Judgment P. S. Mishra, J. 1. Petitioner herein has moved this Court for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 2-4-1987, passed by the Joint director of Consolidation, Bihar, Patna, dated 19-11-1984 of the Deputy director of Consolidation, Muzaffarpur, and dated 21-8-1980 of the Consolidation officer, Baruraj, on grounds, inter alia, that they are not competent to decide a pure question of title and that they have acted without jurisdiction in ingnoring a Civil Courts, decree recognising a gift with respect to land in dispute. 2. Respondents were noticed to show-cause and when after their appearance the case was heard by a Division Bench on -25-1-1989 and on 17-2-1989, it was referred to a Full Bench and accordingly heard. Besides learned counsel for the parties, Mr. Basudeo Prasad and Mr. Kamal Nayan Choubey, learned advocates have addressed the Court on the questions of law. Learned Advocate general has argued on behalf of the State. 3. The Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation act, 1956 (Bihar Act XXII of 1956) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act)received the assent of the President of India on the 6th September, 1956 and was published in the Bihar Gazette, of the 10th October, 1956. The Act which has purported to provide for the Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of fragmentation has defined a holding to mean a parcel or parcels of land held by a Raiyat and forming the subject matter of a separate tenancy, land to mean agricultural land including horticultural land, Kharaur land, Jand with bamboo dumps, pasture land, cultivable waste land, homesteads, tanks, wells and water-channels ; and a raiyat to mean a person who has acquired right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself or by members of his family or by hired servants or with the aid of partners including the successors-in-interest of persons who have acquired such a right, a village headman in respect of his private holding in the district of Santhal Pargsinas, a Mundan khunt Kattidar and a Bhainhar in the areas to which the Chota Nagpur tenancy Act, 1908 applies. It has defined consolidation to include rearrangement of parcels of land comprised in a holding or in different holdings for the purpose of rendering such holding or holdings more compact, and fragment to mean a piece of land being in area less than the standard area determined in Sec.30 thereof. Chapter II of the Act has dealt with consolidation of holdings. Sec.3 thereof states that with the object of effecting consolidation of holdings for the purpose of better cultivation of lands in any area the State Government may, after such enquiries as it may deem fit, by notification in the official Gazette, declare its intention to make a scheme for consolidation of holdings in that area and make publication of the substance of the notification by beat of drum in the villages comprised in the notified area, by copies of the notification hung up at the offices of all the Gram Panchayats, the police stations, the offices of the Anchal Adhikaris and the village Cutcharies of the State Government. There has, however, been several amendments to the Act including in Sec.4 thereof which originally provided that during the period commencing from the date of the publication of the notification under Sec.3 to the date when the scheme of the consolidation came into operation under Sec.14 in any notified area, no suit or other legal proceeding in respect of any land in such area would be entertained in any court and in calculating periods of limitation applicable to suits and proceedings, such periods would be excluded and all suits and proceedings pending in any court, in respect of any land in such area would remain pending and would thereafter be dealt with in conformity with the provisions of the Act, but nothing would apply to any proceeding under Chapters XI and XII of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1898 or to any suit or proceeding unless such suit or proceeding involved transfer of land from one person to another. Bihar Act 27 of 1975 and Bihar Act 35 of 1982, however, have changed Sec.4 substantially. It at present provides:- "4. Bihar Act 27 of 1975 and Bihar Act 35 of 1982, however, have changed Sec.4 substantially. It at present provides:- "4. Effect of notification under Sec.3 (1) of the Act;-Upon the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Sec.3 in the official Gazette the consequences, as here-in-after set forth shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified in the notification till the close of the consolidation operation, ensure in the area to which the notification relates, namely :- (a) the district or part thereof, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be under consolidation operations and the duty of preparing and maintaining the record-of-rights and the village map of each village shall be performed by the Director of Consolidation, who shall prepare or maintain them, as the case may be, in the manner prescribed ; (b) no suit or other legal proceedings in respect of any land in such areas shall be entertained in any court and in calculating period of limitation applicable to such suits and proceedings such period shall not be counted : provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any proceedings under section 48 (E) of the Tenancy Act, 1885 (Act 8, 1885) and to the proceedings relating to the recording of the titles of Bataidars ;. (c) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision shall on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated : provided that if the State Government empowers any other officer appointed under this Act to dispose of any proceeding relating to survey settlement operations under the provisions of Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885 (Bihar Act VIII of 1885), or Chapter 12 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (Bengal Act 6, 1908)or Santhal Parganas Settlement Manual, 1872 (Manual 3, 1872)and transfer such proceeding to such officer for disposal, then the proceeding shall not abate or shall not be considered to have been abated: provided also that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in any other manner that may be convenient and after giving them an opportunity of being heard : provided further that such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the persons affected to agitate the right or interest in the said suits or proceeding before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provision of this Act and the rules made thereunder : provided that the State Government may, by notification in the Official gazette exempt any such proceeding, suit, appeal, reference or revision or any class of them, if in its opinion their abatement is not in public interest, and is not necessary for the purposes of this act : provided further that nothing in this section shall apply to any proceedings under (Sections 144 of 148 of Chapter X of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) the Bihar Tenants holdings (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973 (Bihar Act 28 of 1973), Sec.48-E of the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885 (Act VIII of 1885) and the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (Act XII of 1962)". 4 After providing for a bar to the suits or proceedings in any court and abatement of pending proceedings and suits in respect of declaration of rights of interests in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under the Act, as a first step in the execution of the scheme a provision has been made in Sec.8 of the Act for the preparation of up-to-date record of rights before consolidation. 5. Section 8 states that after the publication of a notification under Section 3 of up-to-date record of rights in respect of lands comprised in the notified area together with a map shall be prepared in accordance with the provisions of chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (Act 8 of 1885) or as the case may be Chapter XII of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (Bengal Act 6 of 1908)or Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulation 1872 (Regulation 3 of 1872) or the bihar Tenants Holdings (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973. Sub-section (2)of Sec.8 of the Act, after some amendments, provides that where in respect of lands comprised in the notified area may and record of rights have been prepared and preliminary or finally published under the provisions of Chapter x and XII of the Bihar Tenancy Act and the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act respectively, as the case may be, or Santhal Parganas Regulation within twenty years preceding the date of the publication of the notific ation under Sec.3 of the Act such map and record of rights shall be deemed to be up-to-date map and record of rights prepared under sub-section (1 ). Sec.9 of the Act, which also has undergone some amendments, provides for preparation of a register in the prescribed form and states in sub-section (1)- "when the record of rights and map have been or are deemed to have been brought up-to-date there shall be determined, the valuation of each plot after taking into consideration the opinion of the village advisory Committee, of such raiyats as may be availnble and after taking into consideration its productivity, location and availability of irrigation facilities, if any. " 6. By an amendment, Sec.9-A has been introduced which provides for preparation of statement of principles. 7. " 6. By an amendment, Sec.9-A has been introduced which provides for preparation of statement of principles. 7. Section 10 is a comprehensive provision about publication of register of lands and statement of principles and objections thereon, which states as follows :- " (1) The registers prepared under sub-section (2) of Sec.9 and the statement of principles prepared under Sec.9-A shall be published in the manner prescribed and shall remain published for not less than 30 days. (2) Any person may, within 45 days of the date of the publication of the register under sub-section (1) file before the Assistance Consolidation officer objection in respect thereof, disputing the correctness and nature of entries in the records or in the statement of principles. (3) The Assistant Consolidation Officer shall, after hearing the persons interested and after such enquiries as may be necessary, decide the objection, settle the disputes or correct the mistake, as far as may be, by way of compromise between the parties appearing before him and pass orders on the basis of such compromise. (4) All cases which are not disposed of by the Assistant Consolidation officer under sub-section (3), all cases relating to valuation of plots and all cases relating to valuation of structures, tree, bamboo-clumps, well or other improvements for calculating the amount thereof, and its apportionment amongst co-owners, if there be more owners than one, shall be forwarded by the Assistant Consolidation officer to the Consolidation Officer who shall dispose of the same in the manner prescribed. (5) Where objections have been filed against the statement of principles under sub-section (2) of Sec.10 the Assistant Consolidation officer, after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned and after taking into consideration the view of the village Advisory Committee, shall submit his report to the consolidation Officer who shall dispose of the objections in the manner prescribed. (6) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidation officer or Consolidation Officer under sub-sections (3), (4) or (5)may, within 30 days of such order file an appeal before the Assistant director of Consolidation, whose decision, except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, shall be final. (6) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidation officer or Consolidation Officer under sub-sections (3), (4) or (5)may, within 30 days of such order file an appeal before the Assistant director of Consolidation, whose decision, except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, shall be final. (7) The Consolidation Officer shall and the Assistant Director of consolidation may, where necessary, before deciding an objection or an appeal, make local inspection of the unit, after giving due notice to the parties concerned and the village Advisory committee. " 8. Section 10-A states that no question in respect of any entry made in the map or register prepared under Sec.9-A relating to the Consolidation area, which might or ought to have been raised under Sec.10 but has not been raised, shall not be raised or heard at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceeding. 9. Section 10-B, however, has recognised certain matters relating to changes and transfers affecting rights or interests recorded in the register of land published under sub-section (1) of Sec.10 of the Act for which cause of action had not arisen when proceeding under Sections 8 and 9 were started or were in progress and states that all matters concerning such changes and transfers may be raised before the Consolidation Officer within 30 days of the cause of action, but not later than the date of notification under Sec.26-A or under sub-section (1) of Sec.4-A, which sections provide for the closure of the consolidation operations by issuing a notification in the official gazette and the cancellation of the notification under Sec.3 in respect of the whole or part of the area specifid in the notification. 10. Section 10-C has envisaged a republication of the register of lands in certain cases and Sec.10-D has empowered the Deputy Director of Consolidation, for reasons to be recorded in writing to order for the re-publication of the register of lands or the statement of principles or both to give to any person opportunity to file before the Assistant Consolidation Officer objections, notwithstanding the provisions under Sec.10-A, on being satisfied that in the register of lands published under sub-section (1) or corrected under sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) or (6) of Sec.10, a substantial number of raiyats or under-raiyats. for sufficient and unavoidable reasons could not avail of the opportunity to place their claims under sub-section (2) of Sec.10 of the Act. 11. Section 10-E has then reiterated the bar to objections in the following words- "the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (4 ). (5), (6) and (7) of Section 10 shall mutatis mutandis apply to the objections of any matter raised under Sections 10-C and 10-D but the dispute which has been decided earlier in accordance with the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) or (5) or (6) of Sec.10 shall not be re-opened on re-publication of the register of lands or the statement of principles or both. " 12. Section 11 of the Act, which also has undergone several amendments is a provision for preparation of the draft scheme for consolidation. 13. Sections 12 of the Act, after some amendments, provides for the publication of the draft scheme and giving a general notice so that all the raiyats may obtain relevant extract of the scheme free of cost and for filing of objection, if any, subject to the provisions contained in Sec.10-A, by any person whose right or interest is substantially prejudiced or affected by the draft consolidation scheme or who disputed the propriety or correctness of the entry in the draft consolidation scheme or the extract furnished therefrom. 14. Section 12-A is a provision for the disposal of objections under Section 12 and appeal against the order disposing of the objections and the disposal of the appeal followed by Sec.12-B, which on demand and satisfaction that material injustice is likely to be caused to the raiyats or under-raiyats in giving effect to the draft consolidation scheme, has empowered the Consolidation officer or the Assistant Director of Consolidation, as the case may be for getting a fresh draft consolidation scheme prepared. 15. Section 13 of the Act provides for the confirmation of the draft consolidation scheme and its publication. It states besides other things that the "draft consolidation scheme so confirmed shall be published in the unit, and except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, shall be final". Confirmation of the scheme, as provided in Sec.15 of the Act, has to be followed by a certificate of transfer. 16. A brief examination of the language of Sec.15 at this stage may be helpful. Confirmation of the scheme, as provided in Sec.15 of the Act, has to be followed by a certificate of transfer. 16. A brief examination of the language of Sec.15 at this stage may be helpful. Sub-section (1) of Sec.15 of the Act has remained unchanged, which runs as follows :- "the Consolidation Officer shall grant to every raiyat to whom a holding has been allotted in pursuance of a scheme of consolidation a certificate in the prescribed from containing the prescribed particulars. Such certificate shall be conclusive proof of the title of such raiyat to such holding and he shall be liable for payment of such rent as may be specified in the certilicate. " Sub-section (2) of this section was originally worded thus- "a similar certificate of transfer shall be granted to every under-raiyat having a right of occupancy in any land allotted to him in pursuance of the scheme and the certificate shall be conclusive proof of the title of such under-raiyat to such land and he shall be liable to payment of such rent and to such person as may be specified in the certificate. " This, however, has been amended by Bihar Act 27 of 1975 and at present reads, thus- "a similar certificate of transfer shall be granted to every under-raiyat, whether having a right of occupancy or not in any land allotted to him in pursuance of the scheme and the certificate shall be conclusive proof of the title of such under raiyat to such land and he shall be liable to payment of such rent and to such person as may be specified in the certificate. " 17. A certificate of transfer in the hands of a Raiyat or an under-raiyat has been made conclusive proof of the title of such raiyat. " 17. A certificate of transfer in the hands of a Raiyat or an under-raiyat has been made conclusive proof of the title of such raiyat. Words "title" and "conclusive proof are noticed no where except sub-section (b) of Sec.4 in the Act until Sec.15 is reached Sec.16, however, has recognised the effect of the confirmation of the scheme in the following words - "when certificates of transfer have been granted to the raiyats and under-raiyats under Sec.15, the scheme confirmed under section 13 shall, in supersession of the up-to-date record-of-rignt prepared under Sec.8, shall be deemed to be the record-of-rights prepared and finally published under Chapter X of the Bihar tenancy Act, 1885 (VIII of 1885), or as the case may be, Chapter xii of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (Ben. Act VI of 1908), or the Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 1872 (Reg. III of 1872)". And Sec.17 has recognised a raiyats right to be the same in the land allotted to him in pursuance of the scheme of consolidation as he had in his original holding 18 There is comprehensive revisional power recognised in the Director of Consolidation in Sec.35 of the Act. This states :- "the Director of Consolidation may of his own motion or on the application of any party or on reference being made by any sub-ordinate authority, call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceeding taken by such authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceeding ; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, and may after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as the thinks fit. " Thereafter Sec.36 says, no appeal or revision shall lie from any order passed under this Act, as provided in the Act from any order passed under the act ; and Sec.37 reads- "no civil court shall entertain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or out to have been taken under this Act. " above is a quotation from the authentic English translation published by the superintendent, Secretariat Press, Bihar Patna which evidently is a trady reproduction of the translation of the Hindi legislation) which reads- 19. It is noticeable that Sec.15 (1) of the Act which has remained unchanged, contains the expression title, which expression figured in Section 37 as it was originally enacted Sec.37 of the Act before amendment provided, thus- "no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act, unless such decision or order has decided a question relating to title to land or to some interest in land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto". By the amendment by Act 27 of 1975, adjudication in respect of title, subject to the meaning that this word may get for the purpose of the Act, has not been left for the courts to decide, in case a decision is taken in course of the consolidation proceedings. 20. I have prospected a little into the provisions of the Act to understand whether the adjudication ofdisputes with respect to land defined in the Act is for the limited purpose of the consolidation only or not and whether various authorities empowered to decide such disputes by one or the other provision of the Act are courts/tribunals/authorities of limited jurisdiction or not. I have done so also for knowing, whether the Act has created a parallel adjudicatory mechanism to the civil courts or not. 21. I shall dilate into this aspect of the matter a bit later, because according to me certain historic impsratives have to be recalled and certain laws relating to the lands in the State have to be noticed. Ever since the British crown established its rule in the co ntry, originally as a part of the State of bengal and later a combine of the States of Bihar and Orissa and finally as the state of Bihar as an entity, three different land cultures have flourished in the state. They are located in well defined geographical contours and are easily identifiable as areas now under the Bihar Tenancy Act, the Chotanagpur tenancy Act and the Santha 1 Parganas Settlement Regulations. They are located in well defined geographical contours and are easily identifiable as areas now under the Bihar Tenancy Act, the Chotanagpur tenancy Act and the Santha 1 Parganas Settlement Regulations. A proprietor stood above a Thikedar or a tenure-holder, who stood above a tenant or a raiyat who was ordinarily a tiller of the soil having hosticulture or agriculture upon a parcel or parcels of land. Raiyats in course of time engaged or hired labourers who in due time became occupancy Raiyats from share croppers or or cultivators for fixed rent paid In kind or cash, without, however, displacing the Raiyat?, intermediaries or proprietors Types of rights and interests in the land were statutorily recognised and a peculiar land ownership mechanism existed with the tiller at the bottom and the proprietor at the top with intermediaries in between having their distinct but interdependent right and interests in the land. 22. The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1952 came to remove in one sweep proprietors and intermediaries who operated between the State and the Raiyat. It abolished every intermediary interest between the State on the one hand and the Raiyat on the other hand, but at the same time recognised the existence of bakasht of the intermediary in the shape of homestead or agricultural or horticultural holdings in Khas possession of the intermediaries. Intermediaries were recognised as tenants under the State for such lands in their Khas possession and, thus, they also became Raiyats like any other Raiyats under them. 23. Independent India, however, would not afford such a system except at the risk of denying social and economic equality or any semblance thereof to men and women engaged in agriculture and hosticulture. 24. 23. Independent India, however, would not afford such a system except at the risk of denying social and economic equality or any semblance thereof to men and women engaged in agriculture and hosticulture. 24. Definition of raiyat in Sec.2 (14) of the Act meaning primarily a person who has acquired a right to hold lands for the purpose of cultivating it by himself or by members of his family or by hired servants or with the aid of partners including the successor-in-interest or persons who have acquired such a right as also a village head man in respect of private holding, if any, in the district of Santhal Parganas, a Mundari Khutkattidar or Bhuinhar in the area 10 which the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act applies has got all essental aids in different provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act, Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Regulations including Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary provisions) Act, 1949. 25. Abolition of intermediary interests in the land, however, was no end to the malady of a marginal cultivator or a tiller who still suffered the indignity of living in abject poverty. A law for the said reason was enacted popuarly known as the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceilling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 or Ceiling Act, in short. This came with a promise to fix ceiling upon the area of land in the hands of a tenant or a Raiyat who was called a land-holder and created a fiction of a family as the land-holder, thus, clubbing the lands of the husband with that of the wife or vice versa and denying any separate unit for a dependent except marginally acknowledging some area for them. Share cropping or Bataidari, however, existed in different forms and the Tenancy Acts were amended several times to accommodate their interests and give to them some sort of a right in the land under their cultivation. The act which intended to consolidate holdings of land in possession of a Raiyat had to take notice of the existence of three different types of laws in the State covered by the aforementioned three tenancy laws and the Land Reforms laws, particularly the Ceiling Act and Sec.48-E of the Bihar Tenancy Act which recognised the rights of a Bataidar or an under-Raiyat 26. Ceiling Act and the Consolidation (Act) were/are so much interdependent or one may say Consolidation Act is so much dependent upon the fixation of ceiling area and distribution of surplus lands acquired from the land-holders that any consolidation may not be final and run the risk of being re-opened depending upon the fixation of ceiling area in the hands of each land-holder, transferees or successors-in-interest. 27. Both the Ceiling Act and the Consolidation Act have to achieve on the one hand a fair and equitable distribution of lands for agricultural and horticultural purposes with no one getting unreasonably large area in Khas possession and no one deprived of the maximum utilization of land belonging to him. Both the laws, however, exclude the jurisdiction of courts. Ceiling Act, completely in the process of determination of the matters concerning ceiling area, and Consolidation Act as stated therin. They create for the limited purposes envisaged therein a hierarchy of officers who apparently act to decide issues for the limited purposes, but their adjudication be come final. 28. The Constitution of India has firmly established separation of the judiciary and the Executive by recognising in Article 32 in part III of the Constitution of India a right to move the Supreme Court tor the enforcement of the fundamental rights and in Article 226 of the Constitution of India a right to move the High Court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and other constitutional and statutory rights. It has also recognised the existence of a subordinate judiciary as a mechanism fully separated and controlled by the High courts in Articles 233 to 236 of the Constitution of India, yet since there has been no strict and rigid separation of the Judiciary from the Executive, notwithstanding one of the directive principles of the State policy as stated in article 50 ia Part IV of the Constitution of India in the following words "the state shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the Executive in the public service of the State", laws like the Ceiling Act and the Consolidation Act created such adjudicatory scheme in which the civil courts were given no role to play. 29. In Union of India V/s. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth and another, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 2328), Bhagwati, J. as he then was, has said- "now the independence of the judiciary is a fighting faith of our constitution. . . 29. In Union of India V/s. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth and another, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 2328), Bhagwati, J. as he then was, has said- "now the independence of the judiciary is a fighting faith of our constitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . And hovering over all these provisions 1 ike a brooding omnipresence is Article 50 which lays down, as a directive principle of State Policy, that the State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State. This provision, occurring in a chapter which has been described by Granville Austin as "the nonscience of the Constitution" and which embodies the social philosophy of the Constitution and its basic underpinnings and values, plainly reveals, without any scope for doubt or debate, the intent of the constitution-makers to immunise the judiciary from any form of executive control or interference". Indeed a right to raise a dispute as to a right or interest and claim adjudication by a body completely independent of executive control or any other influence has a foundation deep into the conscience of the people not only in India but everywhere, where the welfare of the people is the primary duty of the sovereign, whether a King or a President. 30. Privy Council in the Bribery Commissioner V/s. Pedrick Ranasinghe, (1965 Appeal Cases 172) had the occasion to deal with a case where certain persons were appointed to constitute a Bribery Tribunal under the Constitution amendment Act in Cylon. It has said- "the Constitution is contained in Ceylon (Consiilution) Orders in council, 1946 and 1947. . . . . . . . . Viscount Radcliffe in Attorney-General of Ceylon V/s. de Livers, said of the Constitution, "although there are many variations in matters of detail, its general conceptions are seen at once tc be those of a parliamentary democracy founded on the pattern of the constitutional system of the United Kingdom. " the Constitutional does not specifically deal with the judicial system which was established in Ceylon by the Chapter of Justice of 1983 and is dealt with in certain Ordinances, the principal being the courts Ordinance, cap.6. The power and jurisdiction of the courts are therefore not expressly protected by the Constitution. " the Constitutional does not specifically deal with the judicial system which was established in Ceylon by the Chapter of Justice of 1983 and is dealt with in certain Ordinances, the principal being the courts Ordinance, cap.6. The power and jurisdiction of the courts are therefore not expressly protected by the Constitution. But the importance of securing the independence of judges and of maintaining the dividing line between the judiciary and the executive was appreciated by those who framed the Constitution. . . . . . . . . " The Privy Council has pronounced that the law which provided that appointments could be made of persons who were not judicial officers to constitute the tribunal was ultra vires and so were the orders passed by persons who constituted the Tribunal without being judicial officers. 31. In Don John Francies Douglas Liyanage and ors. V/s. The Queen, (1967 appeal Cases 259) the Privy Council has once again dealt with the issue of severence of powers between Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. This is a case where an issue, whether the criminal law (special provisions, Act No.1 of 1962) purported ex post facto to create new offences after the acts complained of had been committed and to alter the rule of evidence and criminal procedure obtaining under the general law at the time when offencess were committed in a context where the intention was manifest to do away witn the prohibition under the general law of certain kinds of evidence and further to impose enhanced punishment was involved. In it a question arose whether there was any interference with the exercise by Judges of their Judicial power by such appointment by nomination to sit to decide the cases. 32. The said case is an apt illustration of the norms of British Justice originally not extended to the colonies but when realised, applied with the same sense of responsibility to them also. The Privy Council has said- ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As has been indicated already, legislation and homines which is thus directed to the course of particular proceedings may not always amount to an interference with the functions of the judiciary. The Privy Council has said- ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As has been indicated already, legislation and homines which is thus directed to the course of particular proceedings may not always amount to an interference with the functions of the judiciary. But in the present case their lordships have no doubt that there was such interference ; that it was not only the likely but the intended effect of the impugned enactments ; and that it is fatal to their validity. The true nature and purpose of these enactments are revealed by their conjoint impact on the specific procedings in respect of which they were designed, anu they take their colour, in particular, from the alterations they purported to make as to their ultimate objective, the punishment of those convicted. These alterations constituted a grave and deliberate incursion into the judicial sphere. . . . . . . . . . . . " 33. There are some co-relation of the directive principles of State policy in Article 50 of the Constitution of India and Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution of India. Any person aggrievad by encroachment or invasion of his right can always raise a dispute as to interests in a land in a court of law. Specific Relief Act read with the provisions in the Civil Procedure Code and various provisions of the Tenancy laws of the State give to all such persons claiming inheritance, transfer, bequeath, surrender, assignment etc. a right to institute a suit/proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus any persons right to seek independent adjudication in a court law has been recognised by laws under Article 13 of the Constitution. This is a right extended to every person even against the actions of the State. When, however, laws are made creating a mechanism to adjudicate such disputes keeping adjudications by authorities appointed to decide such disputes immune from any judicial review problems arise. This is a right extended to every person even against the actions of the State. When, however, laws are made creating a mechanism to adjudicate such disputes keeping adjudications by authorities appointed to decide such disputes immune from any judicial review problems arise. It is one thing to say that some sort of judicial review is always available because any order passed by any of the authorities under the Act can always be impugned before the High Court either under Article 2.6 of the constitution of India or 227 thereof ; and another as noticed by this Court and the Supreme Court in several cases that atleast at some stage of a legal proceeding independent and qualified judicial adjucatory mechanism is made available. However, since this question has to be viewed with mare comprehension it is necessary first to examine whether the State Legislature is competent to make such a law which bars a courts jurisdiction or not and whether the authorities under the Act arc a court or not. Any examination of a law shall always take one to the constitutional promise of equality before law and equal protection of law and omnipresent Article 14 of the Constitution shall provide necessary guidance. 34. Items 18 and 63 of the State List delineate the lagislative power of the State with respect to land including rights in or over land and jurisdiction and powers of the courts except the High Court and the Supreme Court. 35. In Brij Bhukan Kalwar and others V/s. S. D. O. Siwan and others (AIR 1955 Patna 1) a Special Bench of this Court considered the validity of certain provisions of the Bihar Act 31 of 1950, also known as Bihar Land encroachment Act. The Special Bench had the advantage of relying upon article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India besides other provisions thereof (Article 19 (1) (f) has since been repealed ). It has said that the words of item no.18 read with item no.65 are comprehensive enough to include the remedial as well as procedural provisions concerned with reliefs in respect of several rights and remedies enumerated in item no.18 ; and item no.18 is wide enough to include rights in land such as rights like full ownership or lease-hold or of such right and rights over the land which incude easement and other co llateral rights of different nature. It has also said that a rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Article 14 of the Constitution as a rule of substantive law and it is necessary that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for reliefs and for defence with alike protection and without discrimination. The Special bench has declared, ". . . . . . if the Act is constitutional and valid and if it cannot be regarded as repugnant to the provisions of the existing hiw, then certainly it was open to the legislature to insert the section in the Act which lays down that no suit shall lie in any Civil Court in respect of any proceedings under this Act. In the Civil Procedure Code we have got Sec.4 (1) which lays down that in the absence of any specific provision to the contray, nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special from of procedure prescribed by or under any other law for the time being in force. . . . . . " 36. In the case of the State of Bombay V/s. Narottam as Jethabhai and another (AIR 1951 Supreme Court 69) also a question had arisen how expressly or impliedly jurisdiction of the civil court can be barred. It is after reference to Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which states, "the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred", that the Supreme court has said, "this section obviously postulates among other things the barring of the jurisdiction of the civil courts by Legislatures with respect to particular classes of suits of a civil nature, and the statute-book abounds in instances in which the jurisdiction of the civil courts is barred under Acts passed by the Central and Provincial Legislatures. There are also many Acts providing that any suit or proceeding concerning the subject-matters of those Acts shall be triable by the Court or Courts specified there in. There are also many Acts providing that any suit or proceeding concerning the subject-matters of those Acts shall be triable by the Court or Courts specified there in. Such provisions are to be found in a number of Acts enacted both prior to and af icr the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, and there can be no doubt that the British Parliament while enacting that Act was fully aware of the existing legislative practice obtaining in this country as well as of the tact that the provisions in question were sometimes necessary and therefore it empowered the Central and Provincial legislatures to make them under Entry 53 of List 1 and Entry 2 of list II, respectively. This, in my opinion, is the true meaning of these entries, and it also explains why a separate entry was necessary enabling the two Legislatures to legislate with regard to the power and jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of the subject matters mentioned in the three legislative Lists. . . . . . . . . " A Presidential reference with respect to the special courts bill 1978 has been answered by the Supreme Court in its judgment reported in A. I. R.1979 supremen Court 478. Speaking on the subject, the Supreme Court has said- "though the Parliaments legislative competence to create special courts, for the purpose in the instant case of trying criminal cases, connct be denied for reasons set out above, it is necessary to advert to an off shoot of the argument to the effect that, in any event, parliament has no power to create a court outside the hierarchy of courts recognized by the Constitution. It was suggested during the course of arguments on the question of legislative competence that the Constitution contains a complete code of judicial system which provides for the Supreme Court at the apex and for the High courts, the District Courts and subordinate courts next in order of priority. It was suggested during the course of arguments on the question of legislative competence that the Constitution contains a complete code of judicial system which provides for the Supreme Court at the apex and for the High courts, the District Courts and subordinate courts next in order of priority. Article 124 provides that there shall be a Supreme Court of India, Article 214 that there shall be a High Court for each state, Article 231 (I) that Parliament may be law establish a common High Court for two or more States or for two or more states and a union territory while Chapter VI of Part VI of the constitution provides by Articles.233 and 234, for the District courts and courst subordinate thereto. To complete the picture, article 236 (a) defines a "district judge" to include the judge of a city civil court, additional district judge, joint district judge, assistant district judge, chief judge of a small cause court, Chief Presidency magistrate, additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, sessions judge, additional sessions judge and assistant sessions judge. Finally, article 237 empowers the Governor to apply the provisions of chaptar VI and any rules made there under to any class or classes of Magistrates. The Constitution having provided so completely, and copiously for a hierarchy of Courts, it is urged that it is impermissible to the Parliament to create a court or a class of courts which does not fall within or fit in that scheme. An important limb of this argument which requires serious consideration is that the creation of a trial court which is not subject to the control and superintendence of the High Court is detrimental to the constitutional concept of judicial independence, particularly when the Bill empowers the Central Government by Clause 5 to designate the special Court in which a prosecution shall be instituted or to which a pending prosecution shall be transferred. . . . . . . . . . . . It is true that the special courts created by the Bill will not have the constitutional status which High Courts have because such courts are not High courts as envisaged by the Constitution. . . . . . . . . . . . It is true that the special courts created by the Bill will not have the constitutional status which High Courts have because such courts are not High courts as envisaged by the Constitution. Indeed, there can but be one High Court only for each State, though two or more States or two or more States and a union territory can have a common High court, It is also true to say that the Special Courts are not District courts within the meaning of Article 235, with the result that the control over them will not be vested in any High Court. But we do not accept that by reason of these considerations, the creation of special courts is calculated to damage or destroy the constitutional safeguards of judicial independence. Our reasons for this view will be come clearer after we deal with the questions arising under articles 14 and 21 but suffice it to say at this stage that the provision in Clause 10 (I) of the Bill for an appeal to the Supreme Court from every judgment and order of a special court and the provision for transfer of a case from one special court to another (which the bill does not contain but without which, as we will show, the Bill will be invalid) are or will be enough to ensure the independence of special courts. Coupled with that will be the consideration, as we will in course of our judgment point out that only sitting judges of the High Courts shall have to he appointed to the special courts. A sitting judge of the High Court, though appointed to the spedal court, will carry with him his constitutional status, rights, privileges and obligations. There is no reason to apprehend that the mere change of vanue will affect his sense of independence or lay him open to the influence of the executive. One may also not be unmindful of the begin presence of Article.226 of the Constitution which may in appropriate cases be invoked to ensure justice". Speaking as to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Supreme court, while disposing of the reference, noticed the law stated in the case of maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. V/s. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay air 1974 SC 2009 ) and reiterated :- ". . . . . Speaking as to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Supreme court, while disposing of the reference, noticed the law stated in the case of maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. V/s. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay air 1974 SC 2009 ) and reiterated :- ". . . . . . whenever a special machinery is devised by the legislature entrusting the power of determination of disputes to an authority set up by the lagislature in substitution of regular courts of law, one should not react adversely against the establishment of such an authority merely because of a certain predilection for the prevailing system of administration of justice by courts of law. In the context of the need for speedy and expeditious recovery of public premises for utilisation for important public uses, where delatoriness of the procedure may defeat the very object of recovery, the special procedure prescribed by the two Acts was held not to be really and substantially more drastic and prejudicial than the ordinary procedure of a civil court. The special procedure prescribed by the two acts, it was observed, was not so substantially and qualitatively disparate as to attract the vice of discrimination". 37. Brother S. B. Sinha, J. has made his own research in the case of k. P. Verma V/s. State of Bihar (1988 P. L. J. R.1036) : 1989 (1) BLJ 216. He has spoken for the Division Bench, "it is now well settled that the judicial review is a basic feature of the constitution" has referred to a judgment by me in a Division Bench in Awadhesh Kumar Singh V/s. State of Bihar (1988 P. L. J. R.269) 1988 BLJ 433 and concurred with the view that unless judicially trained independent persons of proven integrity are appointed to adjudicate and judicial review is left untramelled, the litigant public would carry a feeling that the decision making process might be affected by reason of dependence upon the executive. 38. I shall refer to the said judgment also while considering, whether the different authorities under the Act, namely, the Assistant Consolidation Officer, the Consolidation Officer, the Dy. Director or Director are courts or not. I may, however, conclude my discussions on the question of the legislative competence in making special provisions and creating a special adjudicatory mechanism before proceeding further. 39. Director or Director are courts or not. I may, however, conclude my discussions on the question of the legislative competence in making special provisions and creating a special adjudicatory mechanism before proceeding further. 39. Authorities aforementioned and the provisions under the Constitution of India establish beyond any shadow of doubt that civil courts jurisdiction can be barred by a legislation, if it is not constitutionally invalid or bad for want of legislative competence, that an independent adjudicatory mechanism can be provided for matters within the competence of the law marking authority and that a legislature while providing for a mechanism different from a tegular court of law cannot altogether deny to a litigant a judicial review independent of any executive control or interference, otherwise it shall be hit by discrimination/arbitrariness, and thus by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 40. Brother S. B. Sinha, J. has again a march over me on the question, whether the authorities under the Consolidation Act are courts or not. His judgment in Ram Singashan Pathak V/s. K. P. Sinha (AIR 1989 Patna 39) 1988 blj 912 ; is available on the subject. 41. I do not, however, propose to adopt a short-cut and propose to discuss in brief some of the provisions of the Act and the case law, why the authorities under the Act be deemed to be courts. Act 27 of 1975 has introduced sections 37-A and 37-B in the Act. They state that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force the Director of Consolidation, the Dy. i irector of Consolidation, the Assistant director of Consolidation, the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Consolidation officer shall be deemed to be courts of competent jurisdiction while hearing objections or appeals on deciding objections under the Act and that they shall have all such powers, rights and privileges while hearing any matter in dispute as are vested in a civil court in respect of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on aath, affirmation or otherwise and issuing a commission to examine witnesses, compelling any person tor production of any document, and puishing a person guilty of contempt. It would have been difficult to sustain the vires of the law empowering the consolidation authorities to decide issues as to rights and interests in the law with any sort of finality had they be not deemed to be courts. Sections 37-A and 37-B of the Act evidently make them courts within the meaning of the provisions of the Evidence Act as also within the meaning of the provisions of the contempt of Courts, Act, which together make them a court subordinate to the High Court, otherwise their contempt cannot be taken notice of by the High Court. 42. The Commissioner who has been authorised to take evidence has been held to be a court in Jyoti Narayan V/s. Brijnandan Sinha, ( AIR 1954 Pat 289 ). The Rent Controller has similarly been held to be a court (See AIR 1976 andh. Pra.270) and (1977 Cri LJ 1362 ). The Election Tribunal. similarly has been held to be a court (See 1967 All LJ 5 ). I am tempted, however, to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi V/s. The State of Punjab ( AIR 1956 SC 153 ) and yet another judgment of the Supreme Court in Nathu V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1956 SC 56 ). In Virindar Kumar satyawadis case it is observed- "there has been considerable discussion in the Courts in England and australia as to what are the essential characteristics of Court as distinguished from a tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions. Vide 1931 AC 2/5 (A),- R. V. London Country Council, 1931-2 KB 215 (B) ;- cooper V/s. Wilson\ 1937-2 KB 309 (C) ;- huddart parkar and Co. V/s. Moorehead, (1909) 8 CIR 330 (D); and- Rola co. V/s. The Common Wealth, (1944) 69 CIR 185 (E ). In this Court, the question was considered in some fullness in - bharat Bank ltd. V/s. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd: AIR 1950 SC 188 (F ). It is unnecessary to tra verse the same ground once again It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. It is unnecessary to tra verse the same ground once again It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claims and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an opportunity created by an Act is a Court as distijguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court. " 43. In Brajnandan Sinha V/s. Jyoti Narain ( AIR 1956 SC 66 ), the Supreme court has said that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. 44. The law, which has crystaised by now, takes finally to the test as to whether the dispute, which is to be decided by it, is in the nature of a civil dispute or not and the procedure for determining su;h dispute is a judicial procedure or not and if these two are satisfied, whether the decision given by it has got a binding effect or not (See AIR Pat 227 ; AIR 1967 SC 1434 ; 1975 bbcj 656 ; and AIR 1981 SC 723 ). 45. Brother S. B. Siuha, J. has taken notice of the abovementioned cases in his judgment in K. P. Vermas case (supra) as also in Ram Singhasan pathaks case (supra ). He has also taken notice of the "deemed court" provisions in Sections 37-A and 37-B of the Act in Ram Singhasan Pathaks case (supra) and the effect of the legal fiction in the words of Lord Asquith in East end Dwellings Co. He has also taken notice of the "deemed court" provisions in Sections 37-A and 37-B of the Act in Ram Singhasan Pathaks case (supra) and the effect of the legal fiction in the words of Lord Asquith in East end Dwellings Co. Ltd. V/s. Finsbury Borough Council (1952) AC 109 at page 132)- "if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs ; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. " 46. "court"is defined in the Evidence Act to include all Judges and magistrates and all persons except Arbitrators legally authorised to take evidence. "deemed" always means to be treated as if it were. Lord Asquith has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay V/s. Pandurang Vinayaka ( AIR 1953 SC 244 ) ; Commissioner of Income Tax V/s. S. Teja Singh ( AIR 1959 SC 352 ) and Additional Income Tax Officer V/s. E. Alfredh ( AIR 1962 SC 663 ). "deemed" has been read by the Privy Council, allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court to mean-"when a person is deemed to be something the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something, the Act requires him to be treated as if he were (See 1930 PC 54 ; 1981 All LJ 649 ; 1988 Lab IC 275 and AIR 1958 SC 687 ). 47. The consolidation authorities under the Act, therefore, are deemed courts meaning thereby that by a fiction of law they have to be treated as courts of law. They also appear to exercise judicial power. "judicial power" has always been understood as the authority vested in courts and Judges as distinguished from Executive and Legislative power. Attempts to define or identify a judge or a court and to suggest that a Judge and a court are something independent and different from executive and legislature has until now alluded even the veterans. "judicial power" has always been understood as the authority vested in courts and Judges as distinguished from Executive and Legislative power. Attempts to define or identify a judge or a court and to suggest that a Judge and a court are something independent and different from executive and legislature has until now alluded even the veterans. Yet it has by now come to stabilise that office which is laid to the administration of justice has to be given such independence that it does not in any manner get influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. It is, however, conceded that creation of deemed courts or tribunals with limited or even extensive power to adjudicate and finally decide cases may be created and they can exercise their jurisdiction so long they function within their limits and their acts are scrutinised by the High Court and/or the Supreme Court. In such a situation there is no transgratioo of constitutional limitation. As in England, in India also an extensive supplement net work of adjudicatory bodies has grown up side by side with the traditional courts of law. A close relationship between the two systems, both because under the ordinary law the tribunals are subject to control by the courts and also because the legislature has in the majority of cases provided a right of appeal from the tribunals to the courts on any question of law has until now maintained the balance between them. They have stood side by side and strengthened the judicial system. Courts in India have recognised that when any new scheme of social welfare or regulation is introduced, new ad hoc tribunals are set up, rather than recognising those already existing. In course of time, thus, acts done by administrative tribunals have been recognised as quasi judicial or judicial, because they too have been deciding cases finally, recording findings on facts and in substance discharging the same functions as the courts of law. Yet in British as well as in India it has been emphasised that courts and tribunals must be kept free from political influence ; and in order to make their independence a reality members of tribunals be independent persons and not civil servants. 48. Yet in British as well as in India it has been emphasised that courts and tribunals must be kept free from political influence ; and in order to make their independence a reality members of tribunals be independent persons and not civil servants. 48. The Act, however, has left no doubt to the fact that the Consolidation officer, Assistant Consolidation Officer, Deputy Director of Consolidation or Director of Consolidation are civil servants appointed by the State Government to exercise all such powers and discharge all functions which are assigned to them for the purposes or the Act. It is obvious that they cannot be independent of the executive control or the political Government. They no doubt function as courts and their decisions have a finality atleast for the purposes of the Act, yet they do not appear to have any judicial training, except that when called upon by the State Government, they may sit to adjudicate all questions concerning the land under the Act. 49. I have already noticed that there is hardly anything to suggest that the legislature had no competence to frame this Act or that merely because courts jurisdiction has been ousted, the power vested in the authorities under the Act conflicts with any basic feature of the Constitution I am aware of the authorities and the rules of interpretation of statutes that constitutionality of an act should be tried to be upheld, that if need be the provisions of the Act should be either read down or read up to uphold the constitutionality, that, if necessary, if a particular provision of law requires restructuring or filling in any omission, it should be done in the interest of the constitutionality of the Act. I am not entering into any detailed discussion of this aspect for the simple reason that before any attempt to apply any such principle is made, it is necessary to know that is the extent of or limitation on exercise of jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities and whether any role is left for the courts after the consolidation authorities decide disputes, by the Act or not. 50. 50. I may straightway refer to a Special Bench judgment of this Court which has stated in no uncertain terms that creation of special forum for adjudication of rights of parties in the land by the consolidation authorities is not unconstitutional and also that under Sec.4 (c) of the Act suits with respect to right and title in land and certain other dependent reliefs abate. 51 In Ram Krit Singh and others V/s. The State of Bihar nad others (1979)B. B. C. J.259), the Special Bench has considered the attack on the vires of the act and more particularly Sections 12-A, 37 and 4 (c) thereof on the ground that the Act and the aforesaid sections were discriminatory, that under the scheme of the Act, the Assistant Director of Consolidation was entitled to finally determine the question of tide and that their determination in that regard could not be challenged in a civil court even though the said officers had no judicial training and were illequipped to decide cases which involved intricate questions of fact and law and whenever consolidation proceedings commenced the Raiyat and under-raiyat had/have no option but to have their title determined by untrained hands. 52. S. Sarwar Ali, Acting C. J. speaking for the court answered the contentions stating that the mere fact that law created special forum would not make the law suffer from the vice of discrimination and added- "the view of the legislature appear to be that the scheme of consolidation would be inordinately delayed, if not set at naught, if ordinary civil courts are to decide the questions of title relating to lands which are subject matter of the consolidation proceeding. It cannot be said that this view is unreasonable. It is well know that civil litigation, atleast in this State, usually takes such a long time and that the litigants, feel completely exasperated. In such a situation to invest authorities under the Act with the power to determine question of title could not be said to be either unreasonable or having no nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, speedy consolidation of agricultural lands". 53. In such a situation to invest authorities under the Act with the power to determine question of title could not be said to be either unreasonable or having no nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, speedy consolidation of agricultural lands". 53. On the question of vires of Sec.4 (c) in particular Special Bench accepted the contention on behalf of the State that the abatement when read with the qualifying words, so far as rights and interests in the lands are concerned, saved the constitutionality of the Act and particularly Sec.4 (c) and concluded- ". . . . . . . . . . . . The opening words of Sec.4 state clearly that the consequence as mentioned therein shall ensure "from the date specified in the notification till the close of the consolidation operation". The consolidation operation closes by issue of notifications envisaged in Sec.26-A of the Act. eht language being clear and explicit effect has to be given to the words used. When the section says that the ensuing consequences are till the close of the consolidation operating, we cannot nullify the words aforesaid by saying that the consequences are for all times to come. It is obvious, therefore, that on the close of consolidation operation in a village or area the abated suits would revive. But the revival of those suits would not create any problems as suits will have to be decided in conformity with the decisions arrived at in the consolidation proceedings in so far as the rights or interest in any land covered by the consolidation proceedings is concerned. If this interpretation is accepted it would be seen that the suggested harshness or injustice disappears In the illustration already given, if a party succeeds in establishing its title, after the close of the consolidation proceedings, it would be open to it not only to have its title declared accordingly but also to have a decree for mesne profits". 54. A Full Bench of this Court again came close to deciding the limitation of the consolidation courts, jurisdiction but left the same undecided. 54. A Full Bench of this Court again came close to deciding the limitation of the consolidation courts, jurisdiction but left the same undecided. In Sheoratan chamar and others V/s. Ram Murat Singh alias Kishori Raman Singh and others ( 1985 PLJR 86 ) : 1985 BLJ 76 (FB), Sandhawalia, C. J. referred to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Gorakh Nath Dube V/s. Harinarain Singh and others (AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2451) and also noticed that the Bihar act which came in force in 1956, has undergone a structural change by a number of subsequent amendments, but recorded- ". . . . . . . . . As the exhaustive provisions of the 40 sections of this Act would indicate, it was intended to be a self-contained Code for the purpose of consolidation of all agricultural lands within the State. The bar of jurisdiction of civil courts under Sec.37 of the Act would show that the Legislature clearly requires that with respect to any matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, the same alone provides the forum and further, all decisions or orders, given or passed under this Act, are immune from interference by the Civil Court". 55. A Bench of this Court in Nagendra Narayan Pd. and others V/s. Lakshman goswami and others, ( 1984 BBCJ 316 ) was faced with a question, whether a magistrate exercising powers under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could ignore the order of the Consolidation authorities and decide the dispute of possession with reference to other evidence on the record or not. Speaking for the Court N. P. Singh, J. took notice of Sections 39 and 37 of the act, which together State that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force ; and that a civil court shall not entertained any suit or application to vary or to set aside any order given or passed under the Act. The Court has stated- "on a plain reading, Sec.39 gives an overriding effect to the provision of the Act. The Court has stated- "on a plain reading, Sec.39 gives an overriding effect to the provision of the Act. Now, in face of Sections 37 and 39 the decision of the consolidation Officer in accordance with the provisions of the Act cannot be challenged in any civil court and in that sense it is final. It is well known that so for as the final order in a proceeding under section 145 of the Code is concerned, it is subject to any decision by a civil court. It has been pointed out on several occasions that a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code does not purport to decide the right, title and interest of the parties to the dispute, the main object of the proceeding being to decide the dispute so far as the criminal court is concerned, with the sole purpose to maintain peace. Whereas, the orders passed and decision taken in a consolidation proceeding are not to be challenged in a civil court. In such a situation, in my view, it is difficult to hold that the Magistrate while deciding a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code can ignore the binding orders passed in a consolidation proceeding. . . . . . " This is the law stated by a Bench of this Court in Bijali Thakur and others V/s. Rameshwar Thakur and others, ( 1977 BBCJ 701 ) C. S. S. Sinha, J. following the decision in Anandi Prasad and another V/s. Nandan Das and others, ( 1986 BLJR 33 ) has referred to the two questions referred to before him, (i) whether Section 37 of the Act is a bar to the maintainability of the suit giving raise to the appeal 1 and (2) whether the civil court can adjudicate upon the title of the parties and give its declaration in favour of the person whose title and interest were not recognised by the authorities under the Acts ?, and has stated- "this substantial question of law has to be answered in the affirmative. The Act makes provisions for preparation of draft scheme, its publication, disposal of objections and after other formalities, for confirmation of the scheme and under Sec.16 of the Act confirmed scheme is to be treated as finally published record of rights. There is provision for appeal against the order of Assistant Consolidation officer in sub-section (6) of Sec.10 of the Act. There is provision for appeal against the order of Assistant Consolidation officer in sub-section (6) of Sec.10 of the Act. Section 35 of the Act makes provision for revision and reference by the director of Consolidation. Then follows Sec.36 of the Act which lays down that "except as provided in this Act, no appeal or revision shall lie from any order passed under this Act". Sec.37 of the Act provides: "no civil court shall entertain any suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under this Act with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act". Section 37-A of the Act provides, inter alia, that "the authorities under the act shall be deemed to be Courts of competent jurisdiction while hearing objections or appeals or deciding disputes under this Act" and they have been given certain powers of the civil courts under section 37-B of the Act. Sec.3y of the Act lays down that "the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force. The competency of the proceedings before the consolidation authorities in respect of the suit land is not under dispute. It is also undisputed that both the parties put forward their respective claims in respect of the suit land and, ultimately, the decision of the consolidation authorities went against the plaintiffs and the suit land was recorded in the names of the defendants and in their possession. In such a situation allowing the relief in the instant suit will amount to varying or setting aside the decision or order given by the Consolidation officer under the Act and the mischief of Sec.37 of the Act will be attracted. In Bijali Thakur and others V/s. Rameshwar Thakur and others, a Division Bench of this Court has held that the act is a self contained Act with regard to determination of all matters which may or ought to be raised before the prescribed authority, decision of authorities on such matters are final and the civil court has no jurisdiction to interfere with anything done by the authorities in accordance with the provisions of the Act". 56. 56. In this connection it is also relevant to take notice of a judgment of the Supreme Court in Zafar Khan and others V/s. Board of Revenue, U. P. and others (AIR 1985 Supreme Court 39 ). The appellants of the said case had claimed to be the Khudkasht holders of the Zamindars of the disputed plots of lands involved in dispute and filed a sun for possession under Sec.180 of the u. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 against the respondents who were in actual physical possesssion and cultivating the land. The suit ended in a decree in favour of the appellants and in execution of the decree, the appellants asserted that they obtained actual and physical possession from the respondents. Their claim was that on the advent of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 they had acquired the status of Bhumidars in respect of the plots of land in dispute. The respondents made an application under Sec.232 of the said Act against the appellants alleging that they were in actual and physical possession during the cut off year, but they were subsequently dispossessed. The assistant Collector, who heard the said application rejected the same, holding that the respondents were not in possession through the entire years but only for a part of the year and they had not acquired the status of Adhivasis and were not entitled to regain possession. The respondents carried the matter in appeal to the Additional Collector, who held that the respondents had acquired the status of Adhivasis and were entitled to regain possession and accordingly allowed the appeal. In compliance with the said order, the respondents regained actual and physical possession of the land. The appellants carried the matter to the Board of Revenue which allowed the appeal holding that once the village in which the plots involved in the dispute were situated had been put into consolidation and a notification under Sec.4 of the U. P. Consolidation Act had been issued, the Additional Collector should have stayed the appeal under the law as it then stood and not heard the appeal on merits and allowed the same. The Board of Revenue remitted the appeal to the Additional Commissioner to retain it on its file and stayed further hearing of the appeal, There were other proceedings also between the parties, but the appellants were unsuccessful in getting any relief. The Board of Revenue remitted the appeal to the Additional Commissioner to retain it on its file and stayed further hearing of the appeal, There were other proceedings also between the parties, but the appellants were unsuccessful in getting any relief. They accordingly moved the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the writ application. There was vet another round of litigation and again a writ petition, which was dismissed with costs followed by a Special appeal to a Division Bench of the allahabad High Court. One of the questions before the Division Bench was whether the suit was barred under Sec.49 of the U. P. Consolidation of holdings Act.1953 or not. Sec.49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings act provides thus- "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which a notification has been issued under sub-section (2) of Sec.4 or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of the act and no civil or j revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act". The Supreme Court has answered the said contention, saying that the admitted facts are that the authority under the 1953 Act allotted the plots in question to the respondents. It may be that the decision may appear to be erroneous inasmuch as it was founded on the decision of the Additional Commissioner in favour of the respondents which was reversed by the Board of Revenue. The question is once the allotment under 1953 Act became final, would a suit lie before the civil or revenue Court with respect to rights in land or with respect to to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the 1953 Act When the village in which the plots in dispute are situated was put into consolidation was not made clear to us. But the statutory authorities and the High Court while dismissing the appeal of the appellants had noticed that the village was put into consolidation several years before the suit from which the present appeal arises was filed and village was denotified in the year 1958. Once the village was denotised, the allotment made under the 1953 act became final. The final allotment cannot be questioned by the suit before civil or revenue court in view of the bar enacted in Sec.49. 57. There are several other cases taking the aforementioned stand that the adjudication with respect to rights and interests in the land by the Consolidation authorities cannot be questioned in a civil court. What matters, however, are covered by the Consolidation Act and what is the extent or the nature of the rights and interests that can be brought before a civil court, notwithstanding any bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court enacted by Sec.37 of the act or the provisions in Sec.4 of the Act has not received definite answer in any case. 58. It is well recognised that the courts ad here firmly to the wide meaning of jurisdiction since this is the sheet anchor of power to correct abuses. In the case of tribunal or authority of limited jurisdiction, it is all the more necessary to know the limits on jurisdiction so that any transgration or departure be not allowed. A quest, therefore to understand the limitation on the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act is relevant in this respect. 59. In Ram Adhar Singh V/s. Ramroop Singh, (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 714), the Supreme Court declared that an appeal pending before it stood abated in view of the amendment of Sec.5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings act, 1953. The appeal pending before the Supreme Court was one with respect to the right of possession in the land. Ram Adhar Singhs case, however was distinguished by the Sureme Court in Gorakh Nath Dube V/s. Hart Narain Singh (AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2451 ). The Supreme Court has said- "ram Adhar Singh V/s. Ramroop Singh (\968) 2 SCR 95 : ( AIR 1968 SC 714 ) was relied upon by the respondents before us. Ram Adhar Singhs case, however was distinguished by the Sureme Court in Gorakh Nath Dube V/s. Hart Narain Singh (AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2451 ). The Supreme Court has said- "ram Adhar Singh V/s. Ramroop Singh (\968) 2 SCR 95 : ( AIR 1968 SC 714 ) was relied upon by the respondents before us. But this was a case in which the question considered and decided by this Court was whether a suit for possession of agricultural land, under Sec.209 of U. P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, would abated when section 5 of the Act does not mention suits for possession. It was held there that the language of Sec.5 of the Act, after its amendment, was wide enough to cover suits for possession involving declaration of rights and interests in land which can be the subject matter of decisions in consolidation proceedings. The whole object of this provision of the Act was to remove from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil and revenue courts, for the duration of consolidation operations, all disputes which could be decided in the course of consolidation proceedings before special courts governed by special procedure. Such adjudication by consolidation authorities were considered more suitable, just, and efficarious for speedy decisions which had to be taken in order to enable consolidation operations to be finalised within a reasonable time". After, thus, distinguishing Ram Adhar Singhs case (supra) the Supreme Court has stated that there was no decision of the court directly on the question, whether the suit for cancellation of a sale deed, which was pending on the date of notification under Sec.4 would abate under Sec.5 (2) of the U. P. Act. If, however, took notice of a decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad high Court in Jagarnath Shukla V/s. Sita Ram Pande (1969 All LJ 768 ). The question before the Supreme Court was, whether the plaintiffs claim that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid, inopsrative and void. If, however, took notice of a decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad high Court in Jagarnath Shukla V/s. Sita Ram Pande (1969 All LJ 768 ). The question before the Supreme Court was, whether the plaintiffs claim that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid, inopsrative and void. Nothing the preponderating weight of the decisions of tha Allahabad High Court in support of the view that question relating to the validity of the sale deeds, gift deeds and wills could be gone into in proceedings before the consolidation authorities, because such questions naturally and necessarily arose and had to be decided in the course of adjudications on rights or interests in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings, the Court has stated the law in these words- ". . . . . . We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interests in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but, where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it. In the case before us, the plaintiffs claim is that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid, inoperative, and avoid, such a claim could be adjudicated upon by consolidation courts. . . . . . In the case before us, the plaintiffs claim is that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid, inoperative, and avoid, such a claim could be adjudicated upon by consolidation courts. . . . . . . . . ". After stating the law, as above, the Supreme Court has said- ". . . . . . We find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed by the division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Jagarnath Shuklas case, 1969 All LJ 768 (supra) that it is the substance of the claim and not its form which is decisive". 60. In Suba Singh V/s. Mahendra Singh and others (AIR 1974 Supreme court 1657) a question arose, whether when after finalisation of a consolidation proceeding a certain person died before taking possession and one of his heirs applied for mutation to the Consolidation Officer and the claims was decided in his favour, but when he filed a suit for partition against other heirs on the basis of title by inheritance, the suit was barred by Sec.49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act or not. The Supreme Court answered the said question in the following words- "the whole question in the present appeal turns on the ambit and limit of the Civil Court jurisdiction in the light of Sec.49. It is well settled that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be easily inferred and any provision which takes it away must be construed strictly. We must have this principle in mind when interpreting Sec.49. Analytically examined, it is clear that the two inhibitory clauses of Sec.49, are not identical in their scope and effect. The first clause is confined to matters "arising out of consolidation proceedings" under the Act, while the second clause is limited to matters "in regard to which a suit or application could be tiled under the provisions of this Act". In the present case, the question that had arisen was as to who were the heirs of Jagrara. This question was not covered by the first clause, for two reasons : Firstly, it was not a matter arising out of consolidation proceedings but one arising from a vis major i. e. the death of Jagram. The words "out of" in clause 1, must be given their full restrictive effect. They cannot be loosely interpreted and equated with "during". This question was not covered by the first clause, for two reasons : Firstly, it was not a matter arising out of consolidation proceedings but one arising from a vis major i. e. the death of Jagram. The words "out of" in clause 1, must be given their full restrictive effect. They cannot be loosely interpreted and equated with "during". The Legislature appears to have advisedly used these words to restrict the operation of this clause to those matters which are directly connected with the consolidation proceedings and which, but for such proceedings, would not have arisen. Secondly, the question of inheritance to the estate of Jagram arose after the consolidation operations had been substantively completed. . . . . . . It was thus abundantly clear that an application for mutation on the basis of inheritance when the cause of action arose, after the finalisation and publication of the scheme under Sec.2), is not a matter in regard to which an application could be filed "under the provisions of this Act" within the meaning of Clause 2 of section 49. Thus, the other limb of Sec.49, also is not attracted. The result is that the plea of bar of the civil courts jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate upon the title to the land or the son-ship of the plaintiff has no substance. Nothing done in consolidation proceedings is undone by that suit. To urge that the formal notification under Sec.52 not having been published the Court had no jurisdiction is to misread Sec.49 and to exalt a ritual into a legal reality". 61. Soon thereafter, it appears that in Chattar Singh and others V/s. Thakur prasad Singh (AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1499), the law laid down in Ram adhar Singhs case (supra) was once more reiterated and the Supreme Court stated- ". . . . . . During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, a notification has been issued under Sec.4 of the Act. By virtue of the operation of Sec.5 (2) (a) of the said Act, there is a statutory abatement of the suit and other proceedings pending therefrom. This Court has in Ram Adhar Singh V/s. Ramroop Singh (1968) 2 SCR 95 : ( AIR 1968 SC 714 ) held that even appeals pending before this Court will abate consequent on the above statutory provision. This Court has in Ram Adhar Singh V/s. Ramroop Singh (1968) 2 SCR 95 : ( AIR 1968 SC 714 ) held that even appeals pending before this Court will abate consequent on the above statutory provision. The appellants have moved in C. M. P. No.19 of 1975 for passing an order of abatement under Sec.5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings act. Counsel for the respondent faced with the decision of this court and the clear statutory provision agrees that the stand taken by the appellants is correct We therefore hold that the suit and the appeal stand abated. It is open to the parties to work out their rights before the appropriate Consolidation Authorities. With this direction, the appeal is disposed of as abated. Parties will bear their costs throughout". It appears that there were many serious attempts of the courts to settle the issues as to when a dispute, as to right and interest in the land, shall go to the Consolidation authorities and when a court can entertain the suit. I may state here about a few. In Ram Shanker v.3rd Additional District Judge (AIR 1983 Allahabad 152), the law has been noticed in the following words- "learned counsel next submitted that the suit was barred by Sec.49 u. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and hence the compromise cannot be recorded. This submission again is totally without any merit. The plaintiffs sought the cancellation of the sale deed on the ground of fraud. Such a relief could be granted only by the civil Court and not by the Revenue Court. I do not agree with the learned counsel that before Civil Court could assume jurisdiction there must be some material on the record establishing fraud. As there was no such material, the compromise could not be recorded. I cannot agree. The question is whether on the plaint allegations the court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the suit. On the plaint in the present case the court clearly had jurisdiction to try the suit. . . . . . ". 62. The Orissa High Court has been facing cases after cases on the subject with respect to the Consolidation Act of the State of Orissa. On the plaint in the present case the court clearly had jurisdiction to try the suit. . . . . . ". 62. The Orissa High Court has been facing cases after cases on the subject with respect to the Consolidation Act of the State of Orissa. D. B. Mohapatra, j. in Siba Prasad Sashoson V/s. Kali Charan Das (AIR 1984 Orissa 108) has stated the law in the following words- "it is not in dispute that the properties in respect of which the suit has been held by the trial Court to have abated come within the notification issued by the State Government under Sec.3 (1) of the act. The question whether a suit pending in the Civil Court either at the stage of trial or appeal or revision abates under Sec.4 (4)of the Act has been subject-matter of consolidation in a large number of decisions of this Court. Shortly put, the ratio in the decided cases has been that if the subject-matter involved in the suit is available to be dealt with by the authorities under the special Act and the reliefs sought in the suit can be granted by the said authorities the suit pending in the Civil Court shall abate. . . . . . In the first case mentioned above the Division Bench took the view that if a suit abates, then the Consolidation Authorities must have jurisdiction to go into the question involved or conversely, if a matter can be gone into by the Consolidation Authorities, then a suit in respect of that matter must abate under Sec.4 (4 ). The test to be applied in determining the question whether a suit shall abate or not is whether the parties can get the real and effective relief from the Consolidation Authorities. In all these decisions emphasis has been given on the real and effective relief sought in the suit". 63. The test to be applied in determining the question whether a suit shall abate or not is whether the parties can get the real and effective relief from the Consolidation Authorities. In all these decisions emphasis has been given on the real and effective relief sought in the suit". 63. In Iswar Dehury V/s. Suchi Dei and others (AIR 1986 Orissa 131), s. C. Mohapatra, J. has stated the law in the following words- "noimally, the suit is to be tried and judgment is to be pronounced on all issues of fact and law as is provided under Order XIV R.2 Civil p. C. Sec.4 (4) of the Act is a departure from the normal procedure where without trial of the suit, the Court is to consider whether the suit has abated and on the passing of an order to that effect the suit shall stand abated. Sec.51 (2) of the Act, however, does not provide for an order to be passed as is the case under section 4 (4 ). This is a provision relating to exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court. Exclusion of jurisdiction of a Civil Court is not to be readily inferred, where some preconditions are to be satisfied for exclusion of the jurisdiction, Civil Court is to examine whether the precondition provided under the statute is satisfied. Sec.51 (2) of the Act does not bar all suits relating to land in a consolidation area. It bars the suits in respect of any matter which an officer or authority empowered under the Act can decide. In other words, suits for reliefs in respect of any land in a consolidation area would be barred in case, relief prayed for in the suit can be granted by the officers or authorities under the Act. As the bar of suits under Sec.51 (2) depends upon the relief to be granted, attempt might be made ingeniously in drafting the plaint in a manner which would cover the real relief claimed. Courts are to guard against such camouflage. Merely because the suit relates to homestead and relief for possession is prayed for, it cannot be said that the suit is barred. The provisions of the Act and the nature of the homestead are to be carefully scrutinised to examine if the relief of recovery of possession of homestead in question can granted by an officer or authority under the Act. The provisions of the Act and the nature of the homestead are to be carefully scrutinised to examine if the relief of recovery of possession of homestead in question can granted by an officer or authority under the Act. It is only ia cases where the court comes to the conclusion that such relief can be granted by the officers or authorities under the Act, it would answer the issue against the plaintiff. Each case would depend on its own facts. In case the Civil Court comes to the conclusion that there is no provision under the Act which authorities, the officers or authorities to grant the relief there would be no scope for bar of the suit under section 51 (2) of the Act. Where a special statute does not authorities an officer or authority created under the Act to exercise any power or to grant any relief, judicial pronouncement cannot authorise such officer or authority to exercise such power or grant such relief unless in exercise of the powers specifically vested on such creatures of the statute it becomes incidental to grant the relief. " 64. Coming to the Act, two cases decided by the Supreme Court about the effect of the notification under Sec.3 (1) of the Act. as provided under section 4 of the Act, may at this stage be referred to : In Satyanarayan Prasad sah V/s. State of Bihar ( AIR 1980 SC 2051 ) constitutional validity of Sec.4 of the Act was questioned as being violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the constitution. The said challenge was repelled and the law Laid down in Ram adhar Singh and Chatter Singhs case (Supra) was affirmed. In Mostt. Bib rahmani Khatoon V/s. Karkoo Gope (1982 P. L. J. R.59) (SC ). The effect of abatement was considered and the law has been stated in the following words- "accordingly, both on principle and precedent it is crystal clear that where a notification is issued bringing the land involved in a dispute in the civil proceeding under a scheme,. of consolidation, the proceedings pending in the civil court either in the trial court, appeal or revision, shall abate as a consequence ensuing upon the issue of a notification and the effect of the abatement would come to a naught. of consolidation, the proceedings pending in the civil court either in the trial court, appeal or revision, shall abate as a consequence ensuing upon the issue of a notification and the effect of the abatement would come to a naught. Therefore, the order of the High Court impugned in this appeal is legal and valid so far as it not only directed abatement of the appeal pending before the High Court but also abating the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the first appellate court because the entire civil proceeding came to naught". 65. Our Courts attempt to notice the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Consolidation authorities is no less involving. Some of such cases have already been noticed by me earlier. 66. In Ramkrit Singh and others case (supra), the Court has said- "controversy in a suit may relate to right and title in land and certain reliefs dependent on the determination of the aforesaid title. Only in such a situation in my opinion, the suit abates not only in relation to ancillary or dependent reliefs. But the position is different where independent relief or reliefs, unconnected with the declaration and determination of title to land are involved in a suit. In such a situation the suit does not abate in relation to such controversies". The said observations were applied in the case of Bhagwan Das vrs. Gulab Singh (1982 B. B. C. J.548) 1982 BLJ 550 by B. P. Jha, J. (as he then was) in a case in which the suit property was claimed by the plaintiffs on the basis of a transfer by the decree holder in an auction sale. He affirmed the order of the Act lower appellate court which held that Sec.4 (c) of the Act would not apply in respect of a case of delivery of possession and mesne profits. In Rameshwar thakur V/s. Smt. Bhagwati Devi (1982 B. B. C. J.155), 1982 BLJ 205 this Court considered whether an order holding that the suit was not maintainable for the reason of the bar under Sec.4 (b) of the Act read with Sec.37 thereof, was a decree or not and held that the same was a decree within the ambit of order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil procedure and, therefore, was appealable. Although it is not so stated, but it appears that the court took notice of the fact that the question as to whether the suit was maintainable or not had to be decided after adjudicating as to the nature of the suit and if it was a suit raising a pure question of title, the bar under Sec.4 (b) read with Section 37 of the Act could not be applied. 67. In Tarkeshwar Upadhya and another V/s. Mahesh Kahar and others, (1982 b. B, C. J.114), Narain, J. has held that a suit for cancellation of a deed of gift on the ground that the same was void, abated under Sec.4 (c) of the Act. 68. Similar view has been expressed in several other cases. To refer to a few, are the cases in Bettiah Estate V/s. Pushpa Devi and others (1986 P. L. J. R.222), in which it was held that only such land which had nexus to agriculture would be covered by the Act ; Chaturbhuj Prasad Singh V/s. Saryu Prasad Singh (1985 B. B. C. J.383) 1985 BLJ 747 in which it was held that a partition suit with regard to agricultural land situated within the area covered by notification issued under Sec.3 of the Act would abate and the suit would proceed with regard to the non-agricultural land and even agricultural land which do not relate to the area covered by the notification ; and the case of bishwanath Rai and ethers V/s. Dulhin Indrasani Devi and others (1988 P. L. J. R.808), in which it was held that the lands with buildings in the town of Dumroan with municipal limit has nothing to do with the agriculture and as such the provisions of the Act would not be attracted to such land. 69. I, however, propose to make a particular reference to a Division bench judgment of this Court in Narendra Kumar Verma and others V/s. State of bihar (1980 B. B. C. J.252 ). It was with respect to a suit concerning the bakasht Jote lands of the ex-landlords of Barari which fell to the share of one shashi Muhan Thakur at a family partition of the ex-landlords. The lands being Bakasht were deemed to be settled with the ex-proprietor under Sec.6 of the Land Reforms Act. The State Government, however, initiated proceeding for consolidation of holdings under the Act. The lands being Bakasht were deemed to be settled with the ex-proprietor under Sec.6 of the Land Reforms Act. The State Government, however, initiated proceeding for consolidation of holdings under the Act. The consolidation proceedings were completed and a notice to that effect was finally published on 19-1-1965. In the consolidation proceedings, however, the suit lands were recorded as bihar Sarkar. The ex-proprietors, however, transferred the lands to Narendra kumar Verma and others by a registered sale deed dated 8.9.1976. when the agents of the Government of the State threatened them of dispossession they filed a title suit. There a plea was raised that the suit was barred under section 37 of the Act This Court took notice of the prayer in the plaint- " (a) The court be pleased to hold and declare that the plaintiffs have got indivisible right, title in the land in suit and the defendant has got absolutely no manner of right, title in the same as the suit land was Nagdi occupancy Jote land of the plaintiffs vendor Shree shashi Mohan Thakur. (b) On the above adjudication it be declared that the suit land has been wrongly recorded as Bihar Sarkar in the Survey made under the consolidation Act and the survey entry in respect of the land in suit is wrong, null and void and without jurisdiction and not binding on the plaintiffs". and in the words of the Civision Bench- "the substance of prayer at paragraph (a) was that the plaintiffs sought adjudication of their right and title in the suit lands as Negdi occupancy Jote of the plaintiffs vendor Shashi Mohan Thakur. The second prayer in substance was that the entry in the record of rights had been wrongly made as Bihar Sarkar and that it was wrong, null and void and without jurisdiction and not binding on the plaintiffs. Sec.37 of the Act even before amendment or after placed no bar upon a civil court to adjudicate pure question of title. The bar was only to entertainment of a suit or application to vary or set aside any decision or order under the Act. It is obvious, therefore, that any order passed in terms of the Consolidation act cannot be varied or set aside by civil court, but it does not deprive a civil court of the jurisdiction to decide queftion of title for at all times. It is obvious, therefore, that any order passed in terms of the Consolidation act cannot be varied or set aside by civil court, but it does not deprive a civil court of the jurisdiction to decide queftion of title for at all times. The scheme of the Act is that while the consolidation proceedings are in operation no court should decide any question in relation to title. The scheme is contained in Section 4 of the Act. Sec.4 (1) (b) of the Act prohibits courts from entertaining any suit or legal proceeding while the consolidation proceedings are in progress. Suits instituted prior to the initiation of consolidation proceeding shall abate in terms of Sec.4 (c) of the Act. It is now well established that the abatement of the suit or appeal subsists only till the consolidation proceedings are in progress. The notification by State Government in official gazette stating that the consolidation operation have been closed, thereafter suits or appeals which had abated during the consolidation proceedings may be revived. In Ram Krit Singh and others V/s. The State of bihar and others a full Bench of this Court, to which I was a party laid down that on the close of consolidation operations in a village or area the abated suits would revive. It is thus obvious that the jurisdiction of civil courts to adjudicate questions of title remains in abeyance during the consolidation operations. It does not annihilate that powers of civil courts for all times. I have, therefor, no hesitation in holding that after the consolidation proceedings have come to a close, the jurisdiction of civil courts to adjudicate upon pure questions of title is not barred by Sec.37 of the Act. That is the position in law before the amendment of Sec.37 or after. The amendment, therefore, makes little difference in power of civil courts to adjudicate upon questions of title. The idea that courts are not debarred from adjudicating questions of title after the close of consolidation proceedings is implicit in the words of section 37 (before amendment) itself. The second pan of the section quoted above lays down that if the decision of the consolidation authorities has decided questions relating to title to lands or to some interest in land as between the parties having conflicting claims the jurisdiction of civil courts will not be barred. The second pan of the section quoted above lays down that if the decision of the consolidation authorities has decided questions relating to title to lands or to some interest in land as between the parties having conflicting claims the jurisdiction of civil courts will not be barred. It would be curious situation that while civil suits would not be barred if the consolidation authorities have decided a question relating to title but it would be barred if no question of title has been decided by them. I see no warrant for this interpretation in regard to the content of Sec.37 of the Act before the amendment of 1975. If a question of title has not been decided by the consolidation authorities a citizen must have some forum for getting judicial verdict in regard to his title. In my view, a pure suit for title is not barred by Sec.37 of the Act. The clause "unless such decision or order has decided a question relating to land or to some interest in land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto" is not to be found in Sec.37 after the amendment, but that makes no difference so far as the power of courts to adjudicate pure questions of title is concerned. What will be the result of the suit is a different question and has no relevance to the maintainability of the suit. In my view, therefore, the court below was clearly in error in rejecting the plaintiffs plaint as being barred by Sec.37 of the Act. The plaintiffs wanted adjudication of their title. They did not seek to vary or set aside the order of the consolidation authorities. The plaintiff could*not be denied their right to have their title adjudicated". The Court rejected the argument that such a title suit, in which the jurisdiction might result in nullifying the order passed under the Consolidation proceeding, would be barred. 70 What may be derived from the discussions above can be summarised thus- (1) No all questions of title in respect of the land can be decided Dy the consolidation authorities. Exceptions to their jurisdiction are issues which require adjudication independent of any right or interest in the land, although as a result of adjudication of such independent issue, the right or interest in the land may stand nullified or varied. Exceptions to their jurisdiction are issues which require adjudication independent of any right or interest in the land, although as a result of adjudication of such independent issue, the right or interest in the land may stand nullified or varied. (2) consolidation Authorities are deemed courts of limited jurisdiction confined to the matters relating to the land ; (3) Some types of suits may be entertained by the court notwithstanding the bar under Sec.4 (b) of the Act even during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings ; and (4) pending suits with respect to cancellation of documents etc. including suits raising issues independent of the right and interest in the land which are not incidental to the claims of right and interest in the land, may not abate. 71. I shall advert to the Act later to consider specifically the provisions in sections 4, 15 and 37 of the Act, but before doing so, I am tempted to refer to a Full Bench judgment of this Court and two judgments of the House of Lords of England. 72. A Full Bench of this Court in Patna Municipal Corporation V/s. Ram bachanlal, (1961 BLJR 3) has considered in some details the question as to whether the civil court or the High Court can enquire into the correctness of the decision of a Tribunal or Administrative authority of limited jurisdiction or not ? the Full Bench has said that the first principle which must be kept in view is that the civil court is a court of plenary jurisdiction and is competent under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. the Full Bench has said that the first principle which must be kept in view is that the civil court is a court of plenary jurisdiction and is competent under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The Full Bench has referred to a large number of authorities deciding the question and concluded that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine the cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principle of judicial procedure or that a local authority and administrative authority or tribunal of limited jurisdiction assumed jurisdiction to do anything or to pass any order by arriving at a wrong decision on facts which facts have been referred to in various decisions as preliminary or collateral facts or as jurisdictional facts and held that the civil court or the High Court, in exercise of its power to issue and appropriate wric in suitable cases, can investigate the correctness of the decision of the inferior tribunal of limited jurisdiction relating to such facts. This statement of law by the Full Bench is based on the basic concept that exercise of limited jurisdiction inflicted by such objections which relate to the incompetency of the Judges or Authorities concerned or the nature of the subject matter or the absence of some essential preliminary facts as to the jurisdiction or by any on of them is null and void. It is possible upon this, thus to say that if the fundamental principles of judicial procedure are ignored and questions of title are allowed to be decided ignoring the rules of evidence and procedure for determination of issues, vital to the adjudication before the Consolidation Authorities, the rule of law is the first victim and Administration of justice becomes a false promise. This approach can be found reiterated in Anisminic Ltd. V/s. The Foreign Compensation Commission and another (1969 Vol 1 All ER 208 ). This approach can be found reiterated in Anisminic Ltd. V/s. The Foreign Compensation Commission and another (1969 Vol 1 All ER 208 ). The House of Lords has at great length gone into this aspect, and in the words of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest it has said- "i return then, to the question as to how the appellants can justify the calling in question by them of the determination of the commission. The answer is that they boldly say that what looks like a determination was in fact no determination but was a mere nullity. That which they say, should be disregarded as being null and void, is a determination explained in a carefully reasoned document nearly ten pages in length which is signed by the Chairman of the commission. There is no question here of a sham or spurious or merely purported determination. Why, then, is it said to be null and void? The answer given is that it contains errors in law which have caused the commission to exceed their jurisdiction. When analysed, this really means that it is contended that, when the commission considered the meaning of certain words in Article 4 of the Order in Council, they gave them a wrong construction with the consequence that they had no jurisdiction to disallow the claim of the appellants. It is not suggested that the commission were not acting within their jurisdiction when they entertained the application of the appellants and gave it their consideration nor when they heard argument and submissions for four days in regard to it. The moment when it is said that they strayed outside their allotted jurisdiction must, therefore, have been at the moment when they gave their "determination. " the control which is exercised by the High Court over inferior tribunals (a categorising but not a derogatory description) is of a supervisory but not of an appellate nature. It enables the High court to correct errors of law it they are revealed on the face of the record. The control cannot, however, be exercised if there is some provision (such as a "no certiorari" clause) which prohibits removal to the High Court. But it is well settled that even such a clause is of no avail if the inferior tribunal acts without jurisdiction or exceeds the limit of its jurisdiction. The control cannot, however, be exercised if there is some provision (such as a "no certiorari" clause) which prohibits removal to the High Court. But it is well settled that even such a clause is of no avail if the inferior tribunal acts without jurisdiction or exceeds the limit of its jurisdiction. In all cases similar to the present one it becomes necessary, therefore, to ascertain what was the question submitted for the determination of a tribunal. What were its terms of reference What was its remit ? what were the questions left to it or sent to it for its decision ? what were the limits of duties and power Where there any conditions precedent which had to be satisfied before its functions began ? if there were was it or was it not left to the tribunal itself to decide whether or not the conditions precedent were satisfied If Parliament has enacted that provided a certain powers, it is clear that the tribunal will not have those powers unless the situation exists. The decided cases illustrated the infinite variety of the situations which may exist and the variations of statutory wording which have called for consideration. Most of the cases depend, therefore, on an examination of their own particular facts and of particular sets of words. It is, however, abundantly clear that questions of law as well as of fact can be remitted for the determination of a tribunal. If a tribunal, while acting within its jurisdiction, makes an error of law which it reveals on the face of its recorded determination then the court, in the exercise of its supervisory function, may correct the error unless there is some provision preventing a review by a court of law. If a particular issue is left to a tribunal to decide then even where it is shown (in cases where it is possible to show) that in deciding the issue left to it the tribunal has come to a wrong conclusion that does not involve that the tribunal has gone outside its jurisdiction. It follows that, if any errors of law are made in deciding matters which are left to a tribunal for its decision, such errors will be errors within its jurisdiction. It follows that, if any errors of law are made in deciding matters which are left to a tribunal for its decision, such errors will be errors within its jurisdiction. If issues of law as well as of fact are referred to a tribunal for its determination, then its determination cannot be asserted to be wrong if Parliament has enacted that the determination is not to be called in question in any court of law". "if, therefore, a tribunal while within the area of its jurisdiction committed some error of law and if such error was made apparent in the determination itself (or, as it is often expressed, on the face of the record) then the superior court can correct that error unless it was forbidden to do so. It would be so forbidden if the determination was "not to be called in question in any court of law". If so forbidden it could not then even hear argument which suggested that error of law had been made. It could, however, still consider whether the determination was within "the area of the inferior jurisdiction". The above view has been reiterated by the House of Lords in Oreilly V/s. Mackman and others, (1982) 3 All ER 1124) thus- "it was this provision that provided the occasion for the landmark decision of this House in Anisminic Ltd. V/s. Foreign Compensation commission, (1969) 1 All ER 208: (1969) 2 AC 147, and particularly the leading speech of Lord Reid, which has liberated English public law from the fetters that the courts had therefore imposed on themselves so far as determinations of inferior courts and statutory tribunals were concerned, by drawing esoteric distinctions between errors of law committed by them within their jurisdiction. The breakthrough that Anisminic made was the recognition by the majority of this House that if a tribunal whose jurisdiction was limited by statute or subordinate legislation mistook the law applicable to the facts as it had found them, it must have asked itself the wrong question, i. e. one into which it was not empowered to inquire and so had no jurisdiction to determine. Its purported determination, not being a determination within the meaning of the empowering legislation, was accordingly a nullity". 73. The characteristic attribute of a judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether it be a right or wrong. Its purported determination, not being a determination within the meaning of the empowering legislation, was accordingly a nullity". 73. The characteristic attribute of a judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether it be a right or wrong. An error af law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles govern not only the findings of inferior courts stricto sensu but also the findings of Administrative bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies are deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction ; and provided that they keep within those limits of their jurisdiction ; their decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal. Evea the doctrine of res judicata is applied to such decisions. What does than jurisdiction mean It means authority to decide. Whenever a judicial or quasi judicial tribunal is empowered or required to enquire into a question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon become final until reversed on appeal. Where a quasi judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion, whether it is wrong in law or in fact. The quesiion, whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is deterrninable at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry. Such jurisdiction may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some facts. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the deemed court or the tribunal has to try. This determination, whether it exists or not, is logically prior to the determination of the actual question. A decision as to the collateral fact, thus, is necessary before jurisdiction to decide such questions, which fall for decision the authority concerned, are decided. 74. This determination, whether it exists or not, is logically prior to the determination of the actual question. A decision as to the collateral fact, thus, is necessary before jurisdiction to decide such questions, which fall for decision the authority concerned, are decided. 74. An examination of the scheme of the law in the Act clearly shows that consolidation authorities have not been vested with the power to determine finally the preliminary facts on which father exercise of their jurisdiction depends. Yet it is a law under which the consolidation authorities may be required to take notice of such collateral facts and decide, whether to enter into such questions which are unconnected with the matter or are collateral to the matter as to the rights and interests in the land, and their jurisdiction will depend not on a wrong decision with regard to a collateral fact but a right decision. Once it is shown that a wrong decision has been taken as to such collateral facts by them and by so wrongly deciding the jurisdictional fact they have assumed jurisdiction, the adjudication, on the issues tailing within their jurisdiction, shall also become without jurisdiction. 75. In Ujjam Bai V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (A. I. R.1962 supreme Court 1621) such a question had arisen and the Supreme Court has expressed- "when a statute presciibes manner or form in which a duty is to be performed or a power exercised, it seldom lays down that will be the legal consequences of failure to observe its prescriptions. The courts must, therefore, formulate their own criteria for determining whether the procedural rules are to be regarded as mandatory in which case disobedience will render void or voidable what has been done or as directory in which case disobedience will be treated as a mere irregularity not affecting the validity of what has been done. A quasi-judicial authority is under an obligation to act judicially. Suppose, it does not so act and passes an order in violation of the principles of natural justice. What is the position then There are some decisions, particulary with regard to customs authorities, where it has been held that an order of a quasi-judicial authority given in violation of the principles of natural justice is really an order without jurisdiction and if the order threatens or violates a fundamental right, an application under Article 32 may lie. What is the position then There are some decisions, particulary with regard to customs authorities, where it has been held that an order of a quasi-judicial authority given in violation of the principles of natural justice is really an order without jurisdiction and if the order threatens or violates a fundamental right, an application under Article 32 may lie. (See sinha Govindji V/s. Deputy Controller of Imports and Exports, Madras sc Petns.307 and 308 of 1960), U/23-3-1961 (SG ). These decisions stand in a class by themselves and really proceed on the footing that the order passed was procedurally ultra vires and therefore without jurisdiction". Ujjam Bais case is an authority supporting the aforementioned conclusions that a tribunal may lack jurisdiction if its is improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries to the enquiry, but it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is empowered or required to determine. The strength of this theory of jurisdiction lies in its logical consistency. 76. In this Act one may take notice of the fact that jurisdiction to decide disputes or objections is given to the Assistant Consolidation officer in Section 10 of the Act. These provisions operate after the preparation of the registers under sub-section (2) of Sec.9 and the statement of principles prepared under Sec.9-A. Preparation of registers of lands has been made dependant upon the record of rights and map, as provided in Sec.8 of the Act in accordance with the provision of Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act or as the case may be Chapter XII of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act or Santhal parganas Settlement Regulations or the Bihar Tenants Holdings (Maintenance of records) Act, 1973. After grant of the certificate of transfer to the Raiyats and under-Raiyats under Sec.15 of the Act, Sec.16 of the Act thereof has provided that the scheme confirmed under Sec.13, which obviously is done after the disposal of the objections and appeals etc. Would be deemed to be the record of rights prepared and finally published under Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act or as the case may be Chapter XII of the Chotanagpur tenancy Act or Santhal parganas Settlement Regulations in supersession of the up-to-date record of right prepared under Sec.8 of the Act. 77. Would be deemed to be the record of rights prepared and finally published under Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act or as the case may be Chapter XII of the Chotanagpur tenancy Act or Santhal parganas Settlement Regulations in supersession of the up-to-date record of right prepared under Sec.8 of the Act. 77. A full Bench of this Court in Nand Kumar Rai and others V/s. State of Bihar and others (AIR 1974 Patna 164) has considered a case in which the plaintiff-petitioners instituted title suit in the court of Munsif II at Buxar for declaration of title and confirmation of possession or in the alternative for recovery of possession in respect of the suit lands and also prayed for permanent injuction to restrain the defendants from interfering with their possession. Their case was that defendants had no Sikmi right over any portion of the suit land and that by bringing the survey staff in their collusion, the defendants got the name of defendant No.2 recorded as Sikmidar to lay a false claim. During the pendency of the said suit, Bihar Act 6 of 1970 was enacted replacing Section 109 of the Bihar Tenancy Act by Sec.2 of the Amending Act, Sec.3 of which provided that all suits of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of section 109 would stand transferred to the Collector of the District, in which such court is situated, and the Collector would dispose them off. The defendants accordingly, filed a petition before the learned Munsif for transfer of the suit to the Collector. The learned Munsif rejected the objections and the attempt to drop all references in the body of the plaint with respect to the survery entry relating to the schedules and held that in view of the provisions contained in the amending Act, the suit was beyond the jursidiction of the learned Munsif and stood transferred to the Collector. The learned Munsif rejected the objections and the attempt to drop all references in the body of the plaint with respect to the survery entry relating to the schedules and held that in view of the provisions contained in the amending Act, the suit was beyond the jursidiction of the learned Munsif and stood transferred to the Collector. Constitutional validity of the said amending Act was questioned before this Court and several contentions were raised, including contentions that it was discriminatory and void as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, that unguided uncontrolled and arbitrary powers had been vasted in the Revenue courts which were presided over by Executive Officers directly under the control of the State Government, that it was against the directive principles engrafted in Article 50 of the Constitution of India and that no procedure was prescribed in the matter of conduct and trial of suits and disposal of appeals. 78 Untwalia C. J. (as he then was) observed that the main point for consideration, however, was, whether the impugned Act 6 of 1970 stood the test of equal protection of laws guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India or not and other points were really part and parcel of or subsidiary to the main point, that is to say, the alleged violation of Article 14 of the constitution. He then tracted the relevant history of some of the provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act beginning from Bengal Tenancy Act, 1855, and noticed that the entry in the record of rights was given only presumptive evidenciary value, it was rebuttable and it could be show in any civil court that the entry did not correctly record the facts. Untwalia, C. J. referred to an earlier amendment by Bihar Act 2 of 1965 which read-"subject to the provisions of Section 109a, a Civil Court shall not entertain any application or suit concerning the preparation or publication of record of rights or settlement of rent or preparation of Settlement Rent Roll or for alteration of any entry in any such record or roll for the determination of incidents of any tenancy", and a judgment of this court in Chhatri Mehta V/s. State of Bihar (1967 B. L. J. R.236), in which the said provision had been interpreted. Narasinham, C. J. who has delivered the judgment of the Court in the case of Cbhatri Mehta, has said- "all suits and proceedings which under the unamended Act could be instituted either in the Civil Court or Revenue Court at the choice of the party were now required to be filed only in the Revenue court. But the suits which even prior to the amendment could be heard only by the Civil Court were not intended to be dealt with by the Amending Act. The Legislature could not possibly have intended that a Revenue Court was competent to decide questions of title between parties. Thus under no principle of interpretation can Sec.11 be so construed as to enlarge the jurisdiction of the revenue Court and to confer on it powers to hear regular title suits. . . . . . . . . . . . It is well known that the entry in the record-of-rights neither creates title nor extinguishes title, and though, as the law stood prior to 1964, a suit in the Civil Court for mere correction of an entry in the Settlement Record-of-Rights was maintainable, such suit was not ordinarily instituted unless there was a could cast on the title of the plaintiff or apprehension of dispossession or interference with possession. In Such instances the main relief, as in this case, was always for declaration of title and confirmation of possession or recovery of possession. Such a suit was not barred by section 109 of the Act, as amended, and on the same line of reasoning Sec.11 of the Amending Act 1964 could not possibly apply to such suits. It is also difficult to imagine how the Legislature could have thought of transferring regular title suits from ordinary civil courts to Revenue Officers merely because one of the reliefs asked for in the suits was for correction of any entry in the settlement Record-of-Rights. It is well known that Civil Courts are better qualified to decide questions of title to immovable property than Revenue Officers". It is well known that Civil Courts are better qualified to decide questions of title to immovable property than Revenue Officers". Untwalia, C. J. has then taken notice of the impugned amendment which read as follows:- "bar of jurisdiction to Civil Courts- (1) Subject to the provisions of Sec.109-A, a Civil Court shall not entertain any application or suit- (a) concerning the preparation or publication of record-of-rights or settlement of rent or preparation of Settlement Rent Rolls; (b) for alteration of any entry in any such record or roll; (c) for the determination of incidents of any tenancy ; or (d) for declaration of title to or recovery of possession of or confirmation of possession over any holding or tenancy or part thereof in which correctness of any entry in any such record or ro)l is expressly or impliedly challenged or in which determination of incidents of any tenancy is involved. (2) Suit for declaration of title to or recovery of possession of or confirmation of possession over any holding or tenancy or part thereof, in which correctness of any entry in any record-of-rights or Settlement Rent Roll is expressly or impliedly challenged or in which determination of incidents of any tenancy is involved may be instituted before the Collector or any Revenue officer specially empowered by the State Government by notification in this behalf who shall dispose of the suit in the prescribed manner. (3) An appeal against the decision under sub-section (2) shall lie :- (a) if the decision is by an officer other than the Collector of the district or to any other officer as may be specially empowered by the State Government by notification in this behalf, whose decision thereon shall be final ; or (b) if the decision is by the Collector of a district, to the commissioner of the Division whose decision thereon shall be final. (4) Every appeal under sub-section (3) shall be presented within ninety days from the date of the decision under subsection (2)". (4) Every appeal under sub-section (3) shall be presented within ninety days from the date of the decision under subsection (2)". Untwalia, C. J. also took notice of Sec.3 of the amending Act which read as follows:- "transfer of certain applications and suits pending in Civil Courts- (1) Notwithstanding any ting contained in the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (Bihar Act VIII of 1885) or any other law for the time being in force all applications and suits of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Sec.109 of the said Act as amended by this Act, pending in a Civil Court immediately before the commencement of this Act shall, on such commencement, stand transferred to the Collector of the district in which such court is situated and the Collector shall either dispose them of himself or transfer them to any Revenue Officer competent to hear on application or suit of such nature under sub-section (2)of the said Sec.109 : provided that an appeal against or proceedings in execution of any judgment, decree or order of a Civil Court passed in any such suit before the commencement of this Act shall be disposed of as if this Act had not been enacted. (2) The Collector or the Revenue Officer shall dispose of the suit transferred to him under sub-section (1) in the prescribed manner ; (3) An appeal against the decision under sub-section (2) shall lie- (a) if the decision is by an officer other than the Collector of a district to the Collector of the district or to any other officer as may be specially empowered by the State government by notification in this behalf, whose decision thereon shall be final; or (b) if the decision is by the Collector of a district, to the commissioner of the Division whose decision shall thereon be final. (4) Every appeal under sub-section (3) shall be presented within ninety days from the date of the decision under sub-section (2)". Untwalia, C. J. has said- "it is difficult to conceive how complicated title suits would be speedily and summarily disposed of by Revenue Courts and how the under-raiyats would be benefited thereby. I can take judicial notice of the fact that a large number of title suits have been filed throughout the state of Bihar wherever Revisional Survey operation have taken place. I can take judicial notice of the fact that a large number of title suits have been filed throughout the state of Bihar wherever Revisional Survey operation have taken place. I am also aware that the number of Civil Courts is too small to dispose of such large number of title suits. I am, however, also aware of the fact that the number of Revenue Courts is also not sufficient rather small to dispose of such a large number of complicated title suits. They will be simply unable to decide them unless they technically choose to literally dispose of the suits by any means; no Court by a judicial approach will be able to dispose of such a large number of suits. I am, however, not concerned with the wisdom behind this legislation. I am concerned merely with its constitutional validity. In procedural matter suits of lighter vein have been allowed to be brought to the High Court and complicated suits are to be finally dispose by the Revenue authorities. I also do not see any justification for making a distinction between title suits for declaration of title and possession and suits of other types such as partition or mortgage suits". Untwalia C. J, has observed that Sec.109 of the Bihar Tenancy Act barred only a suit for title or possession but not a defence in which there could be necessity of challenging the correctness of the survey entry. To illustrate, he has stated- ". . . . . . Supposing a person has got his name entered as an under-raiyat in the Survey record-of-rights, but actually he is not able to get possession and cultivate the land. In such a case, if he files a suit for possession, it would be open to the defendant to resist the suit by pleading that the survey entry is wrong. I have already stated that an entry in the record-of-rights neither creates nor extinguishes rights nor does an omission of entry affects the rights of the parties-Vide Mohendra Nath Biswas V/s. Shyam Lai Banerjee.19 Cal. L. J.308- (AIR 1914 Cal.6tt ). Irrespective of the entry in the record-of-rights, the owner of the land remains the owner, the person in possession remains to be so unless ousted in due course of law. L. J.308- (AIR 1914 Cal.6tt ). Irrespective of the entry in the record-of-rights, the owner of the land remains the owner, the person in possession remains to be so unless ousted in due course of law. Will it then be reasonable to any that a person must go to the Revenue Court if he wants to challenge the entry seeking declaration of title and possession when he is at liberty to challenge the entry in the Civil Court as a defendant Many under-raiyats may be in the position of plaintiffs or defendants. Is it, therefore, correct to say that there is a rational nexus between the classification made and the avowed object of the impugned act The law of rebuttal of presumption engrafted in sub-section (3) of Sec.103-B is still intact. Will it, therefore, be not discriminatory to the title holders of the lands to ask them to go to the same Revenue Court for rebutting the presumption of the correctness of the entry Or is it not fair to allow them to establish their title and possession in a Civil Court To my mind, the answers suggested in the question themselves are all against the validity of the impugned legislation". Nand Kumar Rais case (supra), thus, gives a clear vision of the consequences of the confirmed scheme to be treated as finally published record of rights ; correctness or otherwise of the record of rights prepared and finally published under Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act or as the case may be Chapter XII of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act or Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulations always be a question in a duly constituted title suit before the civil court of competent jurisdiction. Sec.37 of the Act in such a situation shall not inhabit the civil courts jurisdiction to decide the issues of title and in that also whether the survey entry is correct or not. All that is done or envisaged in course of the consolidation proceedings in veiw of the provision in Sec.6 of act, finally merges into the record of right, correctness or otherwise of which can always be questioned before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. All that is done or envisaged in course of the consolidation proceedings in veiw of the provision in Sec.6 of act, finally merges into the record of right, correctness or otherwise of which can always be questioned before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. 78-A. As noticed here-in-before, the Special Bench in Ram Krit Singhs case did not consider the question as to whether the consolidation authorities are courts of limited jurisdiction or not and thus it made an observation that the civil Court while disposing of the suits after revival thereof at the end of the consolidation proceedings, would merely pass a decree in terms of the decision of the consolidation authorities. The said observations must be held to have been rendered per incuriam inasmuch as in the cases where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred in terms of Sec.4 (b) or Sec.37 of the Act, the Civil Court cannot pass a decree only in terms of the decision of the consolidation authorities after revival of the suit. The said observations, therefore, are not binding upon this Court. In such a situation the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to decide suits relating to such matter in respect whereof its jurisdiction is not barred either in terms of Sec.4-B or Sec.37 of the said Act. 79. Certificate of transfer, however, has been treated separately in Section 15 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Sec.15, which has been introduced by act 27 of 1975, it appears, has ignored the exception enumerated in Sec.4 of the Act. Sec.48-E of the Bihar Tenancy Act deals, in particular, with the right of possession of the under-raiyat. Procedure prescribed therein shows that Bataidars can always agitate their claim of Bataidari rights before the collector under the said Act. Sec.4 has specifically provided that nothing, as in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Sec.4 shall apply to any proceeding under section 48-E of the Tenancy Act, 1885 and to the proceedings relating to the recording of title of Bataidars. How, then there can be any final adjudication of the question, whether a certain under-raiyat has got right of occupancy or not by the Consolidation authorities If there can be no such adjudication by them, how can a certificate of transfer be granted with an entry that a certain under-raiyat has got right of occupancy or title to any land under the scheme. Sub-section (2) of Sec.15 of the Act, which states about grant of a certificate transfer to every under-raiyat whether having a right of occupancy or not, has used the words, "the certificate shall be conclusive proof of the title of such under-raiyat to such land". The right of a under-raiyat having occupancy right or having no occupancy right, however, would be governed under the provisions of Bihar Tenancy Act. However, a decision with regard to his occupancy right, is evidently excluded from the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities by expressly providing in Sec.4 of the Act about the proceedings under Section 48-E of the Act and proceedings relating the title of the Bataidars. Sub-section (2) of Sec.15 of the Act has, thus, imagined a jurisdiction which the Act has no where contemplated to be adjudicated npon by the Consolidation authorities between the raiyat on the one hand and the under-raiyat on the other hand. 80. Both in-sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec.15 of the Act the Legislature has used the expression "conclusive proof". "conclusive proof" has been defined in Sec.4 of the Evidence Act to mean that when one fact is declared by the Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved and shall not allow the evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it. 81. Law is divided into two broad categories of substantive law and procedural law. Broadly stated whereas the substantive law defines for duties and liabilities, the procedural law deals with application of substantive law in particular cases. The law of evidence is a part of the law of procedure, as it deals with the question as to what facts may and what may not be proved, what sort of evidence may or may not be given. Use of the certificate of transfer in any proceeding, in which title is in dispute, if what is provided in Sec.15 of the act is valid, shall be as conclusive or irrebuttable evidence or presumption in favour of the certificate holder. 82. It is not possible to equate the words "conclusive proof of title" in section 15 of the Act as a rule of substantive law. 82. It is not possible to equate the words "conclusive proof of title" in section 15 of the Act as a rule of substantive law. In Izhar Ahmad Khan and others V/s. Union of India and others (AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1952), detailed study of the question as to what may constitute an irrebuttable presumption as a rule of substantive law and what may constitute irrebuttable presumption as a rule of procedural law, has been made. The Supreme Court has taken notice of the study of this branch of law in England, quoted from, a history of english Law by Holdsworth, Wingmore on Evidence, Phipson on Evidence, stephens Digest of the law of Evidence, the Diceys conflict of laws and thayers A preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, as well as case laws and pointed out,- ". . . . . . Thus the rule of rebuttble presumption adds statutory force to the natural and inherent probative value of fact A in telation to the proof of the existence of fact B and in adding this statutory value to the probative force of fact A, the rule, it is conceaded. makes a provision within the scope and function of the law of evidence. If that is so, how does it make a difference in principle if the rule adds conclusive strength to the probative value of the said fact A in relation to the proof of the existence of fact B In regard to the category of facts in respect of which an irrebuttable presumption is presented by a rule of evidence, the position is that the inherent probative value of fact A in that behalf is very great and it is very likely that when it is proved in a judicial proceeding, the judicial mind would normally attach great importance to it in relation to the proof of fact B. The rule steps in with regard to such facts and provides that the judicial mind should attach to the said fact conclusiveness in the matter of its probative value. It would be noticed that as in the case os rebuttable presumption, so in the case of an irrebuttable presumption, the rule purports to assist the judicial mind in appreciating the existence of facts. It would be noticed that as in the case os rebuttable presumption, so in the case of an irrebuttable presumption, the rule purports to assist the judicial mind in appreciating the existence of facts. In one case the probative value is statutorily strengthened but yet left open to rebuttable, in the other case, it is statutorily strengthened and placed beyond the place of rebuttal. Considered from this point of view, it seems rather difficult to accept the theory that wheas a rebuttable presumption is within the domain of the law of evidence, irrebuttable presumption is outside the domain of that law and forms part of the substantive law". Having so stated the law, the Supreme Court has then pointed out- "in deciding the question as to whether a rule about irrebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence or not, it seems to us that the proper approach to adopt would be to consider whether fact A from the proof of which a presumption is required to be drawn about the existence of fact B, is inherently relevant in the matter of proving fact B and has inherently any probative or presuasive value in that behalf or not. If fact A is inherently relevant in proving the existence of fact B and to any rational mind it would bear a probative or persuasive value in the matter of proving the existence of fact B, then a rule prescribing either a rebuttable presumption or an irrebuttable presumption in that behalf would be a rule of evidence. On the other hand, if fact A is inherently not relevant in proving the existence of fact B or has no probative value in that behalf and yet a rule is made prescribing for a rebuttable or an irrebuttable presumption in that connection, that rule would be a rule of substantive law and not a rule of evidence. Therefore, in dealing with the question as to whether a given rule prescribing a conclusive presumption is a rule of evidence or not, we cannot adopt the view that all rules prescribing irrebultable presumption are rules of substantive law. Therefore, in dealing with the question as to whether a given rule prescribing a conclusive presumption is a rule of evidence or not, we cannot adopt the view that all rules prescribing irrebultable presumption are rules of substantive law. We can answer the question only after examining the rule and its impact on the proof of facts a and B. If this is the proper test, it would become necessary to enquire whether obtaining a passport from a foreign government is or is not inherently relevant in proving the voluntary acquisition of the citizenship of that foreign State". Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Raja Anand Brahma shah V/s. The State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1081) and in smt. Lila Vati Bai V/s. State of Bombay (AIR 1957 Supreme Court 521 ). 83. In Smt. Somawanti and others V/s. The State of Punjab (AIR 1963 supreme Court 151) it hasbeen pointed out that there is no difference between the expression "conclusive proof" and "conclusive evidence". It has said-a distinction is sought to be made between "conclusive proof" and "conclusive evidence" and it is contended that where a law declares that a fact shall be conclusive proof of another, the Court is precluded from considering other evidence once such fact is established. Therefore, where the law makes a fact conclusive proof of another the fact stands proved and the Court must proceed on that basis. But, the argument proceeds, where the law does not go that far and makes a fact only "conclusive evidence" as to the existence of another fact, other evidence as to the existence of the other fact is not shut out. In support of the argument reliance is placed on section 4 of the Evidence Act which in its third paragraph defines conclusive proof. . . . . . . . . This paragraph thus provides that further evidence is barred where under the Evidence Act one fact is regarded as proof of another. But it says nothing about what other laws may provide. There are a number of laws which make certain facts conclusive evidence of other facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . This paragraph thus provides that further evidence is barred where under the Evidence Act one fact is regarded as proof of another. But it says nothing about what other laws may provide. There are a number of laws which make certain facts conclusive evidence of other facts. . . . . . . . . . . . Since evidence means and includes all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made, when the law says that a particular kind of evidence would be conclusive as to the existence of particular fact it implies that that fact can be proved either by that evidence or by some other evidence which the Court permits or requires to be advanced. Where such other evidence is adduced it would be open to the Court to consider whether, upon that evidence, the fact exists or not. Where, on the other hand, evidence which is made conclusive is adduced, the Court has no option but to hold that the fact exists. If that were not so, it would be meaning less to call a particular piece of evidence as conclusive evidence. Once the law says that certain evidence is conclusive, it shuts out any other evidence which detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence. In substance, therefore, there is no difference between conclusive evidance and conclusive proof. Statutes may use the expression conclusive proof where the object is to make a fact non-justiciable. But the legislature may use some other expression such as conclusive evidence for achieving the same result. There is thus no difference between the effect or the expression conclusive evidence from that of conclusive proof, the aim of both being to give finality to the establishment of the existence of a fact from the proof of another". 84. Conclusive proof of a fact is one thing and conclusive proof of existence of a right is another thing. I have already noticed that a suit questioning the correctness of the record of right, notwithstanding whether the same has been prepared in accordance with the orders passed by the Consolidation authorities, shall be maintainable and the bar under Sec.37 of the Act shall not apply in sach a situtation. I have already noticed that a suit questioning the correctness of the record of right, notwithstanding whether the same has been prepared in accordance with the orders passed by the Consolidation authorities, shall be maintainable and the bar under Sec.37 of the Act shall not apply in sach a situtation. Use of the certificate in a suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession or recovery of possession shall, therefore, be only for the purposes of establishing before the Court by irrebuttable evidence that the certificate holder has got title to the land. The question, however, is, can a certificate of such nature shall be a document of title or not. Answer to it is obviously not. 85. I have already noticed that conclusive proof by dint of the provisions in Sec.15 of the Act shall be of the fact that the certificate holder has established his right or interest in the land before the Consolidation authorities. Will it then exclude the possibility of any evidence of rebuttal of the correctness of the certificate based on the findings of rights and interests in the land by the Consolidation authorities. Legislatures attempt is obvious. It has intended to make the certificate of transfer a document conclusive and final so thac no dispute is allowed to be raised with respect to the title of the certificate holder. Word title I have already noticed, has occurred only in Sec.15 of the Act and in the proviso to Sec.4 while talking about recording of the title of Bataidars. Proceedings which could be taken before the Consolidation authorities under the Act are objections in respect of the registers prepared under sub-section (2) of Sec.9 and the statements of principles prepared under Sec.9-A of the Act, besides partition of joint holdings contemplated in Sec.8-A and matters connected thereto and rights and liabilities of a raiyat as recorded in the register of lands prepared under Sec.9 or secured in the lands allotted, subject to the deductions, if any, made on account of the contribution to public purposes under the Act. In other words, the nature of the interests or rights of the Raiyat when recorded, shall remain the same as before the proceeding had started or corrected in course of the proceedings either under Sec.10 or Sec.12 of the Act. 86. In other words, the nature of the interests or rights of the Raiyat when recorded, shall remain the same as before the proceeding had started or corrected in course of the proceedings either under Sec.10 or Sec.12 of the Act. 86. The jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities, begins with the preparation of up-to-date record of rights before consolidation to transfer all the rights and interests of the raiyats recorded in such record of rights to a new holding or holdings with all the encumbrances and to substitute the record of rights prepared before consolidation by the record of rights prepared in accordance with the Act as stated in Sec.16 of the Act. The result of such consolidation will in such a situation be that as in the case of record of rights, the presumption of correctness shall be available in the new holdings. 87. In Baikunthi Devi and others V/s. Mahendra Nath and another (AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1514), the Supreme Court considered a case in which one jeewa Ram, who had a half share in a tract of land Ac.6-00 in extent with a small house thereon, had entered into an agreement to sell his share for a consideration of Rs.3,000/- to respondent no.1. The said agreement was sought to be enforced by a suit for specific performance although by that time jeewan Ram had passed away and his daughter (appellant no.1) become his legal heir. The demand for specific performance was made by the plaintiff first respondent, who incidentally happened to be the nephew of the late Jeewan ram. The suit was filed after the consolidation proceedings had come to a close, as a result of which proceeding the land which was the subject matter of the agreement to sell, less a tiny bit of Ac.0.06 was included in the chak allotted to Jeewa Ram and the first respondent. It was argued before the supreme Court that on account of the consolidation proceedings even though the same lands had been alloted in the new chak, there was nevertheless a loss of identity. This agreement, however, was not accepted by the Supreme court. 88. It was argued before the supreme Court that on account of the consolidation proceedings even though the same lands had been alloted in the new chak, there was nevertheless a loss of identity. This agreement, however, was not accepted by the Supreme court. 88. In Piarey Lal V/s. Hod Lal (AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1226), however, the Supreme Court considered a similar contention with a little variation in a suit for specific performance of agreement for the sale of six plots of land, in which suit the defendant denied the execution of the agreement for sale and pleaded that as new plot had been allotted as a result of the consolidation of his holding under the U. P. Act, he could not perform the agreement for sale. The Supreme Court considered various provisions of the U. P. Act and has said- ". . . . . . It would thus appear that while Clause (a) deals with the rights, title, interests and liabilities of the tenure-holder entering into possession of the chak as well as of the former tenure-holder of the plots comprising the chak in their respective original holdings, and provides that their rights, title, interests and liabilities shall "cease", clause (b) provides that the tenure-holder entering into possession of the chak shall have, in that chak, the same rights, title, interests and liabilities "as he had in the original holdings". The expression chak has been defined in Sec.3 (1-A) of the act to mean "the parcel of land allotted to a tenure-holder on consolidation". The two clauses therefore are quite simple and clear, and do not raise any real problem of interpretation, but the question is whether there is justification lor the argument in the facts and circumstances of this case, that the expression liabilities would cover the liablility of the seller (i. e. the defendant), under the aforesaid agreement for the sale of his original holding ? as is obvious, Clause (a) of Sec.30 does not bear on the question in controversy because it only provides for the cessation of the rights, title, interests and liabilities both of the tenure-holder to whom the chak has been allotted and the former tenure-holder of the plots comprising the chak in their respective "original holdings". There is no controversy that this was so in the present case. There is no controversy that this was so in the present case. It is also nobodys case that the rights, title and interests of the tenure-holder entering into possession of his chak have any bearing no the controversy relating to the specific performance of the agreement for sale, for all that has been urged before us is that the defendant, as the tenure-holder of the new holding or chak, had the same "liabilities" in that chak as he had in the original holding. What therefore remains for consideration is whether, on the defendants entering into possession of his new land or chak, there was the same liability "in" the new land as "in" the original holding. It has therefore to be examined whether, by virtue of the agreement for sale, any liability accrued "in" the original holding"? 89. The Supreme Court, however, took note of Sec.54 of the transfer of property Act and held that a contract for sale of land created no interest of the plaintiff in the holding of the defendant as the tenure-holder; and, thus, when he lost that property as a result of the scheme of consolidation and his rights, title and interest ceased in that property by virtue of Clause (a)of Sec.30 of the U. P. Act, the agreement for sale became void within the meaning of Sec.56 of the Contract Act. 90. I have endeavoured in the instant case to understand the meaning of the expression title in Sec.15 of the Act and its effect when the certificate of transfer has been made conclusive proof of title of the Raiyat in the new holding only to somehow understand the limits to which such certificate of transfer can be put to use. This attempt shall remain inconclusive unless the scheme of Sec.4 of the Act in particular is also taken into consideration. 91. An examination of Sec.4 (e) and (c) of the Act makes it clear that both for the purposes of holding that the suit is not maintainable or that the suit Dabated, the existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be examined by the Court. 91. An examination of Sec.4 (e) and (c) of the Act makes it clear that both for the purposes of holding that the suit is not maintainable or that the suit Dabated, the existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be examined by the Court. A court shall refuse to entertain a suit or record abatement only when the court will find that the rights, claimed or denied, will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities, who will be deemed to be vested with such jurisdiction by necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in the land. For instance, to declare a document effective or ineffective and in a case where there is a document, the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or being cancelled to hold that the consolidation authorities are not vested with the jurisdiction to decide the validity or otherwise of such document. Thus any adjudication of the controversy as to the quantum and the nature of the right or interest claimed in the land will first be determined as a preliminary fact or jurisdictional fact by the Court. If the finding with respect to the preliminary or jurisdictional fact is in favour of the jurisdiction of the Consolidation authorities, the court shall record the order of abatement in a pending suit or refuse to entertain a suit until consolidation proceedings were completed. In other words, civil courts plenary jurisdiction will become barred under Clause (b) of Sec.4 of the Act or shall stand suspended until the disposal of the consolidation proceedings or cancellation thereof for the purposes of Sec.4 (c) of the Act, only when it is found by it that the questions raised before the court were such that they could be decided by the consolidation authorities under the Act. In other words, it is always necessary to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities and allow only such proceedings to proceed in their deemed courts which can be decided by them. Adjudication of any controversy or issue, which in its nature is one which will have to be decided before any question as to right and interest in the land will arise evidently will not be within the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities. 92. Adjudication of any controversy or issue, which in its nature is one which will have to be decided before any question as to right and interest in the land will arise evidently will not be within the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities. 92. A question of inheritance in dispute, may have a direct bearing on the question of right and interest in the land x or y who may be claiming by inheritance a particular estate or property, may as a result of the adjudication of the question, as to whether x or y (was the heir or the legal representative of the deceased holder of the property, when decided, will automatically extend such right or interest which last holder had in the property in favour of one or the other. 93. A closer look to the scheme of the law reveals that jurisdiction of a civil court to decide a question as to right and interest in the land is put under suspension for the period for which the consolidation scheme is in operation and for the land falling in the area of the operation of the scheme. One cannot deny to a litigant a right to institute a civil suit with respect to properties including land falling in the area of the operation of the consolidation scheme as well as falling beyond the area of the operation of the scheme. The civil court may have to refuse entertaining a suit with respect to the land falling in the area ot the operation of the scheme and continue the proceeding in the suit with respect to the land and other properties falling beyond the area of the consolidation scheme. One can easily think of the civil court deciding the question of inheritance or the right ot the plaintiff of the suit or as a donee, a transferee, a co-sharer, a co-tenant or a person in adverse possession in respect of the properties and the land falling within its jurisdiction and the consolidation authorities investigating and deciding the same rights in respect of the lands falling within their jurisdiction. If their decisions on such question conflict and Sec.15 is allowed to extend its conclusive proof of title, even with respect to the land about which consolidation authorities can decide, the result would be that the successful plaintiff in the civil court, who established his title to the property or land claimed by the defendant, would loose the land falling within the consolidation area, on account of a decision on the question of title by the consolidation authorities. It cannot be suggested that the law makers intended, in the event of such a conflict, to give primacy to the orders of the revenue authorities over the orders of the civil courts. 94. Mitakshra law includes a minor or even a child in the womb a cosharer and a land holder with other male holders of the property governed by the Mitakshra School of Hindu Law. Their rights cannot be destroyed by acts of those who represent them, except and to the extent recognised by the textual hindu Law and the Hindu Succession Act. Entry in the record of rights and exercise of possession by a co-sharer in the absence of the other co-sharer do not destroy the right of the absentee co-sharer unless and until it is shown that such entry has been made and such possession has been exercised with the intention to deny the rights and interest of the co-sharer concerned. 95. In my considered view, therefore, in the field of procedural law, a a certificate of transfer of the nature as envisaged in the Act, cannot be made unrebuttable in the case in which pure questions of title, which are for the reasons either or error of jurisdiction committed by the Consolidation authorities or ignorance of the parties contesting under Sec.10 or 12 of Act, are decided by the Consolidation authorities. Use of the expression "conclusive proof of the title" of such raiyat or under-rayat in Sec.15 (1) and (2) of the Act is somewhat inconsistent with the scheme of transfer of the holding or holdings to the raiyats after consolidation. Use of the expression "conclusive proof of the title" of such raiyat or under-rayat in Sec.15 (1) and (2) of the Act is somewhat inconsistent with the scheme of transfer of the holding or holdings to the raiyats after consolidation. The certificate of transfer can do no more than as the other provisions of the Act clearly establish that the rights and interest in the holding or holdings which the raiyat or the under-raiyat possessed or claimed as recorded in the record of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act or as the case may be Chapter XII of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act or the Santhal Farganas settlement Regulation or the Bihar Tenants Holdings (Maintenance of record)Act, are transferred to the new holding or holdings and accordingly deemed to be recorded and finally punished as provided in Sec.16 of the Act. Sec.15 of the Act, therefore, shall not survive the test of reasonableness, as adjudications by consolidation officers cannot be placed beyond the judicial scrutiny of the civil courts. Neither Section.4 (b) nor Sec.4 (c) of the Act or even Sec.37 of the Act, intended to do away with the jurisdiction of the civil courts with respect to the pure questions of title. 96. There is some scope for thinking that while considering, whether a certain suit be entertained or not or a certain pending such be kept in abeyance until the disposal of the consolidation proceedings or not, the civil court shall look into the jurisdictional facts to find out whether the matter in issue before the court is exclusive to the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities or not, there is no such provision in the Act under which the consolidation authorities proceeding under the Act are required to decide whether certain issues raised are falling exclusively within their jurisdiction or not. Once the register of lands and statements of principles are prepared and published, as required under section 10 (1) of the Act, objections are invited and on such objections, they proceed to decide all such issues which relate to the land under consolidation. They are not required to test whether a certain question is pure question is pure question of title which question they cannot decide. They are not required to test whether a certain question is pure question is pure question of title which question they cannot decide. It is, however, an established principle of law that a Tribunal or court of limited jurisdiction has to exercise jurisdiction only when such preliminary facts exist and confine to the limits to which they jurisdiction extends. 97. The Act has contemplated adjudication up to reference or revision by the Director of Consolidation. Consolidation authorities are also made deemed courts. They (Consolidation authorities) are, however, chosen by the State government without there being anything in the Act suggesting that they, who are required to act judicially, must have some sort of judicial training. There is, thus no pretention in the Act that the deemed courts of consolidation authorities are a mechanism created in lieu of the civil courts. In such a situation, it is difficult to hold that anything done by them shall be final and conclusive as to the title of any person to a property including the land. It shall indeed be in tune with the scheme of the Act that any person intending to raise a pure question of title may file a suit before a civil court of competent jurisdiction which shall decide either to proceed or to hold shat the issues raised in the suit fell within the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities or not. When it is so decided by the civil court that the issues raised in the suit could be decided by the consolidation authorities, the suit shall not be entertained during the period the consolidation proceedings are pending. After the disposal of the consolidation proceedings finally or cancellation of the scheme in the area, however, it shall be open to the person concerned to file a suit questioning the validity of the record of rights and raising other issues for declaration of title and recovery of possession etc. While deciding such a suit, the civil court shall have jurisdiction to test the correctness or otherwise of the record of rights which evidently shall include the correctness or otherwise of the certificate of transfer under section 15 of the Act. While deciding such a suit, the civil court shall have jurisdiction to test the correctness or otherwise of the record of rights which evidently shall include the correctness or otherwise of the certificate of transfer under section 15 of the Act. The observati ;ns in Ramkrits case (supra), that on the close of consolidation in a village or area the abated suits would revive, but the revival or those suits would not create any problems as suits will have to be decided in conformity with the decisions arrived at in consolidation proceedings in so far as the rights or interest in any land covered by the consolidation proceedings is concerned have to be read along with the observations in the same judgment- ". . . . . . . . . Whereas Sec.15 makes the certificate issued under the said sections as conclusive, the effect of the confirmed scheme being treated as finally published record of rights is that the same has only a presumptive value. In my view, there is no conflict. Section 15 only relates to proof of title and that is conclusive. But in respect of matters not covered by Sec.15, the confirmed scheme shall have only a presumptive value. In any event, even if there be a conflict, Sec.16 being clear and explicit, has to prevail". 98. These observations in Ramkrits cases are not in conflict with the view that I have taken with respect to the vires of Sec.15 of the Act as also the scope to a suit that may be filed by any person questioning the validity of any entry in the record of right. 99. My above view is supported by judgment of this Court in Narendra kumars case (supra ). Abated suits under Sec.4 (c), after cancellation of or completion of the consolidation scheme shall in the same manner proceed and the jurisdiction of the civil court shall not be affected by the bar of jurisdiction provided under Sec.37 of the Act for the reason that the validity or otherwise of the record of right when considered will no doubt taken into account certain orders that may have been passed in course of he consolidation proceeding. It will not be a suit to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under the Consolidation Act. It will not be a suit to vary or set aside any decision or order given or passed under the Consolidation Act. In other words what may be taken into consideration by the civil court after the disposal of the consolidation scheme or its cancellation will be the record of right as a piece of evidence as any other evidence with rebuttable presumption of its correctness. 100. Since I am of the view that adjudication by the Consolidation authorities as deemed courts is only for the limited purposes of consolidation and transfer of the rights and interests as recorded in the record of rights before the consolidation proceedings to new holding or holdings after consolidation, their knowledge of revenue law and the law of evidence and the civil procedure need not be equal to that of a judicial officer, yet since some sort oi adjudication of rights and interests are required to be done, it is desirable that they have the judicial training and atleast at the level of the appellate or revisional authority, a better judicial approach is made available to the litigants than presently made available to them. It is possible to extend the reasonings in the judgment of my brother S. B. Sinha, J. in the case of K. P. Verma (supra) and hold that when the legislature has made the Consolidation authorities deemed courts and applied the provisions of the Evidence Act and the Civil Procedure Code to the consolidation proceedings, they must be men of the requisite calibre and independence, able to determine the complicated questions of rights and interest in the land. This will be in tune with the authorities of the Supreme Court in minerva Mills Ltd. V/s. Union of India (AIR 190 Supreme Court 1789) and other cases. 101. I am, however, abstaining from making any specific order for the reason that the respondent state may exercise its discretion and decide to introduce atleast one judicial review in course of the consolidation proceedings before the scheme is made final with respect to every case that is filed and decided in course of the proceedings. 102. 101. I am, however, abstaining from making any specific order for the reason that the respondent state may exercise its discretion and decide to introduce atleast one judicial review in course of the consolidation proceedings before the scheme is made final with respect to every case that is filed and decided in course of the proceedings. 102. My conclusions, therefore, are that: (1) all suits of civil nature, including suits in respect of any land in the area notified under Sec.3 of the Act can be filed, notwithstanding, the bar under Sec.4 (b) of the Act, before a civil court of competent jurisdiction, which on examination of jurisdictional facts, may hold that the suit is not maintainable until notification is cancelled or consolidation scheme is completed. When such order is passed by the court, the parties concerned may raise their dispute in respect of any land in such area before the consolidation authorities. (2) pending suits shall not abate unless specific order of abatement is made by the civil court of competent jurisdiction. The suit shall revive and proceed in accordance with law in the event of cancellation of the consolidation scheme or its completion. The civil court shall, while making the order of abatement, see that no question of pure title, except in respect for declaration of rights or interests in any land lying in the area or such incidental questions which arise from the claim of the rights or interests is involved in the suit. If any question of pure title other than claims in respect of the declaration of rights or interests in the land or incidental thereto is involved, the suit shall not abate. (3) the consolidation authorities shall be required to decide preliminary/collateral/jurisdictional facts before assuming jurisdiction. It shall be open to a party to the proceeding or any person affected by the decision on the jurisdictional facts to file a suit before a civil court of competent jurisdiction questioning the correctness of such findings of fact recorded by the consolidation authorities. (3) the consolidation authorities shall be required to decide preliminary/collateral/jurisdictional facts before assuming jurisdiction. It shall be open to a party to the proceeding or any person affected by the decision on the jurisdictional facts to file a suit before a civil court of competent jurisdiction questioning the correctness of such findings of fact recorded by the consolidation authorities. Such a suit shall be maintainable, notwithstanding the bar under Sec.4 (b) of the Act; (4) a pending suit abated under Sec.4 (c) of the Act or a suit not entertained under Sec.4 (b) of the Act may proceed or entertained, as the case may be, after the completion of the consolidation scheme and notification under Sec.26-A of the Act or cancellation thereof, which suit shall be decided by the civil court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with law ; (5) the bar under Sec.37 of the Act shall not apply to any suit questioning the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities, the abated suit under Sec.4 (c) and the suit not entertained under section 4 (b) when revived or filed after completion of the consolidation scheme or its cancellation. Sec.15 (1) and 15 (2) of the act are ultra vires Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution, in so far as they declare certificate of transfer to be conclusive proof of the title of the Raiyat to the transferee holding or that of the under raiyat therein ; (6) the certificate of transfer shall have use only with respect to the rights presumed to exist under Sec.16 of the Act as to be the rights under record of rights prepared and finally published under chapter X of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 or as the case may be chapter XII of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 or the Santhal parganas Settlement Regulation, 1972 ; and (7) Consolidation authorities are deemed courts of limited jurisdiction. Any decision by them except on questions relevant to the record ot rights, correctness wheeeof can be questioned on the grounds of wrong decision by them on pure questions of title, shall neither be binding or available as evidence of title in a court of law. 103. Coming to the facts of this case, I find that there is little controversy as to the question that the petitioner has raised. 103. Coming to the facts of this case, I find that there is little controversy as to the question that the petitioner has raised. The consolidation authorities could not finally decide as to whether a civil court decree was valid or not. In this view of the matter, the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to pass an order contrary to or inconsistent with a civil courts decree which has not been set aside by a higher court. The parties challenging a civil court decree must, therefore, approach civil court itself, if it is permissible in law to get a declaration that the decree passed in the earlier suit was not binding upon him. In this view of the matter, the impugned orders passed by the consolidation authorities must be quashed. 104. In the result, with the declarations, directions and observations, as above this application is allowed. There shall, however be no order as to costs.