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1989 DIGILAW 34 (GUJ)

BABUBHAI BHURABHAI v. PARMANAND NATHALAL VAGHELA

1989-02-20

S.B.MAJMUDAR

body1989
S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE present revision application under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (the Act for short) is filed by the petitioner original defendant who is since deceased and is represented by his heirs. He has brought in challenge the decree for possession as confirmed by the appellate Court at Amreli agreeing with the conclusion reached by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. ( 2 ) I will refer to the original petitioner-defendant as defendant and the respondents plaintiffs for the sake of convenience in the later part of this judgment. The defendant is occupying a shop on the ground-floor of the building to the plaintiffs situated in Vania Vora Sheri at Amreli. The defendant occupied the said shop on the ground floor at a monthly rent of Rs. 8. 00. He was a sitting tenant even before the plaintiffs purchased this property from executors and heirs of deceased Ramji Hansraj. The defendant was carrying on his tailoring business in the said shop. The main entrance door of the shop was facing east and was having height of 5 and was 2-9 broad. Over that door was a ventilator. It is the case of the plaintiffs that without asking for their permission the defendant changed this door and the ventilator in the eastern wall into one larger door having 7 height and 5 width. It is the case of the plaintiffs that this was done about 2 months before filing of the suit. It is pertinent to note that the suit was filed in the trial Court on 1-3-1974. Thus according to the plaintiffs the aforesaid larger door was put up in the eastern wall of the demised shop by the defendant somewhere by the end of December 1973 or beginning of January 1974. It is this act of the defendant which resulted into filing of the aforesaid suit by the plaintiffs against the defendant for eviction. Thus according to the plaintiffs the aforesaid larger door was put up in the eastern wall of the demised shop by the defendant somewhere by the end of December 1973 or beginning of January 1974. It is this act of the defendant which resulted into filing of the aforesaid suit by the plaintiffs against the defendant for eviction. The said suit was filed mainly on two grounds firstly under Sec. 13 of the Act which provides that the landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied that the tenant has committed any act contrary to the provisions of clause (o) of Sec. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 The suit was also based on additional ground under Sec. 13 (1) (b) which provides that the landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied that the tenant save as otherwise provided in Sec. 23 has without the landlords consent in writing erected on the premises any permanent structure. There is an explanation added by the legislature to Sec. 13 ( b) which reads as under:"for the purpose of clause (b) no permanent structure shall be deemed to be erected on any premises merely by reason of the construction of a partition wall door or lattice work or the filling of kitchen-stand or such other alterations made in the premises as can be removed without serious damage to the premises". The nature of the offending door of larger size was examined by the trial Court Oh evidence. The plaintiffs support of their case examined engineer Mr. J. S. Soni Ex. 40. He had examined the disputed door and given his report Ex. 42. He also prepared a map Ex. 43 showing the nature of the premises after the offending door was placed in the eastern wall of the premises and he produced at Ex. 45 the front view of the shop in question along with shop No. 5 being adjoining shop which was in possession of another tenant who had put up rolling shutter in place of the earlier old door in the eastern wall but it was done with the consent of the landlord and his landlord had not taken any steps for possession for his having put up such shatter. The learned trial Judge placing reliance on the evidence of the aforesaid engineer Ex. The learned trial Judge placing reliance on the evidence of the aforesaid engineer Ex. 40 took the view that she act of the defendant amounted to wasting of the premises making him liable to be evicted under Sec. 13 (1) (a) of the Act read with Sec. 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act. So far as the case of the plaintiff under Sec. 13 (1) (b) was concerned placing reliance on the explanation to Sec. 13 (1) (b) the trial Court took the view that if even without consent of the landlord a door was put up the defendant it cannot be said to be a permanent structure and hence decree cannot be passed against the defendant under Sec. 13 (1) (b ). However the learned trial Judge passed decree under Sec. 13 (1) (a) of the Act. It is this decree which was challenged before the appellate Court. Before the appellate Court no attempt was made by the respondents-plaintiffs to support the decree under Sec. 13 (1) (b) of the Act. Therefore the only question which remained for consideration of the appellate Court was whether the decree for possession passed against the defendant by the trial Court can be sustained under Sec. 13 (1) (a ). The learned appellate Judge considered this question in para 13 of the judgment under challenge: before me. The learned appellate Judge referred to Sec. 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act and observed that the tenant should not change the user of the premises which would be destructive or permanently injurious to the property. Having noted that provision the learned appellate Judge tuned to the evidence of witness Jaisukhbhai Soni and them observed that his report conclusively shows that the wall had become unsafe due to the big opening and this opening was on account of the higher door replaced by the defendant and that there was no reason to disbelieve the expert evidence. Therefore according to the learned Judge due to the alteration made by the defendant the wall was subjected to the strain and additional burden and it has separated from the adjoining wall and had become unsafe and unstable. Therefore the defendant had not used the premises as a man of ordinary prudence so as not to make it non-injurious. Therefore according to the learned Judge due to the alteration made by the defendant the wall was subjected to the strain and additional burden and it has separated from the adjoining wall and had become unsafe and unstable. Therefore the defendant had not used the premises as a man of ordinary prudence so as not to make it non-injurious. Having reached that finding the learned appellate Judge held that the lower Court was perfectly justified when it held that the defendant was guilty of an act contrary to the provisions of clause (o) of Sec. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and accordingly he confirmed the decree of the trial Court under that provisions. ( 3 ) MR. S. M. Shah for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the appellate Court has not property come to the gripe of the problem. That Sec. 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Set read with Sec. 13 (1) (a) of the Rent Act can he pressed in service only if the alleged act of tenant is squarely covered b the contingencies contemplated by Sec. 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act. Placing reliance on the said provision he submitted that as enjoined by the said provision the lessee may use the property and its products (if any) as a person of ordinary producer would use them if they were his own but he must not use or permit another to use the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased or fell or sell timber pull down or damage buildings belonging to the lessor or work mines or quarries not open when the lease was granted or commit any other act which is destructive or permanently injuries thereto. He submitted that if at all the case would fall under the last part of the aforesaid provision and that is precisely the case with which the plaintiff came to Court. Therefore on evidence the Court must reach a clear finding of fact as to whether by increasing the size of the door in the eastern wall of the suit shop the petitioner had committed an act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the demised premises. In the substance of such a clear finding no decree can be passed against the defendant under that provision. In the substance of such a clear finding no decree can be passed against the defendant under that provision. Placing reliance on the explanation to Sec. 13 (1) (b) of the Rent Act it was. submitted that if the door as put up by the tenant in the demises premises by virtue of the aforesaid explanation he cannot be deemed to have put up a permanent structure if such a door can be removed without serious damage to the premises. He submitted that even the trial Court had held in view of the said explanation that the case was not covered b) Sec. 13 (1) (b) of the Rent Act and that part of the finding of the trial Court was not challenged before the appellate Court by the respondents-plaintiffs and that the only case placed before the appellate Court for getting decree of eviction confirmed against the petitioner was under Sec. 13 (1) (a) of the Rent Act. It was therefore contended that it was incumbent on the appellate Court as a final Court of facts to come to a clear finding effect that the impugned door said to have been put up in the eastern wall of the suit shop by the petitioner was destructive or permanently injurious to the suit shop. As such a finding in not arrived at the suit deserves to he dismissed. ( 4 ) MR. Hathi for the respondents on the other band submitted that the trial Court has come to be clear finding of fact that the offending door in the eastern wall of the suit shop was az act which was permanently injurious to the premises and this finding is based on the evidence of the engineer and it is this evidence which was reconsidered by the appellate Court in para 13 of its judgment and the appellate Court has also noted the provisions of Sec. 108 (3) of the Transfer of Property Act and consequently when the appellate Court found that due to alteration made by the defendant the wall is subjected to strain and additional burden and it had separated form the adjoining wall and had become unsafe and unstable it can he implied that the appellate Court had found that the act of the defendant in putting up the door in the eastern wall of the suit shop was permanently injurious to the suit premises. He also submitted that it the offending structure is permanently injurious to the other part of the property in possession of the plaintiff then also it may most the requirements of the case. ( 5 ) I have carefully considered the aforesaid rival contentions canvassed by the learned Advocates of both the parties. Even taking a most charitable view of the finding reached by the appellate Court in para 13 of its judgment it has to be held that all that the appellant Court has found as a matter of fact is that the offending door had subjected the wall in which it is placed to the stain and additional burden and had made it unsafe and unstable. Nowhere it is found in the said para that offending door has permanently injured the suit Premises. In the context of Sec. 108 (o) on the Transfer of Property Act it is difficult to agree with the submission of Mr. Hathi for the respondents that the offending use of the suit premises by the lessee can be destructive or permanently injurious to any other part of the property of the plaintiff de hors the leased premises and even in such contingencies Sec. 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act would get attracted. The very first part of the aforesaid provision indicates that it deals with the obligation of the lessee qua demised property which is permitted to be used by the lessee under the contract of lease. There obviously cannot be any use by the lessee of the other property of the lesser not put in his possession under the contract. Even second part of Sec. 108 (o) indicates the same position as it enjoins upon the lessee not to use or permit another to use the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. It is also his obligation not to fell or sell timber pull down or damage buildings belonging to the lessor and then follows the last part of the provision which lays down that he would not do any other act which is destructive or permanently injurious thereto. The words permanently injurious thereto would necessarily connote causing permanent injury to the demised property. Therefore it is difficult to agree with the general proposition canvassed by Mr. The words permanently injurious thereto would necessarily connote causing permanent injury to the demised property. Therefore it is difficult to agree with the general proposition canvassed by Mr. Hathi for the respondents that if portions of demised premises which are shop on the ground floor have not suffered any permanent injury by putting up of the offending door in the eastern wall of the suit shop by the defendant if that act has made any damage to other property of the lessor in lessors possession the lessee would become liable to be evicted under last part of Sec. 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act On proper construction of Sec. 108 (o) of the Transfer of Property Act it must be held that the Court must find that the offending act of the lessee is destructive or permanently injurious to the demised premises. The words permanently injurious thereto must be held to connote permanently injurious to the demised premises. It is therefore obvious that if the plaintiffs case is based on the aforesaid provision it has to be established by him that the defendant by putting up door of larger size in the eastern wall of the suit shop had committed an act which was permanently injurious to the suit shop. Unfortunately nowhere in para 13 of the judgment of the appellate Court such a finding is found to have been reached. (REST of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.)RULE made absolute. .