Judgment :- 1. Second appeal is by the second defendant. Deceased first defendant was her husband and fourth defendant their daughter. Third defendant is the husband of fourth defendant and defendants 5 and 6 are their children. Defendants 2 to 6 were impleaded only as persons residing in the building in the suit property a1ongwith the first defendant. 2. Suit property is 26 cents and a building, which originally belonged to first defendant on lease. In 1951, he assigned it to one Vareed under Ext.AS, but continued to reside in the building on oral rent arrangement and then on the basis of Ext. A10 rent deed executed in 1954. In 1960, plaintiff got Ext.A1 assignment of the rights of Vareed. First defendant, thereafter, attorned to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff filed an R.C.O.P. for eviction, first defendant denied his title and the rent arrangement itself. Denial of title was found bona fide and hence by Ext. B9 order, plaintiff was directed to seek remedy before the civil court. That is how this suit was filed for recovery of the land and building on the strength of title. 3. The stand taken by the defendants was that first defendant never parted with his rights in favour of Vareed and he continued to be the owner in possession of the land and building. Rent arrangement was also denied. Ext.A5 was contended to be the result of fraud and what was intended to be executed was a simple mortgage to secure a loan which was thereafter discharged. In short, the contention was that plaintiff has no right to get any relief. 4. On the evidence, both the courts below found that Exts.A5 and A1 are valid documents which conferred title and possession to Vareed and then to the plaintiff. Rent arrangement of the building was also found true. A decree was given for recovery of the land with mesne profits. The claim for eviction of the building was not considered. Trial court said: "Whether the first defendant can be evicted from the building or whether he is entitled to protection of Act 2 of 1965 are matters to be considered by the execution court". Learned District Judge refused to interfere in appeal and dismissed the same confirming the decree saying that the trial court was right in doing so. Hence this second appeal. 5. Learned District Judge refused to interfere in appeal and dismissed the same confirming the decree saying that the trial court was right in doing so. Hence this second appeal. 5. Concurrent findings regarding genuineness of Exts.AS, A1 and A10 as well as the decree for recovery of possession of the land with mesne profits, past and future, do not require interference and that part of the decree was rightly not seriously challenged before me. The only request was that the appellant may be permitted to put forward the plea of kudikidappu right when the question of recovery of the building and the benefits of Act 2 of 1965 are considered in execution as directed in the decrees of the courts below. Such a plea was not raised before the trial court or the appellate court. It was raised, for the first time, only in the memorandum of second appeal. Respondent/ plaintiff opposed the request saying that it is barred by res judicata and estoppel. What is pleaded is constructive res judicata on the ground that such a contention, which might and ought to have been pleaded before the courts below, was not pleaded. Estoppel is on the ground that such a plea was raised before the Rent Control Court and withdrawn atleast for the time being as seen from Ext.B9 order. In the way in which I am going to dispose of the second appeal, both these contentions cannot arise. If the plea is now allowed to be raised, there is no question of res judicata operating. The R.C.O.P. did not decide anything except the bona fides of the denial. When the denial of title was found bona fide and the petitioner referred to the civil court, if the respondent did not want the kudikidappu to be considered at that time, it cannot give rise to a plea of estoppel. 6. But a very inconvenient position has arisen on account of the approach made by the trial court and the appellate court. Both of them unwittingly directed and authorised the execution court to go into and decide matters not within the province of the execution court, but to be decided on the trial side itself. The suit, so far as eviction of the building is concerned, was not at all considered by the trial court or the appellate court except finding that the rent arrangement is genuine. The suit, so far as eviction of the building is concerned, was not at all considered by the trial court or the appellate court except finding that the rent arrangement is genuine. Both the courts below went under the erroneous impression, after finding that the first defendant is a tenant, that the question whether he is liable to be evicted or whether he is entitled to the protection under Act 2 of 1965 are matters not to be decided on the trial side, but could be decided in execution. These are matters to be decided on the trial side and not to be left open for decision in execution. 7. A decree is the formal expression of an adjudication conclusively determining the rights of parties with regard to the matters in controversy between the parties in the suit so far as that court is concerned and judgment is the statement given by the judge on the grounds of the decree or order. Execution court is concerned only with execution of the decree and it can deal only with questions relating to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree as rendered by the court. When the claim in the suit is for recovery of a building with rent and the defence is benefits of the rent control legislation, all matters arising from the pleadings for granting or refusing the relief will have to be considered and decided on the trial side itself and it cannot be relegated to the execution. Without a decree or order to be executed, there is no question of execution. Such relegation could only be treated as refusal of the trial court and appellate court to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them and which they were bound to exercise. Any shortcut in that matter by relegation to execution is illegal. Execution court cannot be invested with the right to determine controversial questions which are to be the basis of the decree that has to be executed. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for eviction of the building and if so on what terms and conditions and whether the defendant is entitled to the benefits of the rent control legislation are all matters to be considered and decided by the decree. The execution court cannot go into these matters and act as trial court. 8. The execution court cannot go into these matters and act as trial court. 8. The building is admittedly in an area where the rent control legislation is applicable. There is no case that the building comes under any exempted category. Rent arrangement, though denied by the defendants, was found true. Undoubtedly, this is a case in which Act 2 of 1965 is applicable. It is trite law that in such cases eviction could be had only on any one or more of the grounds enumerated in S.11 of Act 2 of 1965. So far as the building is concerned, this suit had to be filed before the civil court only because denial of title before the rent control court was found bona fide. When title is denied or permanent tenancy is claimed, under the second proviso to S.11(1), rent control court has to conduct an enquiry and record finding whether the denial or claim is bona fide. If the finding is in the negative, the proceedings can continue. On the other hand, if the finding is in the affirmative involving bona fide dispute on the question of title, it cannot be decided by the rent control court. The petitioner will have to sue for eviction in a civil court competent to try the suit. In such a situation, irrespective of the non obstante clause contained in S.11(1) of Act 2 of 1965, a decree for eviction passed by the civil court could be put into execution for evicting the tenant without an order from the rent control court for eviction. This is because even in such a case, when the relationship of landlord and tenant continues, a decree for eviction could only be on any one or more of the grounds enumerated in S.11. Such ground or grounds must be alleged and established in case of denial as a condition precedent to getting a decree for eviction. 9. Unfortunately, no such ground was alleged in the plaint and proved in the case. That may be because of lack of familiarity with the legal requirement. On that ground, the courts below could have dismissed the suit in so far as it related to eviction of the building. But that was not done and the execution court was authorised and directed to consider and decide those matters. Thus, in effect, the controversy was not settled and no decree was passed. On that ground, the courts below could have dismissed the suit in so far as it related to eviction of the building. But that was not done and the execution court was authorised and directed to consider and decide those matters. Thus, in effect, the controversy was not settled and no decree was passed. The execution court, which is only to execute the decree, was directed to settle the controversy and pass a decree and execute the same. Such a direction is beyond the competence of the trial court. That direction is without jurisdiction and as such a nullity. Whether there will be such an objection or not the execution court will be well within its limits if it refuses to carry out that part of the decree on the ground that it is null and void for want of jurisdiction and incompetency of the execution court to go into those questions. I could have vacated that finding or direction and referred the plaintiff to a fresh suit for that relief. But that may work prejudice to the plaintiff who did not even file an appeal on the bona fide belief that he could have his claims settled in execution as directed by the courts below. Acts of court should never prejudice parties. The present direction cannot be equated to one where there is an irregular direction to fix the value of improvements or mesne profits in execution. Here what is involved is that the trial court has not done anything and the entire job is left to execution. 10. It is true that no appeal or cross objection was filed by the plaintiff though the entire decree was challenged by the appellant. In such a situation, in order to do justice to the parties and to avoid the illegality resulted by the decisions of the courts below, I think that I may be justified in interfering under the powers provided in O.XLI R.22 or 33 even though no appeal or cross objection was filed. It is the duty of the court to solve such a situation which is necessary in the ends of justice. 11. While confirming the decree of the courts below except regarding the direction given to the execution court concerning the building and dismissing the second appeal without costs, the direction regarding the building is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court. 11. While confirming the decree of the courts below except regarding the direction given to the execution court concerning the building and dismissing the second appeal without costs, the direction regarding the building is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court. The trial court will allow the plaintiff, if he wants, within a period of one month of the receipt of records, to amend the plaint alleging grounds, if any, under Act 2 of 1965 to recover the building. If the plaint is not so amended within a period of one month of the receipt of records or within such reasonable time as extended by the trial court, the suit, in so far as the building is concerned, will be dismissed subject to such terms as to costs as the trial court deems fit in the circumstances. If the plaint is amended, the trial court will allow the defendants to file additional written statement, if they so want. Additional issues will then be framed and after giving the parties opportunity to adduce further evidence on the amended pleadings, the suit will be disposed of on the merits, so far as the building is concerned. Execution regarding the confirmed portion of the decree need not await. If a claim of kudikidappu is raised, that will be decided after reference to the Land Tribunal. Office will transmit the records to the trial court forthwith and the parties will appear before the trial court on 20.10.1989. Being an old suit, the trial court will expedite disposal, if possible, within one year of receipt of records.