Judgment :- 1. The question raised for consideration in this appeal related to the ownership of a piece of land formed as a result of a river changing its course. Since the question raised was found to he of public importance, the Second Appeal was referred for decision by a Division Bench. It is thus the Second Appeal has come up before us for consideration. 2. The facts necessary for deciding the question can be summarised thus: The river Manimalayar, before it assumed its present course, flowed over the plaint schedule property bearing survey No.87/1C in Nedumpram village, 82 cents in extent. It then formed part of the river bed at that point. The plaintiffs' father was holding lands on both sides of the river when it was flowing over the plaint schedule property. Thus on the west, Survey Nos.197/22 to 27 of Thalavady village and on the east Survey Nos. 243/23 & 24 of Nedumpram village were held by the plaintiffs' father. 3. While so, according to the plaintiffs, the river changed its course about 70 years prior to the date of filing the suit and began flowing through the properties in survey Nos.197/22 to 27 held by the plaintiffs father instead of survey No.87/1C of Nedumpram, which thereafter became dry. According to the plaintiffs, immediately thereafter, their father reduced the land so formed into his possession. From such time onwards it was alleged that their predecessors and themselves are in continuous possession and occupation of the plaint schedule property and have thus acquired title by adverse possession over the properties. 4. Meanwhile in 1967 the Government initiated proceedings under the Kerala Land Conservancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and registered two cases against plaintiffs 1 and 2 as L.C. Nos.178 and 177 of 1967 respectively. In the said proceedings under the Act, the plaintiffs were found to be encroachers and were accordingly fined under the Act. The suit was filed to declare the title of the plaintiffs and to set aside the orders passed in the land conservancy proceedings and also for consequential injunction restraining the State from evicting the plaintiffs from the plaint schedule property. 5. The suit was filed to declare the title of the plaintiffs and to set aside the orders passed in the land conservancy proceedings and also for consequential injunction restraining the State from evicting the plaintiffs from the plaint schedule property. 5. In the plaint even though adverse possession was the main ground alleged for claiming title, the plaintiffs have also averred in Para.4 of the plaint that they are entitled to the plaint schedule property in law and equity taking into consideration the fact that as a direct result of the change in the course of the river they have lost large areas of land on the western side of the plaint schedule property. 6. The defendant State while admitting the change in the course of the river contended that it was only 25 years prior to the date of the suit that the river has changed its course and that the plaintiffs are only encroachers and cannot claim adverse possession against the State. They also contended that plaintiffs 1 and 2 have submitted Exts.B5 and B16 petitions before the Tahsildar Thiruvalla requesting to assign the land in their names treating the land as belonging to the Government and as such the present claim made in the suit for title over the property based upon the principles of accretion is totally baseless and unjustifiable in law. 7. The trial court decided the case as if the plaintiffs have claimed title only on the basis of adverse possession. On an appreciation of the evidence before it, the court found that the plea of adverse possession has not been established. Accordingly the suit was dismissed. The decision was confirmed in appeal. In the Second Appeal No.1282 of 1974 this Court also con firmed the finding regarding adverse possession. However this Court found that in para.4 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have averred necessary factual particulars constituting a claim for title based upon the principles of accretion and that the courts below have not considered the said contention. Accordingly this Court remanded the case to the lower appellate court for entering a finding regarding the plea based upon the principles of accretion and to take a fresh decision in the suit on the basis of the finding thereon. 8. After the remand the lower appellate court considered the claim of the plaintiffs for title based upon the principles of accretion also. 8. After the remand the lower appellate court considered the claim of the plaintiffs for title based upon the principles of accretion also. The learned judge however found that'as the property in question was a river bed, it belongs to the Government in view of the Regulations of the erstwhile Travancore State and also under the Kerala Land Conservancy Act' and dismissed the suit. 9. The plaintiffs in the suit have no claim that before the change in the course of the river they had any kind of right, title or interest in survey No.87/1C, while it was a river bed. According to the defendants it was and is a river puramboke vested in the Government. 10. It is the admitted case of both parties that the plaint schedule property bearing survey No.87/1C was formed or became occupiable land when the river changed its course suddenly and not slowly and imperceptably as in the case of formation of accretions to an existing land. It is only after such formation of the land that the plaintiffs have claimed right over it. It is their case that they occupied it immediately after the change in the course of the river, since they have lost land in survey Nos.197/22 to 27, on the western side of 87/1C. From the allegations and the evidence in the case it is clear that the plaintiffs have not claimed any prior title over the plaint schedule property and they claimed title only on the basis of their alleged possession of the same for more than 60 years after the river had changed its course. Even though the word accretion as such is not used in the plaint the learned counsel Sri.K.C. John for the appellants has submitted that the plaintiffs have claimed in the suit and are still claiming title to the property on the basis that the land is an accretion to their adjoining property. 11. In defence the learned Advocate General has argued that the plaint schedule property belonged to the Stale when the river was flowing over it and it still belongs to the State and is a river puramboke as per the revenue records. As per the law of water courses or the law of riparian rights the beds of public navigable rivers always belong to the State as per the English and Indian Law. As per the law of water courses or the law of riparian rights the beds of public navigable rivers always belong to the State as per the English and Indian Law. It is further pointed out that there were successive legislations in force governing the rights on the beds and banks of rivers in Kerala such as Regulation II of 1067 (Government Land Conservancy Regulation) and Regulation IV of 1091 (Land Conservancy Regulation) and now the Kerala Land Conservancy Act 8 of 1958. As per the provisions of these Regulations and Acts, the beds and banks of rivers were always considered as vested in the Government and as such also the plaint schedule property belongs to the Government. The plaintiffs having failed to establish title by adverse possession cannot turn round and contend that the land from its very for million belonged to them as per the principles of accretion. 12. It is clear from the above discussion that, in this case we are concerned with the ownership of a land, formed by a sudden change in the course of a river leaving open a considerable area of its bed as dry land. Such mode of formation of land is known as accretion by dereliction in contra-distinct ion with accretion by alluvion, in the realm of the law of riparian rights. In the phraseology of English law the expression dereliction is used to denote a sudden and perceptible, shrinking or retreat of the sea or of a river and derelict land issued to denote land suddenly and by evident marks and bounds left uncovered by water. Regarding the real nature of the process of dereliction Lal Mohan Doss in his book "Law of Riparian Rights" (Tagor Law Lectures) has stated thus: "Dereliction may be either gradual or sudden. If it is gradual, the result, in the generality of cases, is the same as that which is produced by alluvion. The physical processes implied in them respectively, in fact correlate to one another. The deposit of soil on the bank, by the 'projection of extraneous matter' on it, cannot take place without a simultaneous withdrawal pro tanto of the water from the site which such'projected' matter occupies. But if the derelict ion is sudden, it is regarded as an altogether distinct mode of acquisition of property. The deposit of soil on the bank, by the 'projection of extraneous matter' on it, cannot take place without a simultaneous withdrawal pro tanto of the water from the site which such'projected' matter occupies. But if the derelict ion is sudden, it is regarded as an altogether distinct mode of acquisition of property. Property speaking, it is not a mode of acquisition of property at all; it merely denotes a particular mode of transition of land (in which there is already an existing right) from one state to another, from the stale of being covered by water to the state of being dry land; and when there is this transition, the law uniformly declares that there shall be no change of ownership". 13. Trailokya Nath Ghose in his book "The Law of Alluvion and Diluvion" has after referring to the decided cases summarised the legal position as far as the ownership of land left by sudden dereliction thus: "Thus, it will appear that the reported cases, in India, also support the view that, in cases of sudden dereliction, there will be no change in the ownership of the derelict land. Hence, it follows that the bed of a navigable river or the sea which, in this country, prima facie belongs to the Government will continue to be part of the public territory, when such bed becomes dried up in consequence of the sudden dereliction of the waters thereof, and that the bed of a navigable river, to the soil of which an ownership has been acquired by a private individual, and the bed of non-navigable rivers will continue to be private property, when such bed becomes dried up by reason of the same cause". In Tharakdas Acharjee Chowdhury v. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1935 P.C.125) Sir Shadilal J. observed that "it is beyond question that the bed of a public navigable river is presumed to be the property of the Government". In Surya Rao v. Secy. of State (A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 406 (2)) Leach C.J. has made the following observations regarding the question of ownership of the bed of rivers in India. "The general law that is applicable is free from doubt. The bed of a public navigable river is the property of the Government though the banks may be the subject of private ownership. of State (A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 406 (2)) Leach C.J. has made the following observations regarding the question of ownership of the bed of rivers in India. "The general law that is applicable is free from doubt. The bed of a public navigable river is the property of the Government though the banks may be the subject of private ownership. If there be slow accretion to the land on cither side, clue for instance to the gradual accumulation of silt, this forms part of the estate of the riparian owner to whose bank the accretion has been made". In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suryanarayana (A.I.R. 1963 AP. 94) it has been observed that "according to Indian Law as expounded by the Privy Council, the bed of a public navigable river is presumed to be the property of the Government whether tidal or not". 14. Applying the principles governing riparian rights, referred to above, it has to be held that since the plaint schedule property was originally the bed of a public river, it belonged to the Government and since its re-formation as land was due to a sudden change in the course of the river, its ownership will continue to vest in the Government itself. As there is no plea that while the land was the bed of the river it belonged to the plaintiffs or that the river is not a navigable one, the plaintiffs cannot sustain their claim to the plaint schedule properties as accretion to their land in survey No.243/23 & 24 of Nedumpram Village. This is especially so since the plaintiffs have themselves averred that the change of the course of the river was sudden. 15. Further it has to be held that in the light of S.3 of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act and the corresponding provisions contained in Regulation No.II of 1064 and VI of 1091, which were in force in the locality where the suit property is situated prior to the commencement of the present Act, the beds and banks of all rivers irrespective of the question whether the rivers are tidal or non-tidal navigable or non-navigable, vest in the Government. This is clear from the wording of S.3(1) of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act which is to the following effect. "3. This is clear from the wording of S.3(1) of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act which is to the following effect. "3. Property of Government defined.--(1) AJI public roads, streets, lanes and paths, the bridges, ditches, dykes and fences on or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below high water mark, the beds and banks of rivers, streams, irrigation and drainage channels, canals, tanks, lakes, backwaters and water courses, and all standing and flowing water, and all lands wheresoever situated, save in so far as the same are the property of - (e) any person claiming through or holding under any of the persons referred to in clauses (a), (b), (c), or (d), are and are hereby declared to be, the property of Government, except as may be otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, subject to all rights of way and other public rights and to the natural and easement rights of other land owners and to all customary rights legally subsisting. XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX". The statutory vesting of the banks of the rivers would preclude the plaintiff in this case from claiming any riparian rights with reference to the lands owned by them." 16. The learned counsel for the appellants has however contended that S.3 will not affect their rights to claim title to the plaint schedule property as the vesting of beds and banks of rivers is only "subject to all rights of way and other public rights and to the natural and easements rights of other land owners and to all customary rights legally subsisting". According to the counsel, vesting is only subject to the riparian rights of land owners which are comprehended by the word 'natural rights' used in the section and cannot affect his clients. We are not able to agree with the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. We are of the view that in the light of the categoric declaration of the law contained in S.3(1) of the Act no riparian rights can be claimed by any person against the State as riparian owner. Riparian rights which are rights inseparably annexed to the ownership of riparian land cannot survive the vesting of the beds and banks of the rivers under the Act. Riparian rights which are rights inseparably annexed to the ownership of riparian land cannot survive the vesting of the beds and banks of the rivers under the Act. Only the natural rights of other land owners in contrast to natural rights of owners of riparian lands are saved from the vesting along with other specifically enumerated categories of rights. Since, statutorily the bed of every river navigable or otherwise vests in the Government, on a river abandoning its course and leaving its bed open to dry up, it becomes automatically the property of the State. Silting up of such land thereafter would enure only to the benefit of the owner of that land and not to the owner whose land was separated by the bank of the river when the river was flowing over the said land. We find support for this view in the decision reported in Mathoo Mani and others v. Ulahannan Paulose and others (XX TLR.24), and Secretary of State for India v. Kadirikutti (ILR (13) Mad. 369). 17. Thus in this case both under the general law and under the relevant statutory provisions, the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any title to the land in Survey No.87/IC of Nedumpram village and described in the plaint schedule as owner of land in survey N0.243/23 & 24. 18. However, we make it clear that the dismissal of the suit will not preclude the plaintiffs from prosecuting the petitions Exts.B5 and B16 for assignment of lands under the Conservancy Act and the said proceedings shall be decided in accordance with law after giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard in the matter if they have not already been finally disposed of. The appeal is thus without any merit and is dismissed. The panics shall bear their respective costs.