JUDGMENT : L. Rath, J. - A petition under Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 151, CPC to review the final decree proceedings and to set aside the final decree having been rejected, the Petitioner has moved this revision. It is his case that O. S. No. 143/65 in which his father was Defendant No. 1 was preliminarily decreed on 20-11-1966. The Plaintiff applied for final decree on 11-12-1973 but before notice was issued, the Defendant No. 1, who was the father of the Petitioner and opposite party No. 7 as also the husband of Defendant No. l(Ka), expired on 20-3-1974, but despite the fact that the order-sheet of the court showed him to have been substituted, yet no notice was issued to the legal representatives either before substitution or after it. In the final decree proceeding, a Civil court commissioner was appointed on 11-7-1975 to effect partition but no notice thereof was also issued to the parties either by the court or the commissioner. 'The mother of the Petitioner and opposite party No. 7, Hara Dibya, who had been substituted on the death of Defendant No. 1 as Defendant No. 1 (Ka) expired in October, 1975 but no steps for substitution in her place was also taken. The report submitted by the civil court commissioner was behind the back of the Petitioner and neither he nor opposite party No. 7 had any opportunity to file objections to the report. On the basis of the report, the 'preliminary decree was also amended so as to include another item of property as lot No. 1 and the commissioner was again directed to divide that property. The further report of the commissioner was also without notice to the Petitioner and for other Defendants. In spite of such allegations the final decree was passed'on 18-1-1977. On an application being made on 27-9-1978. the final decree was amended on 16-5-1980. The Petitioner having received information from one Jayamadhab Panigrahi, an advocate of Bhadrak on 21-1-1982 that the predecessor-in-interest of opposite parties 1 to 6 was to take delivery of possession in Execution Case No. 129/80 and realise the costs; he discovered on enquiry the fraudulent actions perpetrated and filed the petition for review. the final decree was amended on 16-5-1980. The Petitioner having received information from one Jayamadhab Panigrahi, an advocate of Bhadrak on 21-1-1982 that the predecessor-in-interest of opposite parties 1 to 6 was to take delivery of possession in Execution Case No. 129/80 and realise the costs; he discovered on enquiry the fraudulent actions perpetrated and filed the petition for review. The application was contested by the opposite parties contending that notices had been properly served on the legal representatives of deceased Defendant No. 1 and hence any review was not permissible. The learned Subordinate Judge discussing the evidence came to the conclusion of the Petitioner and the other legal representatives having received notice for which no interference was called for and apart from it he also held the petition to be barred by time. 2. Mr. Kar, has raised a preliminary objection of substantial importance contending that if at all the final decree proceeding continued behind the back of the Petitioner and the suit was decreed exparte behind his back, a Petitioner under Order 47, Rule 1 or Section 151. CPC was not maintainable and the remedy to the Petitioner was only under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code. 3. An application for review lies only if the party discovers any new and important matter or evidence which was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time the decree was passed even after exercise of due diligence, or on account of some mistake or error on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. It is the consistent pronouncement of all judicial authorities that "any other sufficient reason" as found in Order 47, Rule 1 CPC must have a meaning analogous to grounds of review mentioned earlier than it which would mean that a -power of review excludes from consideration grounds which were not decided by the former court as immaterial. Such was also the view expressed in AIR 1922 P.C. 112 (Chhajju Ram v. Noki and Ors.) and A.I.R 1954 Pat 163 (Baikunthesh Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Ganesh Ram). Such was also the view expressed in AIR 1922 P.C. 112 (Chhajju Ram v. Noki and Ors.) and A.I.R 1954 Pat 163 (Baikunthesh Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Ganesh Ram). A Defendant seeking to avoid an ex parte decree can, without question, have recourse to three remedies, the first to file an application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC to set aside it, second to file an appeal against the decree, and the third to file an application under Order 47, Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure. A similar question was considered in AIR 1954 MP 3 (Chatar Das Guru Raghunathdas v. Keshavdas Guru Bikaridas) wherein though the court held the absence of a counsel or a party does not enable a court to review an ex parte decree within the limited scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC but held a case of failure of the court to issue notice of hearing to the Defendant as clearly distinguishable and to be within the purview of Order 47 Rule 1 as an error apparent on the face of the record. In A.I.R 1932 Oudh 63 (Bankey Behari Lal and Anr. v. Abdul Rahman and Ors.) the question considered was the passing of some orders by the court in the chambers on some applications without the parties being present. Such fact was held sufficient reason for the court to review the orders since it was an error apparent on the face of the record for the Subordinate Judge to have decided the applications in the chambers in the absence of the parties. Similarly, in Bhola Nath Chatterjee Vs. Maharajadhiraj of Burdwan and Others, where challenge was made to an order passed on review by the Munsif at the instance of an auction purchaser reversing the order of setting aside a sale and confirmation of possession, it was held that though the grounds of review as were relied-upon by the Munsif were not available, yet the very fact, that the sale was purported to be set aside on deposit of the decretal amount by the Petitioner in that case but no notice of such deposit had been given to the auction purchaser, the order passed setting aside the sale was in violation of Clause (2) of Section 174A of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 and was a justifiable ground for review. 4. 4. Though absence of notice would enable the Defendant to ask for a review, yet the exercise of such power must be within the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1. An ex parte decree being available to be set aside by the court which passed it both under the provisions of Order 9, Rule 13 CPC as also under Order 47, Rule 1, it is but apparent that the powers are not exercisable simultaneously and that the power under Order 47, Rule 1 can be invoked only in the specific circumstances where such absence of notice is an error apparent on the face of the record. If such error is not so apparent and would need leading of evidence to establish the fact that in effect notice had not been served upon the Defendant, it is more properly a case under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC than to be set aside by exercise of power of review. To be explicit, one would be a case of apparent non-issue of notice to the Defendant which would appear on the face of the record itself, and the other would be where the absence of notice upon the Defendant has to be established before the court through evidence and other materials. The former would justify a review whereas in case of the latter, Order 9, Rule 13 has to be invoked, it being the specific provision in the statute for the purpose. In AIR 1981 Kar 35 (Gangadhar Bhat v. Srikant and Anr.) it was held that a Defendant can take recourse to remedy under Order 47 only if he has not preferred any appeal from the decree and when he is able to make out a case of review on the limited grounds on which review is permissible. If however he takes recourse to the remedy of appeal, he may have to make out a case for setting aside the decree only on the basis or the material available on record or on such other additional evidence which may be brought on record under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure. If however he takes recourse to the remedy of appeal, he may have to make out a case for setting aside the decree only on the basis or the material available on record or on such other additional evidence which may be brought on record under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure. Generally, though having regard to the limited scope of Order 47 and Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a Defendant avails the remedy under Order 9 Rule 13 whose scope is far wider when compared with the other two, inasmuch as he becomes entitled to adduce evidence to show that summons were not duly served or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called for hearing, yet he cannot be prevented, if he so likes, from choosing a less advantageous remedy to get the ex parte decree set aside. 5. On the aforesaid analysis, it has to be held that the application made by the Petitioner under Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 151 CPC was not maintainable since the absence of notice to him was not apparent on the face of the record, but instead required to be established, inasmuch as the application was treated as an original proceeding and the parties were allowed to adduce evidence. It appears as if the learned Subordinate Judge, though the application was styled as one under Order 47 Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 'yet treated it as one under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC and proceeded to decide the matter in that manner. In such circumstances I would hold that in effect the Petitioner made an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Once conclusion is reached that the application of the Petitioner before the Subordinate Judge was treated as one under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC to set aside the decree, a revision in this Court is not maintainable against the order passed by the Subordinate Judge, but an appeal lay before the district Judge. This revision must accordingly be dismissed as not maintainable and the Petitioner may, if so advised, prefer an appeal before the District Judge. This revision must accordingly be dismissed as not maintainable and the Petitioner may, if so advised, prefer an appeal before the District Judge. A petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed by the Petitioner in this Court, but however since the revision is held to be not maintainable, no orders can be passed on the said petition though the Petitioner may move the appellate authority with a petition under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. The revision is accordingly dismissed, but no costs. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed