In that case it was held that the question even according to the employer falls under Sec.25-FFF of the Act and therefore in deciding that question the Labour Court has to adjudicate as to whether the proviso thereof was satisfied or not. 26. Thus in that case the existing right of the concerned workmen to obtain compensation was not in dispute but the only dispute was as to whether the said compensation was to be paid under Sec.25-F or under the proviso to Section 25-FFF. 27. As noticed hereinbefore in the instant case there is a dispute as to whether the circular of the year 1963 as contained in Annexure 2 to the writ application is attracted or not in the case of the concerned workmen and further whether the concerned workmen having regard to their qualification, skill and experience were entitled to the scale of pay attached to the scale of pay admissible to a workman placed in the Grade F or Grade E. 28. In other words the competence of the Selection Committee to fix the workmen in c particular scale of pay itself thereunder was challenged which could not have been de-cided in a proceeding under Sec.33-C(2) of the Act, but could have been the subject- matter of a decision in a reference made under Sec.10 thereof. 29. So far as the second contention raised or behalf of the petitioner is concerned, in my opinion, the same has no merit. Apart from a fact that in an industrial adjudication normally a plea of waiver is not relevant except in clear cases, in view of the fact that in these cases the concerned workmen never accepted the scale of pay without any demur but in fact had been agitating their grievances before the management, categorically show that they had not waived their right. 30. The decision in Chandradip Paswan V/s. The Chairman and Managing Director, Allahabad Bank, reported in, 1983 Pat LJR (HC) 161, was rendered in a different situation. In that case the concerned workman had accepted re-employment offered by the employer, although according to him he was illegally retrenched. In that situation it was held by this court that the concerned workman, having accepted the offer of re-ap-. pointment has waived his right to continue in his service as allegedly his services were terminated in violation of Sec.25-F of the Act. 31. In that situation it was held by this court that the concerned workman, having accepted the offer of re-ap-. pointment has waived his right to continue in his service as allegedly his services were terminated in violation of Sec.25-F of the Act. 31. Taking thus into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that the applications under Sec.33- C(2) of the Act were not maintainable and consequently the impugned order passed by the respondent No. 1 as contained in Annexure 8 to the writ application cannot be sustained. 32. In the result these applications are allowed and the order dt. 27.8.1979 passed by the respondent No. 1 as contained in Annexure 8 to each of the writ application is hereby quashed. Let a writ of certiorari be issued accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.