JUDGMENT : V. Gopalaswamy, J. - This Misc. Case arises out of Criminal Revision No. 162 of 1989 preferred by the Petitioners (first party) against the order of the Executive Magistrate, Athgarh, in Criminal Misc Case No. 64 of 1987 a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, declaring the possession of the second party member Sanatan Pradhan (opposite party No. 2) over the lend in dispute In this Misc. case the Petitioners have prayed for the appointment of a receiver in respect of the lands In dispute till the disposal of the revision. 2. From the arguments advanced by the counsel for both the parties the point of law that arises for decision is whether this Court has power to appoint a receiver pending disposal of the revision petition preferred against an order passed by the Magistrate u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties cited some decisions in support of his contention that this Court has no power to appoint a receiver pending disposal of the revision. In the decision Munia Servai Vs. Thangayya Onturiyar and Others a Single Bench of the Madras High Court, relying on the Division Bench decision of that High Court reported in Marudayya Thevar Vs. Shanmugasundara Thevar and Another, held that the High Court has no power to appoint a receiver pending disposal of the revision application preferred against an order passed u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. In Marudayya Thevar v. Shanmugasundara's case (supra) the Division Bench held that the High Court has no power to appoint a receiver pending disposal of a petition to revise an order passed u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. In coming to such a decision, the Full Bench ruling in P. Vaerappa Naidu v. Avudayamrnal and Ors. AIR 1925 Mad 438 (F.B.) that the Court cannot by invoking its inherent powers extend the powers given to it by Statute was referred to and followed. Gulam Mohammad Afsal v. Iqbal Begum and Anr. (1969) I An. In coming to such a decision, the Full Bench ruling in P. Vaerappa Naidu v. Avudayamrnal and Ors. AIR 1925 Mad 438 (F.B.) that the Court cannot by invoking its inherent powers extend the powers given to it by Statute was referred to and followed. Gulam Mohammad Afsal v. Iqbal Begum and Anr. (1969) I An. W.R. 549, a Single Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court relying on Marudayya Theyer's case (supra) and Munia Servai' s case (supra) held that Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 does not confer any new or additional powers on the High Court and so the High Court has no inherent power to appoint a receiver in proceedings coming up in revision against the 145, Code of Criminal Procedure order. From the above decisions it is seen that the High Courts of Madras and Andhra Pradesh held that during the pendency of a revision against an order u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, no receiver can be appointed regarding the land In dispute, as the High Court has no inherent power to appoint such-a receiver. 4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners, in support of his contention that a receiver can be appointed during the pendency of the Criminal Revision in this Court, cited Ali Muhammad Mandal v. Piggot 22 (1921) CLJ 213, a Special Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, wherein it was held that the High Court may make consequential or incidental orders in exercise of its power of superintendence over the subordinate Courts which may be invoked, if occasion should arise to reach and remedy all forms of judicial high-handedness. The above decision of the Calcutta High Court was prior to the date of introduction of Section 561-A (by Act 18 of 1923) dealing with the inherent powers of the High Court in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 and thus the views expressed in the said decision received statutory recognition. 5. For showing the similarity between the provision of Section 151, CPC and Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, the same are quoted below: Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 151. 5. For showing the similarity between the provision of Section 151, CPC and Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, the same are quoted below: Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 151. Saving of inherent powers of Court: Nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure 482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court: Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. On a reading of the above two sections it is clear that the object and spirit of both the sections is the same in that both the sections recognise the fact that while enacting procedural Codes it is not possible for the Legislature to anticipate all the contingencies that may arise in the course of future litigation and so to meet such unforeseen contingencies it is necessary that the Courts should have inherent powers apart from the express provision of law See Pampapathy Vs. State of Mysore, . 6. In Manharlal v. Seth Hiralal AIR 1662 SC 527, while dealing with the question whether the Court can issue temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction u/s 151, Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court observed as follows: It is well-settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive for the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The affect of the expression if it is so prescribed in Section 94 is only this that when the rules in Order 39, Code of Civil Procedure, prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the Code; the Court could stilt issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court 'to exercise its inherent power. x x x x The section (151 Code of Civil Procedure) itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the fact of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Further, when the Code itself recognises the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code. In the above decision, the Supreme Court held that there being no such expression in Section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any rules made under the Code, the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39, Code of Civil Procedure, if the Court is of opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such interim injunction. 7. Relying on the above Supreme Court case, Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Shavax A. Lal and Others Vs. Syed Masood Hosain and Others while holding that the Court has inherent powers to appoint a receiver observed as follows: In Manohar Lal Chopra Vs. 7. Relying on the above Supreme Court case, Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Shavax A. Lal and Others Vs. Syed Masood Hosain and Others while holding that the Court has inherent powers to appoint a receiver observed as follows: In Manohar Lal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive for the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. They have further held that Section 151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice and that therefore it cannot be held that the provisions of the Code control the inherent powers of limiting it or otherwise affecting it. Their Lordships add that the inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court and that it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Therefore, in the exercise of its inherent power, it is competent to the Court to appoint a receiver even on the assumption that the contentions of the learned Counsel for the Appellants as to the limitations of Order 40, Rule 1 Sub-rule (2), are sound. 8. The decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal's case (supra) deals with the inherent powers u/s 151 Code of Civil Procedure. But then, as the language used in Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure is virtually similar to that in Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. I think one can receive guidance from the principles laid down in Manohar lal's case, while considering the scope of the inherent powers u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure. In Pampapathy's case (supra), the Supreme Court indicated the extent to which the High Court can exercise its inherent powers u/s 561-A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure by stating thus: (1) The inherent power cannot be invoked in respect of any matter covered by the specific provisions of the Code. In Pampapathy's case (supra), the Supreme Court indicated the extent to which the High Court can exercise its inherent powers u/s 561-A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure by stating thus: (1) The inherent power cannot be invoked in respect of any matter covered by the specific provisions of the Code. (2) It cannot also be invoked if its exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. (3) It is only if the matter in question is not covered by any specific provisions of the Code that Section 561-A can come into operation, Section 482 of the new Code reproduced Section 561-A of the old Code, without any change. The one other limitation in the exercise of inherent powers is what is indicated by the Supreme Court in Sankatha Singh Vs. State of U.P. when it laid down that the inherent powers cannot be exercised to do what the Code specifically prohibits the Court from doing. 9. In exercise of its revisional jurisdiction this Court has power to set aside the final order passed by the Magistrate u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in favour of the opposite party/parties and declare the possession of the Petitioner (s). So it is absolutely necessary that this Court must have powers to ensure that the subject matter of dispute is preserved from loss or wastage and is allowed to remain in tact, by appointing a receiver over it, so that at the end of the final adjudication the parties might be entitled to the benefit thereof and the final relief granted may be effective. Hence I differ with the views expressed in the decisions of the High Court of Madras and the Single Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court cited by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties. Relying on Manohar Lal's case of the Supreme Court (supra) and Shavax's case of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (supra), I hold that in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court, a receiver can be appointed during the pendency of the revision against an order u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure before this Court, Such powers should be exercised very sparingly and in exceptional cases only to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Before a receiver is appointed the Court must be satisfied that the Petitioner has a strong prima facie case in his favour and further all the facts and circumstances of the case justify such appointment. 10. In the present case, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Petitioners would suffer irreparable loss and damage unless the land in dispute is kept in the custody of somebody who is accountable to the Court. On a perusal of the impugned order I find that the Petitioners have a strong prima facie case in their favour. However, taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the Case I find that it would be just and convenient to appoint opposite party No. 2 Sanatan Pradhan as the receiver and accordingly the opposite party No. 2 is appointed as the receiver in respect of the land in dispute till the disposal of the revision petition. In the result, the Misc. Case is allowed. Final Result : Allowed