JUDGMENT - V.V. KAMAT, J.:---This petition seeks a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the order dated 31st July 1981 made in Case No. Rent 45/80 by the Rent Controller, Goa North Division, respondent No. 4 and order dated 12th September, 1988 made in Eviction Appeal No. 65/81 by the Administrative Tribunal, respondent No.3. 2. Facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioners are the landlords of a building called Ganga Niwas situated at Panaji, Goa. By a lease agreement executed between the parties on 9th August 1968 the first floor premises consisting of 11 rooms was let out as office accommodation of the Directorate of Agriculture or any other Government Office. The lease stipulated that it shall be for a period of 360 days with effect from 1st May, 1968 to be automatically renewed for equal period in future on payment of the monthly rent of Rs. 1,925/- to the be paid by the 10th of the following month. At some stage the contractual rent stipulated between the parties was sought to be given a go- by and the department held out that the rent would be paid at the rate of Rs. 1,540/- with effect from 1st May, 1969. Though this action of the department was alleged to be unilateral and high handed, yet strangely the petitioners agreed to receive the rent of Rs. 1,540/- per month with effect from August 1969. However, by the next communication some time before April 1970 the department held out to the petitioners that with effect from 1st April 1970 the rent would be paid at the rate of Rs. 1,370/- per month but in view of the objections raised by the petitioners the department agreed to pay Rs. 1,573/- per month instead of what was previously held at the rate of Rs. 1,376/-. Perhaps by the wisdom dawned on the department they instituted proceedings for fixation of fair rent by invoking section 12 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 for short the Rent Act. It may be pertinent to note that the Rent Act was extended to the Territory of Goa with effect from 1st October, 1969 and needless to mention that the parties were and are governed by that Act. It may be pertinent to note that the Rent Act was extended to the Territory of Goa with effect from 1st October, 1969 and needless to mention that the parties were and are governed by that Act. Even otherwise when the lease contract was executed by the parties on 9th August, 1968 the parties were governed by Decree Law No. 43525 dated 7th March 1961 which was in the field governing leases in respect of buildings. That Decree read in conjunction with Diploma Legislative 1409 dated 14th November, 1952 left it open to the parties to apply for valuation of the demised premises and depending upon the decision to be bound by such award with the result that the contractual rent would accordingly stand modified. The fair rent proceedings bearing No. 263/73 finally culminated by the order confirmed in appeal made by the Board in Civil Appeal No. 253/77. The fair rent payable was held to be Rs. 1,300/- per month together with half the yearly Municipal tax levied on the premises. It was further directed that the fair rent shall be payable with effect from 19th November, 1973 though the order was made by the Tribunal on 28th September, 1977. From 1st December, 1973 the premises are occupied by the office of Directorate of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services of the Local Government for short the Department. As the rents were not paid regularly nor the amount of municipal tax for a long time by the statutory requirement of section 22 of the Rent Act, the petitioner served a notice dated 15th November, 1979 upon contesting respondents demanding of them the arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 12,471.14 being the rents form the month of March 1979 to October 1979 and the dues of the municipal taxes for the years 1976-77, 1977-78 and 1978-79, that is, arrears of rent being Rs. 10,400/- and Rs 2,071.14 as arrears of Municipal tax due at the rate of Rs. 690.38 per year. The notice further called upon the respondents to pay the arrears within 30 days of the receipt of the notice and failing the same a threat was held out that eviction proceedings would be filed. It is common ground that this notice was never replied to nor the requisition contained regarding the demand of the arrears was complied with. The notice further called upon the respondents to pay the arrears within 30 days of the receipt of the notice and failing the same a threat was held out that eviction proceedings would be filed. It is common ground that this notice was never replied to nor the requisition contained regarding the demand of the arrears was complied with. However the fact remains that on 17th April, 1980 the arrears of rent for the month of March 1979 to July 1979 were paid which were received under protest and without prejudice. The petitioner thereafter instituted proceedings for eviction of the department of Directorate of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services who were in occupation of the premises on the grounds of non-payment of rent and Municipal tax on or about 6th June, 1980. The claim for areas made in that application vide Rent Application No. 45/80 was from the month of August 1979 to May 1980 and the Municipal taxes for the years 1976-77,1977-78 and 1978-79 totalling to Rs. 15,071.14. The notice of the institution of these proceedings was served on Union of India on 8th September 1980 and on the Administrator of the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, as it then was and the Chief Secretary on 10th September 1980. On finding that no arrears of rent are deposited before the Rent Controller nor any attempt made to pay the rent to the petitioners directly within 30 days from the service of the writ of the proceedings an application under section 32(4) of the Rent Act was instituted on 17th October, 1980 with a prayer that all further proceedings in Rent Case No. 45/80 be stopped and order made directing the respondents to hand over the premises to the petitioners. However on 24th October, 1980 the department paid the arrears of rent from August 1979 to September 1980 along with Municipal taxes covering the period 1980-81. Finding that no further payment was being made nor any rent deposited for the month of October 1980 onwards the petitioners were perforced to institute another application dated 16th January, 1981 by invoking section 32(4) of the Rent Act to stop all further proceedings and for a direction to the respondents to hand over the premises. On behalf of the department defences were filed on or about 18th April, 1981. On behalf of the department defences were filed on or about 18th April, 1981. By the defences filed the eviction proceedings were contested and while holding out that the department had been regular in the payment of rent as also the Municipal taxes the delay in payment of rent was attributed to the petitioners for their failure to give pre-receipted bills. On this view of the matter it was also contended in the written statement that the proceedings launched by the petitioners were frivolous as the department has been making prompt payments of rent up to date. On the basis of these pleadings and whatever documents produced in support by the parties concerned the Controller by the order dated 31st July, 1981 dismissed the proceedings for eviction instituted by the petitioners with costs with no inquiry whatsoever. Being aggrieved by this order of dismissal of their eviction proceeding the petitioners preferred Eviction Appeal No. 65/81 which appeal was equally dismissed by the Administrative Tribunal by the order dated 12th September, 1986. To make the narration complete it may be necessary to advert to a few more facts that occurred during the pendency of this Eviction Appeal No. 65/81 before the Tribunal. That this appeal was instituted on or about 23rd December, 1981 and notices of institution of the appeal were issued to the respondents and for that matter respondent No.1 received it on 19th February, 1982 and respondents 2 and 3 on 16th February, 1982 and 10th February 1982 respectively. Despite being in arrears of rent and despite not paying the rent directly to the petitioners, no action was taken on behalf of the respondents to deposit the rent during the pendency of the proceedings as mandatorily required under section 32 of the Rent Act. The result was that the petitioners were again forced to institute from time to time 4/5 different applications under section 32(4) of the rent Act, the first being on 12-11-1982 vide Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 44/82 stop proceedings; the second on 22-6-1984 vide Miscellaneous Application No. 30/84 stop proceedings; the third on 17-7-1985 vide Miscellaneous Application 27/85 stop proceedings and the fourth being on 27-2-1986 vide Miscellaneous Application No. 4/86 stop proceedings. According to the petitioners they also filed another application for stop proceedings 22-8-1984 but, however that was not numbered as such separately by the Tribunal. According to the petitioners they also filed another application for stop proceedings 22-8-1984 but, however that was not numbered as such separately by the Tribunal. It is equally true that at some late stage on or about 2-3-1985 the respondents instituted an application for deposit of the arrears of rent during the pendency of the appeal proceedings and it is common ground that for June 1984 the rent was deposited. I will, however, come to details of this deposit a little later in the judgement. 3. The Rent Controller while disposing of the eviction proceedings held that the petitioners received rents on 17-4-1980 and also on 24-10-1980 and, therefore, there was no question of the respondents depositing the rents in his Court during the pendency of that proceedings. What further impressed him is that receipt of the arrears directly by the petitioners amount to waiver of the right of eviction by the petitioners and in that view of the matter the Controller held that there was no further right to get eviction of the respondents. He equally held that there was sufficient cause on accepting a submission made on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners had not issued in advance pre-receipted bills. Insofar as the Administrative Tribunal is concerned in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners, it is held that there was also a waiver on the part of the petitioners and in the absence of per-receipted bills the petitioners could not be paid in time but, however, the delay is attributable to the petitioners themselves and respondents exonerated. The Tribunal further recorded that there was no default either intentional or deliberate, calculated or conscious and sufficient cause could be read from the fact that the petitioners themselves waived all their right in the matter of alleged default by acceptance of rents. 4. There is considerable grievance made by Shri Presswalla, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, that the non-payment of rents and falling in arrears of the payment thereof which is a ground enumerated in section 22 of the Rent Act for eviction of a tenant is not akeen to nor paying or depositing the rents during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction. He points out that when any tenant wants to contest the proceedings, it is clearly mandatory on the part of the tenant either to pay all arrears of rent and continue to pay the rents accruing due in future from time to time and/or deposit the same within 30 days of the service of the writ of the proceedings and, if, there is a failure on the part of the tenant to do so, it is clearly incumbent upon the Controller to stop the proceedings at that stage by making an order directing the tenant to hand over the vacant possession to the landlord unless a sufficient cause is shown by the tenant for not stopping the proceedings. Shri Presswalla has naturally urged this point to contend, and not without justification that when there was a failure on the part of the respondent to pay the arrears of rent demanded and/or to deposit the same within 30 days from the receipt of the notice of the proceedings there was no justification for the Controller in the first place and the Tribunal in appeal proceeding to have decided the case on merits and by shelving to decide the stop proceedings applications made from time to time and from and making an appropriate order under section 32(4) of the Rent Act. The fact of the matters is that despite two applications made before the Controller, one dated 17-10-1980 and the other dated 6-1-1981 it is unfortunate that the Condtroller did not decide those applications and took them up along with the main matter under section 22 to be decided on merits. Similar is the position insofar as the Tribunal is concerned. Despite the fact that the Tribunal registered four different stop proceedings applications under section 32(4), the same were refused to be taken up for consideration on merits and they were taken up along with the main appeal of the petitioners which finally culminated in the order of 12th September, 1988. 5. Despite the fact that the Tribunal registered four different stop proceedings applications under section 32(4), the same were refused to be taken up for consideration on merits and they were taken up along with the main appeal of the petitioners which finally culminated in the order of 12th September, 1988. 5. It is pertinent to note that the Goa Rent Act is in force since 1-10-1969 for a period of over two decades and by the various pronouncements on the subject by the Judicial Commissioner's Court, as it then was, and subsequently this High Court, it is clear that it is incumbent upon the authorities under the Act to have decided application under section 32(4) styled as stop proceedings for, when a case is made out by the landlord or when the authorities do not accept the sufficient cause sought to be made out by the tenant the proceedings are liable to be closed and an appropriate order made against the tenant to hand over the premises to the landlord. There is nothing on record to suggest as to why the Controller or for that matter Tribunal did not adopt this course of not taking up these applications under section 32(4). 6. It is pertinent to note that the grounds of eviction are mentioned in section 22 of the Act and needless to say that they are restricted unlike the wide range of grounds under the Transfer of Property Act. Section 22(2) (a) further restricts the ground of non-payment of rent. In the first instance the tenant must be in arrears of rent for the total period of 3 months and in the second place that he must fail to pay or tender the arrears within 30 days of the receipt of a registered notice to be served on him. In other words to initiate proceedings for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent a registered notice is required to be addressed to the tenant and if within 30 days of the receipt thereof the tenant clears the arrears then that is the end of the matter and eviction proceedings cannot be launched. 7. In other words to initiate proceedings for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent a registered notice is required to be addressed to the tenant and if within 30 days of the receipt thereof the tenant clears the arrears then that is the end of the matter and eviction proceedings cannot be launched. 7. Now once the proceedings are launched and be that on any ground enumerated in section 22, section 32 says that no tenant against whom proceeding for eviction has been instituted shall be entitled to contest the proceedings unless the tenant has paid to the landlord or deposits with the Controller or the appellate or revisional authorities, as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit and further to continue to pay or deposit the rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings before the Controller or the appellate or the revisional authority. Sub-section (2) of section 32 provides that the deposit shall be made in such time and manner as may be prescribed and Rule 7 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Rules, 1969 provides that deposit of all arrears of rent due shall be made within one month from the date on which the notice of the proceedings is served for the first time on the tenant either by the Controller or the Appellate or Revisional Authority and continue to deposit the rents which may subsequently become due within 15 days from the date on which such rent had becomes payable in the absence of the contract or as stipulated in the lease agreement. A scope is given for disputes in relation to the rent or the quantum payable and that is by an appropriate application to be made in that behalf by virtue of sub-section (3) of section 32. Further it empowers the Controller, Appellate or Revisional Authority after making an inquiry to determine summarily the dispute in relation to the rent or quantum to be paid or deposited. Further it empowers the Controller, Appellate or Revisional Authority after making an inquiry to determine summarily the dispute in relation to the rent or quantum to be paid or deposited. Sub-section (4) of section 32 reads thus :- "If any tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent as aforesaid the Controller or the Appellate or revisional authority as the case may be shall unless the tenant shows to the contrary stop all proceedings and direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the building". It, therefore, stands to reason that a clear duty is cast on a tenant whoever wants to contest the proceedings filed against him on whatever ground, to pay the rents or arrears of rent according to the contract between the parties or deposit the rent within 30 days from the service of the notice of the proceedings for the first time and if there is failure either to pay or deposit, the landlord is entitled to ask for stoppage of the proceedings and for a direction to hand over the premises in terms of sub-section (4) of section 32. Therefore, the non-payment or non-deposit of the rent in terms of section 32 read with Rule 7 of the Rules is a sort of additional ground for seeking eviction of the tenant. In this view of the matter Shri Presswalla is fully justified in his grievance in arguing that it was clearly incumbent upon the Controller as well as the Appellate Authority to have considered the stop proceedings on merits and not clubbing them with the main application to be decided on merits. 8. The next grievance made by Shri Presswalla learned Counsel for the petitioners, is that there was clearly an error of law apparent on the part of the two authorities, namely, the Controller and the Tribunal in holding that the conduct of the petitioners in accepting rent amounted to a waiver of their right and entitlement of an order of eviction. The Counsel now relies upon an unreported decision rendered on 25th March, 1985 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 42 of 1983 in the case of (Roque Antonio J.T.C. Ribeiro v. Angelo Cassiano das Noves Souza and 4 others)1. The Counsel now relies upon an unreported decision rendered on 25th March, 1985 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 42 of 1983 in the case of (Roque Antonio J.T.C. Ribeiro v. Angelo Cassiano das Noves Souza and 4 others)1. A division Bench of this Court (Madhava Reddy, C.J. and Kamat, J.,) on noticing several judgement of this Court and other High Courts and on noticing some judgement of the Supreme Court held that receipt of rent by the landlord during the pendency of the proceedings under section 32(4) after the tenant has committed default does not constitute waiver and that the landlord does not lose his right to request the Court to stop all further proceedings and seek a direction for the tenant to put a landlord in possession. There is no doubt that some observation exist in the judgement that depending upon some special facts in a given case sometimes certain action on the part of a landlord may amount to waiver but it is clearly held that mere acceptance of the rent cannot attract waiver. What had happened in that case was that the landlord had instituted proceedings on 19th April, 1977 on the ground that the tenant had sub-let a part of the building to some business house, On 11-8-1978 stop proceedings application under section 32(4) was made that the tenant had failed to pay the rent for the month of July 1978 which was due and payable on 10th July, 1978. This application was opposed by the tenant but the Controller by the order dated 30th December, 1988 stopped all further proceedings and directed the tenant to put the landlord in possession thereof. An appeal preferred by the tenant was dismissed. The matter was taken up by the tenant in a writ petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, quashed the orders of the Rent Controller as also the Appellate Court and directed the Rent Controller to dispose of the eviction proceedings expeditiously. Though the rent payable there was on or before 10th July, 1978, it was not paid until August 1978 and in the meantime the landlord had instituted proceedings under section 32(4) on 11th August, 1978. It was contended by the tenant that by receiving the rent on 30th August, 1978 the landlord had waived his right of eviction which found favour with the learned Single Judge. It was contended by the tenant that by receiving the rent on 30th August, 1978 the landlord had waived his right of eviction which found favour with the learned Single Judge. However the Division Bench did not accept the point. Applying the ratio of this case to the facts the present case it is common ground that when the petitioners received rent firstly on 17-4-1980 in respect of the arrears from March 1979 to July 1979 the receipt clearly shows that the same was under protest and without prejudice to their rights. After the launching of the proceedings on 6-6-1980 when the petitioners received further arrears of rent on 24-10-1980 and part of the Municipal taxes, the receipt again shows that it was under protest and without prejudice to the petitioners rights. I, therefore, fail to understand as to how the receipt of the money on two occasions or even thereafter when every time it was received under protest and without prejudice to the rights of the petitioners would amount to waiver of their rights to get their application for stop proceedings under section 32 decided on their merits. Therefore, the order of the Controller dated 31st July 1981 and that of the Tribunal dated 12th September, 1988 applying the doctrine of waiver to the petitioners is patently an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Perhaps there may be some justification for the Controller to have wrongly imported this doctrine of waiver as there was no judgment in the field qua the provisions under Goa Rent Act nut the same cannot be held true insofar as the Tribunal is concerned because it is explicit that the Tribunal decided the appeal on 12th September, 1988 and the judgment delivered by the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 42/83 was holding the field from 25th March, 1985. It is not possible to accept that the Tribunal was ignorant of such decision as it is well known practice that that matter had arisen from the order of the Tribunal itself and while certifying the proceedings back to the Tribunal, a copy of the judgment is always certified for its benefit. 9. It is not possible to accept that the Tribunal was ignorant of such decision as it is well known practice that that matter had arisen from the order of the Tribunal itself and while certifying the proceedings back to the Tribunal, a copy of the judgment is always certified for its benefit. 9. Shri Presswalla now very strongly contends that having regard to the conduct, past and during the pendency of the proceedings at both the stages, original before the Controller and appellate before the Tribunal, the petitioners ought to succeed on both counts in the stop proceedings initiated under section 32(4) and also on the merits. The contention is that at no stage the department has disputed that they are not in arrears as alleged by the petitioners from time to time. He now says that the department lacked bona fides in the contention raised. According to him the defaults are not only intentional but they are persistent and for long periods of time and what is more cantankerous and somehow to harrass the petitioners. 10. Unfortunately neither the Controller nor the Tribunal have really addressed to questions which were required to be decided whether the department has made out a case for remaining in arrears of payment and/or to find out whether a reasonable cause existed not to have stopped the proceedings. Equally it is the case that neither of these two authorities have made an attempt to examine the defence set up by the department that the delay in the payments of rent from time to time before and after the proceedings including appeal proceedings was as a result of the petitioners not giving pre-receipted bills. In my view perhaps Shri Presswalla would be justified in saying that this has been deliberately avoided because it was inconvenient for the Controller and the Tribunal to have done so. The Rent Controller is admittedly a Government servant who is generally a Deputy Collector and Sub-Divisional Magistrate and unfortunately the Tribunal in this Territory is otherwise manned right from the Chairman to its Members by Government servants mostly Secretaries to various departments of the Government and when they were faced with the eviction of one department, namely, Directorate of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services, needless to say they were called upon to decide an inconvenient matter. 11. 11. The facts which clearly emerge from the pleadings between the parties and undisputed facts is that by the contract the respondents agreed to pay rents before the 10th of the following month to which it relates. The lease contract dated 9th August, 1968 does not make any stipulation for pre-receipted bills. Therefore, needless to say that by the contract the petitioners had to be paid by the 10th of the following month. When the notice dated 15th November, 1979 was addressed to the respondents the demand made was for Rs. 10,400/- being the arrears for the months of March 1979 to October 1979 together with a sum of Rs. 2,071.14 for the Municipal taxes due and payable by the department to the landlord at the rate of Rs. 690.38 for 3 years, namely, 1976-77,1977-78 and 1978-79. Though it was requisitioned in the notice to pay the arrears within one month from the receipt thereof and on threat of eviction proceedings, no payment was done. However on 17th April, 1980 arrears were paid but, restricted to the period from March 1979 to July 1979. It is just not possible to know as to why the arrears from August 1979 till the data of payment had not been made and despite the fact that whatever payment made on 17th April, 1980 was much beyond the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice by the respondents. It is equally clear that when proceedings were instituted for eviction on 6th June, 1980 and despite the fact that the notices on respondents were served on 8th September, 1980 and 10th September, 1980 no arrears of rent up to date were paid directly to the petitioners nor an application taken in terms of section 32(1) read with Rule 7 of the Rules for deposit of the rents. Nevertheless the fact remains that on 24th October, 1980 arrears of rent were paid corresponding to the months of August 1979 to September 1979 along with the dues in respect of Municipal taxes covering the period 1980-81. As mentioned earlier these payments were acknowledged under protest and without prejudice to the rights of the petitioners. The story, therefore, is no better as no payment was thereafter done for the months of October onwards either in terms of the contract or in terms of section 32 read with Rule 7 of the Rules. As mentioned earlier these payments were acknowledged under protest and without prejudice to the rights of the petitioners. The story, therefore, is no better as no payment was thereafter done for the months of October onwards either in terms of the contract or in terms of section 32 read with Rule 7 of the Rules. It is equally transparent that perhaps the payment on 24th October, 1980 might have come in the wake of an application instituted for stop proceedings on 17th October, 1980 but what is more to be noted is that the department did not reply to that application for stop proceedings and for that matter not even to subsequent proceeding taken up on 16th January, 1981 by which time the arrears had mounted up for the months of October 1980 onwards. Despite this position it is not known as to why the Controller did not take up the applications for stop proceedings filed by the petitioners and further the Controller decided to take up the main application for eviction and more particularly when there had been no application under sub-section (4) of section 22 of the Rent Act. It is pertinent to note and by now I have sufficiently adverted that there are 3 opportunities given to a tenant to get over the order of eviction. In the first place the tenant can stall eviction proceedings by tendering the arrears of rent claimed in the statutory notice spoken to in section 22(2)(a) within one month from the receipt thereof. In the second place it is open to a tenant to stall the order of eviction once the proceedings are filed by resorting to sub-section (3) of section 22 by tendering to the landlord or depositing with the Controller the arrears of rent due up to the date of such payment together with the cost of the application and this too can be done by stating so in an application within 30 days of the service of the summons of the proceedings of eviction. What is further important to notice is that when a tenant wants to opt under sub-section (3) of section 22 he need not even show any sufficient cause for falling in arrears and when such application is made the Controller is bound not to make any order for eviction and lastly that at any stage of the proceedings it is open to a tenant to have recourse to sub-section (4) of section 22 by admitting the default but at the same time showing sufficient cause and then it is up to the Controller to decide such application and in the event he is satisfied that the payment of rent was not without reasonable cause, not to make an eviction order and on the contrary to reject the landlord's application for eviction. 12. Those three opportunities given to a tenant are, however, restricted only to the payment of arrears of rents and such opportunities do not have any connection with regard to the payment of the rent and/or its deposit during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction. In other words section 22 and section 32 of the Rent Control Act operates on two different fields and this is abundantly made clear by an unreported decision in Letters Patent Appeal No. 52 of 1983 dated 5th December, 1984. 13. Once we have noticed that in the present case the landlord instituted two applications, one on 17th October, 1980 and the other on 16th January, 1981 for non payment and non-deposit of the rent during the pendency of the proceedings it is, therefore, difficult to appreciate that the Controller could have decided the main application on merits without deciding the application for stop proceedings under section 32(4). This is, however, not all. The worse part for the departments is that neither of these two applications were replied to and nothing was placed on record as to why the department had failed to pay or deposit the rent during the pendency of the proceedings before the Controller. If the department believed that it had same grounds justifying the non-payment or the non-deposit it was clearly open to it to have shown sufficient cause within the meaning of section 32(4) and to get over their predicament. 14. If the department believed that it had same grounds justifying the non-payment or the non-deposit it was clearly open to it to have shown sufficient cause within the meaning of section 32(4) and to get over their predicament. 14. Coming to the order of the Controller dated 31st July, 1981, by now, it has been made sufficiently clear that the first ground that prevailed upon the Controller, namely, the doctrine of waiver could not have been applied, the Controller, however, further held that there was sufficient cause and this is how he disposed of the matter:- ``I am satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown to me by the respondents that the delay caused for payment of rent was not due to them but due to the applicant for non-issuing of advance rent receipt required for preparing the bills. The case therefore fails as the respondents are not in arrears of rent as demanded by applicant in the suit application. It is therefore not necessary to continue further proceedings. Both the application dated 6-6-1980 and the application dated 17-10-1980 under section 32(4) of the Act therefore deserves to be dismissed with costs.'' The manner in which the matter of sufficient cause has been disposed of by the Controller highlighted above is nothing but acceptance of the case of the department that the department fall in arrears because the petitioners did not issue pre-receipted bills. I have already said enough on the matter that there was no obligation on the part of the petitioners to issue pre-receipted bills as the lease contract did not provide for such stipulation and I will come to more on this subject a little later when Ideal with the order of the Administrative Tribunal. At any rate therefore the so called sufficient cause which prevailed upon the Controller is in my view no sufficient cause at all. 15. The other aspect of the impugned order of the Controller is besides being slipshed, he did not indicate that he was purporting to act under sub-section (4) of section 22 of the Act. There is nothing to suggest that the department also had pleaded its case under sub-section (4) of section 22 and on the contrary the department had contested the eviction proceedings by squarely trying to put the blame on the petitioners. 16. There is nothing to suggest that the department also had pleaded its case under sub-section (4) of section 22 and on the contrary the department had contested the eviction proceedings by squarely trying to put the blame on the petitioners. 16. The story is nothing better when it comes to the order of the Tribunal dated 12th September, 1988 when it embarked upon deciding the petitioner's appeal on merits along with four applications of stop proceedings under section 32(4). A detailed examination of the appeal proceedings will reveal as to how the Tribunal is functioning. The appeal was instituted on 23rd December, 1981 and the matter was directed to be placed for admission on 1st October, 1982. The notice of the institution of the appeal dated 8th February, 1982 was served on the various respondents on 10th February, 16th February and 19th February, yet when the matter came up on 1st October, 1982 there was nobody present to represent the respondents and the case was thereafter adjourned to 18th November, 1982. Nothing is known as to what happened to this matter as the next roznama reveals that the matter came up on board on 2nd March, 1985. Counsel appearing for the respondents moved an application under section 32(1) for depositing the rents and thereafter matter is adjourned from time to time finally to be disposed of along with several stop proceeding applications which were filed from time to time by the petitioner. 17. The first application for stop proceedings under section 32(4) was instituted on 12th November, 1982 by which the petitioners complained that despite service of the summons on the respondents as early as February 1982 no rents have been deposited for the months of August, September and October 1982 at the same time showing a chart as to how delayed payment of rents were made from time to time covering the period from August 1979 to July 1982. This application was, however, replied by the Director of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services that the payments of rents for the months of August, September, October and November 1982 was made on 16th December, 1982 and for the month of December 1982 on 17th January, 1983. Paragraph 3 of that reply says that in order to obviate the probable delay in making timely payments, the department being a Government Office, the Director has started drawing funds on Abstract Contingent Bills. Paragraph 3 of that reply says that in order to obviate the probable delay in making timely payments, the department being a Government Office, the Director has started drawing funds on Abstract Contingent Bills. Finding that payments of rent are irregularly made some times delayed by over two months, another stop proceeding application was instituted on 22nd June, 1984. In the meantime another application was filed on 22nd August, 1984 which, however, merited a reply according to the department and in its reply the department says that many times rents were despatched well in advance but due to postal delay or on account of delay attributable to the petitioners themselves the payments were not received on time but the fault does not lie with the respondents. Again the question of pre-receipted bills has been put forth and then it is alleged that the petitioners with a mala fide intention and ulterior motive avoided to co-operate and in fact deliberately tried to take undue advantage of the procedures followed by the Government Department in order to build a case for a case under section 32(4) and failed to give pre-receipted bills. It is really not understood as to how the respondents are typing to set up a case that the petitioners did not forward pre-receipted bills when the record is clear which shows that even in the absence of pre-receipted bills the department has been making payments by drawing on Abstract Contingent Bills. Therefore, it is crystal clear that what is sought to be attributed to the petitioners is not well founded at all and if the requirement of pre-receipted bills is a sine qua non then one fails to understand how in the earlier reply filed by the Director he stated that to obviate the delays he has been drawing on Abstract Contingent Bills. The worse situation now comes when by their application dated 2nd March, 1985, that is, to say more than three years after the first notice of the judgement of the appeal had been served on the respondents, a request is made for issuing challans for deposit of rents and that too for the limited period of June 1984 to August 1984. It is beyond comprehension that when this application was instituted on 2nd March, 1985 the department should choose to deposit rent only for the period from June 1984 to August 1984 thereby still avoiding to deposit the rent up to date as on 2nd March, 1985. On 17th July, 1985 the third application is moved for stop proceedings. The complaint made in this application was to the effect that the Municipal taxes for the year 1982-83 has not been paid and for that matter for the subsequent years 1983-84, 1984-85 and 1985-86. Though the department obtained challan for the deposit of the rent up to August 1984 the rents for September 1984 to June 1985 amounting to Rs. 13,000/- was never deposited. The last application for stop proceedings is dated 27th February, 1986 which is further to the application of 17th July, 1985 which complains that the rents deposited are clearly not in accordance with Rule 7 of the Rules 1969. By the reply dated 21st March, 1986 the sufficient cause sought to be shown by the department is to this effect :- "The rents were despatched in advance by the respondents. However, the same were delayed in transit through the post for which the respondents are not in any way responsible ... The appellants have to issue pre receipted bills for the rentals payable falling every month .... However, the appellant in order to create the grounds for eviction of the respondent herein with ulterior motive, refused to sign and send to the respondent the pre-receipts and on that account the respondent was unable to pursue the further steps and procedure pertaining to payment of rent........'' In the matter of the complaint of non-payment of the Municipal taxes the reply states as under :-- "It is submitted that inspite of several requests made to the appellant by the respondent the appellant have failed to intimate to the respondents the amount of monthly tax and the proportionate share of the respondents which was to be deposited by the respondent. In the absence of any such intimation, the respondent is unable to pay the monthly taxes in such circumstances.'' Several comments are required on the conduct as to how failure in the first instance to make out a case of sufficient cause under section 32(4) and secondly whatever shown by way of sufficient cause by attributing malafides to the petitioners does not in fact hold good. I have already noticed the tom tom of the department in relation to the pre-receipted bills and I do not think I should dilate on this issue any more. I am sure that the theory of pre-receipted bills is nothing but a hoax. I have already mentioned as to how even in the absence of pre-receipted bills the department has paid directly to the petitioners, through belatedly. Therefore the questions of pre-receipted bills as raised by the department is a defence sought only to malign the petitioners. Insofar as the allegation that the petitioners have failed to intimate to the respondents the amount of municipal tax and the proportionate share of the respondents is concerned, again the story put up to attribute fault to the petitioners is without any justification. The department can be exposed on this allegation by referring to their own documents which are on record. Before coming to their own documents let me see the order of the Fair Rent Tribunal which while determining the fair rent held that the fair rent shall be Rs. 1,300/- per month together with half of the Municipal tax levied on the premises and this order was made some time on 28th September, 1977. Now let us notice what is the amount of Municipal tax and how and where it was known to the department. In the notice dated 15th November 1979 issued under section 22(2)(a) before filing the eviction proceedings the petitioners made a demand for Municipal tax due for the years 1976-77, 1977-78 and 1978-79 at the rate of Rs. 690-38 per annum amounting to Rs. 2,071.14. In other words the petitioners had informed them the figure of Municipal tax due and there is nothing brought on behalf of the department to dispute this position. 690-38 per annum amounting to Rs. 2,071.14. In other words the petitioners had informed them the figure of Municipal tax due and there is nothing brought on behalf of the department to dispute this position. The case set up by the department further stands belied when one reads a letter dated 24th October, 1980 written by Director of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services to the first petitioner which reads as under :- ``With references to your letter dated 1-10-1980, I am to state that the Municipal taxes for the years 1976-77 to 1978-79 were adjusted in the excess payments made to you. The rent and Municipal taxes for the period from March 79 to July 79 were paid to you. Now the rent for the period from August 79 .... and Municipal taxes for the period from August 79 to March 80 and for the year 1980-81 amounting to Rs. 1,150.64 drawn vide Demand Draft No. ..... for forwarded herewith.'' It is, therefore, impossible to believe that any further communication regarding the quantum of Municipal taxes had to be made. It is true that Shri Bharne indeed urged that there is variation of Municipal taxes as the Municipality embarks on assessment and re-assessments from time to time. In my view I need not consider this argument as it is not the case of the department that there has been reassessment in the levy of tax. Even assuming that there was Shri Bharne is not justified in saying so because the departments is bound to pay in terms of the assessment already known and operated in the field and if there had been any reassessment obviously the department would not have been held responsible when there was failure to pay in terms of re-assessment in the absence of communication from the petitioners. I do not think any further answer is required for Shri Bharne's contention. 18. In the matter of sufficient cause the next thing mentioned is that the cheques were delayed in transit and some time on account of postal delay. This statement is as wild as ever and it appears to be another hoax as otherwise the department would have given the particulars as to when the cheques were despatched, when they were posted and other details attributing delay of the postal authorities. This statement is as wild as ever and it appears to be another hoax as otherwise the department would have given the particulars as to when the cheques were despatched, when they were posted and other details attributing delay of the postal authorities. Counsel for petitioners says that the office and residence of the petitioners are within some metres from the demised premises. During the pendency of the appeal the deposit made after obtaining challan by the application dated 2nd March, 1985 the story revealed is thus:- "Rent Amount Deposit made in Administrative Tribunal by Government @ Rs. 1,300/- per month. Paid on Late Months Days June 1984 4-3-85 6 24 late July 1984 4-3-85 7 24 late Aug. 1984 4-3-85 6 24 late Sept. 1984 23-3-85 6 13 late Oct. 1984 23-3-85 5 13 late Nov. 1984 23-3-85 4 13 late Dec. 1984 23-3-85 3 13 late Jan. 1985 23-3-85 2 13 late Feb. 1985 23-3-85 1 13 late Mar. 1985 22-4-85 0 12 late Apr. 1985 17-5-85 0 07 late May. 1985 11-6-85 0 01 late June. 1985 10-7-85 in time July. 1985 23-8-85 0 13 late Aug. 1985 27-9-85 0 17 late Sept. 1985 20-11-85 1 10 late Oct. 1985 12-12-85 1 02 late Nov. 1985 15-1-86 1 05 late Dec. 1985 15-1-86 0 05 late -------------------- Jan. 1986 3-2-86 pd. in time Feb. 1986 6-3-86 pd. in time Mar. 1986 7-4-86 pd. in time Apr. 1986 2-5-86 pd. in time May. 1986 2-6-86 pd. in time June. 1986 9-7-86 pd. in time July 1986 1-8 -86 pd. in time Aug. 1986 1-9-86 pd. in time Sept. 1986 1-10-86 pd. in time Oct. 1986 3-11-86 pd. in time Nov. 1986 27-11-86 pd. in time Dec. 1986 5-1-87 pd. in time -------------------------------------- Jan. 1987 29-1-87 pd. in time Feb. 1987 2-3-87 pd. in time Mar. 1987 25-3-87 pd. in time Apr. 1987 4-5-87 pd. in time May 1987 3-6-87 pd. in time June 1987 2-7-87 pd. in time July 1987 18-8-87 0 08 late Aug. 1987 27-8-87 in time Sept. 1987 12-10-87 0 02 late Oct. 1987 26-10-87 in time''. 1987 29-1-87 pd. in time Feb. 1987 2-3-87 pd. in time Mar. 1987 25-3-87 pd. in time Apr. 1987 4-5-87 pd. in time May 1987 3-6-87 pd. in time June 1987 2-7-87 pd. in time July 1987 18-8-87 0 08 late Aug. 1987 27-8-87 in time Sept. 1987 12-10-87 0 02 late Oct. 1987 26-10-87 in time''. In these circumstances it is not known as to how the Tribunal while refusing to consider stop proceeding applications right from the first one dated 12th November, 1982 to the last one dated 27th February, 1986 thought of taking up the matter of appeal on merits thereby adopting the modus operandi of the Controller. All that the Tribunal has said in the matter of deciding the appeal on merits and 5 applications for stop proceedings is this :- "Adv. Shri Monteiro, refuting the arguments of his learned colleague Shri Tamba, said that the respondents have shown sufficient cause for the delay, if any, in payment of rent. There has been no wilful default on the part of the respondents. The formalities to be undergone was time consuming which could have been cut short, had the appellants co-operated with the respondents by giving pre-receipts. On going through the record and on hearing the learned Counsel, we are inclined to uphold the impugned order of the Dy. Collector. The respondents are bound by the rules and regulations governing preparation of bills. No doubt, no distinction can be made between Government and a private citizen before the eye of law. The respondents have been taking steps to make payment of rent by drawing the required amount on successive abstract contingent bills followed by successive detailed contingent bills. Diligence on the part of the respondent is apparent on record. There has been no default which can be termed intentional, deliberate, calculated or conscious with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing there from sufficient cause has been shown by the respondents for the delay. By accepting rent after the prescribed time limit, the appellants waived off their rights if any for the alleged default." 19. Shri Bharne did contend that according to the established procedure in a department whenever any payments is liable to be made there must be a pre-receipt or a pre-receipted bill. By accepting rent after the prescribed time limit, the appellants waived off their rights if any for the alleged default." 19. Shri Bharne did contend that according to the established procedure in a department whenever any payments is liable to be made there must be a pre-receipt or a pre-receipted bill. According to him he is supported by the Central Treasury Rules, Volume I. According to him the case at hand rests under the provisions of Rules 205 which comes under the heading ``the responsibility for money withdrawn'' and sub-heading `vouchers for payment. I am afraid that I am unable to accept that this Rule has anything to do in respect of the payment of rents of private building taken on lease by the Government. In my view Rule 205 contemplates not a payment covered of lease rent but other payment. I am inclined to accept what is fact is shown to me by Shri Presswalla that the Rules attracted are Rules 287 and 293-A of the Central Treasury Rules. Rule 287 under `General Rules' and sub-heading `Classification of Charges' reads thus: "Contingent charges incurred on the public service are divided into the following classes, the classification adopted in each department or office being determined by orders of competent authority:- (1) Contract contingencies - Those for which a lump sum is placed annually at the disposal of a disbursing officer for expenditure without further sanction of any kind.'' Rule 293---A clearly says that contingent bills preferring claims for rents, electricity and other connected charges incurred on account of the hire of private buildings by the Government for accommodation of Government Offices should be accompanied by the following certificates signed by the disbursing officer. That the certificates should show the amount drawn on account of rent, rates and taxes in Contingent Bill and that no portion of the building for which the expenditure was incurred was utilized for residential or other purposes during the period the charges are required to be paid. Even assuming that Shri Bharne is right in invoking Rule 205, it is not possible to apply it to the facts of the present case when it is abundantly clear that even in the absence of pre-receipted bills, on several occasions, though belatedly, amounts were paid and deposited during the pendency of the appeal. Even assuming that Shri Bharne is right in invoking Rule 205, it is not possible to apply it to the facts of the present case when it is abundantly clear that even in the absence of pre-receipted bills, on several occasions, though belatedly, amounts were paid and deposited during the pendency of the appeal. The question that one has to pose is how this was possible and when this was possible then why it was not adhered to all the time. 20. Shri Bharne now says that the institution of the eviction proceedings Rent Case No. 45/83 was not preceded by the statutory notice under section 22(2) (a) and the so called notice purportedly given on 15th November 1979 is a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact of the matter is that the notice dated 15th November, 1979 in terms says that it is under section 80 but, however it must be held that this argument is hypertechnical as this notice clearly sets out the entire case of the petitioners about non-payment of rents leading to the eviction, making demand for the arrears of rents as also the share of municipal taxes, further calling upon the respondents to pay the same within 30 days under a threat that non-compliance thereof eviction proceedings would be launched. In substance I find that all attributes are present in the notice although it was styled as a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21. Shri Bharne next contended that the cause of action in the application for eviction is different from the cause of action set out in the notice dated 15th November, 1979. In that he points out that in the so called notice the demand for arrears of rent had been made for the period from March 1979 to October 1979 and that however on 19th April, 1980 the arrears of rent from March 1979 to July 1979 had been paid directly to the petitioners. He now says that in the eviction proceedings instituted on 6th June, 1980 the demand for arrears was for the period August 1979 to April 1980. He therefore, urged that inasmuch as there is a variation between the period mentioned in the notice and the period mentioned in the application for eviction the cause of action in the application for eviction has naturally changed. He therefore, urged that inasmuch as there is a variation between the period mentioned in the notice and the period mentioned in the application for eviction the cause of action in the application for eviction has naturally changed. Though this argument at the first flush looks to be sound, in my view, on a careful examination of the same it is not available to the department. In the notice no doubt the arrears of rent claimed were from March 1979 till October 1979 the notice being dated 15th November 1979. The further fact remains that arrears restricted from March 1979 to July 1979 only were paid on 19th April, 1980. `Admittedly these payments were accepted under protest and without prejudice to the rights of the petitioners. The second part is that the arrears from August 1979 to October 1979 were admittedly left to be paid and since the notice covered the arrears of rent for August, September and October, 1979 that was, in my view, a sufficient period to institute an eviction application spoken to in section 22(2)(a) of the Rent Act. This is, however not all. If the department wanted to got exonerated it was clearly incumbent upon the department to have paid the amount of full arrears up to date and that too within 30 days of the receipt of the notice. Admittedly the notice were received by the respondents some time in December 1979 and obviously the payment in part was made four months thereafter. Therefore, it is not open to Shri Bharne to contend that there is a different cause of action pleaded in the application for eviction than what was set out in the notice dated 15th November, 1979. 22. Shri Bharne now says that the Controller and the Tribual exercised their discretion and even if it is held that the Tribunal had erroneously decided the matter, the order of the Controller cannot be faulted with and much less in a proceedings of this nature. By now I have sufficiently pointed out that neither the controller nor the Tribunal really addressed to questions required to be dealt with and decided by them. They were merely content in saying that the department has shown sufficient cause without in reality saying what that sufficient cause is. I have already highlighted what sufficient cause was pleaded and how that cannot even amount to any cause much less sufficient. They were merely content in saying that the department has shown sufficient cause without in reality saying what that sufficient cause is. I have already highlighted what sufficient cause was pleaded and how that cannot even amount to any cause much less sufficient. I have also highlighted the material on record to show that so far as tenant is concerned the expression 'sufficient cause' should otherwise receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice but nonetheless this is so when there is no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides on the part of the tenant. The question did agitate my mind whether I should remand this proceeding to the Administrative Tribunal but having regard to the background of the case I prefer not to adopt that course. It is unfortunate that the Tribunal in this Territory is manned only by Government Servants. The Administrative Tribunal is constituted by a statute called the Goa. Daman and Diu Administrative Tribunal Act, 1965. Several types of jurisdictions have been conferred on this Tribunal. In the first place it is an appellate forum under the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Rent, Lease and Eviction) Control Act, 1968. It is the revisional forum under the Goa, Daman and Diu Mundkars (Protection from Eviction) Act, 1975. It is again revisional forum under the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964. It has appellate jurisdiction under the Goa, Daman and Diu Sales Tax Act, 1964. It is a forum under the Goa, Daman and Diu Education Act. It is , therefore, inconceivable that these sorts of jurisdictions be decided by a Tribunal constituted as it does here. Nowhere in this country a Tribunal is manned in this fashion. It is common knowledge that it is always manned by judical officers. The department was clearly negligent and callous and this apathy cannot be rewarded in importing sufficient cause. What is more is that no sufficient cause has ever been shown and whatever was sought to be made is already commented by me and on the top of it they had the check to attribute their failures to the petitioners, which again shows lack of bona fides on their part. The defaults were not only wilful but persistent and not free from deliberate harassment to the landlords. I will be fully justified in holding that the department has been cantankerous in this case. 23. The defaults were not only wilful but persistent and not free from deliberate harassment to the landlords. I will be fully justified in holding that the department has been cantankerous in this case. 23. Shri Presswalla made a grievance that even during the pendency of this proceeding no rents are being deposited and further that there had been no attempt to pay the municipal taxes due and payable by the department right from the year 1983-84 onwards. I find substance in the latter part. Section 32 governs the deposits when the proceedings are pending before the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority and strictly speaking section 32 shall have no application when writ petitions are pending in this Court. Nevertheless the story of the department is no better inasmuch as though this petition is pending since January 1989 no rents are paid and admittedly the municipal taxes due from 1983-84, 1984-1985, 1985-1986, 1986-1987, 1987-1988 and 1988-1989 are not paid and this exposes the department. It must be seen that fair rent includes not only the rent but also 50% of the municipal taxes due vide definition clause. It is beyond comprehension why municipal taxes due for 6 years are not paid. What more is required? Section 32 has been enacted to secure rents to the landlord during the pendency of the proceedings. This benefit to the landlord cannot be overlooked. 24. In my judgement, therefore, the eviction application filed by the petitioners must succeed for failure on the part of the respondents to pay the rents before institution of the application. Even if it is held that some latitude can be shown to the department for having kept the arrears before the institution of the suit, the petitioner's should succeed on the failure of the respondents to deposit the rents before the Administrative Tribunal during the pendency of the appeal. 25. The petition, therefore, succeeds. Rule is accordingly made absolute in terms of prayer (a) and the department is directed to hand over the premises of Ganga Niwas to the petitioners within a period of 6 months from today provided and subject to the department depositing all arrears of rent up to date including municipal taxes due within 30 days from today and continue to deposit the rent for the next 6 months on or before 18th of each and every month to which they relate. In the event no deposit of arrears is made, the petitioners shall be entitled to execute the decree. Rule made absolute. -----