K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) OF course, learned Counsel for the appellant is justified in submitting that the lower appellate Court was not justified in holding that the agreement of reconveyance is impermissible in law, because it is not incorporated in the sale deed Ex. p. 1 and as such it does not fall under Section 58 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judge does not appear to have read clause (c) of Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act correctly. If a recital as to reconveyance is contained in the sale deed itself, in the facts and circumstances of the case, and on taking into consideration the terms of the document and all attending circumstances which will have a bearing on the intention of the parties, it will be open to the Court to decide whether the document is one of sale out and out or a mortgage. Thus the proviso to clause (c) of section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act does not govern and apply to where there is an independent separate agreement of reconveyance entered into by the parties. Even after executing a deed evidencing absolute sale, the parties can still enter into an agreement of reconveyance either orally or by way of written document and such an agreement may either be contemporaneous or subsequent to execution of the sale deed. Such agreement is permissible in law and evidence with regard to such oral agreement can be adduced. Sections 91 and 92 of the evidence Act do not come in the way of pleading and proving such an agreement. ( 2 ) IF the matter stood at that, probably the argument of Sri Jayavittal Kolar, learned counsel for the appellant that the decree for -possession passed by the lower Appellate court is not sustainable in law should have been accepted. In the instant case, no doubt the agreement of reconveyance, came into existence after the execution of the sale deed dated 7-6-1976; but subsequent to such agreement of reconveyance there was another agreement executed by the first defendant which was produced and marked as Ex. p. 2 and the execution of which was not disputed. In the instant case, no doubt the agreement of reconveyance, came into existence after the execution of the sale deed dated 7-6-1976; but subsequent to such agreement of reconveyance there was another agreement executed by the first defendant which was produced and marked as Ex. p. 2 and the execution of which was not disputed. The said document reads thus: ( 3 ) A reading of the aforesaid document makes it clear that the parties gave up the agreement of reconveyance and the vendor namely the first defendant agreed to give up possession of the remaining portion of the property sold under the sale deed. Therefore, in the light of Ex. p2 dated 11-4-1980, it is not now open to the first defendant to plead or claim any right or defend his possession on the basis of the agreement of reconveyance. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that having regard to the terms contained in Ex. p2 it was required to be registered, therefore, it could not have been admitted into evidence. It is to examine this contention only the whole document is reproduced. Ofcourse, at the outset it may be noticed that no objection as to admissibility of the document was raised when it was produced and marked as Ex. p2. Further a reading of the document makes it clear that it does not either create or extinguish any right, title or interest in a immoveable property worth more than Rs. 100/ -. The document Ex. p2 only acknowledges the past events and further gives an undertaking that possession of the remaining portion of the property which formed part of the subject matter of the sale deed would be delivered on 1-5-1980. Therefore, the document did not require to be registered. ( 5 ) THAT being so, the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court declaring that the plaintiff is the owner and further directing delivery of possession of the suit property is in accordance with law. Hence, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is not admitted and the same is dismissed. ( 5 ) THAT being so, the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court declaring that the plaintiff is the owner and further directing delivery of possession of the suit property is in accordance with law. Hence, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is not admitted and the same is dismissed. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, the appellant is granted time till the end of March, 1990 to voluntarily vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit property to the first respondent - plaintiff on a condition that he files a memo of undertaking before the Trial Court on or before the 20th of October, 1989 to the effect that he will voluntarily vacate the suit schedule premises and deliver vacant possession of the same, to the plaintiff - first respondent; that he will not cause damage to the schedule premises and will not induct third parties into it. If the appellant fails to file such an undertaking with a copy served on the first respondent or his counsel, on or before 20-10-1989, it is open to the first respondent to move this Court for modification as to the time granted to the appellant for vacating the suit property. --- *** --- .