Judgment : The revision as well as the Crl.M.P. had been filed to revise the orders passed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Madras in Crl.M.P.Nos.2166 and 2167 of 1989 respectively in Sessions Case No.133 of 1989 on his file dismissing those applications filed under Sec.231(2) of the Code Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying for deferring the cross-examination of P.W.1, approver until all the independent witnesses excepting the investigating officer are examined during trial. The revision petition in Crl.R.C.No.334 of 1989 is accused 1 and the petitioners in Crl.M.P.No.7497 of 1989 are accused 2 and 3 before the trial Court. 2. Accused 1 is running a Glassware & Crockery shop under the name and style of “Ramesh Kumar Uthamchand” at No.9, Kasi Chetty Street. Accused 2 is his younger brother and he is assisting him in his business, accused 3 and the approver P.W.1 were employees working under accused 1 in the said business. Accused 1 married the deceased Kamala Devi about four years prior to her death. The spouses were blessed with a child Accused 1, his brother accused 2, the deceased living in the fourth floor at Door No.22, Thulasingam Street, Sowcarpet, Madras-79. The servants, namely, accused 3 and the approver P.W.1 were also having boarding and lodging in the house of accused 1. Accused 1 used to go on tour to various places in India and foreign countries for business reasons, very often. On 6.6.1987, accused 1 left for Singapore by flight that took off at Madras at 11.00 P.M. Prior to his departure, it appears that a conspiracy had been hatched between accused 1 and 2 to commit the murder of Kamala Devi during his absence from station in such a way as to make it appear to the outside world that it was a case of suicide by falling from the fourth floor. Accused 2 enlisted the support of accused 3 and the approver P.W.1 in working out the methodology of performing the feat sought to be accomplished pursuant to the conspiracy. On the night of 9.10.1987, accused 2 and 3 and the approver entered into the room of the deceased while she was fast asleep, accused 2 and 3 quenched their lascivious desire by raping her by turns and thereafter pushed her down from, the balcony of the fourth floor, in the early hours of the morning. On the night of 9.10.1987, accused 2 and 3 and the approver entered into the room of the deceased while she was fast asleep, accused 2 and 3 quenched their lascivious desire by raping her by turns and thereafter pushed her down from, the balcony of the fourth floor, in the early hours of the morning. The case though registered initially under Sec.174, Cr.P.C, was subsequently altered into one under Secs.120-B, 302, 376 and 201, I.P.C., against accused 1 to 3 and the approver, P.W.1 After completing the formalities of the investigation, a report had been laid under Sec. 173(2), Cr.P.C, for the aforesaid offences against accused 1 to 3 before the VIIIth Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Madras, who in turn, after completing the formalities of giving all records to accused and examining the approver, committed the case to Court of Session, Madras. 3. During the course of trial, when the approver P.W.1 was examined in chief accused 1 as well as accused 2 and 3 respectively filed separate applications under Sec.231(2), Crl.P.C. praying the Court to defer the cross-examination of P.W.1, the approver till the examination of all other witnesses excepting the investigation officer. Learned Sessions Judge dismissed those two applications, giving rise to the present revision as well as Crl.M.P. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners drawing my attention to the various relevant provisions under the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, amended Code of 1955 and the new Code of 1973 as regards the procedure available in the respective Codes regarding committal and Sessions trial, would lay stress and emphasis on the provisions of Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.231 - salutary provisions of which had been introduced in the new Code of 1973--which give a very valuable right to the defence to defer the cross-examination of any witness until any other witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any other witness for further cross-examination, and in the backdrop of cannons of justice, equity and fairplay demand judicial discretion to be exercised favourably to the defence in a criminal trial of heinous offence of murder and allied offences putting in jeopardy the life and liberty of the individual facing such a trial. 5. 5. For a better understanding of Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, I think to pen down the same here, which runs as follows: “The Judge may, in his discretion, permit the cross-cxamination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any witness for further cross-examination.” It is to be noted here that a similar analogous provision is also available in the said Code in Chapter XIX relating to the trial of Warrant Cases in provision to Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.242, which runs as follows: “Provided that the Magistrate may permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any witness for further cross-examination.” 6. If a cursory comparison of the aforesaid two provisions is made, it may appear as if both the provisions arc exactly identical, which is really not so and the same would emerge to the surface by deeper scrutiny. In Sec.231(2) of the Code, the phraseology, ‘in his discretion’ is an addition to the word ‘may’, which alone had been used in the proviso to Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.242 of the Code. The use of the word ‘may’ alone, without the addition of the phraseology ‘in his discretion’ immediately after the word ‘may’ can by no stretch of imagination be stated to connote, and convey the same meaning with the addition of the phraseology ‘in his discretion’. 7. For a better understanding of the connotation and concept of the word ‘may’, an useful reference may be made here to the various interpretation made by the Federal Courts at the earliest times, as could be seen from the book "Words and Phrases =Permanent Edition - Volume 26-A" at page 409: "Generally, the word "may" used in statutes will be given ordinary meaning unless it would manifestly defeat object of statute and means permissive, discretionary, and not mandatory, Millder v. Schlereth, 36 N.W. 2nd 497, 806,151, Neb. 33." Word "may" in statute is permissive and confers discretion, unless context clearly indicates contrary, but will be given mandatory construction, when legislative intent is to impose duty and public or third persons have claim de jure to exercise of power. Wolf v. Luther on Mutual life INS Co., 18. W.2d 804, 808, 236 Iowa 334." 8. 33." Word "may" in statute is permissive and confers discretion, unless context clearly indicates contrary, but will be given mandatory construction, when legislative intent is to impose duty and public or third persons have claim de jure to exercise of power. Wolf v. Luther on Mutual life INS Co., 18. W.2d 804, 808, 236 Iowa 334." 8. A similar reference may be made to the word ‘discretion’, as could be seen from the book "words and Phrases Permanent Edition-Volume 12-Aat Page 327: "Discretion" ordinarily means sound discretion, not wilful orarbitrary, but regulated by well-known and established principles of law, or such as may be exercised without violating any principle of law. Davis v. Shigley, 100 H.E. 2D. 261, 263, 88 Ohio App.423". Page 329: The term "discretion" as applied to the acts of a judge means, in a broad sense, the option which a judge may exercise, either to do or not to do that which is proposed to him that he shall do, choosing between the doing and not going of the thing, the doing of which cannot he demanded as an absolute right of the party asking it to be done, or the exercise of the right legally to determine between two or more courses of action. Koll v. State, 157 S.W. 2D 377, 380, 143 tex. Cr.R. 104". Page334: "Judicial action, which involves "discretion" which is the power exercised by court to determine questions to which no strict rule flaw is applicable but which from their nature and circumstances are controlled by the personal judgment of the court is final and cannot be set aside on appeal except when there is an abuse of discretion. Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co., C.C.A. Ca. 124 F. 2d 965. 967". Page 342: "Discretion" is part of judicial function which decides questions arising in trial of cause according to particular circumstances of each case with court’s judgment uncontrolled by fixed rules of law. Kujich v. Little, Mont., 260 2D. 383, 389, 390". "Discretion" within statute authorizing dismissal of action for want of prosecution means discretion of trial court and not discretion of reviewing court. Hiroko Kawakita Hayasht v. Lorenz, Cal. App. 258 P 2d 1039,1041. 9. Kujich v. Little, Mont., 260 2D. 383, 389, 390". "Discretion" within statute authorizing dismissal of action for want of prosecution means discretion of trial court and not discretion of reviewing court. Hiroko Kawakita Hayasht v. Lorenz, Cal. App. 258 P 2d 1039,1041. 9. Reverting our attention to sub-clause (2) of Sec.231 of the Code, it is pretty clear by a cursory glance of the provision that the power either to permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred or recall any witness for further cross-examination is vested in the trial Judge. It is not as if that the power that is vested in him is such an unbridled power without any letters or restrictions, which could be exercised in any manner he likes but is power to be exercised in his discretion. There is no right enuring in favour of the defence permitting them to defer the cross-examination merely for the sake of asking without any reason whatever. The power that is vested therein may be exercised suo mom by the trial Judge or on his being persuaded to exercise his discretion by the defence either orally or by the filing of an application. Whatever might be the situation that arises in the exercise of the power, it is pretty certain that the same could be exercised only by the proper exercise of judicial discretion. When the discretion that is vested in him is exercised by taking into account all cannons of justice, fair-play, equity, and good conscience besides relevant facts and circumstances of the case, without exhibition of any caprice or whimsical fancies, the exercise of such power cannot at all be called in question by the appellate or reviewing forum in the hierarchy of judicial administration. 10. Even according to the defence, the arch villain of the piece is the approver, who alone would speak the events between 9 P.M. on 9.6.1989 and 3 A.M. on the following day, that is, on the fateful night in question and there could be no corroboration for the events that took place during the relevant time. If at all there is any corroboration to the testimony of the approver, the corroborative material might relate to event that took place either prior or subsequent to the relevant time as aforesaid for the commission of the offences of murder, rape and disposal of the body pursuant to a conspiracy. If at all there is any corroboration to the testimony of the approver, the corroborative material might relate to event that took place either prior or subsequent to the relevant time as aforesaid for the commission of the offences of murder, rape and disposal of the body pursuant to a conspiracy. The defence would urge here that if they are not permitted to defer the cross-examination of the approver, P.W.1 till all other witnesses are examined in this case, excepting the investigating officer, there is likelihood of serious prejudice being caused to the defence in the sense of revealing their defence theory by putting questions in cross-examination to the approver, which would have the deleterious effect of making it not possible for them to elicit any favourable answer from the mouth of the other corroborating witnesses, who would be waken up by the defence theory having been revealed to them and they would tailor their evidence to suit the exigencies of the case of the prosecution, causing prejudice to the cause of justice. I am unable to understand either the sanguinity or tenability of such an argument raised in a criminal trial. If such an argument is to be accepted, it would tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. The corroborating materials in the normal parllance consist of relevant facts and circumstances confirming or supporting the existence of the facts in issue and thereby lends assurance to the acceptability of the facts in issue. As such, abduction of evidence regarding the facts in issue and the proof of the same tested by the touchstone of cross-examination must precede the evidence to be adduced by way of corroboration lending assurance to the facts in issue. To require the prosecution to adduced evidence of corroborative material preceding the proof of the facts in issue by relevant evidence is opposed to all cannons of justice an fair-play in a criminal trial. Pertinent it is to note here that the defence and the cross-examination of P.W.1 approver deferred till all the witnesses inclusive of the doctor, when conducted the autopsy, except that of the investigating officer, are examined. The examination of the witnesses acquainted with the occurrence would undoubtedly result miscarriage of justice. The credible acceptance or otherwise of the eye witness could be test by the touch-stone of the expertise testimony the medical witness. The examination of the witnesses acquainted with the occurrence would undoubtedly result miscarriage of justice. The credible acceptance or otherwise of the eye witness could be test by the touch-stone of the expertise testimony the medical witness. This feat can be achieved only when the testimony of the eye witness complete before the examination of the medical expert. It is implicit for the defence in criminal trials to reveal its theory by putting question in cross examination eliciting answers from the main witnesses in order to probabilise its theory. The argument that revealing of the defence theory to the main witness will result in serious prejudice to the case of the defence by the other witnesses to be examined by any of corroboration at a later point of time tailoring their evidence to the occasion is no answer at all and the defence, in such a situation is the best Judge as to when exactly the defence theory has to be revealed to the witness. In this view of the matter, the rejection of the prayer of the defence to permit the deferring of the cross-examination of the approver, P.W.1 by the Court below cannot be said to be one of misuse or interference. Further, there is no irregularity or illegality in the orders of the Court below. 11. Both the Criminal Revision Petition and Criminal Miscellaneous Petition therefore deserve to be dismissed and arc accordingly dismissed.