JUDGMENT S. S. Ahmad, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against an order dated 641989 passed by the Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd., Lucknow, by which the petitioner has been placed under suspension. 2. Learned counsel for the opposite parties raised a preliminary objection that a Full Bench of this Court in Radha Charan Sharma v. U.P. Cooperative Federation and others 1982 UPLBEC 89 has held that the federation is not a State or Local Authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and, therefore, the present petition is not maintainable. Without entering into this controversy, we proceed to consider the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. 3. The order of suspension contained in Annexure6 has been assailed on the ground that it was not in consonance with Regulation 84 (5) of the U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. Karmchari Sewa Niyamawali, 1980 framed under Regulation 102 of the U.P. Cooperative Employees' Service Regulations, 1975. The Niyamawali has since been approved by the U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board. 4. In paragraph 23 of the writ petition an English translation of the relevant portions of Rule 84 (5) is quoted, which is reproduced below: An employee may be suspended in the following circumstances by the appointing officer, or by any other officer authorised to do so: (ka) when the aforesaid officer is satisfied that, prima facie, the matter is such that there was possibility of the employee being dismissed or reduced in rank. (Kha) When it was necessary or when in regard to his conduct enquiry was expected to be held immediately, or was in contemplation and it was not in the interest of the Federation to allow the employee to continue on his post, or (ga) . 5. A perusal of the rule quoted above will indicate that an order of suspension can be passed when the appointing officer or any other officer authorised in this behalf is satisfied that the matter, primafacie, was such that there was the possibility of the employee being dismissed or reduced in rank. This rules out the suspension of an employee on trivial charges. Condition precedent for invoking the power of suspension is the gravity of charge which, if found proved, would ultimately result in the employee's dismissal or his reduction in rank. 6. The matter does not end here. This rules out the suspension of an employee on trivial charges. Condition precedent for invoking the power of suspension is the gravity of charge which, if found proved, would ultimately result in the employee's dismissal or his reduction in rank. 6. The matter does not end here. After having considered the nature of charge, the appointing authority or the officer invested with the power of suspension, has to make up his mind on two other factors contemplated by Clause (Kha) of Rule 85 (4). They are: (i) Whether there would be immediate initiation of the disciplinary proceedings or that such an enquiry was merely, at that stage, contemplated. (ii) Whether it would not be in the interest of the Federation to allow the employee to continue on the post. 7. Once these factors coupled with the nature of charge have been objectively considered by the concerned officer, he can proceed to pass the order of suspension. 8. The word contemplated (equivalent of Hindi word hindi used in clause (kha) above has also been used in Rule 49A of the U.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 9. While considering Rule 49A, a Full Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v Jai Singh Dixit ( 1975 (2) SLR 754 ) observed as under: 33 The proper meaning which can be assigned to the word contemplate used in Rule 49A or in Rule 1A, therefore, is to have in view, 'to expect', take into account as a contingency: Therefore, whenever it is in the mind of the appointing authority that in due course a formal departmental inquiry shall be held or there exists a contingency for such an inquiry, one can say that a formal departmental inquiry is contemplated. It is however, necessary that there should be application of mind, in the eye of law, in good faith, and not arbitrarily. 10. The above quotation has been extracted from one of the majority judgments delivered by the then Chief Justice D.S. Mathur. It will, however, be useful to reproduce another para from another majority judgment delivered by Hon'ble Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) who also considered the meaning of the word contemplated and laid down as under: 69. The next question is as to the correct connotation and significance of the term contemplated in the phrase inquiry is contemplated or is proceeding. The next question is as to the correct connotation and significance of the term contemplated in the phrase inquiry is contemplated or is proceeding. It is obvious that contemplated cannot mean the same thing as 'proceeding' in relation to the inquiry; else the term 'contemplated' would be superfluous. In this context the word 'contemplated' refers to stage of the inquiry different than when it is proceeding. From the moment the inquiry has been commenced, it can be said to be proceeding. In my opinion an inquiry commences when it is set in motion or is initiated. Formal departmental proceedings start when a decision to hold them is taken, because the decision directly leads to and sets in motion the various ministerial steps of the proceedings, like framing and communication of charges, calling for an explanation, hearing witnesses etcetc. The decision to hold a formal departmental inquiry sets in motion or initiates it. From this point of time onwards the inquiry proceeds. 70. In this view, the word 'contemplated' occurring in the phrase inquiry is contemplated or is proceeding must refer to a stage earlier than whence the inquiry is proceeding. The term contemplated means 'to have in view; 'expected', 'to take into account as a contingency.' A person can have an inquiry in view, or expect an inquiry before he decides to hold it. This also corroborates the interpretation that the word 'contemplated' occurring in the phrase 'inquiry is contemplated or is proceeding' points to a stage when the inquiry is expected; that is, prior to the taking of the decision to hold the inquiry. We are unable to share the view expressed by the Full Bench in J.L. Bhargava's (1) case that the word contemplated is equivalent to decide. 11. This full Bench decision was also considered by a Division Bench of which one of us (S. Saghir Ahmad, J.) was a member in NooruIHasan v. Senior Superintendent of police (1985 Lucknow Civil Decisions 208). 12. In view of the above Full Bench decision, an order of suspension can be passed even when an enquiry was merely expected, or to the use of the word used in the rule, contemplated. That is, an order of suspension can be passed even prior to the taking of the decision to held the enquiry. 13. 12. In view of the above Full Bench decision, an order of suspension can be passed even when an enquiry was merely expected, or to the use of the word used in the rule, contemplated. That is, an order of suspension can be passed even prior to the taking of the decision to held the enquiry. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that the word prima facie, according to P. Raraanatha Aiyer's 'The Law Lexicon' Reprint Edition 1987, means: Prima facie case A prima facie case is a case made out by proper and sufficient testimony. Prima facie case is a case mace out by sufficient evidence and can be overthrown only by rebutting testimony, one on which is established by sufficient evidence adduced on the other side. A prima facie case is that state of facts which entitles the party to have the case go to the jury. A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the original or general presumption of innocence, and a conviction if not then encountered and controlled by evidence tending to contradict it and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it. 14. It is on the basis of the above that the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that before passing an order of suspension the Managing Director ought to have held an enquiry and collected evidence to come to the conclusion that there was a primafacie case made out against the petitioner and then only he could have exercised his jurisdiction to place the petitioner under suspension and not at any earlier stage. 15. Law Lexicon, upon which learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance, also defines Prima facie evidence as Evidence which, standing alone and unexplained, would maintain the proposition and warrant the conclusion to support which it is introduced. It also means Evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome by other evidence. 16. This indicates that there should be some evidence'' to indicate that there is a serious charge against an employee who is proposed to be placed under suspension. 17. It also means Evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome by other evidence. 16. This indicates that there should be some evidence'' to indicate that there is a serious charge against an employee who is proposed to be placed under suspension. 17. In the matter of suspension it is the satisfaction of the appointing or authorised authority based on an objective consideration of the material on records which is material and such material would constitute the Prima facie evidence against the employee proposed to be suspended. Since the Satisfaction is to be based on objective consideration, it would not be justifiable except on the grounds that there was no material on the record on which the satisfaction could be based or that the order of suspension was the result of arbitrary exercise of power or that it was malicious pr motivated or passed on extraneous consideration. 18. These grounds, it may be specified, relate strictly to the question of satisfaction and not to the ground or grounds which may be available under the relevant service Rule, namely, that the order was in violation of the Rule or that there was triviality of charge and/or the guidelines indicated in the Rule were not followed and so on which need not be further multiplied. 19. Since in the instant case, Sri Umesh Chandra, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended that there was no material on the record to warrant an order of suspension being passed, we directed Sn A.K. Tewari, counsel for the opposite panics to produce the original record which he did and which besides being perused by us, has also been looked into by Sri Umesh Chandra. 20. The record indicates that the order of suspension has been passed on the basis of a report dated 541989 submitted by the General Manager (Administration), which leads as under : matter in hindi 21. On the above quoted report the following order was passed by the Managing Director on 641989. It is evident from 'A' that Shri Ram Naresh Saxena has crossed all limits of decency and has grossly misbehaved with G.M. (Adm). For this act of gross misbehavior Shri Saxena is suspended and is attached to R.M. Office, Luckno Shri A.K. Ojha is appointed Enquiry Officer. 22. It is evident from 'A' that Shri Ram Naresh Saxena has crossed all limits of decency and has grossly misbehaved with G.M. (Adm). For this act of gross misbehavior Shri Saxena is suspended and is attached to R.M. Office, Luckno Shri A.K. Ojha is appointed Enquiry Officer. 22. The report extracted above constituted the prima facie evidence against the petitioner, which if not controverted, would establish the accusation against the petitioner. The Managing Director on an objective consideration of the contents of the report could have legally proceeded to pass the order of suspension. It was, therefore, not a case where there was no material on record. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Managing Director ought to have held some sort of a formal enquiry into the allegations made in the report and collected evidence against the petitioner. It is contended that the opinion could have been based on the evidence so collected and not merely on the report. We cannot subscribe to this view. 24. The Full Bench of this Court in State v. Jai Singh (supra) has already held that an order of suspension can be passed even prior to the holding of a preliminary enquiry. For passing an order of suspension, therefore, it was not necessary to collect evidence. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sri Pranab Prasanna Biswas v. The State of West Bengal and others (1980 (1) Service Law Reporter, page 611, relevant page 635). This case is clearly distinguishable with the facts on which the order of suspension was passed were held not to be germane to the question of suspension in that ease. 26. Learned counsel or the petitioner next contended that although in the original order of suspension dated 6.4.1989 only this much was stated that the petitioner had grossly misbehaved with the General Manager (Administration) and it was for this act of gross misbehavior that the petitioner was placed under suspension by the impugned order dated 6.4.1989 in which it has also been stated as under: matter in hindi [Contemplated] 27. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of suspension as contained in Annexure No. 6 speaks of many more reasons than those contained in the eider passed on the file and, therefore, it will have to be presumed that the original order did not exist on the file. 28. We are not prepared to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 29. The original order dated 6.4.89 passed on the file has to be read alongwith the report of the General Manager (Administration) which sets out in detail the incident and the conduct of the petitioner. The Managing Director on being satisfied passed an order of suspension of the petitioner, on the basis of which the impugned order (Annexure No. 6 to the writ petition) was later drawn up. The contents of this order cannot be said to be at variance with the original order passed on the file. 30. Another argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on the averments made in paragraph 27 of the petition, which is reproduced below: 27. That Rule 85(6) (ka) which permits payment of onethird salary as subsistence allowance is ultra vires in as much as the rule does not take into consideration if the employee, who is suspended can maintain himself and his family in the reduced amount of Rs. 600 per month as subsistence allowance. The rule is ultra vires for no employee, including the petitioner can live with dignity which is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, and in the meagre sum of Rs. 600 per month as subsistence allowance the petitioner is faced with starvation. It is further submitted that it has not been considered that in fixing the amount of subsistence allowance regard should he had to the fact that the employee concerned is to maintain himself and his family and, in any case, before passing the order of suspension the family Circumstances of the petitioner ought to have been taken into account and objectively considered. 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the meagre Amount of Rs, 600, which is onethird of the salary of the petitioner was not sufficient to maintain the petitioner and his family and, therefore, provisions of Rule 85 (6) of the said Rules are ultra vires of Article 21 of the Constitution. 32. 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the meagre Amount of Rs, 600, which is onethird of the salary of the petitioner was not sufficient to maintain the petitioner and his family and, therefore, provisions of Rule 85 (6) of the said Rules are ultra vires of Article 21 of the Constitution. 32. True that suspension does sot result in termination of service and it merely immobilises an employee for a temporary period but he has to be paid reduced emoluments by way of subsistence allowance as contemplated in the Service Rules. Initially onethird of the salary is to be paid to the petitioner and if the suspension order continues for a period of more than six months, the subsistence allowance is to be raised to onehalf of the salary. Whether or not the petitioner is able to maintain himself and the members of his family with the aid of the reduced emoluments cannot be considered and determined in this writ petition as the petitioner has not given the necessary details to come to a conclusion whether or not the family of the petitioner can be maintained with the aid of the reduced amount of Rs. 600 per month 33. Since the foundation for challenging the vires of the Rule has not been properly laid in the petition, it is not possible to consider and adjudicate upon this question. In any case, since the rule itself provides for increase of the subsistence allowance after the expiry of six months it will not be appropriate to invoke even the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan ( AIR 1983 SC 803 ) in which the service rule providing for token subsistence allowance of Rs. l during the period of suspension was held to be bad. 34. In view of the above the petition fails and is dismissed summarily at the admission stage. (Petition Dismissed)