Judgment :- In these 23 Original Petitions 25 petitioners challenge the validity of instructions issued by the Director of Public Instruction, in the matter of admission of Students to the Teachers Training Certificate Course for he period from 1989 to 1991. Petitioners claim to be educational institutions established and administered by minority communities. They are receiving aid from the State. The salary of all teaching and non-teaching staff are fully paid directly by the State. They claim the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India to administer the institutions of their choice. According to the petitioners, this comprehends the right of choice of students to be admitted to the Course, irrespective of any constraint imposed by the State. In other words, they claim that they are entitled to receive applications from eligible candidates having the minimum qualifying marks and satisfying the other requirements provided for admission. It is also their submission that they are not bound to select candidates on the basis of merit and that they are entitled to admit candidates entirely from the minority communities, admission of candidates belonging to other communities being only a matter of condescension and not a matter of right of any such candidate. They also contend that rules 5,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules impose restrictions abridging their above rights under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India in the matter of admission of students to minority institutions; and as such, those rules are inapplicable to them. They rely on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sidharajbhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC 540, K.O. Varkey v. State of Kerala, 1968 KLT 815, State of Kerala v. Corporate Manager, 1970 KLT 106, and YounusKunju v. State of Kerala, 1988(2) KLT 299. 2. The first of these Original Petitions, O.P.Nos.5996 of 1988, was filed on 26-7-1988, seeking the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P3, and a declaration that rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 shall not be applicable in the case of the Corporate Management of which the petitioner is the Manager. Petitioner is the Corporate Manager of the Schools of St Thomas Valiappalli, Ranni, which belongs to the Knanaya Jacobite denomination. It conducts two High Schools, an Upper Primary School and a Basic Training School. Petitioner is the Corporate Manager of the Schools of St Thomas Valiappalli, Ranni, which belongs to the Knanaya Jacobite denomination. It conducts two High Schools, an Upper Primary School and a Basic Training School. It is asserted that the Training School has been brought into existence by the Church so that qualified teachers of their choice would be available to be appointed in their schools. The predecessor of the petitioner had filed O.P.NO.3533 of 1982 for a declaration that rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules shall not be applicable in the case of the Corporate Management Schools, of which he was the Manager. On the basis of interim orders, he could admit students to all available seats in the Training School (since re designated as Teachers' Training Institute). That Original Petition was withdrawn on the basis of a submission, that the petitioner was making a representation to the State Government. A Division bench of this Court in Ext.Pl judgment dated 6-4-1988 dismissed that Original Petition as withdrawn. Petitioner filed Ext.P2 representation on 12-5-1988 seeking a declaration that M.S. Teachers Training Institute, Ranni is established and administered by a minority. In Ext. PS dated 18-7-1988, Government refused such a declaration for the reason that right from 1949-50 when the School was started, it was one of general schools and not a minority institution. It was stated, that the Management had not filed any petition claiming minority protection before any of the Departmental Authorities, and that except obtaining two interim orders for two different years from this court, no declaration was obtained from this court as sought by the petitioner. Government referred to the fact that admissions were made ever since the establishment of the school excepting the two years, from the State selection list, except to the usual management quota. It was in consideration of those facts that the Government refused the declaration which the petitioner had sought. The Original Petition was admitted on 27-7-1988. Since there were no interim orders, petitioner had to admit candidates from the select list for the course 1988-90, except 11 seats which remained unfilled due to candidates from the select list not reporting for admission. Pursuant to the directions issued by me in CM.P. No. 13055 of 1989; petitioner has filed Ext.P7 series list of candidates selected to the Teachers Training Course during the years 1984-85 to 1988-89. Pursuant to the directions issued by me in CM.P. No. 13055 of 1989; petitioner has filed Ext.P7 series list of candidates selected to the Teachers Training Course during the years 1984-85 to 1988-89. In the further affidavit, he has produced Ext.P8 select list of candidates for T.T.C. Admission to 1989-1991 in the petitioner's institutions. I may have to refer to these details in the course of the judgment. 3. Petitioners in the remaining Original Petitions adopt almost a uniform pattern. I will therefore refer to some of the representative cases only. 4. O.P.No.2927 of 1989 is filed by the Manager of the Corporate Educational Agency of Christ King Convent Teacher Training Institute, which was established by Sisters of the Carmelite Congregation of Trichur. Rules 6 to 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules have the effect of prescribing that the Managements of Aided Training Schools of the State can admit students only to 20% of the seats. The remaining 80% has to be filled up by candidates selected by a Committee consisting of a member of the Public Service Commission's Chairman and an official nominee of the Education Department. Managements of Training Schools established by some of the minority communities filed O.P.No.927 of 1966 series challenging the validity of the above rules as infringing their fundamental rights under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. A learned single judge of this court allowed that Original Petition declaring that rules 6 to 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules would not apply to training Schools established and administered by the minority communities. O.P.No.1900 of 1968 was a petition filed by the Corporate Manager of two Training Schools administered by the Diocese of Madhya Kerala, which is a part of Church of South India. That Original Petition was allowed in the judgment in K.O. Varkey's case, 1968 KLT815, in the light of the decision in Sidharajbhai's case, AIR 1963 S.C. 540. In K.O. Varkey's case, Mathew J., as then was, held; "I hold that rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules are void to the extent they contravene the fundamental right of the minority to establish and administer educational institutions or their choice; and restrain the respondent from enforcing these rules as against the schools in question." 5. In State of Kerala v. Manager, Corporate Management of Schools of the Diocese of Palai,1970 KLJ 273, a Division Bench of this Court affirmed the judgment in O.P.No.927 of 1966. The Division Bench therefore upheld the directions issued by the learned single judge, that "the conditions of reservation of 80 percent of the seats in aided training schools for candidates chosen by the selection Committee and the Director of Public Instruction should not be applied to Schools run by minorities within the meaning of Article 30(1) of the Constitution." 6. The State was thereafter allowing Training Institutes claiming to be established and administered by the minority communities to admit students to all seats in the Training Course without claiming any reservation in favour of candidates selected by the Selection Committee set up by the State under rule 7 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules. The minority character of these institutions was recognised in notifications issued by the Director of Public Instruction, inviting applications specifying qualifications and eligibility necessary for admission to the Teachers' Training Certificate Course by separately identifying the minority institutions in the appendix thereto. Clause 17(8) of the notification issued by the Director of Public Instruction on 14-1-1987 and published in the Gazette dated 3-2-1987 is produced to prove the point that applications for admission to the minority schools were to be submitted to the respective Managements who were free to select candidates. I will refer to that notification hereafter as Ext.P4. In addition to the prescription of qualifications, eligibility etc. of candidates, it was specified in clauses 5,6 and 7 of that notification, that candidates may be selected on a comparative assessment of merit (Clause 5), that 50% of the seats should be earmarked for SSLC holders and the remaining 50% to those who have passed Pre-Degree or equivalent examinations (Clause 6), and managements also may select candidates only on the basis of merit and the reservation mentioned above (Clause 7). 7. The Director of Public Instruction issued notification dated 2-1-1989, which was published in Kerala Gazette dated 17-1-1989, inviting applications for admission to the Teachers Training Course for 1989-1991. In the list attached to that notification, 30 out of 98 Teachers Training Institutes were marked as minority institutions. Clause 18(8) provided that candidates applying for admission in Schools administered by minority communities may apply to the respective Managements directly. In the list attached to that notification, 30 out of 98 Teachers Training Institutes were marked as minority institutions. Clause 18(8) provided that candidates applying for admission in Schools administered by minority communities may apply to the respective Managements directly. Clauses 5,6 and 7, which insist that the Managements as also the Selection Committee should select candidates only on the basis of comparative merit and insist 50% reservation for SSLC-holders and Pre-Degree-holders respectively were reiterated. The Director of Public Instruction issued another notification dated 25-1-1989, which was published in the Gazette dated 30-1-1989, cancelling the previous notification dated 2-1-1989 referred to above. In the meantime, he issued yet another notification dated 21-1-1989, containing the same clauses 5 to 7 and omitting sub clause (8) of clause 18 which provided that applications for admission to training institutes conducted by minority communities may be submitted to the respective Managements. In the list of Training Institutes appended to the notification, the institutions which were formerly specified as minority institutions were marked as "private" . I will refer to that notification hereafter as Ext.P5 as marked in the Original Petitions referred to specifically. The result of this omission is to insist upon submission of all applications to the Deputy Directors of Education of the respective Revenue Districts as enjoined by clause 16 of Exts.P4 and P5. As a consequence, the management also lost the right to select candidates of their choice for admission to the Teachers Training Course. 8. The reliefs which the petitioner seeks are the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the notification dated 21-1-1989 and a declaration that the Director of Public Instruction has no power to apply rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules to the petitioner's school. He has also sought a consequential relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to forbear from enforcing the above rules to the petitioner's training School. 9. O.P.No.3359 of 1989 is filed by the individual-Manager of Teachers' Training Institute which was established as early as in 1946. He claims that the School was established on behalf of a minority community viz., Nadar Christians of Neyyattinkara Taluk and other places. 9. O.P.No.3359 of 1989 is filed by the individual-Manager of Teachers' Training Institute which was established as early as in 1946. He claims that the School was established on behalf of a minority community viz., Nadar Christians of Neyyattinkara Taluk and other places. By order dated 9-12-1969, the Director of Public Instruction allowed the petitioner to select candidates for admission to the Training School in 1969-70 in conformity with the decision of the High Court. Ext.P4 notification dated 14-1-1987 is produced to show that the petitioner's training institute was treated as a minority institution and the petitioner was selecting all candidates for the available seats in that institute. An affidavit accompanying C.M.P.No.13162 of 1989, was filed along with Exts.P6 to P13, apparently pursuant to my direction dated 25-5-1989. Ext.P6 series are tabulated statements of candidates admitted to the Teachers Training Course from 1984-1986 to 1988-1990. The mark lists of candidates admitted during 1986-1988 are produced as Exts.P7 toP9. The notification issued by the Director of Public Instruction on 12-12-1976 regarding admission of students to the Teachers Training Course (1977-1979) is Ext P10. Verification reports for the years 1987-1989 and 1988-1990 prepared by the Deputy Director of Education, Trivandrum are Exts. Pll and P12. Ext. P 13 notification is a copy of Ext.P4 dated 14-1-1987. The reliefs which the petitioner seeks in this Original Petition are, a declaration that Evan's Teachers Training Institute, Parassala is a minority institution and that the respondents have no right or power to enforce rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules against the Teachers Training Institute of the petitioner. He seeks the issue of a consequential direction not to enforce the clauses as far as his institution is concerned. 10. O.P.No.3364 of 1989 is filed by Corporate Manager of the Schools owned and conducted by the Diocese of Madhya Kerala, Church of South India. His predecessor had filed O.P.No.1900 of 1968, which was allowed in K.O. Varkey's case, 1968 KLT815. I have extracted earlier the operative portions of that judgment. Petitioner objects to the attempt to enforce rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules against the training institutes conducted by the Corporate educational agency. He asserts that such attempts are contrary to the directions contained in the judgment in CO. Varkey's case (supra). I have extracted earlier the operative portions of that judgment. Petitioner objects to the attempt to enforce rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules against the training institutes conducted by the Corporate educational agency. He asserts that such attempts are contrary to the directions contained in the judgment in CO. Varkey's case (supra). He submits further that a Division Bench of this Court had considered the same question in Younus Kunju's case, (supra). Reliance is placed on the observation: " there is little elbow room for fresh thinking and for the Government to contend that rules 6,7 and 8 in Chapter XXV still applied to minority institutions. Even then, the Advocate General contended that the "trend" of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court indicated that conditions could be imposed for the grant in aid by the Government, and when those conditions relate to admission of students especially in training institutions and to achieve excellence in educational standards, they are regulatory in nature, permissible under the constitution and not violative of Article 30(1)". Reference is made to Ext.P4 notification dt.14-1-1987 more specifically to clause 17(8) --to the effect that applications for admission to minority schools shall be submitted to the respective managements and the notification dt. 2-1-1989 in which the same condition was reiterated in clause 18(8), and Ext.P5 notification which is published in the Kerala Gazette da ted 7-2-1989, in which the above conditions was completely omitted. Reference is also made to the omission of identification of 30 minority institutions as such in the list attached to Ext.P5 notification. The reliefs which the petitioner seeks are the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to compel the petitioner and the Corporate Management of which he is the Manager, to comply with rules 6 to 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules, on the basis of Ext.P3 notification dated 1-1-1989, to declare that the above rules are not applicable to the training institutes conducted by the petitioner and a consequential direction restraining the respondents from receiving any application from and selecting students for admission to the Teachers' Training Course in the two Training Schools managed by the petitioner. The other reliefs which he seeks are a direction to the respondents restraining them from interfering with the petitioner's right to receive applications and to admit students for the Teachers Training Course in the two Training Schools managed by the petitioner, and a declaration that Ext.P2 (same as Ext.P5) notification is void and illegal in so far as it omits to exempt that minority schools, especially the two Training Schools managed by the petitioner, from the operation of rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules. 11. On O.P. No.3746 of 1989, almost similar contentions are faired. He has produced, in addition to Ext.P5 notification a Circular issued by the Director of Public Instruction on 3-4-1989, requiring the managements of all Teachers Training Institutes that "they may only fill up 20% seats in their institutions and "the remaining 80% seats will be filled by the Department on the basis of the provisions of the Kerala Education Rules". Petitioner himself had invited applications for admission to the Teachers Training Course for the term 1989-1991. The reliefs which the petitioner seeks in the Original Petition are the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash Circular dt.3-4-1989 of the Director of Public Instruction, the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P3 notification (Same as Ext.PS) in so far as private T.T.C. Schools belonging to the religious minorities including the petitioner's school and also in so far as the above notification directs all candidates to apply to the Deputy Director and that the private managers also should apply to the Deputy Director for candidates coming under the management quota. He also seeks a consequential direction to the respondents not to interfere with the petitioner's right to select and admit candidates of its own choice to all the 40 seats in the St-Thomas Teachers Training Institute, Thiruvalla. 12. The complaints of the petitioner are that the cancellation of the first notification dated 2-1-1989 by subsequent notification dated 25-1-1989 and its substitution by Ext. PS notification published in Gazette dated 7-2-1989 constitute an indirect attempt to abridge the right of minority communities to admit students of their choice in the Teachers' Training Institutes conducted by them. 12. The complaints of the petitioner are that the cancellation of the first notification dated 2-1-1989 by subsequent notification dated 25-1-1989 and its substitution by Ext. PS notification published in Gazette dated 7-2-1989 constitute an indirect attempt to abridge the right of minority communities to admit students of their choice in the Teachers' Training Institutes conducted by them. They submit that the instruction that all applications should be submitted directly to the Deputy Director of Education of the respective Revenue Districts and selection shall be conducted on the basis of the principles of reservation for appointments in Government service, do violate the right of the minorities to administer educational institutions of their choice. Some of the petitioners have also raised a point that the insistence upon selection only on the basis of merit is violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution, since the minority managements have an unfettered right to choose students for admission as a part of the right to administer educational institutions of their choice. The important aspects of the case advanced by the petitioners are four-fold: (1) Rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules were declared as void and the State was injected by specific orders in judgments inter-parties against enforcement of those rules against Teachers Training schools/ institutes of the minority communities. The present attempt is to bring back the same conditions which abridge the right of the minorities contrary to such judgments; (2) The restriction of the number of seats to which the Managements may admit candidates to 20% and the insistence that an outside agency shall select candidates for the remaining 80% of the seats is undue abridgment of the rights under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India; (3) The State acted without bona fides in removing the identification of the Institutes conducted by the petitioners as minority institutions in Ext. PS notification in spite of the long practice since 1969-70; and (4) that there was no material on the basis of which the State could have come to the conclusion that Training Institutions administered by the petitioners had ceased to be minority institutions or that Governmental interference in their administration was called for in the interests of excellence of education imparted by the institutions. 13. O.P.Nos. 2810,2855,2920,2927 and 2962 of 1989 were admitted on 31-3-1989. 13. O.P.Nos. 2810,2855,2920,2927 and 2962 of 1989 were admitted on 31-3-1989. The petitioners sought a stay of operation of Ext.P5 notification till the disposal of the Original Petitions. My learned brother Viswanatha Iyer J., ordered, that "there will be an interim order of stay as prayed for. But the petitioner shall not also finalise any admission to the Course in question without further orders from this Court". Substantially the same order was passed in the other Original petitions. As a result of the interim order, the petitioners have received applications from the candidates directly and have selected candidates for admission. But such admissions have not been finalised. 14. In the nature of the controversy involved in these Original Petitions, I thought that more details are necessary to bring the points into focus. Therefore, I passed a further order in the interim applications on 24-5-1989. I passed orders in some of the other Original petitions after hearing both sides, requiring the petitioners to furnish details relating to,- "the number of students admitted each year during the last five years from 1984-85 to 1988-89, the community of each candidate, whether they belong to any of the minority communities, scheduled castes or backward classes, the marks scored by each of the candidates in the qualifying examination, the results of the examination during each year, disclosing as to how many of the trainees passed the examination with marks scored in the training examination and details of successful candidates who were appointed after training each year. Details as to whether they were appointed to Government Schools or minority institutions or private non-minority institutions may also be furnished, if available." 15. Simultaneously, I required the Government Pleader to collect relevant particulars relating to admission into the various Teachers Training Institutes conducted by the petitioners over the years. I also requested the Government Pleader to produce the files which led to the notifications dated 1-1-1989 and 21-1-1989 and the Circular of the Director of Public Instruction dated 3-4-1989. The Government Pleader has produced some of the files. 16. A Junior Superintendent in the Office of the Director of Public Instruction has filed a counter affidavit on 29-5-1989 dealing generally with the controversy involved in these Original Petitions. There is no specific reference to the pleadings in any of the Original Petitions. The Government Pleader has produced some of the files. 16. A Junior Superintendent in the Office of the Director of Public Instruction has filed a counter affidavit on 29-5-1989 dealing generally with the controversy involved in these Original Petitions. There is no specific reference to the pleadings in any of the Original Petitions. It contained general arguments seeking to justify the action of the Director of Public Instruction, without more specific reference to the judgments inter-parties and the previous notifications whereby the Training Institutes of the petitioners were treated as minority institutions. The second respondent asserted that those do not preclude the Government or the Department from taking a different view on a re appreciation of the facts situation prevailing in each and every case. He asserted, that -rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules are regulatory in nature and those provisions were incorporated to ensure that meritorious candidates alone were admitted to Teachers Training Course. Emphasis is laid on the duty of the State to see that candidates having utmost merit alone are selected to undergo Teachers Training Certificate Course, since otherwise the quality of teachers to be appointed from among those who pass out from the Training Schools cannot be ensured. It is also asserted that competence and efficiency of teachers form a basic factor which advances the cause of education and promotes excellence of its standards. The impugned orders are sought to be supported is perfectly in consonance with the object of ensuring proper selection of meritorious candidates for admission to Teachers' Training Institutes which will have a direct bearing on advancement of excellence of education. Reliance is placed on paragraph 5 of the decision in State of Kerala v. Corporate Management, (supra), in which a Division Bench of this Court emphasised that the reason for upholding the plea of the minority managements was that "They have therefore set up Training Schools to train teachers to be qualified for such appointments in their institutions. Reliance is placed on paragraph 5 of the decision in State of Kerala v. Corporate Management, (supra), in which a Division Bench of this Court emphasised that the reason for upholding the plea of the minority managements was that "They have therefore set up Training Schools to train teachers to be qualified for such appointments in their institutions. When it is remembered that the object of Article 30(1) is the conservation or advancing of the religious culture of minority community, it is easily understandable that teachers of a particular category who will promote the purpose are required for service in their institution and that it is to train such teachers these training schools are established by the community though some other teachers who do not injure their cause will also be entertained there. To restrict the communities, choice of 20% of the School strength would certainly prejudice that interest of the community and would therefore violate the freedom assured to them under Article 30 of the Constitution". The decision in K.O.Varkey's case (supra) and the Corporate Manager of the Diocese of Pa/a/ (supra) were sought to be avoided by asserting that the petitioners are not imparting training in their institutions only to teachers who were or are to be appointed in the schools administered by their communities. Reference is made to Articles 16 and 46 of the Constitution of India in support of the insistence on reservation of seats in favour of candidates belonging to backward classes and scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Specific emphasis is laid on the fact that the impugned notification insisted upon merit as a decisive criterion for admitting candidates to the Teachers' Training Course and the absence of any explanation why this criterion, which is uniformly adopted should not be applied in the matter of admission of students to Training Institutes imparting general secular education to candidates belonging to all communities. Reservation of only 20% of the seats for the management and 80% to be selected by the selection committee is sought to be justified on the ground that no more that 20% of the seats in the 30 institutes conducted by them is necessary to train teachers to be appointed in the Upper and Lower Primary Schools of those communities. Reservation of only 20% of the seats for the management and 80% to be selected by the selection committee is sought to be justified on the ground that no more that 20% of the seats in the 30 institutes conducted by them is necessary to train teachers to be appointed in the Upper and Lower Primary Schools of those communities. The second respondent asserted that those are only regulatory provisions ensuring educational excellence falling in steps with the general pattern in the matter of imparting general secular education. 17. This counter affidavit provoked some of the petitioners to file reply affidavits. In his reply affidavit, the petitioner in O.P.No.3364 of 1989 asserted that the counter affidavit filed by a Junior Superintendent in the Office of the second respondent without specifically dealing with the specific pleadings in his Original Petition was insufficient and therefore it had to be taken as if there was no counter affidavit in his case. The fact that the State did not file any counter affidavit was high-lighted. In an obvious reference to my order dated 25-5-1989, some of the details relating to admission of candidates for the period from 1984-85 to 1987-88, community-wise break up of candidates, the percentage of results, etc., are furnished. Such details like marks scored by the candidates in the qualifying examinations are not furnished. It is asserted that- "those who pass out from the two teachers training institutes are recruited as teachers in the L.P. and U.P. Schools established by the C S I. A merit list of trained teachers is prepared on the basis of a written test and interview. The candidates are examined in Bible knowledge, general knowledge and teaching knowledge. The final rank list is prepared by giving representation to both CSI forward and CSI backward communities in the proportion of 8:7. Vacancies are filled up from the rank list as and when they arise. Almost all the teachers in the LP and UP Schools established and managed by the CSI are persons coming out successful from the two teachers training institutes established and administered by the C S I. It is evident from the above that the CSI have set up the two training schools to train teachers to be qualified for appointments in their L P and U P Schools. The management does not accept any donation either for admissions or for appointments. The management does not accept any donation either for admissions or for appointments. The backward CSI consists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes also. The backward CSI Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are given admission in the Institutes". In the reply affidavits filed in the other Original Petitions, it is stated that "It is not possible to give employment to all those or to a substantial number in the school; but they will be absorbed in other minority schools and when they are appointed, their families will ultimately be benefited" (O.P.Nos.2927,2958,2855 and 3556 of 1989 Etc.). 18. Particularly in view of the statement that the State has not filed any counter affidavit, I posted the case for hearing on 10-7-1989, requiring the Government Pleader to file counter affidavit by 5-7-1989. No such counter affidavit was filed on that day. On 10-7-1989, when the case was taken up for hearing, Government Pleader submitted that the hearing may be adjourned to 17-7-1989, so that the Advocate General may be heard after the State filed its counter affidavit. Since counsel for some of the petitioners objected to that request, I proceeded with the hearing. It appears that in the meantime the first respondent has filed a common counter affidavit on 17-7-1989. This counter affidavit also does not deal specifically with the pleadings in any of the Original Petitions; it contains only broad generalizations in support of the Impugned notification and circular. Since the counter affidavit of the State was not filed within time, I can only ignore the same. 19. The Peoples Council for Social Justice, in the meantime, filed c.m.p. no. 14475 of 1989, seeking to implead itself as a party-respondent on the allegation, that "Under the guise of right of administration admissions in these schools are being denied to meritorious candidates only on the ground of caste and community. Such acts of the management will be violative of the fundamental rights of citizens guaranteed by Article 14,15(1), 21 and 29(2). Large number of Candidates who apply for admission in the Teachers' Training Institutes are the victims of discrimination by the management. If the prayer of the management is allowed the menace of discrimination will go unchecked. As the issues arising in this case are of great public importance, Peoples Council for Social justice desired to implead themselves or at least to be heard in the matter". If the prayer of the management is allowed the menace of discrimination will go unchecked. As the issues arising in this case are of great public importance, Peoples Council for Social justice desired to implead themselves or at least to be heard in the matter". Petitioner filed a counter affidavit, objecting to the impleadment and insisting that the Peoples Council for Social Justice is not a party aggrieved, nor has it any interest so as to seek impleadment in the Original Petition. It was asserted: "The students in a minority school will be selected considering the interests of the minority community. Article 30(1) is equally a fundamental right conferred on a community to safeguard the interest of the community" "If students have been overlooked and thereby the petitioner has violated the fundamental right of the students it is for the students to come forward and challenge the selection". After hearing counsel on both sides, I decided that the petitioner in C.M.P.No.14475 of 1989 will be heard in opposition to the petition in accordance with the provisions contained in rule 152 of the High Court Rules. 20. I should refer to some of the details furnished by the petitioners pursuant to my further order dated 24-5-1989 etc., in the interim applications. Some of them have chosen to incorporate such details in their reply affidavits, whereas others have filed separate statements. Petitioners in 22 of the Original petitions have filed some of the details. Those details disclose that admissions were not confined exclusively to members of the minority community, concerned. A fairly large number of candidates from other communities also have been admitted. In the cases of the petitioners in O.P.Nos. 3009 of 1989 and 3748 of 1989, admissions were confined to candidates of the minority communities alone during the year 1986 to 1989 in the former and 1984-1986 to 1988-1990 in the latter. Even there, it is claimed that some candidates from communities other than the minority community, which administer the schools are admitted. The lowest marks for candidates admitted during the respective years have been furnished by all the petitioners, except in O.P.Nos. 3664 of 1989, 3110 of 1989 and 3556 of 1989. Petitioners in O.P.Nos. Even there, it is claimed that some candidates from communities other than the minority community, which administer the schools are admitted. The lowest marks for candidates admitted during the respective years have been furnished by all the petitioners, except in O.P.Nos. 3664 of 1989, 3110 of 1989 and 3556 of 1989. Petitioners in O.P.Nos. 2746 of 1989, 2927 of 1989 3110 of 1989, 3110 of 1989, 3556 of 1989 and 3788 of 1989 have not furnished the details of the successful candidates, who are appointed as teachers in their Schools. In O.P.No.5996 of 1988, it is stated that five successful candidates from the Teachers Training Institute were appointed in the School belonging to the same management. In O.P.No.2810 of 1989, it is stated that 141 out of 300 persons who completed training since 1984 were appointed in the educational institutions belonging to that Corporate Educational Agency. Petitioners in O.P.Nos. 2855 of 1989, 2920of 1989,2958 of 1989,3109 of 1989 and 3258 of 1989 have only stated that successful candidates are appointed in their schools wherever possible and the others have been absorbed in other minority schools. Petitioner in O.P.No. 3009 of 1989 has stated that successful candidates were appointed in the 96 U.P. and L.P. schools the same management and that 64 permanent hands and 70 leave substitutes wee appointed in Schools under the same management. Petitioners in O.P.No. 3439 of 1989 and 3607 of 1989 have stated that wherever, possible, successful candidates were appointed in the Schools under their management and others were absorbed in other minority Schools. Petitioner in O.P. No.3364 of 1989 has stated that successful candidates are recruited as teachers in the L.P. and U.P. Schools of C.S.I. giving representation to both C.S.I. forward and backward communities in the proportion of 8:7. Petitioner in O.P.No.3359 of 1989 has stated that, exact details are not available; but, one candidate of 1984 March, one of 1985 March, and one of 1987 March were appointed in the petitioner's School. 9 trainees were appointed in Roman Catholic Management Schools, 5 in L.KLS. Management,1 in Salvation Army Management,1 in St Thomas High School, Poonithura, and 1 in Government School. These figures are out of over 105 successful candidates. Petitioners in O.P.Nos. 9 trainees were appointed in Roman Catholic Management Schools, 5 in L.KLS. Management,1 in Salvation Army Management,1 in St Thomas High School, Poonithura, and 1 in Government School. These figures are out of over 105 successful candidates. Petitioners in O.P.Nos. 3748 of 1989 and 4171 of 1989 have stated that, good percentage are absorbed in Schools under the Quilon and Punalur Dioceses and others are absorbed in Schools under Catholic and non-Catholic Christian Managements. Their details are not furnished. 21. It is curious that the petitioners, most of whom are Corporate Educational Agencies owning U P and L P Schools, in addition to Teachers Training Institutes and are in a position to furnish the details of appointment of candidates, who had come out successful from their Training Institutes and who were appointed in Schools administered by the same educational agency have kept back detailed information in this regard for reasons of their own. 22. Some interesting particulars are, however, furnished by the petitioners in O.P.No.3746 of 1989 and 4171/1989. The Teachers Training Institute is owned by the Corporate Educational Agency of Mar Thomite Church. It conducts 133 Upper and Lower Primary Schools and 13 High Schools with Upper Primary sections. It is asserted that on an average, 50 retirement vacancies have to be filled up each year in those Schools. Itis also stated that candidates who pass out of the Training Institute are given preference in appointment. It is curious, however, that no details of appointments are furnished in the statement or reply affidavit. It has provision to admit 40 candidates. According to clause 6 of the notification, 50% each have to be admitted from SSLC and Pre-Degree holders. 414candidates had applied for admission. The petitioner prepared a provisional select list for admission to the 1989-1991 course, consisting of 11 candidates with Pre-degree qualifications. 29 candidates, whose names are included in the provisional selection list belong to the Marthomite denomination. One candidate each belonging to Jacobite Church and Evangelical Church was selected. Three Cheramar, two Nadars, three Hindus and one Muslim make up the remaining candidates. In the SSLC quota, 11 candidates were selected. The remaining 29 candidates belong to the Pre-Degree quota. 6Marthomite candidates are selected in the SSLC quota. Theirmarksare51.7%, 66%, 66.6%, 68.7%, 73.8% and 76.7% respectively. Petitioner rejected applications--among others - of 66 applicants with SSLC belonging to the same community having marks of 52.1% and above. In the SSLC quota, 11 candidates were selected. The remaining 29 candidates belong to the Pre-Degree quota. 6Marthomite candidates are selected in the SSLC quota. Theirmarksare51.7%, 66%, 66.6%, 68.7%, 73.8% and 76.7% respectively. Petitioner rejected applications--among others - of 66 applicants with SSLC belonging to the same community having marks of 52.1% and above. 10 out of those, 66 have marks above 70%. 3 Cheramar candidates selected in the SSLC quota had 47.7%, 53.3% and 58.5% marks. Among the candidates whose applications were rejected, 3 Cheramar candidates have 54.5%, 53% and 59.1% marks. A Hindu-Ezhava was selected in the SSLC quota. He has 56.7% marks. 5 candidates belonging to the same community having 57.3%, 59.3%, 63%, 64.5% and 73.8% were rejected. Three Muslim candidates whose applications were rejected were having 60%, 62.1% and 71.8% marks. In the Pre-Degree quota of 29, as against 20 as prescribed in the notifications, 15 Marthomite candidates with marks ranging from 40.4% to 45%; five candidates with marks ranging from 45% to 50%; three candidates with marks ranging from 51% to 60%; one candidate with more than 61% and another candidate with marks above 70% were provisionally selected. 24 candidates belonging to the same community with marks between 50% to 60% were rejected. In that quota one Hindu-Vilakkithala Nair with 44.1 % was selected, whereas another candidate belonging to the same community with 58.3% marks was rejected. As I have observed earlier, the particulars furnished in O.P.No.4171 of 1989 are also substantially similar. 23. It is relevant in this context to refer to the submissions which the Advocate General made on behalf of the respondents. He said that selection of candidates whether in private or minority institutions receiving aid from the State or in those maintained by the State have to be regulated by merit among all the applicants irrespective of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. He submitted that this had always been a condition for admission. He advanced his submissions on the assumption that petitioners may be entitled to claim the protection of Article 30(1) but that protection will be subject to other Constitutional provisions and reasonable regulations. He did not rely on the extreme proposition contained in the counter affidavit of the respondents. 24. He submitted that this had always been a condition for admission. He advanced his submissions on the assumption that petitioners may be entitled to claim the protection of Article 30(1) but that protection will be subject to other Constitutional provisions and reasonable regulations. He did not rely on the extreme proposition contained in the counter affidavit of the respondents. 24. That submission is amply supported by Ext.P10 notification dated 12-12-1976 relating to admission for TTC Course 1977-1979, Ext.P4 notification dated 14-7-1987 regarding TC Course for 1987-1989 and Ext.P5 notification dated 21-1-1989. One of the specific conditions for admission contained in Ext.Pl is to the effect, that 25. Counsel for some of the petitioners urged emphatically that the minority managements have an absolute right to choose candidates and that the respondents are not entitled to introduce any fetter on such right. One of them went to the extent of urging that the minority managements are not bound to observe the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, since Article 30(1) insulates them against any other constitutional or other rights. Counsel also argued that Article 29(2) of the Constitution also cannot apply to or curtail in any manner, the rights guaranteed to the minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. According to them Article 29(2) is a guarantee in favour of minorities for admission in educational institutions maintained by the State and such of the institutions receiving aid from the State as are not established or administered by the State. In short, the argument is that minorities can confine admission to institutions established and administered by them to members of those communities only, whereas members of those communities have an unrestricted right of admission to institutions maintained and institutions conducted by non-minority communities and receiving aid from the State. The further argument is that even among Candidates belonging to the minority communities, selection need not be made on the as is of merit or any other relevant, ascertainable and definite standards, but can be according to the assessment of their needs by the minority managements. 26. The details furnished in O.P.No.5996 of 1988,3746 of 1989 and 4171 of 189 etc. have to be examined in the light of the above propositions. The definite case the second respondent in the counter affidavit is that admissions are not made on the sis of merit. 26. The details furnished in O.P.No.5996 of 1988,3746 of 1989 and 4171 of 189 etc. have to be examined in the light of the above propositions. The definite case the second respondent in the counter affidavit is that admissions are not made on the sis of merit. It is true that is only a general assertion in respect of all the Original I expected that if selection was made entirely on the basis of merit, the petitioners would have asserted that in their reply affidavits. But that is significantly absent. I will, therefore, be justified in assuming that the Managements selected To the same effect are conditions 5 and 7 in Ext.P4 dated 14-1-1987 and Ext.P5 dated 21-1-1989. They are extracted hereunder: candidates not entirely on the basis of merit, even from among candidates belonging to the same community, but on the basis of other considerations. Most of the petitioners have failed to furnish the necessary details, in spite of specific orders. In these circumstances, I think that it will be proper to draw the inference that in other cases also, selection would not have been made on the basis of merit as enjoined by the conditions contained in the notifications which the Director of Public Instruction was issuing year after year. It is also seen that in the matter of admission of candidates, the directions contained in the notification that 50% of the seats shall be filled up by candidates who have passed S.S.L.C. and the remaining 50% shall be earmarked for candidates who have passed Pre-Degree have been frequently violated as is evident from Ext Pll and P12 in O.P.No.3359 of 1989. The details furnished by the petitioners, as directed by me, also disclose that except in a couple of cases, admissions were thrown open to all communities. No particulars are, however, available to ascertain whether the direction relating to the governing criterion was duly observed by the managements. 27. These Original Petitions were argued in elaborate detail. But, I do not think that it is necessary for me to refer to all the decisions which have been pains-takingly read before me. No particulars are, however, available to ascertain whether the direction relating to the governing criterion was duly observed by the managements. 27. These Original Petitions were argued in elaborate detail. But, I do not think that it is necessary for me to refer to all the decisions which have been pains-takingly read before me. I repeatedly told counsel that in so far as the points arising for consideration are covered by earlier inter partes judgments, or binding precedents of the Supreme Court or a Division Bench of this Court, I am bound to follow them, unless of course the State was able to make out that in the changed circumstances, a different view may have to be taken. I have referred to the counter affidavits of the respondents, which, according to me, contain only broad generalizations and not any more positive materials to justify a conclusion different from that which the respondents had reached on earlier occasions. Much less are those materials sufficient to hold that the judgments inter-parts or the orders issued by the Government or the binding precedents of the Division bench cannot apply to the fact situation in any one of these Original Petitions. I should state, in fairness to the Advocate General, that he did not dispute this position. He confined his submission only to two aspects, firstly that in the changed circumstances, there should be more stringent measure to prevent mal-administration by the minority managements and that the provisions of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules and the conditions of admission are only permissible regulations. 28. From the details furnished by the Government, it is evident that in 18 of the Original Petitions there were earlier judgments of this court, holding that the Teachers' Training Institutes concerned were established and administered by the minority communities. In other cases, except O.P.No.5996 of 1988, either the Director of Public Instruction or the Government had accepted their status as educational institutions administered by minority communities. 30 out of 98 Teachers Training Institutes were assumed to be minority institutions in the judgment in Younus Kunju's case, 1988 (2) KLT 299. I have, therefore, to proceed on the assumption, that the petitioners are entitled to claim the benefit of Article 39(1) of the Constitution of India in the matter of administration of the Teachers' Training Institutes. 30 out of 98 Teachers Training Institutes were assumed to be minority institutions in the judgment in Younus Kunju's case, 1988 (2) KLT 299. I have, therefore, to proceed on the assumption, that the petitioners are entitled to claim the benefit of Article 39(1) of the Constitution of India in the matter of administration of the Teachers' Training Institutes. lam also bound by the decisions in K.O. Varkey's case (supra), Corporate Manager of the Diocese of Palai's case (supra) and Younus Kunju's Case (supra). I have therefore to hold that rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules cannot be applied against these managements. 29. I need not go into the reasoning of these binding precedents. In Sidnarajbhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 S.C 540, the Supreme Court held that the restriction of the number of candidates to be admitted in a minority institution to 20% and the insistence on admission of 80% to candidates selected by an outside agency clearly abridged the right of the minority community under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. It was that decision which was followed in the three decisions of this court which I have referred to. It is obvious therefore that the respondents cannot insist that the minority-managements can admit only 20% of the candidates and that they shall admit the remaining 80% of the candidates as selected by the Director of Public Instruction or the selection committee provided under Rule 7 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that the circular issued by the Director of Public Instruction on 3-4-1989, instructing the managements to confine selection of candidates to 20% of the seats in their Teachers' Training Institutes and requiring the remaining 80% to be filled by candidates selected by the selection committee is illegal and unenforceable. 30. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that the circular issued by the Director of Public Instruction on 3-4-1989, instructing the managements to confine selection of candidates to 20% of the seats in their Teachers' Training Institutes and requiring the remaining 80% to be filled by candidates selected by the selection committee is illegal and unenforceable. 30. On a consideration of Sidharajbhai, AIR 1963 S.C 540 and Corporate Manager, 1970 KLT106, the Division Bench held Younus Kunju, (Supra) that - "there is little elbow-room for fresh thinking and for the Government to contend that rules 6,7 and 8 in Chapter XXV still applied to minority institutions." The court thereafter, considered the extent of 'additional regulations which could be imposed on the right of minority communities to administer educational institutions of their choice in the context of Article 30(1) of the Constitution with reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court in In re-Kerala Education Bill, 1957 AIR 1958 S.C 956, St Xavier's College, AIR 1975 S.C 1389, Mother Provincial, AIR 1970 S.G 2079, All Saints High School, AIR 1980 S.C 1042, and All Bihar Christian Schools Association, AIR 1988 S.C. 305; and, held that- "the law is settled that the right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice guaranteed under Article 30(1) is, not an absolute right but is subject to reasonable regulations which subserve the purpose of recognition and affiliation and preserve "the excellence of the institution as a vehicle for general education". Regulations prescribing the curriculum of studies and syllabi for examinations, the conditions of employment of teachers and the hygeine of students, and principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of the institution, are not restrictions within the "prohibited zone" of Article 30(11. Regulations, however, cannot be stipulations for the surrender of this fundamental freedom and cannot abridge or annihilate the minority right to establish and administer an educational institution of its choice". (emphasis added) The Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and declared that rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules are not applicable to admissions to Training Schools. (emphasis added) The Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and declared that rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules are not applicable to admissions to Training Schools. The Court directed the respondents not to enforce those provisions against the appellant and its training school and quashed the orders recognising and ordering closure of the school Respondents were also restrained from withholding recognition of the school or withholding the grant for violation of rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules. All students admitted during the academic year and the previous years were allowed to complete the course and sit for the examination. It was further directed that admission to 1988-89 Course would be made without reference to rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules. It was observed, that - "to the interest of excellence of educational standards, we hope and tnut that merit is not unduly sacrificed by the Management in making admissions". It is clear from the above pronouncement, that the Division Bench of this Court delineated the limits of permissible regulations to include those prescribing "principles of admission and academic needs of the institution." The Bench also recognised merit as an important consideration in the matter of admission. Those observations are also part of the binding precedent 31.The same Division Bench dealt with the same aspect in the judgment in O.P.8739 of 1982 and observed in paragraph 25 as follows: "Regulations can thus prescribe the manner and method of recruitment of teachers. If the regulations insist that appointment of teachers by direct recruitment should be on merit and a selection to choose the best to the post is obligatory, those provisions are advisedly inserted intending to enrich and enhance the quality of education imparted in these institutions. It it difficult to accede to the contention that regulations cannot prescribe reasonable norms of selection of teachers to a minority institution. When insistence on a selection process is a permissible and reasonable regulation, which does not encroach on the fundamental right under Article 30(1), the post of Principal cannot also be excluded from the purview of selection-.A provision for selection for the appointment of a Principal of a College is thus constitutionally permissible and is a relevant, reasonable measure of regulation applicable to minority institutions also." 32. Later judgments of the Supreme Court have crystalised the position further in regard to the extent of permissible regulations in the matter of exercise of the right of the minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Reference need be made only to three later decisions, because Yoonus Kunju's case on which both sides rely rather heavily, has put the position beyond controversy as far as this court is concerned in the portion of the judgment which I have extracted above. I have not been referred to any binding precedent subsequent to that decision taking a contrary or different view regarding the extent of permissible regulations in C.M.C.H.Employees' Union v. C.M. College, Vellore associate on (AIR 1988 SC 37), the Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Madras High Court to the effect that reference under the Industrial Disputes Act of industrial disputes between the workmen and management of Christian Medical College, which is a minority educational institution, violated the right of administration under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The Court observed: "These rights which are enforced through the several pieces of labour legislation in India have got to be applied to every workman irrespective of character of the management. Even the management of a minority educational institution has got to respect these rights and implement them. Implementation of these rights involves the obedience to several labour laws including the Act which is under consideration in this case which are brought into force in the country. Due obedience to those laws would assist in the smooth working of the educational institutions and would facilitate proper administration of such educational institutions. If such laws are made inapplicable to minority educational institutions, there is every likelihood of such institutions being subjected to maladministration. XXX XXX XXX Similarly the right guaranteed under Art.30(1) of the Constitution is not violated, if a minority school is ordered to be closed when an epidemic breaks out in the neighborhood, if a minority school building is ordered to be pulled down when it is constructed contrary to town planning law or if a decree for possession passed in favour of the true owner of the land when a school is built on a land which is not owned by the management of a minority school. In the same way if a dispute is raised by an employee against the management of a minority educational institution such dispute will have necessarily to be resolved by providing appropriate machinery for that purpose." In Governing Body of StAntony's College, Shillong v. rev. fr.paul Petta (AIR 1988 SC 2005) the Supreme Court held that a principal of an aided College administered by a minority community, and whose appointment was approved by the Director of Public Instruction cannot be transferred without notice in view of the instructions in the nature of regulations issued by the State Government. The Supreme Court held such instructions to be permissible regulations. Almost the same view was taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Islamia Karimia Society Indore v. DeviAgukta Viswa Vidyalaya AIR 1988 MP.200 and S. Sreevastava v. Principal, A.A. Institute, AIR. 1989 A11.117. This court had as early as in 1978 held infr.maf/7ewmunf/?/r/v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 Kerala 227 held that "In the course of the argument, we had asked the petitioner's counsel whether the minorities would claim a right to establish educational institutions whenever and wherever demanded. Although with hesitation, petitioner's counsel was obliged to admit this extreme right cannot be maintained. We think too, that such an extreme position entitling the minority to ask, and to be given, the educational institutions, wherever it wants to establish, at any moment when the cry is raised, is not the scope and the content of Art.30. Regulation of the right in time as well as in space, must, if appears, be permissible. Rule 2 seems to provide for nothing more than such a regulation. It provides for the assessment of educational needs of the locality by a competent authority after taking into account the relevant considerations." A Division Bench of this Court in W.ANo.44 of 1970 upheld the validity of rule 51A of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules as follows:- " We see little substance in the contention that rule 51A is ultra vires Article 30(1) of the Constitution. That a fully qualified person who has once been appointed by the Manager and discharged for want of vacancy should be reappointed unless he has meanwhile disqualified himself in some way or other-and there is no such allegation here-is if it at all affects the right to administer, only regulatory and not restrictive of that right". That a fully qualified person who has once been appointed by the Manager and discharged for want of vacancy should be reappointed unless he has meanwhile disqualified himself in some way or other-and there is no such allegation here-is if it at all affects the right to administer, only regulatory and not restrictive of that right". The Supreme Court approved that judgment in Mary Oommen v. M.G.M. High School, Kerala AIR 1987 SCI 163. I had in my judgment in Fr.Francis Fernandez v. D.E.O., Ernakulam, 1988(2) KLT 403, referred to the two Division Bench decisions in 1988(2) KLT 299 and O.P.Nq.8439 of 1982. I am, therefore, of the view that the second respondent was competent to prescribe "principles and methods of admission of students" in the nature of Exts.P4 and P5 and that they are "not within the prohibited zone", except to the extent that the latter, by reason of removal of sub-clause (8) of clause 18 took away the right of admission from the managements and entrusted the power of admission to an outside agency. I hold that the right of the minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, though seemingly absolute, is subject to regulations and such regulations as provide for "principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions" are permissible. 33. The remaining aspects which fall for consideration on the basis of the pleadings are: (1) Are the petitioners right in their submission that no candidate has a right under Article 29(2) of the Constitution of India to insist on admission to an educational institution administered by a minority community? and, (2) Are the petitioners right in insisting that candidates who apply for admission have no right to equality or freedom from arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India in the matter of selection for admission? These questions become relevant in the light of the specific plea raised in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second respondent, to the effect, that "It is therefore essential that those who are admitted for Teachers Training Course in the various Training Institutes in the State (both Government and Private) must be candidates having utmost merit otherwise the quality of teachers to be appointed from among those who pass out from the Training School cannot be ensured. It is needless to say that the competence and efficiency of teachers is a basic factor which advance the cause of education and promote the excellence of education. The selection of 80% of seats in the private Training Schools, by a committee appointed by the Government is to achieve the above avowed object. As already submitted, the Committee selects candidates based on merit subject of course to the rules of reservation. Even in the case of selection in the reserved quota, candidates are selected based on merit from among the eligible candidates for selection in the particular reservation quota". xxxx xxxx xxxx "the petitioners have also no case that they have been making selection of candidates to the T.T.C. Course in their Schools, based on merit or on any reasonable and acceptable criterion. If that be so, admissions made based on "pick and choose" can by no stretch of imagination be said to be perfection in the Geld of education". These assertions are emphatically controverted in the reply affidavits. I will refer only to relevant portions of some of the counter affidavits, because, as I stated earlier, the pleadings follow almost the same pattern. 34. In the reply affidavit in O.P.No.3746 of 1989, the above assertion, that the regulations are imposed for ensuring proper selection of meritorious candidates for admission to Teachers' Training Institutes, which will have a direct bearing on the excellence of education, is controverted. It is stated, that-' " for the advancement of excellence of education in general, even regulatory measures cannot be imposed under Article 30(1). It is settled law applicable to the regulatory measures sought to be introduced". Reference is then made to paragraph 13 of Corporate Management's case. 35. In paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit in CM.P. No. 14475 of 1989, the petitioner in O.P.No. 2927 of 1989 asserts: "The students in a minority school will be selected considering the interests of the minority community. Art.30(1) is equally a fundamental right conferred on a community to safeguard the interests of the community" It is further stated in the counter affidavit filed by the petitioner, that "However, in this case, the question of Art.29(2) does not arise. What is contended is the constitutional invalidity of impugned circular and orders inspired to annihilate the minority right after the declaration of invalidity repeatedly held by the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala". What is contended is the constitutional invalidity of impugned circular and orders inspired to annihilate the minority right after the declaration of invalidity repeatedly held by the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala". He submits further, that "If students have been overlooked and thereby the petitioner has violated the fundamental right of the students it is for the students to come toward and challenge the selection." 36. More emphatic assertions are made by counsel appearing for some of the petitioners. I do not propose to deal with them at greater length, since the pleadings extracted above are sufficient to understand the scope of the submissions made by counsel. 37. Counsel for the petitioners referred me to the decisions-D/rector of S.E.T.N.Govt. v. G.Arogiaswamy, AIR 1971 Madras 440, Gurpreet Singh v. Punjab University, AIR 1983 P & H70, and KA.Hamidv. Mohd.HajiSaboo Siddik Polytechnic, AIR 1985 Bombay 394. In the former decision, the High Court of Madras held, that "the applications for admission to any institution cannot be restricted to a particular community because of Articles 15(1) and 29(2). The result is the students of the Roman Catholic Community, which is said to represent less than ten per cent of the total population, when in competition with students of the other communities who have all applied for admission, obviously will have but slender chances of admission, contrary to the protection afforded by Article 30(1). It is true the impugned order is conceived in public interest to ensure proper standards in the matter of admission to basic and non-basic training schools. That is good by itself. But when applied to a minority institution, its effect is not to its benefit from its own point of view. That is forbidden by Article 30(1)". 38. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the second decision held, that--"on the specific language of Arts.15 and 29 of the Constitution of India, on principle and on authoritative precedent, there is no fundamental right of equality, conferred on all citizens for admission on merit alone, in privately owned and managed educational institutions receiving aid out of State funds". 39. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the third decision frowned upon the reservation in a minority institution of seats in favour of backward classes and scheduled castes. The Court held, that was an impermissible restriction. 39. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the third decision frowned upon the reservation in a minority institution of seats in favour of backward classes and scheduled castes. The Court held, that was an impermissible restriction. On facts, the Court held that the candidate belonging to scheduled caste was refused admission not because of his caste, but only because he had lesser marks. The Court, therefore, held that no question of violation of Article 29(2) really arose for consideration. The decision proceeds on the assumption, that if a candidate was denied admission in a minority institution that would spell out violation of Article 29(2) of the Constitution of India. 40. A further submission is that the freedom under Article 30(1) of the Constitution is totally independent of any other constitutional provision and therefore admissions made by the minority institution cannot be tested in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution to ascertain whether the candidates were admitted on the basis of merit or any other relevant consideration. 41. In Champakan Dorairajan's case, AIR 1951SC 226, the Supreme Court considered for the first time the scope of Article 29(2) of the Constitution, with reference to the provisions of Articles 16 and 46 thereof. The Court held: "It will be noticed that while Cl.(1) protects the language, script or culture of a section of the citizens, Cl.(2) guarantees the fundamental right of an individual citizen. The right to get admission into any educational institution of the kind mentioned in Cl.(2) is a right which an individual citizen as a citizen and not as a member of any community or class of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizens on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. If a citizen who seeks admission into any such educational institution has not the requisite academic qualifications and is denied admission on that ground, he certainly cannot be heard to complain of an infraction of his fundamental right under this Article. But, on the other hand, if he has the academic qualifications but is refused admission only on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them, then there is a clear breach of his fundamental right". 42. But, on the other hand, if he has the academic qualifications but is refused admission only on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them, then there is a clear breach of his fundamental right". 42. The inter-action of Articles 29(2) and 30(1) of the Constitution fell specifically for consideration for the first time in Bombay Education Society v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 561. The Supreme Court held, that "the language of Article 29(2) is wide and unqualified and may well cover all citizens whether they belong to the majority or minority group. Article 15 protects all citizens against the State whereas the protection of Article 29(2) extends against the State or anybody who denies the right conferred by it. Further Article 15 protects all citizens against discrimination generally but Article 29(2) is a protection against a particular species of wrong namely denial of admission into educational institutions of the specified kind". ................................................ "Article 29(2) confers a special right on citizens for admission into educational institutions maintained oraided by the State. To limit the right only to citizens belonging to minority groups will be to provide a double protection for such citizens and to hold that the citizens of the majority group have no special educational rights in the nature of a right to be admitted into an educational institution for the maintenance of which they make contributions by way of taxes. We see no cogent reason for such discrimination". 43. In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956, the Supreme Court considered that question again. S.R. Das C.J., speaking for the Court, observed: "It is obvious that a minority community can effectively conserve its language, script or culture by and through educational institutions and, therefore, the right to establish and maintain educational institutions of its choice is necessary concomitant to the right to conserve its distinctive language, script or culture and that is what is conferred on all minorities by Art.30(1) which has hereinbefore been quoted in full. This right, however, is subject to Q.2 of Art.29 which provides that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.". 44. This right, however, is subject to Q.2 of Art.29 which provides that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.". 44. This position was re-stated by another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Cort in DAV College v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 1731. Yet another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389, also considered the same question. It is significant to note that in none of the 7 different opinions in Si Xavier's College case was the right to confine admissions of students of minority community alone or to reserve seats for them so as to exclude others upheld. With specific reference to Article 29(2), Dwivedi J., held: "A glance at the context and scheme of Part III of the Constitution would show that the Constitution makers did not intend to confer absolute rights on a religious or linguistic minority to establish and administer educational institutions. The associate Art.29(2) imposes one restriction on the right in Article 30(1). No religious or linguistic minority establishing and administering an educational institution which receives aid from the State funds shall deny admission to any citizen to the institution on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The right to admit a student to an educational institution is admittedly comprised in the right to administer it. This right is partly curtailed by Article 29(2)" (para. 256 A.P. 1463). 45. These precedents of the Supreme Court make it unmistakably clear that the right of admission which vests in an institution by virtue of the power of administration enjoyed by it under Article 30(1) cannot be in violation of Article 29(2). 46. The Allahabad High Court accepted that position in Seefansu Srivastava v. Principal, AA Institute, AIR 1989A11.117. A Division Bench observed in the above decision, that- "it is thus dear that a minority institution cannot insists in reserving seats for students of own community. 46. The Allahabad High Court accepted that position in Seefansu Srivastava v. Principal, AA Institute, AIR 1989A11.117. A Division Bench observed in the above decision, that- "it is thus dear that a minority institution cannot insists in reserving seats for students of own community. If such reservation would have been in violation of equal protection guaranteed under Art.14, then any reservation policy which is in teeth of Art.29(2) cannot be upheld such construction, from which there appears no escape, the independence of religion or linguistic minority is neither eroded nor curtailed nor its independence minimized or shaken, rather it harmonizes and advances the objective of secularism the ideal of society and foundation of the Constitution. What crystallizes from above discussion is that neither Government is entitled to interfere with right of minority and direct it to admit a student as it may contravene the choice of minority under Art.30 nor the institution can deny admission to any student because he is not a member of any community nor it can reserve seats for members of its community so as to preclude others as it shall be in violation of Art.29(2). That is choice should be of minority but within the constitutional framework, namely without denying admission on ground of caste or religion etc." 47. I respectfully agree with the above decision. With great respect, I express my inability to agree with the decisions of the Madras and Punjab & Haryana High Courts, since they take views different from the decisions of the Supreme Court in Chempakam Dorairajan, Bombay Educational Society, In re Kerala Education Bill and St. Xavier's College, (supra). It appears to be clear that the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India in favour of the minority community to administer educational institutions of its choice, including admission of students, shall be subject to the right guaranteed under Article 29(2) of the Constitution, to the effect that "no citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them". A more meritorious candidate who applies for admission to the institute conducted by a minority community and receiving aid from State funds cannot be denied admission for the only reason that he does not belong to the religion, caste, or race of the management. 48. A more meritorious candidate who applies for admission to the institute conducted by a minority community and receiving aid from State funds cannot be denied admission for the only reason that he does not belong to the religion, caste, or race of the management. 48. It is equally clear that candidates belonging to the same minority community with better marks shall not be denied admission for the only reason that the minority management does not like the more meritorious candidate or for any other like reason. As has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court in as Catena of decisions, which the Division Bench of this Court has referred to inYounusKunju's case (supra), the right of the minority community under Article 30(1) of the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to regulatory provisions intended to advance and promote excellence in educational standards. That position is reiterated by the Supreme Court of India in a number of recent decisions--C.M.C./Y. Employees' Union v. C.M. College, Vellore, Assocn., AIR 1988 SC 37, Governing Body, St. Antony's College v. Rev. Fr. PaulPetta, AIR 1988 SC 2005, and Andhra Kesari Edu. Society v. Director of School Edu., 1989 (1) SCC 392-that regulations intended to advance excellence of educational standards, to provide for satisfactory conditions of service for the staff, to regulate industrial relations and like relevant matters do not abridge or annihilate the minority right under Article 30(1). The Supreme Court repeatedly held, that such regulations only promote the interests of the institution, its constituents, the teaching staff and the student community. It is of course true, that a distinction was sought to be made in some of the decisions, to the effect that regulations intended to promote general public interest may not be regulations which may be justified in the context of the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The insistence that the candidate belonging to the minority community should be treated fairly and equally in the matter of admission and that selections shall be free from arbitrariness or discriminatory preference unrelated to excellence in educational standards is one such consideration which promotes excellence of the educational institution even as a minority institution. Equality in the sense of freedom from arbitrariness is the hall-mark of the fundamental rights of Indian citizens and members of the minority community are citizens just as much as others. Equality in the sense of freedom from arbitrariness is the hall-mark of the fundamental rights of Indian citizens and members of the minority community are citizens just as much as others. As a matter of fact, the secular Constitution of India does not make a distinction in the application of the fundamental rights as between members of one community or the other or one religion or race, caste or language and the other, except to the very limited extent of advancing the interests of socially and educationally backward classes as provided in Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. It will be a travesty of justice to hold that members of the minority community have no right to equality, only because they belong to that community and that too for admission to institutions which are established and administered to advance the faith, script, language, religion and culture of that very minority community. In all other institutions, whether owned by the Government or privately owned, they are entitled to insist that selection shall be on the basis of merit. It shall not be as if the only fact that they belong to the minority shall deprive them of the right to insist upon constitutional right of equality for admission into institutions conducted in their interests by their community. I have no hesitation in holding that members of the minority community who apply for admission to the Teachers' Training Course in institutions administered by the minority community have equal right, along with others, to insist that admission shall be on the basis of definite and ascertainable standards which apply to all. If this be the correct position in law, the provisions contained in clauses 5 and 7 of the impugned notifications, that admission shall be made only on the basis of merit, whether in government or private or minority institutions, is unassailable. 49. The instances which I have pointed out with reference to the details of applicants furnished in O.P.Nos.5996 of 1988 and 3746 and 4171 of 1989 etc., make it abundantly clear that provisional selection was made not on the basis of merit at all. Candidates who had better marks even among those belonging to the same minority community were excluded unreasonably. The instances which I have pointed out with reference to the details of applicants furnished in O.P.Nos.5996 of 1988 and 3746 and 4171 of 1989 etc., make it abundantly clear that provisional selection was made not on the basis of merit at all. Candidates who had better marks even among those belonging to the same minority community were excluded unreasonably. The stipulation contained in clause 6 of the notification, to the effect that 50% of the seats shall be filled up by candidates having SSLC qualification and the remaining 50% shall be ear-marked for candidates possessing Pre-Degree qualification, was frequently violated. This is evident also from Ext., PH inO.P.No.3359of!989. 50. I cannot accept the submission that the regulatory provisions contained in clauses 5,6 and 7 of Ext.P5 notification are in any manner restrictive or annihilative of the right of the minority community under Article 30(1). Those were conditions for admission for about two decades, since those conditions were parts of the notifications which the Director of Public Instruction had issued year after year, inviting applications for admission. Eventhough some of the managements had not been scrupulous in observing those conditions, they have never challenged them. Even in the present Original Petitions, they have not sought any relief against those conditions. The only challenge is confined to restriction of admission by the managements to 20% of the seats, admission of 80% of the candidates by an outside agency and the rather wilful omission to identify 30 minority institutions, which have thus far been treated as minority institutions. 51. That naturally means that admissions have to be regulated according to the conditions contained in the notification, whether it be the notification dated 1-1-1989 or the one published on 7-2-1989. The managements of Teachers' Training" Institutes of the minority communities are free to admit students from among the eligible who are qualified according to the provisions contained in Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules, except clauses 6,7 and 8. The provisions in Rule 9 and part of Rule 10 may not perhaps apply, because they apply only to selections to be made by a selection committee. All other provisions except those relating exclusively to selection by the selection committee constituted under rule 7 will apply with equal force to all minority managements. The provisions in Rule 9 and part of Rule 10 may not perhaps apply, because they apply only to selections to be made by a selection committee. All other provisions except those relating exclusively to selection by the selection committee constituted under rule 7 will apply with equal force to all minority managements. Petitioners are, therefore, obliged to regulate admissions on the basis of merit and merit alone among candidates who apply for admission. They are bound by the terms of the permissible regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Instruction not to deny admission to a more meritorious candidate only on the ground of religion or caste of the candidate. They are definitely precluded from denying admission to candidates of the same community with better marks and greater merit for the only reason that they do not like those candidates or that they like candidates with lesser merit better due to considerations other than excellence of educational standards. 52. I am also of the opinion that the Government is entitled to insist upon consideration of merit of the candidates as the governing criterion for admission to Teachers' Training course. When once the candidates acquire qualifications prescribed under chapter ;;;, of the Kerala Education Rules, such candidates are entitled to be considered for appointment in U.P. and L.P. Schools maintained by the State as also by institutions aided by it. Rule 12 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules specifically provides, that "candidates who acquire the training qualifications shall, as far as possible, be absorbed as teachers in Government or private schools in the year in which they pass the examination after giving preference to those who have already acquired requisite qualification in the previous years and remain unabsorbed". It is, therefore, essential that the State keeps scrupulous watch over the selection of candidates for teachers' training course. It is evident from Exts. P11 and P12 in OP. No. 3359 of 1989, that the respondents have been verifying-though half-heartedly-the admissions with reference to the principles contained in the notifications inviting applications even as late as in 1977. None of the minority managements have so far demonstrated against such verification. Nor have they pleaded in these Original Petitions, that the respondents are not entitled to verify the admissions with reference to the stipulations contained in the notifications inviting applications. 53. None of the minority managements have so far demonstrated against such verification. Nor have they pleaded in these Original Petitions, that the respondents are not entitled to verify the admissions with reference to the stipulations contained in the notifications inviting applications. 53. It may perhaps be true that the verification of admissions was half-hearted so far. The State has a duty to see that institutions receiving aid from State funds scrupulously observe the permissible conditions regulating admission. The State shall be more concerned to enforce the negative mandate of Articles and 29(2)14 of the Constitution of India. It is essential that the respondents conscientiously enforce the provisions contained in clauses 5,6 and 7 of the notification so that selections are made entirely on the basis of merit. That is the only manner in which equality and freedom from arbitrariness as enjoined by Article 14 of the Constitution can be ensured in the matter of admission to State aided institutions, which are instrumentalities of the State. Enforcement of the above principles does not violate any minority right under Article 30(1). Scrupulous observance of merit as a determinative criterion for admission to Teachers' Training Course, which leads to eventual employment, either in Government Schools or in aided Schools, only promotes excellence of standards in general secular education as also in promoting the institutions even as minority educational institutions. Insistence on observance of equality as between members of the same community only enhances the efficacy of the institution as a vehicle for imparting education even as a minority institution. 54. Some of the counsel emphatically urged that it is not necessary for me to consider whether the citizens have got a right under Art.29(2) to insist upon admission without regard to caste, community or religion. I was also told that it is not necessary for me to consider whether the right under Article 30(1) is subject to Articles 14 and 29(2) of the Constitution, since none of the students or guardians who may perhaps raise these contentions are before me. I was told that courts ordinarily avoid points which are not directly relevant to grant reliefs sought by petitioners. A number of decisions and text books were also cited in support of these propositions. I was told that courts ordinarily avoid points which are not directly relevant to grant reliefs sought by petitioners. A number of decisions and text books were also cited in support of these propositions. I do not propose to refer to them at length because, I am of the opinion that it is essential in the light of the points on which parties have joined issue to pronounce upon the amplitude of and the extent of the constitutional limitations on the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. To me it appears absolutely essential that this shall be done with reference to the pleadings and detailed arguments urged with reference to the associate Article 29 which is included in the same portion of the Constitution dealing with "Cultural and Educational rights'. Equally important is it to consider submissions made on the basis of Article 14, which is the soul of our Constitution. In a case where what is sought to be enforced is an absolute right independent of all other constitutional provisions, this court has to be cautious in granting such reliefs which will promote absolutism which is the sworn enemy of our secular, democratic republican Constitution. 55. Absolutism in any manner in any sphere is foreign to the ethos of our Constitutional system. It is therefore difficult to accept the submission that the right of the minority to establish and administer educational institutions of its choice is absolute, and that even regulatory measures cannot be imposed on the right under Article 30(1) for advancement of excellence of general secular education imparted in those institutions. Nor can the submission that Article 30(1) of the Constitution confers a right on the minorities totally and absolutely independent of other provisions of Part III of the Constitution be countenanced. 56. It is true that the decision of the majority in A.K.Gopalan's Case, AIR 1950 SC 27, was that fundamental rights under various Articles in Part III of the Constitution of India are mutually exclusive. If that view holds good, the petitioners may be right in their submission that Article 30(1) of the Constitution confers on the minority a fundamental right independent of all other provisions of Part III including Articles 14 and 29(2). But a Bench of 11 Judges in RC. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564, by a majority of 10, over-ruled the majority view in A.K.Gopalan's Case. But a Bench of 11 Judges in RC. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564, by a majority of 10, over-ruled the majority view in A.K.Gopalan's Case. The Supreme Court restated this proposition in Maneka Gandhi's Case AIR 1978 SC 597. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555, the Supreme Court had asserted that every State action should be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. I have therefore no hesitation to dismiss the claim of the petitioners that the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India is a separate and independent right and cannot be controlled or even influenced by any of the other Article in Part III. 57. I have referred to the application, CM.P.No.14475 of 1989 in O.P.No.2927 of 1989, whereby the Peoples' Council for Social Justice has sought to intervene. Counsel for the intervenor sought to support the contentions raised by the State in defence of the position that merit shall be the primary consideration in the matter of admissions and that Article 30(1) of the Constitution has to be read along with Articles 14 and 29 of the Constitution of India. There was one other petition, C.M.P.No.17382 of 1989 for impleadment in O.P.No.2810 of 1989. That was filed by the father of one of the candidates included in the provisional select list for admission to the Training Institute conducted by the Diocese of Palai. Counsel for that petitioner did not raise any argument. Notwithstanding that, I have looked into the affidavit in support of the application. What I find is that he generally supports the Management. His complaint is that admission to the course is unduly delayed by reason of proceedings in this court and the disposal of the matter may be expedited. I have heard and considered the arguments advanced by the intervenor in accordance with the provisions of rule 152 of the Kerala High Court Rules. 58. I hold that all educational institutions, which are aided, whether they be administered by the minority community or otherwise, shall regulate admission of students with the awareness of the provisions of Article 14 and 29(2) of the Constitution of India. That is the minimum justice which candidates seeking admission to professional courses leading to employment can legitimately expect from institutions of general secular education receiving aid from State funds. That is the minimum justice which candidates seeking admission to professional courses leading to employment can legitimately expect from institutions of general secular education receiving aid from State funds. That is more so in the case of members of the same community who seek admission to educational institutions administered by their communities, and who, as citizens, are entitled to insist upon admission on the basis of merit. 59. Pursuant to the interim orders of this court, petitioners have received applications and prepared provisional select lists. This court had, however, directed that admissions to the course 1989-1991 will not be made. In view of my finding that merit among applicants will be the governing criterion, the petitioners may have to revise the provisional select lists according to merit among the candidates. Admissions will be finalised after verification with reference to merit on the basis of marks obtained by the candidates. Petitioners will revise the provisional select lists entirely on the basis of marks obtained in the qualifying examination and in strict compliance with clauses 5,6 and 7 of Ext.PS notification. Admissions may be finalised subject to effective verification by the Deputy Directors of Education with reference to the provisions of Chapter XXV, except rules 6,7 and 8 and the Regulatory conditions contained in Ext.P5 notification. 60. O.P.No.5996 of 1988 stands on a different footing. I have referred to the facts of that case at some length. The petitioner sought from the Government, a declaration that the educational institutions under his Corporate Educational Agency are minority institutions, but the State Government refused such a declaration in Ext.P3 in that Original Petition. The petitioner has to avoid that order to obtain the benefits of Article 30(1) of the Constitution. I am not inclined to grant that relief to the petitioner on the scanty materials produced by the petitioner. I will rather leave it to the petitioner to produce all materials necessary for establishing its claim before the State Government. If that be done, the State Government shall consider the matter afresh uninfluenced by whatever is said in Ext. PS order which is impugned in the Original Petition. I allow that Original Petition to that limited extent only. What remains to be considered is as to what relief should the petitioner obtain in respect of admission of students for TTC Course 1989-1991. PS order which is impugned in the Original Petition. I allow that Original Petition to that limited extent only. What remains to be considered is as to what relief should the petitioner obtain in respect of admission of students for TTC Course 1989-1991. In view of the observations contained in the judgment in Younus Kunju's case (supra), that 30 institutions in the State are minority institutions and that may perhaps include the institute of the petitioner as well and the State has not produced any material controverting that assumption, I will proceed on the basis that the petitioner is also entitled, for the time being, to the reliefs as the other petitioners. This will, however, be confined to the current year and will enure in favour of that petitioner only till such time as the matter is reconsidered by the Government before the commencement of admissions for the next batch for TTC Course. 61. In the light of the above, I allow the Original Petitions to the extent indicated below: I) Rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules will not apply to the petitioners. II) The respondents are not entitled to insist that applications for admissions to the Teachers' Training Certificate Course in the Training Institutes administered by the minority communities should be submitted to the Deputy Directors of Education. Sub-clause (8) of clause 18 of Ext.P5 will therefore be restored. III) The Circular dated 3-4-1989 which the Director of Public Instruction issued leaving only 20% of the seats for TTC Course to the managements and insisting on admissions of Candidates to 80% of the seats is declared as illegal and unenforceable against institutions administered by minority communities. IV) The petitioners will regulate admission of students to the TTC Course 1989-1991 and later on the basis of merit among the applicants in view of Articles 14 and 29(2) of the Constitution of India. Such admissions will be finalised as directed in paragraph 58 above. IV) The petitioners will regulate admission of students to the TTC Course 1989-1991 and later on the basis of merit among the applicants in view of Articles 14 and 29(2) of the Constitution of India. Such admissions will be finalised as directed in paragraph 58 above. V) Ext.P5 notification inviting applications, except to the extent indicated in paragraphs I to III and the Rules in Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules, and except Rules 6 to 8 and the rules dealing exclusively with selection of candidates for admission by the selection committee are "Regulations prescribing the curriculum of studies and syllabi for examination and principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of the institution and are not restrictions within the prohibited zone of Article 30(1) of the Constitution" and are promulgated "in the interest of excellence standards" and to see that "merit is not unduly sacrificed by the managements in making admissions" as observed by this court in Younus Kunju's case, 1988(2) KLT299. VI) The above relief will be confined in O.P.No.5996 of 1988 only for admission of students to TTC Course 1989-1991 and will be subject to the directions and observations contained in paragraph 60 above. In dealing with Ext.PZ afresh, the State Government will be uninfluenced by the relief now granted and any observations contained in Ext.P3 order in that Original Petition. and VII) Admissions shall be finalised as directed in para.58 above and in the light of the observations and direction contained in this judgment as expeditiously as possible. Parties will suffer their respective costs.