JUDGMENT - G.H. GUTTAL, J.:---Abdul Gani, accused No. 1 in Case No. 742/CW of 1989 pending in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay, seeks an order of bail under section 438(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This case has a long chequered history. Although the complaint charging the applicant and his wife with the offence punishable under section 120/B r/w 13(1) I.P.C., section 11, 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) both r/w 135(1)(i), 135(1)(a) and 135(1)(b) both r/w 135 (1)(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962 and section 5 and 5-a of Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 has been filed on 31st August, 1989, the circumstances in which this application has been made, need to be set out. The applicant filed Criminal Revision Application No. 2630 of 1988 for anticipatory bail which was granted on 26th December, 1988 with the direction that he shall report to the Superintendent of Customs (Prevention), Air Intelligence Unit, Bombay from 27th December, 1988 to 5th January, 1989 and thereafter the Superintendent of Customs (Prevention) whenever called. If the applicant failed to report, the bail order was to stand cancelled forthwith. After the Order was made, the applicant did not report as ordered although he received summons on 9th January, 1989 requiring him to attend on 11th January, 1989 for interrogation. Thereafter, other summonses were issued but he never appeared. The Investigation had therefore been left incomplete so far as the applicant is concerned and the complaint had to be filed. 2. Since the complaint has been filed, it is clear that the Respondent No. 2 cannot now interrogate the applicant herein. Therefore, the applicant is not required for investigation. But this is an application for anticipatory bail which is pressed even after the learned Magistrate took cognizance and issued a process of non-bailable warrant Armed with an order of anticipatory bail from the Nagpur Bench of this Court, the Applicant had successfully prevented execution of the warrant. The presence of the accused for the purpose of investigation is but one factor relevant in considering the grant of anticipatory bail. There are other principles. The accusation made against the applicant does not stem from an ulterior motive to injure or humiliate him, but from the accusation emerging from bona fide investigation. The considering relevant in granting or refusing to grant anticipatory bail cannot be exhaustively led down. There are other principles. The accusation made against the applicant does not stem from an ulterior motive to injure or humiliate him, but from the accusation emerging from bona fide investigation. The considering relevant in granting or refusing to grant anticipatory bail cannot be exhaustively led down. Yet it must be stated that there are several other considerations like the combined nature and seriousness of the charges, viz the context of the evidence likely to lead with the charges, possibility of the applicant's non presence at the trial, apprehension of tampering with the witnesses and the larger interest of the public or the State. (The State v. Cap. Jagjit Singh)1, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 253. In the context of this case, the principle that is invoked by the learned Public Prosecutor is that having regard to the evidence collected so far, the accused is likely to flee from justice and it is impossible to secure his presence for the trial. It is this circumstance that is required to be examined. The magnitude of the crime, the unlimited resources at the disposal of the applicant, his connections with foreign countries are of writ large on every page of the complaint. The investigation commenced with the seizure of 87.450 kgs. gold valued at nearly three crore rupees concealed in air condition. Every witness who has been examined by the Investigating Officer points his finger to the applicant as the man behind the illegal smuggling of gold. The circumstances which establish the possibility of the accused fleeing from justice are briefly this :--- (i) The applicant is a non-resident Indian although he is in India since 1986. He owns hotels and other immovable assets in India. (ii) From the date of seizure i.e. 11th November, 1988, the accused made himself scarce. He was not found at the known addresses in Bombay and in Kerala. He reported to the Air Intelligence Unit only after he armed himself with the Order of anticipatory bail from the Nagpur Bench of the High Court. (iii) He has been using a post-office box at Sharjah for his correspondence with the assistance of Shivadasani, a tailor who holds the key of that post office box. (iv) The anticipatory bail granted to the applicant was cancelled by this Court. The Supreme Court rejected his appeal. (iii) He has been using a post-office box at Sharjah for his correspondence with the assistance of Shivadasani, a tailor who holds the key of that post office box. (iv) The anticipatory bail granted to the applicant was cancelled by this Court. The Supreme Court rejected his appeal. (v) After coming to know about cancellation of bail, he left Bombay and went to Madras for seeking legal advice and obtaining protection. (vi) During the search on 6th December, 1988 at the flat of the Applicant, passports held by him bearing Nos. J/713791, Q/788226 and V/362382 were recovered. The first two passports showed the address at Nagdevi Street while the third one showed the address at Gandhinagar, Calicut (Kerala). His wife, accused No. 2 also has different passports bearing Nos. J/379319, V/362381 and Q/678052. The accused never resided at the addresses mentioned in the passports. 3. The circumstances set out above clearly prove that the accused has connections abroad and holds different passports. None of these have been surrendered. If the accused holds different passports nothing prevents him from fleeing out of India. This fact together with his status as non-resident Indian shows that he lives out side India also. The existence of his assets in India will not prevent him from fleeing out of India for the duration of the trial. Since this is one of the principles relevant for grant or refusal of the bail, I consider that the applicant should not be granted anticipatory bail. 4. It may be argued, as it has been indeed argued, that even if the applicant were not to apply for anticipatory bail and were arrested in pursuance of the warrant, he can still apply for bail and it is difficult to deny it to him to keep him in custody until the trial is over. The consideration as to whether the accused is likely to flee from justice is relevant not only in granting anticipatory bail but also bail under section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If he is arrested, the learned Magistrate will no doubt consider all these circumstances and exercise his discretion. But this is not a case for granting anticipatory bail. 5. This order is limited to the grant of anticipatory bail. I should not be understood to have held that under no circumstances, the applicant can be released on bail. If he is arrested, the learned Magistrate will no doubt consider all these circumstances and exercise his discretion. But this is not a case for granting anticipatory bail. 5. This order is limited to the grant of anticipatory bail. I should not be understood to have held that under no circumstances, the applicant can be released on bail. He is at liberty to apply for bail after his arrest. His application may be considered on its merits consistently with the principles for granting bail. 6. For all these reasons, the application is rejected. Application rejected. -----