JUDGMENT : J. Das, J. - The above three criminal revisions arise out of the order dated 3-7-1985 passed by the Executive Magistrate, Sambalpur, in Criminal Misc. Case No. 54 of 1981 dropping the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. It appears that Rabinarayan Naik, (Criminal Revision No. 433/85) filed a petition to institute a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of Ac. 2.46 decimals of Land appertaining to Khata No. 113 of village Laida and hence Criminal Mise. Case No. 54 of 1981 was instituted. Sahadev Naik filed a petition supported by an affidavit and prayed for initiation of the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of Ac 0.17 decimals of land appertaining to Khata No. 194 of village laida and hence Criminal Misc. case No. 55 of 1981 was instituted. Kuntala Kumari Naik and Sahadev Naik filed a petition supported by an affidavit and prayed for initiation of the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of Ac. 2.02 decimals of land appertaining to Khata No. 113 of village Laida and hence Criminal Misc. Case No. 53 of 1981 was instituted. It may be mentioned that Sahadev Naik is the son of Uderam Naik and Kuntala Kumari Naik is the wife of Sahadev Naik and Rabinarayan Naik is the son of Shahadev Naik. Thus, the members of the first party in all the three Misc. Cases belong to the same family. The members of the first party in all the three Mise. Cases claimed that Dhanurjaya and janmajay sold the lands in question in their favour under different sale deeds and hence, they have been possessing the same. As common questions of law and fact are involved, all the three Mise. Cases were taken up together and a common order was passed. In order to avoid technicality, three revisions have been filed against three Misc. Cases, although the order impugned is the same. 3. The case of the first party in all the three Misc. Cases is that Jadunath Naik had four sons, namely, Panika, Ghanashyam, Kalanath and Sahadev. After the death of jadunath Naik, his sons effected a partition of the ancestral lands in 1930 into four shares and each son got one share and possessed the same separately and in his own right, title and interest. Ghanashyam had three sons, namely, Badrinarayan, Dhanurjaya and janmajay. After the death of jadunath Naik, his sons effected a partition of the ancestral lands in 1930 into four shares and each son got one share and possessed the same separately and in his own right, title and interest. Ghanashyam had three sons, namely, Badrinarayan, Dhanurjaya and janmajay. Badrinarayan was adopted by Panika Naik. As a result of this, Dhanurjaya and Janmajaya inherited the properties left by Ghanashyam Nayak after his death. After the death of Dhanurjaya and janmajay, their sons possessed the lands failing to the share of their branch jointly and they sold the lands in dispute to the members of the first party by different registered sale deeds and 'gave delivery' of possession of the same and since the date of the sale, the first party members claimed that they have remained in actual physical possession of the lands in question. The first party members asserted that the members of the Sectionond party have no manner of right, title and interest over the lands in question, but they created disturbances over the peaceful possession of the first party and gave threats to the first party members. In such circumstances, the first party members prayed or initiation of the proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. The case of the Sectionond party is that Jadunath Nail has left properties in three villages namely, laida, Manikmunda and Langbahal. During the life time of Jadunath Naik, his sons made an admissible settlement and divided the lands of the three villages amongst themselves. Subsequently, for the purpose of convenience of the cultivation, the sons of Jadunath Naik made mutual exchange of lands and according to this arrangement, the sons of Ghanshyam got lands at Langbahal and they also settled at langbahal permanently and cultivated their lands. The Sectionond party members asserted that the successors-in-interest of Dhanurjaya and Janmajay do not possess any land at village laida and Manikmunda and they also do not reside at laida. In such circumstances, the vendors of the first party do not have any saleable right over the lands in question and even if they have executed a registered sale-deed in respect of the lands in question, that is only paper transaction. The Sectionond party members further assert that in the subsequent amicable settlement the father of the Sectionond party member Ukia Naik got the lands at Laida and Mamkmunda and possessed the same. The Sectionond party members further assert that in the subsequent amicable settlement the father of the Sectionond party member Ukia Naik got the lands at Laida and Mamkmunda and possessed the same. Sahadev Naik father of Ukia Naik gifted away some lands including the lands in dispute in favour of the Sectionond party members Ukia Naik by executing a registered deed of gift and Ukia Naik claimed that since then she has been in possession of the lands in question in her own right, title and interest. 5. The learned Executive Magistrate after considering the relevant materials on record gave a clear finding that there was no apprehension of breach of peace in respect of the disputed attached lands and Ghara Bari. The learned Executive Magistrate also gave a finding that there is ample evidence in proof of actual physical possession of Ukia Naik Sectionond party member and the evidence on behalf of the first party in regard to their possession is not convincing. The learned Executive Magistrate also gave the finding that the properties in question are still having joint status and those are joint family properties and hence, the proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure are not maintainable. 6. The learned advocate for the Petitioners argued that as the preliminary order in the proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure was drawn up on the basis of the fact that there was apprehension of breach of peace, the said order must be deemed to be continuing to disposal of the proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure He also argued that the finding of the learned Executive Magistrate that the lands in question were still joint family properties and were being possessed by the members of the joint family is not the case of the either parties and lienee, it is a third case and so that finding is not tenable. The learned advocate for the opposite parties argued that even though the preliminary order in the proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure was drawn up on the basis of the tact that there is apprehension of breach of peace, still the Court was called upon to give a finding to that effect in the final order, provided the existence of the apprehension of breach of peace is challenged. He also argued that the existence of the apprehension of breach of peace is a jurisdictional fact and once the Court comes to a finding that there is no apprehension of breach of peace, the Court cannot give a decision on the question of possession and such decision, if any, is without jurisdiction. 7. In a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Gajraj and Others Vs. Collector Singh, it has been clearly held that when a party to the proceeding u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure raises a plea under Sub-Section (5) that to dispute exists or has existed, that plea cannot be rejected because the Magistrate had arrived at the conclusion under Sub-Section (1) of Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace. It has also been held in the above Allahabad High Court decision that where after a preliminary order a party to the proceeding raises a plea and adduces evidence that no dispute exists or existed, the Magistrate cannot proceed to pass a final order without considering die plea and milking an order in respect thereof. It has also been held in the same decision that if a definite plea is taken in the written statement that likelihood of breach of peace never existed, the Magistrate is bound to give a decision on that plea on the basis of materials on record. In the Magistrate decided that likelihood of breach of peace and existed or exists, his jurisdiction derived at the stage of Section 145(1) will continue and he might decide the question of possession or do any other thing warranted under law. If on the other hand, the Executive Magistrate finds that the likelihood of apprehension of breach of peace had never existed or does not exist his jurisdiction to decide to question of possession himself or to refer the case to the Civil Court, both come to an end and final order passed in such circumstances in respect of possession will be without jurisdiction. Thus, the decision as to whether there is existence of apprehension of breach of peace or not is a jurisdiction fact and if the decision is to the effect that there is existence of breach of peace, there is jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate to decide the question of possession and if on the other hand there is a decision that there was never or there is no existence of apprehension of breach of peace, the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate to decide the question of possession ceases. 8. In this particular case the Sectionond party in their written statement have taken a definite plea in para-14 that they are in peaceful possession of the disputed attached lands without any disturbance from any quarter and there is absolutely no apprehension of breach of place. In the evidence also some witnesses have stated that there was no disturbances in respect If the suit lands at any point of time and Ukia Naik is in possession of the suit lands since 30 years. Thus, a definite plea has been taken in the written statement by the Sectionond party that there is no apprehension of breach of peace and at the same time there is also evidence to that effect. The learned Executive Magistrate discussed all the relevant materials on record and give a finding that there was no apprehension of breach of peace in respect of the disputed attached lands and Ghara Bari. In view of the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court (supra), the learned Executive Magistrate cannot decide the question of possession after such a definite finding that there was no apprehension of breach of peace in respect of the disputed attached lands and Ghara Bari and hence the decision on the question of possession and also the finding that the disputed properties are joint family properties must be held to be without jurisdiction. 9. The question as to whether there is existence of apprehension of breach of peace is a matter which depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the Executive Magistrate and the decision d the Executive Magistrate in that regard cannot be interfered with in revision. 10. In the circumstances discussed above, all the three Misc. Cases i.e. Misc. Case Nos. 9. The question as to whether there is existence of apprehension of breach of peace is a matter which depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the Executive Magistrate and the decision d the Executive Magistrate in that regard cannot be interfered with in revision. 10. In the circumstances discussed above, all the three Misc. Cases i.e. Misc. Case Nos. 53, 54 and 55 of 1981 u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure have been rightly dropped and I do not find any reason to interfere with the same. 11. In the result, there is no merit in all the three revision petitions Nos. 433, 437 and 438 of 1985 and the same are dismissed and the impugned order dated 3-7-1985 is upheld. Revisions dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed