S. N. Sapra,j. ( 1 ) BY this order, I propose to dispose off an application,filed by plaintiff under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and Order 32rule 7 read with Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, thereby claiming thefollowing reliefs:- " (A) To revoke/recall the order dated 28/02/1985 and revokethe appointment of the arbitrator in relation to the claimbetween the plaintiff and the defendants in the present suit ; (b) To further decree the suit of the plaintiff in terms of the prayerclause made in the plaint as the defendants have admitted thebalance sheet of 1981. " ( 2 ) BRIEFLY, the facts are that plaintiff, a minor, had filed a suit No. 1723 of 1984, through his mother, next friend and natural guardian forrecovery of Rs. 1,28,900. 00 against defendants, on the ground that theamount was lying in deposit in the defendant No. 1 s firm account, in hisname. Defendant No. 1, namely, M/s Lalji Mal Tika Ram, was a partnershipfirm, comprising defendants 2 and 3 as its partners. Defendants 2 and 3 arethe real brothers. Defendant No. 2 is father of the plaintiff/applicant. ( 3 ) IN his written statement, defendant, No. 2 made various allegationsagainst defendant No. 3. The claim of plaintiff was, however, not denied byhim. ( 4 ) IN his written statement, defendant no. 3 alleged that the suit wasgot filed by defendant No. 2. benami in the name of his son, only to harasshim and to prolong the litigation. ( 5 ) SIMILARLY, the minor, Kumari Kumud, daughter of defendant no. 2,filed a suit No. 1724 of 1984, for recovery of Rs. 2. 64,238. 62 againstdefendants. ( 6 ) ANOTHER suit, being suit No. 1657 of 1988 was filed by minor,kumari Sangeeta against defendants for recovery of certain amount. Similar written statements were filed in those two suits. ( 7 ) DEFENDANT No. 2, Shri Ram Gopal, also instituted a suit No. 737of 1984 for dissolution of the partnership firm, namely, M/s Lalji Mal Tikkaram and rendition of accounts, against his brother Shri Ram Charan. Shriram Charan also filed a suit No. 1867 of 1984 for the similar reliefs againsthis brother Ram Gopal. ( 8 ) IT appears that after some discussion amongst the counsel forparties, in all the suits, and the two brothers, namely, Shri Ram Gopal andshri Ram Charan, a settlement had taken place on 28/02/1985 befored. Shriram Charan also filed a suit No. 1867 of 1984 for the similar reliefs againsthis brother Ram Gopal. ( 8 ) IT appears that after some discussion amongst the counsel forparties, in all the suits, and the two brothers, namely, Shri Ram Gopal andshri Ram Charan, a settlement had taken place on 28/02/1985 befored. R. Khanna, J. Vide judgment dated 28/02/1985 D. R. Khanna, J. . in suit No. 737 of 1984, recorded the settlement between the parties to theeffect that the subsisting disputes be REFERRED TO to an arbitrator. For thispurpose, time was sought by the parties to suggest a common name, ifpossible, who was to act as Sole Arbitrator. ( 9 ) PARTIES, however, failed to suggest an agreed name to act as anarbitrator. Accordingly, they sought the appointment of the arbitrator, bythe Court. Vide order dated 22/03/1985, DR. Khanna. J. appointedmr. Justice G. D. Khosla, retired Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court, asthe sole arbitrator, to adjudicate and decide the matters and dispates, asmentioned in order dated 28/02/1985. Incase, for any reason Mr. Justice Khosla declined to act as Arbitrator, or was not otherwise available,then, in that event Mr. Justice S. N. Shankar, retired Chief Justice of Orissahigh Court would act as Arbitrator. ( 10 ) IN the present application, it is alleged that in his order dated 28/02/1985, Mr. Justice Dr. R Khanna had directed the arbitratorto straight-away proceed to direct payment to plaintiff in the suit, as thebalance sheet, which had been admitted by all the parties/partners as correct,show the amount in suit, as payable to plaintiff by the firm. Thus, it isfurther alleged that keeping in view the nature of deposits and the admissionsmade, the amount in suit, was not disputed, so the question of referringthe same to arbitrator, did not arise. The further ground of challenge to theorder, is that plaintiff was never represented by the next friend, nor hiscounsel was present at the time of the alleged settlement, as such, noarbitrator could be appointed, unless the counsel gave a certificate to theeffect, as required under Order 32 Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code. As such,there is no reference in the eye of law. With regard to the disputes betweendefendants 1 and 2, plaintiff was not concerned. ( 11 ) IN reply, defendant no. 3 stated that the question of disputes couldnot be decided in isolation. As such,there is no reference in the eye of law. With regard to the disputes betweendefendants 1 and 2, plaintiff was not concerned. ( 11 ) IN reply, defendant no. 3 stated that the question of disputes couldnot be decided in isolation. The settlement was only to change the forum ofadjudication. Defendant No. 2, being the father and natural guardian ofminors was present in Court. The matter was REFERRED TO to arbitration, withthe consent/permission of the Court. ( 12 ) IN the first place, applicant has invoked the provisions of Section 5of the Arbitration Act. 1940, for revoking/recalling the order dated 28/02/1985. ( 13 ) SECTION 5 reads as under : "5. Authority of appointed arbitrator or umpire irrevocable except byleave of Court.-The authority of an appointed arbitrator or umpire shall notbe revocable except with the leave of the Court, unless a contraryintention is expressed in the arbitration agreement. " ( 14 ) IN M/s. Fulchand Kanhaiyalal Co. v. Kharda Company Ltd andtwo others, A. I. R. 1966, Supreme Court, 1036, their Lordships of Supremecourt, were considering the scope of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, 1940,and held : "we now turn to the legal position which seems to us to be quiteclear. Before the Court exercises its discretion to give leave torevoke an arbitrator s authority, it should be satisfied that a substantialmiscarriage of justice will take place in the event of itsrefusal. In considering the exercise by the Court of the power ofrevocation it must not be forgotten that arbitration is a particularmethod for the settlement of disputes. Parties not wishing the law sdelays know, or ought to know, that in referring a dispute toarbitration they take arbitrator for better or worse, and that hisdecision is final both as to fact and law. In many cases the partiesprefer arbitration for these reasons. In exercising its discretioncautiously and sparingly, the Court has no doubt these circumstances in view, and considers that the parties should not be relievedfrom a tribunal they have chosen because they fear that thearbitrator s decision may go against them The grounds on whichleave to revoke may be given have been put under five heads :1. Excess or refusal of Jurisdiction by arbitrator. 2. Misconduct of arbitrator. 3. Charges of Fraud. 4. Exceptional cases. Excess or refusal of Jurisdiction by arbitrator. 2. Misconduct of arbitrator. 3. Charges of Fraud. 4. Exceptional cases. We have held that there were no such exceptional circumstances inthese cases as would justify us to come to the conclusion that theappointed arbitrator would be disqualified as a result of bias byreason of a conflicting class interest. In view of this finding it isunnecessary to examine the decisions, English or Indian, as respectsthe principle that an interest of which the parties were fully awareat the date of the arbitrator s appointment will not in generaldisqualify him, nor will the fact that he stands in a particularrelationship to the parties or to the matters in dispute, if it can besaid that the parties selected him with knowledge that this was ormust be so. Nor are we concerned with the exception to which theaforesaid rule is subject in relation to arbitrators appointed todetermine future disputes, and the statutory changes made in Englishlaw relating thereto. " ( 15 ) BY the present application, applicant is seeking to revoke, notthe authority of the arbitrator, but is assailing the compromise of the partiesto refer the disputes to the arbitrator, the order of reference and also the appointment of arbitrator by the Court. In my view, the provisions ofsection 5 of Arbitration Act, 1940, are not attracted in the present case. ( 16 ) IN the second place, applicant has invoked the provisions oforder 32 Rule-1 read with Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code for therevocation of the impugned order. Rule 7 of Order 32c. P. C. prohibits thenext friend or guardian, of the minor in suit, from entering into an agreementor compromise, on behalf of a minor, with reference to suit, without theleave of the Court. It further provides that an application for leave, shallbe accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend or the guardian for thesuit, as the case may be. If the minor is represented by a pleader, then, theapplication shall also be accompanied by a certificate of the pleader, tothe effect that the agreement or compromise proposed, is in his opinion, forthe benefit of the minor. If the minor is represented by a pleader, then, theapplication shall also be accompanied by a certificate of the pleader, tothe effect that the agreement or compromise proposed, is in his opinion, forthe benefit of the minor. This, however, does not preclude the Court fromexamining the question, whether the proposed compromise or agreement, is for the benefit of the minor or not If any such compromise or agreement,is entered into without the leave of the Court, then, the same shall bevoidable against tall the parties, other than the minor. ( 17 ) NO doubt, in the present case. a compromise was arrived at without obtaining the leave of the Court. In fact, there was non-complianceof Rule 7. But, in my view, the impugned order cannot be revoked orrecalled, under Rule 7. Thus, an application, under Rule 7 of Order 32c. P. C. cannot be filed to revoke the impugned order. ( 18 ) HOWEVER, it is not the label of a section or the Rule, but thesubstance of the application, which is to be considered by the Court. In myopinion, the present application, in fact, is an application for review underorder 47 of Civil Procedure Code. ( 19 ) MR. R. K. . Makhija, learned counsel, for applicant, urged that since neither an application, under Rule 7, thereby seeking leave of the Courtto enter into a compromise, was filed on behalf of the minor, nor any leavewas, otherwise granted, so, the order dated 28/02/1985, was liable tobe revoked. The disputes between the two partners of the firm, were REFERRED TOto the arbitrator. As such, the minor plaintiff, was not bound by the same. Mr. Makhija has further contended, that since plaintiff was neither represented by his next friend or his counsel, nor the counsel gave any certificate,as required under Rule 7, so, no arbitrator could be appointed, in respect of the claim of plaintiff in the suit. As defendants never disputed the claim ofplaintiff and further, plaintiff was not concerned with the disputes, betweenthe partners of the firm defendant No. 1, so the reference, in respect of theclaim of plaintiff to arbitration was not called for and. as such, there was noreference in the eye of law. The impugned order, so far as it concerns theclaim of plaintiff, is void and not binding upon the minors. ( 20 ) MR. Makhija has placed reliance upon the judgments in Mt. as such, there was noreference in the eye of law. The impugned order, so far as it concerns theclaim of plaintiff, is void and not binding upon the minors. ( 20 ) MR. Makhija has placed reliance upon the judgments in Mt. Mariam and another v. Mt. Amina and others. . A. 1. R. 1937 Allahabad 65:seth Ram Gopal through Seth Fateh Chand. v. Lala Shanti Lal. A. I. R. 1942allahabad 85; Chhabba Lal v. Kallu Lal and others. A. I. R. 1946 Privycouncil 72; Venkataswami Naicker v. Krishna Naicker and others, A. I R. 1947madras 47: Girdhar Prasad and others v. Ambika Prasad Thakur and others,a I R. 1979 Patna 218; and Sheo Kumar Singh v. Hanumat Prasad Singh andothers, AIR/1972 Patna 353. ( 21 ) LEARNED counsel for defendant no. 3, urged that the order dated 28/02/1985, has become final, because the same has not been challenged, either by an application for review or by an appeal. According to him,if an order is passed by a Court, without complying with the provisions oforder 32 Rule 7 C P. C. , it could be set aside only by three modes viz. (A) By a review application, (b) By filing an appeal or (c) by the minor filing a suit in a civil court. He has placed reliance upon judgments in Kaushalya Devi and others v. Baijnath Sayal (deceased) and others, A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 790; Ishar Singh v. Pritam Singh, A. I. R. 1961 Punjab 500; Birbhan v. Harmukh Rai, A. I. R. 1952allahabad 240; Sant Bhushan Lal v. BrijBhushan Lal and others. A. I. R. 1967delhi 1371; Y. B. Patil and others v. Y. L. Patil. AIR 1977 S. C. 392; and0m Pal and ors v. Kirat Ram and ors. 1985 All. L. J. NOC 22. ( 22 ) BEFORE coming to the question of limitation, with regard to thepresent application, which, I have treated, as an application for review, itwill be proper to decide whether the impugned order is void or voidable, atthe option of the minor. ( 23 ) RULE 7 of Order 32 C PC. reads as under : "7. ( 22 ) BEFORE coming to the question of limitation, with regard to thepresent application, which, I have treated, as an application for review, itwill be proper to decide whether the impugned order is void or voidable, atthe option of the minor. ( 23 ) RULE 7 of Order 32 C PC. reads as under : "7. Agreement or compromise by next friend or guardian for thesuit- (1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without theleave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter intothe agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference tothe suit in which be acts as next friend or guardian. (1a) An application for leave under sub-rule (1) shall be accompaniedby an affidavit of the next friend or the guardian for the suit, as thecase may be, and also, if the minor is represented by a pleader, bythe certificate of the pleader, to the effect that the agreement orcompromise proposed is. in his opinion, for the benefit of theminor;provided that the opinion so expressed, whether in the affidavit or in the certificate shall not preclude the Court from examiningwhether the agreement or compromise proposed is for the benefitof the minor. (2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into withoutthe leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against allparties other than the minor. "sub rule I A of Rule 7 was added by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment)Act, 1976. ( 24 ) IN Birbhan v. Harmukh Rai (supra), the following questions werereferred TO to for decision of a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court : "1. Does the omission by the next friend of a minor party to a suitto obtain the leave of the Court as required by sub rule (1) ofrule 7 of Order 32 C P. C. to enter into an agreement to refer thecase to arbitration render the order of reference and the award voidor only voidable at the option of the minor ?2. In case such an order of reference and the award are onlyvoidable at the option of the minor, is it necessary for the minorto file a suit in order to avoid them within a certain period oflimitation ? In case such an order of reference and the award are onlyvoidable at the option of the minor, is it necessary for the minorto file a suit in order to avoid them within a certain period oflimitation ? If so, what Article of the Indian Limitation Act wouldgovern such a suit ?the Full Bench gave the opinion as under :-"our attention was also drawn to the case of Johara Bibi v. Mohammad Sadak Thambi Marakayar, (1951) 2 Madras L. J. 56. Inthis case, after an elaborate discussion the view taken by the learnedjudges who decided it was that the absence of sanction on behalfof the minor under Order 32 Rule 7 of Code of Civil Procedure, foran agreement to refer the dispute in suit to arbitration has theeffect of making a reference a nullity and the award made on sucha reference cannot be said to have any legal effect. It is quite clearthat the law laid down in this case is not on all fours with thatwhich has found favour with the Supreme Court. It is, therefore,unnecessary to discuss this case any further. We are bound tofollow the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Courtand on a full consideration of the relevant law on the point ouropinion in regard to question No. 1 is as follows :"in our opinion, the omission by a next friend of a minor to obtainleave of the Court as required by sub-rule (1) of Rule (1) of Rule 7of the Order 32, Code of Civil Procedure to enter into an agreementto refer the case to arbitration has not the effect of rendering theorder of reference and the award void ab initio. but has merely theeffect of rendering it only voidable at the option of the minor. "we now come to the second question in this case. That question. shortly stated, is that assuming the award and the decree to bevoidable and not void. what is the period of limitation for avoidingit by means of a suit? This question assumes that it is necessaryfor the minor to file a suit in order to avoid the decree within acertain period of limitation. That question. shortly stated, is that assuming the award and the decree to bevoidable and not void. what is the period of limitation for avoidingit by means of a suit? This question assumes that it is necessaryfor the minor to file a suit in order to avoid the decree within acertain period of limitation. There can be no doubt that in thiscase the minor has instituted proceedings for partition and in thoseproceedings one of the issues is whether any permission of the Courtfor reference to arbitration on behalf of the minor was necessaryand, if so, what is the effect of the permission not having beenobtained. It is unnecessary to answer this question as both particsagree that in this particular case the period of limitation will bethree years from the date of attainment of majority by the plaintiffappellant". ( 25 ) IN Kaushalaya Devi and others (supra), their Lordships of thesupreme Court were interpreting the true meaning, object and scope oforder 32 Rule 7 Civil Procedure Code It was held : "the effect of the failure to comply with Order 32 Rule 7 (1) isspecifically provided by Order 32 Rule 7 (2) which says that anysuch agreement or compromise entered into without the leave ofthe court so recorded shall be viodable against all parties otherthan the minor. Mr. Jha reads this provision as meaning that theimpugned agreement is viodable against the parties to it who aremajor and is void in respect of the minor; in other words, he contends that the effect of this provisions is that the major parties to itcan avoid it and the minor need not avoid it at all because it is anullity so far as he is concerned. In our opinion this contention isclearly in consistent with the plain meaning of the rule. Whatthe rule really means is that the impugned agreement can be avoided by the minor against the parties who are major and that itcannot be avoided by the parties who are major against theminor. It is voidable and not void. It is voidable at the instanceof the minor and not at the instance of any other party. Whatthe rule really means is that the impugned agreement can be avoided by the minor against the parties who are major and that itcannot be avoided by the parties who are major against theminor. It is voidable and not void. It is voidable at the instanceof the minor and not at the instance of any other party. It isvoidable against the parties that are major but not against a minorthis provision has been made for the protection of minors, and itmeans nothing more than this that the failure to comply with therequirements of Order 32 Rule 7 (1) will entitle a minor to avoid theagreement and its consequences If he avoids the said agreement itwould be set aside but in no case can the infirmith in the agreementbe used by other parties for the purpose of avoiding it in their owninterest. The protection of the minor s interest requires that heshould be given liberty to avoid it. No such consideration arises inrespect of the other parties to the agreement and they can make nogrievance or complaint against the agreement on the ground that ithas not complied with Order 32, laid down by respondent No. 1does not make the agreement or decree void for it does not effectthe jurisdiction of the court at all. The non-observation of the saidcondition makes the agreement ordecree only voidable at theinstance of the minor, that, in our opinion, is the effect of theprovision of Order 32 Rule 7 (1) and (2 ). " ( 26 ) IN Chhabba Lal (supra), it was held that Order 32 Rule 7 C. P. C. was imperative and should be strictly complied with. It was further heldthat Rule also applied to the agreements to refer the matters in dispute toarbitration. However, an agreement, or settlement to refer the matterin dispute to the arbitrator, without complying with the provisions of Rule 7 could be avoided against all parties, except minor. ( 27 ) IN 0m Pal and others (supra), it was held that the production ofaffidavit from the guardian as well as from the counsel, as required by Rule 7 of Order 32 C. P. C. , was mandatory. If the requirements of the Rule are notcomplied with, then the compromise is voidable at the instance of the minor,despite the absence of proof of fraud or mis-representation. If the requirements of the Rule are notcomplied with, then the compromise is voidable at the instance of the minor,despite the absence of proof of fraud or mis-representation. ( 28 ) IN Bishundeo Narain and another v. Seogeni Rai and others, A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 280, The Supreme Court held : "in our opinion. Order 32 Rule 7 must be read as a whole. Sub-rule (2) contemplates a position where the mandatory provisions ofsub-rule (1) have been ignored. Insuch case, the resultant agreement on compromise is not to be held a nullity. It is only voidable. Therefore, it is good unless the minor chooses to avoid it. It followsthat a decree or order based on the agreement is also good unlessthe minor chooses to challenge it That is the position where thereis no sanction of the Ct. Reading the two provisions together, therule merely means this No. next friend or guardian for the suit canenter into an agreement or compromise which will bind the minorunless the Ct. sanctions it. If the Patna decision is meant to conveythat before the guardian even begins negotiations for compromisewith the other side, he must obtain the sanction of the Ct. we areunable to agree with that view. " ( 29 ) THESE decisions, therefore, are Authority for the propositions that (1) No next friend or guardian for the suit, can enter into an agreement orcompromise on behalf of the minor, with regard to the matter in suit, without the express leave of the Court; (2) Such leave has to be recorded expresslyin the proceedings, though, no particular forum is required for recording suchleave in the proceedings; (j) the provisions of Order 32 Rule 7 Civil Procedure Code shouldbe strictly complied with; (4) The affidavit of the next friend and the certificateby the counsel, if the minor is represented, are mandatory; (5) the certificateof the counsel does not preelude the Court from arriving at its own satisfaction, to the effect that the proposed agreement or compromise is for thebenefit of the minor (6) when, in ease, a compromise or agreement is enteredinto, without the leave of the Court, then, such agreement or compromise isnot void, but voidable against all parties, other than the minor. In otherwords such agreement can be avoided by the minor against the parties, whoare major, but the same cannot be avoided by the parties against the minor. In otherwords such agreement can be avoided by the minor against the parties, whoare major, but the same cannot be avoided by the parties against the minor. It is voidable and not void. It is viodable at the instance of the minor andnot at the instance of any other party; (7) it is not void, because it does notaffect the jurisdiction of the Court at all. ( 30 ) THERE is no force in the arguments of learned counsel for theapplicant, that when the compromise was arrived at on 28/02/1985,counsel for the minor was not present. It may be noted that all the suits, thatis. suits filed by the minors for recovery of their deposits against defendantsand the suits filed by the two brothers against each other, were listed on thesame date, i. e. 28/02/1985. Order was passed in suit No. 737 of 1984. As the order was passed in suit No. 737 of 1984, so in the order, thepresence of the counsel for plaintiff and defendants in that suit wasrecorded. ( 31 ) AS all the suits were listed on the same day, so presence ofcounsel for the parties was recorded in the other suits. In suit No. 1723 of1984. filed by the present applicant, the following proceedings were recordedon 28/02/1985 : "28. 2. 1985present : Mr. N. S. Vashist for the plaintiff. Mr. Arun Mohan withms. Sangita Mehta for defendant no. 1. For order see suit No. 737 of 1984. 28. 2. 1985. "sd/ judgeit clearly shows that when the order was passed, counsel for the presentapplicant was present. ( 32 ) IN the order dated 28/02/1985, D. R. Khanna. J. hasobserved that there were five connected suits and that the parties counselwere present and discussion for settlement had taken place in Court. In theorder, it is also in observed : "so far as the amounts which are lying deposited in the account. books of the firm Laiji Mal Tika Ram in the names of the wivesand the children of Ram Charan and Ram Gopal respectively, ortheir joint Hindu families. It is agreed between the two brothersand plaintiffs of the other three suits that those amounts would bepayable to them and the entries in them are correctly recorded. books of the firm Laiji Mal Tika Ram in the names of the wivesand the children of Ram Charan and Ram Gopal respectively, ortheir joint Hindu families. It is agreed between the two brothersand plaintiffs of the other three suits that those amounts would bepayable to them and the entries in them are correctly recorded. Incase any payments have also been made to any of them againstthose deposits, they too have been recorded in the account booksof the firm, and they are accepted by the parties. The balance sheetdated 9th October will be considered as the base. It will be equitable and fair that payments to both sides should be simultaneouslymade so that nobody steals a march over the other or given anypreference. " ( 33 ) THUS, I am of the view that the settlement was arrived at on 28/02/1985, in the presence of the counsel for the parlies and twobrothers, namely, Shri Ram Charan and Shri Ram Gopal. ( 34 ) THE present application has already been treated, as an applica-tion for review of the impugned order. The next question, arising for deci-sion is with regard to limitation. ( 35 ) THE order was passed on 28/02/1985. Application beingi A. No. 5077 of 1985 was filed in Court on 9/09/1985. The periodof limitation for application for review is 30 days, from the date of the decreeor order, as provided under Article 124 of the limitation Act, 1^63. Thus,there is a delay of 5 months and 9 days. Plaintiff has not filed any applica-tion for condonation of delay. Thus, in my view, the present application isbarred by limitation. ( 36 ) IT is, however, will be appropriate to note that the claims of theminors, were REFERRED TO to the arbitration under the aforesaid settlement. because it had been agreed between the two brothers and the plaintiffs ofthe other 3 suits, that the amounts would be payable to them and that theentries in the balance sheet of the firm were correctly recorded. This was alsowith regard to the deposits, made in the names of the wives and children ofboth the brothers, though no suit had been filed by them. As these amountshad been admitted by two brothers, who are defendants in the suits, filed byminors, at the time of settlement, so it was observed by D. R. Khanna, J. that the arbitrator could give his award straightaway about these undisputeditems. As these amountshad been admitted by two brothers, who are defendants in the suits, filed byminors, at the time of settlement, so it was observed by D. R. Khanna, J. that the arbitrator could give his award straightaway about these undisputeditems. ( 37 ) I hope that the arbitrator will consider this aspect of the order,with regard to the passing of the award for immediate payment to thewives and children of the two brothers, including the minors, who filed suitsfor recovery of various amounts against the present defendants. ( 38 ) IT is made clear that this decision will not affect any right of theminor applicant, with regard to taking any appropriate action, after heattains the age of majority. ( 39 ) UNDER the circumstances, the application, being 1. A. No. 5077 of1985, is dismissed. No order as to costs.