Judgment B. P. Singh, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of this Court U. P. Singh J in C. W. J. C.302/80 (R)whereby he dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant. 2. The facts of the case may be stated thus :- Respondent No.5 herein Pillai Oraon, filed an application under Section 71-A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act on 31-7-1970 against one Ambika Pd. Dubey for restoration of 60 decimals of land out of R. S. Plot No.312 under khata No.57 in village Mokro now in the district of Gumla. The aforesaid application was registered as SAR case No.283/70-71. The case of respondent No.5 was that he had purchased 60 decimals of land out of R. S. Plot no.312 from Ambica Pd. Dubey on 29-4-1967. The total area of the plot was 1.19 acres He was forcibly dispossessed by Ambika Pd. Dubey, his vendor. At this stage, I may notice Annexure-6 filed with the writ application which is an application filed by respondent No.3 in which it was stated that the aforesaid Ambika Pd. Dubey had taken a sum of Rs.1050/- from the petitioner by practicing deceit and had executed sale deed in his favour in respect of 60 decimals of land in Plot No.312 in Khata No.57. Later when he went to take possession of the land in-questton, Kolha Sahu (Petitioner herein) objected to his taking possession of the land. When he requested Ambika Pd. Dubey to put him in possession of the land or to refund the money to him, he was told by Ambika Pd. Dubey that he had already sold the land to him and he could not go upon that land. He also intimated him. It was therefore, prayed in that applicaticn that he should be put in possession of the land which he had purchased or in the alternative he should be refunded the amount which he had paid by way of sale consideration together with expenses incurred by him. It is apparent from the application, Annexure-6 that respondent No.5 never came in possession of the land in-question and that when pursuant to the sale deed executed by Ambika Pd. Dubey, he went to take possession, the petitioner herein offered resistence and did not permit him to take possession. It is apparent from the application, Annexure-6 that respondent No.5 never came in possession of the land in-question and that when pursuant to the sale deed executed by Ambika Pd. Dubey, he went to take possession, the petitioner herein offered resistence and did not permit him to take possession. 3 In the application filed under Sec.71-A of the Act by respondent no.5, the petitioner was not made a party but Ambika Pd. Dubey was made one of the respondents. Notice was Issued to Ambika Pd. Dubey but he did not appear in that proceeding. Ultimately, the Deputy Magistrate Class (1) passed an order on 5-11-1973 Annexure-7 holding that by fraudulent and unlawful method, respondent No.5 had been dispossessed from the land which he lawfully held. He, therefore, directed that the land in question be restored to him. 4. The petitioner filed review petition on 28-4-1975 before the Deputy magistrate Class (1) who bad passed the order of restoration under Section 71-A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act (in short to be stated as the said Act)praying that he may be pleased to review his earlier order in the facts and circumstances of the case. That review application was dismissed by the Deputy magistrate Class (1) on 11-8-1975 Annexure-8 holding that the appellant had no locus standi to challenge the order dated 5-11-1973, Annexure-7 or to pray for its review. The appellant, thereafter, preferred an appeal before the Additional collector which was also rejected on 13-9-1976 Annexure-9 on the same ground. It was held that the appellant may seek his remedy before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. A revision preferred by the appellant was also rejected by the Commissioner on 23-5-1980 Annexure-10. It was under these circumstances that the petitioner preferred a writ application being c W J C.302/80r which, as observed earlier, was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court. Against that judgment, the instant appeal has been preferred. 5. The case of the appellant before the authority under the Act while seeking a review was that the respondent No.5 had suppressed material facts from the courts and had committed a fraud upon the court and had abused the process of court to obtain an older of restoration. The case oi the appellant was that R. S. Plot No.302 alongwith other plots belonged to Ambika. Pd. Dubey. The case oi the appellant was that R. S. Plot No.302 alongwith other plots belonged to Ambika. Pd. Dubey. By a registered deed of sale dated 23-8-1966 Annexure-1, the aforesaid Ambika pd Dubey sold several plots including plot No.312 to one Sri Bhuneshwar pandey On 13-9-1966, the appellant purchased from the aforesaid Bhuneshwar pandey plot Nos.311 and 312 by sale deed, Annexure-2. The appellant therefore claimed to have purchased Plot No.312 under a registered deed of sale Annexure-2 dated 13-9-1966. This was prior to the alleged sale by ambika Pd Dubey in favoure of respondent No.5 who claimed to have purchased 60 decimals out of Plot No.312 on 29-4-1967. Respondent No.5 thereafter filed an application under Sec.71-A of the Act on 3-2-1971 against the appellant claiming that be had been illegally dispossessed by the appellant from the land in-question. He prayed for restoration oi 60 decimals of land out of plot No.312. This application was registered as SAR case No.633/70-71. The application under Sec.71-A of the Act is Annexure-4 to the writ application. By order dated 14-6-1971 Annexure-5, the Sub-divisional officer rejected the application of respondent No.5 under section 71-A of the act observing that there was an earlier sale in favour of the appellant and a later sale in favour of respondent No.5. The disputes arising out of two such sale deeds executed in favour of the contesting parties gave rise to civil dispute and was not a dispute covered by the provisions of Sec.71-A of the Act. He therefore, rejected the application of respondent No.5 holding that the land in-question could not be restored under Sec.71-A of the Act and that respondent No.5 may seek his remedy before an appropriate forum. The respondent No.5 did not appeal against that order. 6. The case of the appellant, therefore, was that respondent No.5 had filed two applications under Sec.71-A of the Act ; one against his vendor Ambika Pd. Dubey from whom he had purchased the land by sale deed dated 29-4-1967 and the other against appellant who resisted when he went to take possession of the land in-question. The application filed against the appellant was rejected on 14-6-1971 but the application filed against Ambika Pd. Dubey was allowed on 5-11-1973. Pursuant to the order dated 5-11-1973, steps were taken tor restoring the land to respondent No.5 and the Halka Karmchari delivered possession of the land in-question on 10-4-1975. The application filed against the appellant was rejected on 14-6-1971 but the application filed against Ambika Pd. Dubey was allowed on 5-11-1973. Pursuant to the order dated 5-11-1973, steps were taken tor restoring the land to respondent No.5 and the Halka Karmchari delivered possession of the land in-question on 10-4-1975. According to the appellant, this was a mere paper transaction and there was really no actual delivery of possession. Having come to know of the report of the Halka Karmchari dated 10-4-1975 and the Circle Officer dated 18-4-1975 the appellant on 28-4-1975 filed an application before the Deputy Magistrate, Gumla praying for recall of the earlier order for restoration of possession which was rejected. 7. The grievance of the appellant is that respondent No.5 though he had knowledge of the fact that the appellant was an earlier purchaser of the land, did not make him a party in the proceeding initiated by him against Ambika pd. Dubey. Consequently, the appellant had no opportunity of representing his case before the concerned authority and since Ambika Pd. Dubey had no interest in the subject matter of the application, he never appeared in that proceeding. Respondent No.5, therefore, managed to obtain an order under Sec.71-A of the Act for restoration of the land in-question ex-parte. The second important fact which respondent No.5 did not bring to the notice of the authority was that he had also filed an application under Sec.71-A of the Act against the appellant in respect of the same Land and chat application had been rejected by the Sub-divisional Officer exercising jurisdiction under Sec.71-A of the act on 14-6-1971. It is well settled that if an application for restoration under section 71-A of the Act is rejected, a subsequent application for the same relief is barred by the principles of res-judicata. Thus, if respondent No 5 had brought this fact to the notice of the Deputy Magistrate dealing with that application under Sec.71-A of the Act, such an order would not have been passed. On these facts, it was connected that ressppndent No.5 was guilty of abusing the process of the court and was in fact, guilty of fraud upon the court. On these facts, it was connected that ressppndent No.5 was guilty of abusing the process of the court and was in fact, guilty of fraud upon the court. By perpetrating such fraud and by suppressing material facts he had managed to obtain an ex-parte order in a proceeding in which he appellant was not even a party even though admittedly it was the appellant who was in possession of the land in-question. 8. Notice of the writ application was served upon respondent No.5, but no counter-affidavit had been filed controverting the statements made in the writ application. The apart, the case of the appellant appears to be well supported by documentary evidence on record of unimpeachable character. The authorities under the Act dismissed the application for review on the ground that the appellant not being a party in the proceeding, he had no locus standi to maintain such an application and that he could enforce his legal rights by seeking remedy before an appropriate civil court of competent jurisdiction. Another reason given by the Addl. Collector, the appellate authority, was that the appellant had approached the court for grant of relief after a delay of almost three years and this was an additional reason why no relief couid be granted. The learned Single Judge of this court while dismissing the writ application also held that the petitioner not being a party in the proceeding had no locus standi to maintain the application for review even if he was vitally interested in the land in-question. lie further held that since notice had been sent to the original owner of the land who chose not to appear in the proceeding there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. He also held that the appellant had approached the court after a long delay of three years which was another reason why no relief could be granted. 9. From the materials placed before us, the following facts are well established. Firstly it cannot be disputed and was not disputed by Sri Moinuddin appearing on behalf of respondent No.5 that respondent No.5 had filed two applications under Sec.71-A of the Act ; one against Ambika Pd. Dubey, his vendor, and another against the appellant. The application against Ambika pd. Dubey had been filed on 31st July, 1970 while the application against the appellant was filed on 3rd of February, 1971. Dubey, his vendor, and another against the appellant. The application against Ambika pd. Dubey had been filed on 31st July, 1970 while the application against the appellant was filed on 3rd of February, 1971. The application filed against the appellant was dismissed by order dated 14-6-1971 holding that no restoration could be ordered under Sec.71-A of the Act since the dispute was not one covered by Sec.71-A of the Act as the parties claimed title to the same land by reason of two sale deeds executed in their favour, the earlier sale deed being in favour of the appellant. After the dismissal of the said application on 14-6-1971, the other application under Sec.71-A against Ambika Pd. Dubey was taken up for consideration. In that application the appellant was not a party and Ambika Pd. Dubey did not appear despite service of notice, obviously because he had no interest left in the land. In that proceeding respondent No.5 did not bring it to the notice of the court that he had filed another application against the appellant in respect of the same land which had been dismissed. Secondly, the appellant claims to have purchased the land in question from Bhuneshwar Pandey by registered deed of sale on 13-9-1966 Annexure-2. His vendor had purchased the land in question together with other lands under a registered deed of sale dated 23-8-1966 Annexure-1 from Ambika Pd. Dubey. After these sales had taken place, Ambika Pd. Dubey executed another sale deed in favour of respondent No. on 29-4-1967. In his application, Annexure-6 filed in the proceeding under Sec.71-A of the Act respondent No.5 had stated that when he went to take possession of the land pursuant to the sale in his favour on 29-4-1967, the appellant did not permit him to take possession and offered resistence. 10. In the back ground of these facts, it is obvious that respondent No 5 was guilty of suppressing material facts from the authority exercising jurisdiction under Sec.71-A of the Act. Firstly, he did not disclose in that proceeding that in another proceeding in respect of the same land initiated by him under section 71-A of the Act against the appellant, his application for restoration had been rejected. Firstly, he did not disclose in that proceeding that in another proceeding in respect of the same land initiated by him under section 71-A of the Act against the appellant, his application for restoration had been rejected. Further despite the statement contained in Annexure-6, he did not make the appellant a party in that application though to his knowledge it was the appellant who was in possession and who had resisted his attemps to take possession of the land in question. If these facts were disclosed in the proceeding under Sec.71-A of the Act against Ambika Pd, Dubey, the result of the proceeding would have been different. By suppressing these facts, respondent No.5 had obtained an order of restoration in the absence of the appellant. 11. In these circumstances, can it be said that the appellant had no locus standi to maintain an application before the authority concerned for recalling or reviewing its order dated 5-11-1973 passed in his absence In my view the party who was really aggrieved by the order dated 5-11-1973 restoring possession to respondent No.5, was the appellant since it was he was ought to be dispossessed pursuant to the order passed by the authority under the Act. On the question of locus standi, therefore, I have no doubt that the appellant had the right to challenge the order by which he was aggrieved. The next question to be answered is as to whether the authority could review or recall its order. In this context, it is important to notice that the expression review is used in two distinct senses, namely, procedural review and a review on merits. In the instant case, on the facts established clearly the authority could have exercised its jurisdiction to grant a procedural review. In the case of Grindleys Bank v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 606 the supreme Court observed as follows :- "we are unable to appreciate the contention that merely because the ex-parte award was based on the statement of the manager of the appellant, the order setting aside the ex-parte award, in fact, amounts to review. The decision in Narshi Thakershi V/s. Pradyumansinghji, air 1970 SC 1273 is distinguishable. The decision in Narshi Thakershi V/s. Pradyumansinghji, air 1970 SC 1273 is distinguishable. It is an authority for the proposition that the power of review is not an inherent power it must be conferred either specifically or by necessary implication sub-sections (1) and (3) of Sec.11 of the Act themselves make a distinction between procedure and powers of the Tribunal under the Act, while the procedure is left to be devised by the tribunal to suit carrying out its functions under the Act, the powers of civil court conferred upon it are clearly defined. The question whether a party must be heard before it is proceeded against is one of procedure and not of power in the sense in which the words are used in Sec.11. The answer to the question is, therefore, to be found in sub-sec. (1) of Sec 11 and not in sub-section (3) of Sec.11. Further-more, different considerations arise on review. The expression review is used in two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent of implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a mis-apprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Narshi Thakershis case held that no review lies on merits unless a statute specifically provides for it, obviously when a review is sought due to procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex-debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal". 12. In the instant case, it is apparent that the sale deed executed in favour of respondent No.5 was later in point of time then the sale deed executed in favour of the appellant even though the appellant had purchased the land in-question from Bhuneshwar Pandey whose vendor was Ambika pd. Dubey. Even that sale had taken place on 23-8-1966 while respondent no.5 claims to have purchased 60 decimals out of Plot No.312 on 29-4-1967. Dubey. Even that sale had taken place on 23-8-1966 while respondent no.5 claims to have purchased 60 decimals out of Plot No.312 on 29-4-1967. In the proceeding u/s.71-A of the Act, to which the appellant was a party, these facts had been brought on record and the S. D. O. the authority under the Act, rejected that application filed by respondent No.5 on the ground that there was a dispute regarding ownership of the land based on the sale deeds executed in favour of the contesting parties, and that such a matter was not covered by the provisions of Sec.71-A of the Act. He consequently dismissed the application filed by respondent No.5 on 14-6-1971. These facts were not disclosed in the proceeding u/s.71-A of the Act which respondent No.5 had initiated his vendor, Ambika Prasad Dubey without impleading the appellant as a Party. By Suppressing such fact which were meterial and which were to the knowledge of respondent No.5, he obtained an order on 5-11-1973 for restoration of the land in-question, in execution of which he claimed to have evicted the appellant who was not even made a party. In my view there can be no doubt that by reason of such suppression of facts, respondent No.5 pursua-ded the authority under the Act to pass a palpably erroneous order under a mis-apprehension. In these circumstances, the authority under the Act had abundant jurisdiction to exercise its power of procedural review which is inherent or implied in every court or tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed by it under a mis-apprehension. Indeed it is there duty to correct such orders ex-debito jusiiliae to prevent the abuse of the process In the instant case, therefore, the learned Single Judge was clearly in error thinking that no review could be granted at the instance of the appellant who was not a party in the proceeding even though he was vitally interested. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly the fact that respondent No.5 procured a palpably erroneous order in the absence of a necessary party by practicing fraud upon the authority by suppression of material facts, this was a proper case in which the authority ought to have recalled its order. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly the fact that respondent No.5 procured a palpably erroneous order in the absence of a necessary party by practicing fraud upon the authority by suppression of material facts, this was a proper case in which the authority ought to have recalled its order. The power of procedural review is inherest in every court or tribunal and in my view this was an appropriate case in which that power ought to have been exercised. 13. The learned Govt. Advocate for the State submitted that when such an order is brought to the notice of this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under article 227 of the Constitution this court has undoubted power to set aside such an order in the interest of justice. 14. It was urged before us that the High Court has committed error of record In holding that the application was delayed by more than three years. The case of the appellant is that pursuant to the order dated 5-11-1973 the restoration of the land in-question was made on paper only on 10-4-1975 by the halka Karmchari. A report was also submitted by the Circle Officer on 10-4-1975 As soon as the appellant could know of these reports he filed an application on 28-4-1975. It was only on 18-4-1975 that the appellant came to know for the first time about the delivery of possession pursuant to order dated 5-11-1973. He therefore, filed the application for review on 28-4-1975, that is only 10 days after coming to know about the delivery of possession which in any event was a mere paper transaction. It was, therefore, submitted that there was no delay of three years as found by the High Court and by the appellate and revisional authority under the Act. It is true that the order for restoration of the land was passed on 5-11-1973 but in that proceeding the appellant was not a party and, therefore, could have no knowledge of such an order particularly when in an earlier proceeding he had succeeded as against respondent No.5. It was only when further steps were taken pursuant to the order dated 5-11-1973 that the appellant could come to know about the passing of another order on 5-11-1973. It was only when further steps were taken pursuant to the order dated 5-11-1973 that the appellant could come to know about the passing of another order on 5-11-1973. It would, therefore, not be fair to hold the appellant guilty of delay when he had no knowledge of the order and he was not a party to the proceeding. The period from 5-11-1973 to April, 1975 should therefore, be excluded in considering this question. On the basis of the annexures placed before us, there is some confusion about the exact date on which the appellant filed an application for review. While the appellant has stated in his memorandum of appeal that such an application was filed on 28-4-1975. I find from the order of appellate authority that the application for review was filed on 27-5-1976. It may be that this date is an error because I find that the order refusing the application for review Annexure-8 was passed on 11-8-1975. Obviously the application for review must have been filed earlier. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not consider it to be in the interest of justice to refuse the application only on the ground of such delay, which in any case cannot be said to be a delay of three years. 15. It was urged before us that having regard to the dismissal of the application filed by respondent No.5 against the appellate u/s.71-A of the Act, the order passed in that proceeding on 14-6-1971 barred by the principles of res-judicata any other application u/s.71-A of the Act. The mere fact that the appellant was not made a party was of no consequence since effectively the remedy was claimed against the appellant who was in possession of the lands in-question and who claimed title through Ambika Prasad Dubey who was the vendor of his vendor and who was party in the other application u/s.71-A of the Act. It was also urged before us that on the plea that respondent No.5 had been forcibly dispossessed, no application u/s.71-A of the act was maintainable as has been consistently held by this Court since the provisions of Sec.71-A of the Act only apply to a case of transfer made by a member of a scheduled tribe in favour of any other person. Forcible dispossession, it was contended, cannot be deemed to be a transfer of title by a member of a scheduled tribe, and consequently no application u/s.71-A of the Act was maintainable. 16. In view of the foregoing discussion. I have no manner of doubt that respondent No.5 by abusing the process of court, and suppressing material facts obtained a palpably erroneous order in a proceeding under Sec.71-A of the Act. The question which now arises for consideration is as to whether the matter should be remanded to the original authority under the Act or whether we should finally dispose of this writ application at this stage itself. I am of the view that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, no useful purpose will be served by remanding the matter to the original authority under the Act because ex-facie, an application under Section 71-A in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not maintainable. 17. Section 71-A of the Act provides for restoration of possession of a property of a member of the schedule tribe over land which is unlawfully transferred by htm. The section provides that if at any time it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that transfer of land belonging to a raiyat who is a member of a scheduled tribe has taken place in contravention of section 46 or any other provision of the Act or by any fraudulent method, he may after giving reasonable opportunity to the transferree, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary enquiry in the matter, evict the transferree from such land. The section therefore contemplates a transfer of land made by a raiyat who is member of a scheduled tribe. It does not contemplate a case were such a raiyat is himself the transferree, and not the transferor. This section seeks to protect the interest of such scheduled tribe raiyats against unscrupulous transferrees who may have pursuaded such a raiyat to transfer his interest in the land contrary to the provisions of Section 46 of the Act or any other provisions of the Act or by any fraudulent method. Sec.46 of the Act provides that before sucn a transfer is made by such a raiyat, the prior permission of the Duputy Commissioner should be obtained. Sec.46 of the Act provides that before sucn a transfer is made by such a raiyat, the prior permission of the Duputy Commissioner should be obtained. The Deputy Commissioner is really the guardian of the members of the scheduled tribes cast with the duty to protect their interest. Thus Sec.71-A will only apply to a case where such a raiyat belonging to any of the scheduled tribes makes a transfer contrary to the provisions of the Act or who is pursuaded to execute a deed of transser by any fraudulent method. The section does not contemplate a situation where a member of a scheduled tribe can be heard to complain that his transferror is not parting with possession of the land which he claims to have purchased. In the instant case, it was the case of respondent no.5 as would appear from Annexure-6, that he had purchased the land in question from one Ambika Pd. Dubey to whom he had paid a sum of Rs.1050/-. When he went to take possession of the land, the petitioner objected and did not permit him to take possession. When he complained to Ambika prasad Dubey, his vender, to put him in possession of the land or to refund the money to him, the said Ambika Pd. Dubey did not either help in getting possession of the land not did he refund the sale consideration. It is, therefore, obvious that in the instant case, respondent No.5 did not transfer any land to any one. He, in fact, claims to be a purchaser from Ambika Pd. Dubey. In an application under Sec.71-A of the Act, respondent No.5 could not have obtained an order for securing possession of the land which he claims to have purchased from Ambika Pd. Dubey. He could have only prayed for restoration of land which he may have transferred to some one provided the conditions laid down in Sec.71-A were fulfilled. Ex facie, therefore, no relief could be granted to respondent No.5 under Sec.71-A of the Act as respondent No.5 had not transferred any land to anyone which was in branch of the provisions of the Act or was procured by any fraudulent method. Sec.71-A does not contemplate an application by a transferree. It only contemplates an application by a transferror who is a raiyat and a member of a scheduled tribe. 18. Sec.71-A does not contemplate an application by a transferree. It only contemplates an application by a transferror who is a raiyat and a member of a scheduled tribe. 18. Having regard to the fact that an application under Sec.71-A of the Act is not maintainable on the facts admitted by respondent No.5 himself in Annexure-6, no useful purpose will be served by remanding the matter to the original authority under the Act. I, therefore, hold that the application filed by respondent No.5 under Sec.71-A of the Act was not maintainable and ought to have been dismissed. In this view of the matter, this writ application is allowed and the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 27th May, 1988 in C. W. J. C.302/80 R is set aside. The writ application filled by the petitioner is allowed and the impugned orders passed by the authorities under the Act namely Annexures 8.9 and 10 are set aside. The application filed by the respondent No.5 under Sec.71-A of the Act being SAR case no.283/70-71 (T. R.125/73-74) is dismissed as not maintainable. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Application Allowed.