K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order dated 21-12-87 passed by the 5th Addl. Judge to the District Judge Indore in c, S. No. 97-A of 1987 whereby the appellant's application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, 0. P. C. , 1908 (for short the Code) read with Section 151 ibid has been dismissed. ( 2 ) IT is not in dispute that by virtue of the advertisement dated 16-8-64, the respondent Samiti a Housing Society allotted to the appellant who is its member, the Plot No. 112 situate at Ravindra Nagar Indore, and in describing the boundaries it has been stated that towards its north is the Government land and towards the south is plot No 112. ( 3 ) ). It is pertinent to point out that no open space has been shown between plot No. 112 and plot No. 113. ( 4 ) THE case of the appellant is that in constructing his building over the plot he has encroached upon a portion of the Government land with the result that towards the south a portion of the plot allotted to him is lying vacant and is in his possession. In ignorance, treating the land to be of the Samiti, he applied in 1973 for the same being leased out to him. Subsequently in 1980 he contended that the land forms part of plot No. 112 sold to him. ( 5 ) THE dispute was taken by the appellant before the Dy. Registrar, co-operative Societies as provided in Section 64 of the M. P. Co-operative societies Act, 1960 (for short 'the Act' ). On his application for temporary injunction the Dy. Registrar directed the appellant to deliver possession of the land to, the Samiti and has restrained the Samiti from selling the same. ( 6 ) THE dispute was ultimately taken up to Board of Revenue in second appeal by the appellant but without success The appellant had lemained unsuccessful even in the writ petition filed in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India On 8-10-87 he instituted the aforesaid suit for a declaration that the land in dispute belongs to him by virtue of sale deed or in the alternative as a result of prescriptive title and that the samiti has no right to dispossess him of the same. The appellant's moved an application for temporary injunction restraining the Samiti from taking possession of any portion out of plot No. 112 specially towards the south. By the impugned order the aforesaid application for injunction has been dismissed. ( 7 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the dispute in question is within the coverable of Section 64 of the Act and, therefore, the bar under Section 82 of the Act regarding the suit is not attracted. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the land in dispute does not belong to the Samiti and relying on the decision in Secretary of state v. Mask and Co. [air 1940 PC 106, it is urged that the suit is maintainable. ( 8 ) RELYING on the decision in Laxminarayan's case [1988 (1) MPWN 117] it has been urged that at any rate at the stage of an order on an anplication for temporary injunction the question of jurisdiction of the suit cannot be considered. The decision in Kartar Singh's case [air 1931 lah. 624] is also pertinent. ( 9 ) RELYING on the decision in Shankarlal's case [ 1978 0 MPLJ 419 ] it has been urged that there is serious question to be tried and the appellant is entitled to have the status quo maintained. ( 10 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the respondent is a registered Society and the appellant is its member. It is not the appellant's case that leaving the land in dispute, the area in his possession is lesser than that sold to him by the Samiti and his contention that it is so because he has encroached upon Government land is without any factual foundation It is urged that for years he treated the land in dispute as belonging to the Samiti and himself chose the forum of the Dy. Registrar in regard to the dispute. It is urged that in the circumstances of the case the impugned order passed by the Court below in exercise of its discretion is not liable to interference. ( 11 ) ). The point for consideration is whether the appeal deserves to be allowed. Registrar in regard to the dispute. It is urged that in the circumstances of the case the impugned order passed by the Court below in exercise of its discretion is not liable to interference. ( 11 ) ). The point for consideration is whether the appeal deserves to be allowed. ( 12 ) ACCORDING to Section 64 of the Act, if the parties to the dispute are as therein mentioned including Samiti and its member, then notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a Society or the liquidation of a Society shall be referred to the Registrar. Section 82 (l) (c) and 82 (3) read as under:"save as provided in this Act no Civil or Revenue Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of: section 82 (1) (c) : any dispute required to be referred to the registrar or bis nominees, section 82 (3): Save as provided in this Act, no order, decision or award made under the Act shall be questioned in any Court on ground whatsoever". ( 13 ) IN the decision in D. M. Co-operative Bank v. Dali Chand [air 1969 SC 1230] with reference to Section 91 (1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative societies Act (No. 32/61) it has been observed thus :"the word 'business' in sub-section (1) of Section 91 has been used in narrower sense and it means the actual trading or other similar business activity of the Society which the Society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and bye-laws. "pointing out that five kinds of disputes are mentioned in the said sub-section including the dispute touching the business of the Society it has been observed as under :"it is clear that the word 'business' in this context does not mean affairs of a Society because of election of office-bearers, conduct of general meetings and management of a Society would be treated as affairs of society. " ( 14 ) IN the decision in M. V G N. S. Sanstha's case [1980 MPLJ 326] where the Housing Society had sold a plot to its member who in turn had sold it to a stranger, it was held that the suit by the Society against the member and the purchaser for cancellation of sale deed executed by the member is not one touching the business of the Society and not being covered by the provisions of Section 64, is tenable in the Civil Court. ( 15 ) ). Regarding exclusion of the Civil Court's jurisdiction the following observations from the decision in Secretary of State's case (supra) may usefully be reproduced :"exclusion of jurisdiction must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Even where it is so excluded Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine cases where provisions of Act are not complied or statutory tribunal does not act according to fundamental principles of judicial procedure. " ( 16 ) ). It may be noted that there is a clear distinction between the two terms i. e. 'jurisdiction' and 'exercise of jurisdiction'. Jurisdiction to hear and determine a case will not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the correctness of the decision pronounced, for the simple reason that the power to decide necessarily carries with in the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly. If any wrong decision is made, the aggrieved party can take recourse according to law for setting the matter right and if that course is not availed, even a wrong decision cannot be disturbed. But there is a clear boundry between an error of jurisdiction and usurpation of power. The error of judgment can be conciderable by the appellate Court, and, therefore, is only voidable. But if any otder is passed by the authority having no jurisdiction that will be totally a nullity. Reference in this connection may usefully be made to the decision in arunchandra Singh's case [mr 1924 Cal 153]. It has rightly been observed that even a right judgment by a wrong Court is the judgment in the eye of law. But if any otder is passed by the authority having no jurisdiction that will be totally a nullity. Reference in this connection may usefully be made to the decision in arunchandra Singh's case [mr 1924 Cal 153]. It has rightly been observed that even a right judgment by a wrong Court is the judgment in the eye of law. ( 17 ) AS pointed out in Preetpal's case [1988 CCLJ (MP) 233] any dispute about jurisd ction has to be determined at the trial and not at the initial stage of supplemental proceedings of temporary injunction (vide Section 94 of the Code ). The relief of temporary injunction is an equitable one and is discretionary. Therefore, even where the three well-known concurrent conditions requisite for grant of the relief exist, it is not obligatory on the court to grant the same. On the facts and in the circumstances of a given case the Court exercising its discretion in the matter in a judicial manner is entitled to refuse the relief to the party applying for it. ( 18 ) THE Deputy Registrar's order requiring the appellant to deliver the possession of the land in dispute to the respondents passed at the initial stage of the proceedings on the appellant's application for temporary injunction appears to be without jurisdiction The fact, however, remains that there is nothing to indicate that for all these years any action has been taken by the Government against the appellant in regard to the alleged encroachment on Government land by him. In the circumstances the greater probability is that it is by mistake that the land in dispute which initially, admittedly, belonged to the respondent remained to be shown as existing between Flat No. 112 sold to the appellant and the Plot No. 113 and the appellant is labouring hard to make the most of this mistake. ( 19 ) IN the decision in Kanhialal Chordia's case [1983 0 MPWN 119] the following observations are pertinent and may usefully be re-produced :"this findings of the Courts below about the prima facie case has not been shown to be perverse calling for interference in revision by this Court. It is in the discretion of the Court to issue or refuse to issue injunction and normally the appellate Court, much less a revisional Court, does not interfere with the exercise of discretion. It is in the discretion of the Court to issue or refuse to issue injunction and normally the appellate Court, much less a revisional Court, does not interfere with the exercise of discretion. The discretion, of course, like other cases of discretion vested in the Courts has to be exercised in accordance with the reasc n and on sound judicial principles. The grant of injunction is a serious matter and the Court should always take good care to grant an injunction. In view of the finding of the two Courts below which has not been found to be perverse, I find no ground for interference in this revision. From what 1 have discussed above the position of the plaintiff is that of a trespasser and as such he is not entitled to a temporary injunction. " ( 20 ) IN the decision in Kamal Singh's case [1986 (1) MPWN 116] it has been held that injunction cannot be claimed merely on the basis of possession. Possession to be protected must be legal and possession of a trespasser cannot be protected. In the decision in Kamal Kumar's case[1986 (1) MPWN 165] it has been held that every injary is not irreparable injury and only that irreparable injury which results from some illegal act has to be taken into consideration. According to the decision possession being taken under authority of law does not constitute irreparable injury and the relief is granted for the protection of some legal right and not when it would be rendered futile in the absence of such right. ( 21 ) AS a result of the foregoing discussion I find that the impugned order is proper and does not deserve to be interfered with. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs Counsel's fee Rs 100/-, if certified. Appeal dismissed. .