ORDER S.K. Dubey, J. The defendant/tenant has preferred this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 4th September, 1984, passed by Seventh Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Indore, in Civil Appeal No. 20-A/1983. confirming the Judgment and decree of eviction passed u/s 20AA of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short, the 'Act'), on 23-2-1983. in CS No. 108-A/1982 by Fifth Civil Judge, Class II, Indore. Brief facts leading to this appeal are: The appellant/defendant is a tenant of the suit accommodation (house) on monthly rent of Rs. 45/-. The plaintiff/respondent on 11-3-1982 instituted a suit and claimed a decree for eviction u/s 20AA, which was inserted in the Act from 7-4-1981, by M. P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 198.1. The plaintiff, as a retired Government servant, claimed possession of the suit accommodation on the ground that at the time of retirement, i.e., on 31-8-1980, the respondent was employed in M.P. Electricity Board (for short, 'MPEB') and was holding the post of Mains Inspector, that the said post was held by him in public service in connection with the affairs of the State and that the suit accommodation is "bona fide" required by him for the benefit of his son Rohinton and that there is no other alternative suitable accommodation available in the local area of Indore. A certificate No. 230/BE/W, dated 1-12-1981, as required u/s 20AA of the Act, issued by the Controlling Officer, Shri V. K. Agrawal, Divisional Engineer, West City Division, MPEB, Indore, was produced. The appellant denied all the allegations, the genuineness of the certificate was denied. The defendant resisted the claim u/s 20AA of the Act, that the plaintiff is not a retired Government servant; as such, the special provision for recovery of possession u/s 20AA cannot be invoked by the plaintiff for seeking eviction. On production of the certificate, which was considered as a conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein, without recording any evidence, the trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for eviction of the defendant from the suit accommodation. 3 The defendant preferred an appeal against the said judgment and decree. On production of the certificate, which was considered as a conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein, without recording any evidence, the trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for eviction of the defendant from the suit accommodation. 3 The defendant preferred an appeal against the said judgment and decree. In appeal, the court held that the MPEB is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and, according to the Notification published in M P. Rajpatra, dated 27-9-1961 the respondent was categorised and shown in Combined Gradation List as Field Officer in the Electricity Establishment of Electricity Department of Government of Madhya Pradesh, and The Controlling Officer has issued the certificate, which is a conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein, hence, the decree was rightly passed the defendant, aggrieved of the said judgment and decree of the Court below, has preferred this second appeal, which was admitted by this court on 12-10-1984 on the following substantial question of law: - "Whether the appellant being an ex-employee of the MPEB, the provisions of section 20AA of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act are not attracted?" During the pendency of this appeal, the appellant filed a petition, being M.P. No. 653/1985, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the vires of section 20AA of the Act. A Division Bench of this court, while dismissing the said petition on 19-7-1985, observed that as the petitioner has availed the remedy of second appeal and the question of vires of section 20AA having been raised therein, there is no occasion to interfere in writ jurisdiction and a prayer for framing a substantial question of law to that effect may be made in the second appeal. The appellant on 13-10-1987 filed an application to that effect, but at the time of hearing the prayer for framing and deciding the substantial question of law regarding vires of the provisions of section 20AA was not pressed. The appellant also filed I A. No. 179/1989, dated 7-1-1989, under Order 6, Rule 17, CPC for amendment of the written statement. This application was opposed by the respondent. The respondent filed application and 13 documents to clarify his position that he was appointed to a public service or post in conection with the affairs of the State. The appellant also filed I A. No. 179/1989, dated 7-1-1989, under Order 6, Rule 17, CPC for amendment of the written statement. This application was opposed by the respondent. The respondent filed application and 13 documents to clarify his position that he was appointed to a public service or post in conection with the affairs of the State. Intially, the respondent was employed in the Electricity Department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh and after the constitution of MPEB under the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, his services were transferred from 1st June, 57, to MPEB. The appellant opposed the application contending that the Gazette Notifications relate to the period before the transfer of services of the respondent to MPEB, which show the placement of the respondent in the Gradation List, the pension related to the share of the Government for the period of services rendered by the respondent in the Electricity Department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh. The appellant also made a prayer that the respondent be directed to produce his service records with regard to pension, option exercised by the respondent at the time of transfer or absorption, that is, whether he elected to be an employee of the MPEB or of the Government. the appellant also filed on 24-3-1989 reply to the clarification made by the respondent. This was supported by an affidavit and two documents issued by the MPEB, one dated 10-10-1958 relating to increment of the respondent and another dated 30-8-1980 by which the respondent was retired and relieved by the MPEB on attainment of the age of superannuation. Shri A. K. Chitale, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the special provision u/s 20AA of the Act is in the nature of a draconian law, as merely by filing a certificate issued by the Controlling Officer of the retired Government servant, a decree for eviction can be passed; therefore, the provisions of section 20AA are to be interpreted strictly, and when a case is made out by a retired Government servant, the Court has 'to pass a decree only on the production of the certificate granted by the Controlling Officer, which is conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. A tenant of such a landlord has no opportunity to meet the case or to raise any defence about the facts stated in the certificate. A tenant of such a landlord has no opportunity to meet the case or to raise any defence about the facts stated in the certificate. In the present case, the respondent was not a retired Government servant and was employed in MPEB, a corporate body created by a statute; though it may be an authority for the purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution, the employee of such a corporate body cannot be said to be a Government servant, and, on retirement, he cannot invoke this special provision. Learned counsel submitted that ex facie the certificate issued by the Controlling Officer is not in relation to a retired Government servant, nor the Controlling Officer is an officer of the State Government, drawing the salary of the retired Government servant immediately before his retirement. Learned counsel in support of his contentions cited Supreme Court decisions and a Division Bench decision of this Court. He also made a reference to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edn... Page 2101, which gives the meaning of "public service," and referred to the provisions of M. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, where the term "Government servant" has been defined. It was submitted that for interpreting section 20AA, clause(2) cannot be read in isolation; the whole section if read, clearly shows the intention of the legislature that the provisions can be invoked only by the landlord who is a retired Government servant who before his retirement, was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State. Shri S. D. Sanghi and Shri R. G. Waghmare, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, made their assiduous submissions and contended that the provision has been enacted to provide benefit to a person who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and is duly retired. The respondent is a retired Government servant. Though the MPEB is a statutory Corporation, and not a department of Government, it cannot be, denied that the functions performed by the MPEB are governmental functions which have to be performed by the Government or any other instrumentality of the Government for rendering public service. The respondent is a retired Government servant. Though the MPEB is a statutory Corporation, and not a department of Government, it cannot be, denied that the functions performed by the MPEB are governmental functions which have to be performed by the Government or any other instrumentality of the Government for rendering public service. Therefore, even if the respondent is not regarded as retired Government servant in the sense that he was not drawing his salary from the public exchequer, he is nonetheless to be regarded as a person who was engaged in public service, carried on by instrumentality of the State Government, which was charged by law. for rendering public service. In the main provision, i.e., clause (a) of section 20AA the words "Government servant" are not used anywhere; therefore, the main provision clearly indicates that its object is to give benefit of the section to a person appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State, and a bare reading of clause (a) of Section 20AA shows that no distinction can be drawn between a retired Government servant and a person "appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State". It was also contended that the Court should not interpret a provision of law so as to defeat the intention of the legislature. Heading of a section or marginal notes or other provisions of the section cannot be read so read the words "retired Government servant" in the main section, when this expression has not been intentionally used. It was also contended that subsequent legislation cannot be looked into for putting a construction on earlier enactment, even if the earlier Act is ambiguous. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., Page 1108, was also cited for the meaning of the words "public service". It was contended that as the certificate granted is conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein, the decree passed by the Courts below was right. Reliance was placed on Mandsakini v. Sushil Jain 1983 MPLJ N. 38. Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of their submissions cited a catena of decision the apex court and of High Courts. Before dealing with the question involved it will be useful to reproduce the relevant provision which came into force from 7-4-1981: - "20-AA. Reliance was placed on Mandsakini v. Sushil Jain 1983 MPLJ N. 38. Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of their submissions cited a catena of decision the apex court and of High Courts. Before dealing with the question involved it will be useful to reproduce the relevant provision which came into force from 7-4-1981: - "20-AA. special provision for recovery of possession of accommodation to a retired Government servant or a member of the family of a deceased retired Government servant - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, - (a) a landlord, being a person who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and is duly retired (which term shall include premature retirement), shall be entitled to recover possession of any accommodation on the ground that the accommodation is "bona fide" required by him for occupation by himself or any member of his family and the Court shall pass a decree for eviction on such ground if the landlord at the hearing of the suit produces a certificate signed by the Controlling Officer to the effect that- . (i) the landlord is a person who was appointed to public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and is now a retired Government Servant; (ii) he does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area where he or the members of the family can reside; (b) where a person who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State dies within five years of his retirement, his widow who is or becomes a landlord of any accommodation, shall be entitled to recover possession of such accommodation on the ground that the accommodation is "bona fide" required by her for occupation by herself or any member of her family and the Court shall pass a decree for eviction on such ground, if such widow, at the, hearing of the suit, produces a certificate signed by the controlling officer to the effect that- (i) she is widow of a deceased Government servant as aforesaid; (ii) she does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area where she or the members of her family can reside. Explanation - For the purposes of clause (a) of this sub-section, the expression "controlling officer" means the officer of the State Government drawing the salary of the retired Government Servant immediately before his retirement and where the retired Government servant was drawing his salary himself his successor in office, (2) for the purpose of this section, any certificate granted thereunder shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein". Section 20AA starts with a non obstante clause, which overrides the provisions of section 12(1) of the Act. In other words, if a landlord wants an eviction on any of the grounds enumerated u/s 12(1) he has to plead and prove by legal and cogent evidence the ground, on which he bases his claim for eviction. It is. also settled that when the accommodation is required "bona fide", then the requirement has to be judged by a Court objectively. But, if the recovery of possession is claimed, by a landlord on the ground of "bona fide" requirement under this special provision of section 20AA, a retired Government servant has merely to produce a certificate at the time of hearing as required by section 20AA(a) of the Act. It is not necessary for such a landlord to adduce any other evidence, because, u/s 20AA(2) the certificate is conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. Therefore, when such a special provision has been made for recovery of poessession, the landlord, who invokes this special provision, must bring his case strictly within the four corners of the section by producing a certificate signed by the Controlling Officer, which must be to the effect that (i) the landlord is a person who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and is now a, retired Government servant; (ii) he does not possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area where he or the members of family reside. There is an Explanation after sub-section (b) of section 20AA which defines "Controlling Officer", for the purposes of clause (a) the expression "Controlling Officer" means the officer of the State Government drawing the salary of the retired Government servant immediately before his retirement and where the retired Government servant was drawing his salary himself, his successor in office. Therefore, if the certificate is not issued by the Controlling Officer as defined in the Explanation and even if. Therefore, if the certificate is not issued by the Controlling Officer as defined in the Explanation and even if. certificate is issued by such Controlling Officer but does not state the fact that the landlord is a person who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and is now a retired Government servant besides the fact that he has no other suitable accommodation in the local area where he or the members of family reside. The certificate cannot be relied as conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein, for passing a decree for eviction. Production of the certificate in accordance with the requirement of the section 20AA is a condition precedent for passing the decree by a Court trying the suit. In other words, the Court only gets jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction, if the certificate so produced is in strict compliance of the provision. Indisputably, the certificate produced by the respondent in this case does not fulfil the essential requirements, as stated in the section. It does not state that the respondent is now a retired Government servant nor the certificate states that it was issued by the officer of the State Government. The certificate issued is by the Divisional Engineer of MPEB who is not an officer of the State Government. It is, no doubt, true that MPEB is a corporate body constituted by the provisions of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, which is a statutory body and carries on governmental or quasi-governmental functions. The expression "other authorities" under Article 12 of the Constitution is wide enough to include within its ambit every authority created under a statute and functioning within the territory of India, or under the control of the Government of India. (See Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur Vs. Mohan Lal and Others, . After the decision in Rajasthan State Electricity Board (supra), the Supreme Court, for bringing an entity within 'State' as State agency or instrumentality, expanded the scope of Article 12 by giving cumulative effect of various tests, e.g. financial resources, functional character being governmental in essence, plenary control residing in Government, prior history of activity being carried by Government and made over to new body, some element of authority or command. If the tests are satisfied, then, Supreme Court held, it is immaterial whether such an entity is created by a statute or incorporated under a law, it will be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 for the purposes of Part III and Parrt IV of the Constitution. The employees of these statutory bodies will have a statutory status, but such employees will not be servants of the Union or the State. In the case of State of Punjab and Others Vs. Raja Ram and Others, , Supreme Court observed that the Food Corporation of India cannot be said to be a Government department. A Government department has to be an organisation which is not only completely controlled and financed by the Government but has also no identity of its own. The money earned by such a department goes to the exchequer of the Government and losses incurred by the department are losses of the Government. The Corporation, on the other hand, is an autonomous body capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of property and having the power to contract. It may also sue or be sued by its own name and the Government does not figure in any litigation to which it is a party. Therefore, even though the Government has got control in the matter of policy, it cannot be a department of the Government, and the employee of such a statutory corporation, though holding a post in public service in connection with the affairs of the State, cannot be said to be a Government servant. In case of Sukhdev Singh, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation Employees Associations Vs. Bhagat Ram, Association of Clause II. Officers, Shyam Lal, Industrial Finance Corporation, , the apex Court in para 67, after holding such statutory bodies to be authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution and the employees of such statutory bodies as having a statutory status and to be entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provision, observed:- "By way of abundant caution we state that these employees are not servants of the Union or the State." A Division Bench of this Court, while considering the case of an employee of the M. P. Electricity Board in K. Dhruva Rao Vs. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, Jabalpur, , has held that the legal position that employees of statutory corporations, like the respondent-Board, are not entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution, but can invoke in their aid the statutory Regulations governing their "conditions of service, is well settled. Under section 3(23) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, "Government" has been defined which includes both the Central Government and any State Government. From this definition also, it is clear that an authority or a corporate body is a separate and distinct entity from Government and, thus, its employees cannot. be said to be Government servants. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the case of an employee, who was employed in the then department of the M. P. State Government and, after constitution of the Madhya Pradesh State Industries Corporation, his services were transferred to the Industries Corporation. The terms and conditions of the transfer were considered and after considering the terms and conditions of the transfer, it was held that where the employees of the erstwhile Government undertaking were transferred to M. P. State Industries Corporation subject to the condition that their services would not be treated as an interruption in service, the transferred employees, who then became the employees of the Corporation, could not claim benefits, accrued to Government employees, subsequent to the transfer as they ceased to be Government employees. The object of creating a fiction of continuity of service was only to secure the benefit of uninterrupted service. (See R.C. Sharma Vs. The Chief Secretary, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal and Others, . In the present case, the respondent has not filed any terms and contitions of transfer, but has filed an order of the Electricity Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh, dated 23-5-1957, wherein, after taking over the service of the employees in the MPEB, it was ordered that from 1st June, 1957, the services under the MPEB of such absorbed officers shall be treated by the MPEB as continuous for all purposes, such as leave, pension, etc. In other words, the transfer of services of an employee in accordance with this order shall not amount to a break in his service. The resolution of the MPEB passed in its first meeting on 1-4-1957 is also to the same effect. In other words, the transfer of services of an employee in accordance with this order shall not amount to a break in his service. The resolution of the MPEB passed in its first meeting on 1-4-1957 is also to the same effect. A bare reading of these two documents also shows that after the transfer of the services of the respondent to MPEB, he ceased to be a Government Servant. The contention of the respondent that in the main section, the expression "retired Government servant" has not been used, hence, it is enough that a landlord, who claims relief under this special provision, should be a person, who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and is duly retired, a decree for possession to such a person can be passed though in the heading of the section and in other parts of the section the use of the words "retired Government servant", has no relevance, cannot be accepted. This special provision has been inserted only in relation to the retired Government servants, which is amply clear from the heading of the section and from other parts thereof. It is true that in clause (2) the words "retired Government servant" have not been used, but, instead of that, the legislature used the words "a landlord, being a person who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and is duly retired **********." But, in the main section itself, the legislature has imposed a condition precedent for passing a decree for eviction, that such landlord at the hearing of the suit has to produce a certificate signed by the Controlling Officer to the effect that (i) the landlord is a person who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and is now a retired Government Servant. The emphasis on the. expression "and is now a retired Government servant" relates to the landlord who is seeking a decree for eviction under this special provision, and if the certificate as required under this provision is not produced, the Court trying such a suit gets no jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction. The emphasis on the. expression "and is now a retired Government servant" relates to the landlord who is seeking a decree for eviction under this special provision, and if the certificate as required under this provision is not produced, the Court trying such a suit gets no jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction. It is settled principle of interpretation that the word "or" is normally disjunctive and the word "and" is normally conjunctive; here, "and" is to be read as conjunctive, which clears the intention of the legislature as disclosed from the context that the special provision has been made for a landlord who should be a retired Government servant. It is also an elementary rule of interpretation that while interpreting a statute for finding out the intention of the legislature, it must be found by reading the statute as a whole. The rule is referred to as an "elementary rule." This equally applies for interpreting a section. It is not permissible to omit any part of the section, construction of a section can be made by reading all its parts together and not a part in isolation. (See Balasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya and Others, . Keeping this in view, I have no doubt that "landlord" used in section 20AA(a) is a person who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and should be a retired Government Servant. The Explanation appended to the section also removes the ambiguity, if any, in the main section, as the Controlling Officer of such a landlord, who seeks this special provision, means that he should be an officer of the State Government drawing the salary of the retired Government Servant immediately before his retirement. Thus, from the words "a retired Government servant" used in the section by the legislature, at different places its intent is clear that the special provision for recovery of possession has been made for the benefit of a landlord who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and is duly retired as a retired Government servant. The above is also clear from the heading of the section 20AA, which reads as under: - "Special provision for recovery of possession of accommodation to a retired Government Servant ***********." This also demonstrates the intention of the legislature that this special provision has been made for a retired Government servant. Therefore, even if the words "retired Government servant" for a landlord having not been used in clause(a) of section 20AA, to remove the doubts, the heading or preface, which is regarded as preamble to the section, though it cannot control the plain words of the section, it may explain ambiguous words, if there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words in the section, which certainly helps the Court to resolve that doubt. (See Bhinka and Others Vs. Charan Singh, . Lastly, though not necessary, the special provision was made for a retired Government servant is also clear from the fact that the Act was later amended by M. P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 27 of 1983) and sections 20A and 20AA were omitted by this Amendment Act; Chapter III-A was inserted, whereby for specified categories of landlords a jurisdiction was vested in the Rent Controlling Authority. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Amendment Act, published in 1983 M. P. Law Times, Part IV, at page 113, reads as under:- "Statement of Objects and Resons - Sections 20A and 20AA of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, make special provisions for facilitating speedy recovery of accommodation by members of the Armed Forces of the Union and retired Government Servants and their widows on the grounds of their "bona fide" requirement for their occupation. The special provisions have however not proved useful nor adequate in achieving the desired objective. It is, therefore, proposed to make suitable changes for facilitating recovery of accommodation on the ground of "bona fide" requirement for residence or for business need "inter alia" by changing the forum from Civil Court to Rent Controlling Authority and by providing summary procedure for disposal of such cases ******." Therefore also, there cannot be any conclusion other than the one that the special provision u/s 20AA of the Act was enacted for a landlord who was appointed to a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State and was duly retired as a Government servant. As held that the respondent is not a retired Government servant, the decree of eviction passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the lower appellate Court cannot be maintained. Now the question left before me is whether the suit should be dismissed. Admittedly, the suit was on various grounds u/s 12(1) of the Act including that of "bona fide" requirement u/s 20AA of the Act. No evidence has been recorded. Therefore, in the circumstances of the case, it would be unjust, if the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed. The better course would be to remit the suit for trial on the grounds raised u/s 12(1) including that of bona fide requirement; hence, the case is sent back to the trial Court for disposing it of in accordance with law, after affording an opportunity to parties to lead evidence. As the suit was filed in the year 1982, a direction1 is essential that the trial of the suit shall proceeded die in diem (from day to day) till it is concluded. The trial Court shall dispose of the suit within six months from the date of appearance of the parties before it. The parties shall appear before the trial Court on 23-10-1989. No fresh notice of appearance of the parties before it shall be issued by the trial Court. Let the record of the trial Court be sent immediately so as to reach the trial Court on or before the date so fixed by this Court. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside, the case is remitted to trial Court for disposal afresh in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed