S. C. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) DEFENDANT Nos. 3 and 5 to 7 are the appellants in this First Appeal since purchases by defendant Nos. 3 to 7 under Exts. A and B have been declared by the trial Court to be invalid. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF No. 1 is the mother and natural guardian of plaintiff No. 2. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are members of the joint family of which plaintiffs are also members as per the following genealogy ( 3 ) PLAINTIFF Nos. I and 2 and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are members of the Scheduled Tribe and are Hindus governed by Mitakshara School of Law. They possess rayati lands and Choukidar Service lands. On abolition of services by the Orissa Village Services Abolition Act, 1964 with effect from 1-5-1965, the service tenure lands vested in the State Government and were settled with plaintiff No. 2 and. defendant No. 1 in respect of some portions and with defendant No. 2 in respect of some other portions. ( 4 ) CASE of the plaintiffs is that defendant No. 1 committed fraud and got a sale deed (Ext. A) executed and registered from plaintiff No. 1 for herself and on behalf of her minor son in respect of rayati lands as mentioned therein on 10-5-1966 in favour of defendant Nos. 3 to 7 which is neither for consideration nor for legal necessity. Similarly, he got another sale deed executed in favour of defendant Nos. 3 to 7 in respect of some lands settled on plaintiff No. 2 on 18-9-1970 without consideration and legal necessity. Besides, such sales are invalid without sanction of the competent court of law under S. 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act as well as under S. 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act. On the basis of these sale deeds when defendants created disturbance in possession of the plaintiffs in the year 1972, suit was filed for partition of the suit lands in Schedules A, B-2 and B 3 lands in three equal shares by setting aside the sale transactions. ( 5 ) DEFENDANT No. 1 filed a written statement. Defendant No. 7 filed a separate written statement, Case of defendant No. 1 is that plaintiff No. 2 was born after death of his father and defendant No. 1 became the Choukidar. ( 5 ) DEFENDANT No. 1 filed a written statement. Defendant No. 7 filed a separate written statement, Case of defendant No. 1 is that plaintiff No. 2 was born after death of his father and defendant No. 1 became the Choukidar. There was previous partition and sales were for legal necessity and consideration without any coercion or undue influence. Defendant No. 7 asserted that he enquired about the legal necessity and paying the consideration purchased the lands and is in possession of the same. ( 6 ) TRIAL Court on assessment of evidence found that there was no fraud, coercion or undue influence, these sale deeds are without consideration and there was no legal necessity. Both the sale transactions are invalid under S. 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Ext. A is invalid under S. 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act. It held that Choukidari Bhogra Lands have been partitioned between defendant No. 1 and plaintiff No. 2. Accordingly, it decreed the suit for partition of `a' Schedule rayati lands. ( 7 ) PLAINTIFFS and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have not assailed the decree. Defendant Nos. 3 and 5 to 7 have filed this appeal with regard to the setting aside of sale deeds Exhibits A and B. ( 8 ) MR. R. C. Rath, learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that findings of the trial Court are neither supportable in law or on fact. Let me examine the legal position first. ( 9 ) TRIAL Court held the sales are invalid under Sec. 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Admittedly, vendors under Exts. A and B are members of the Scheduled Tribe. Section 3 (2) of the said Act provides that the Act shall not apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe unless the Central Government otherwise directs by notification. No such direction has been filed in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Rath is correct in his submission that trial Court erred in law in finding that the sale transactions are invalid under the said Act. ( 10 ) NEXT question of law is whether sale deed Ext. A dt, 10-5-1966 is invalid under S. 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act. There is no dispute that defendant Nos. 3 to 7 in whose favour transfer has been made under Ext. A do not belong to Scheduled Tribe. ( 10 ) NEXT question of law is whether sale deed Ext. A dt, 10-5-1966 is invalid under S. 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act. There is no dispute that defendant Nos. 3 to 7 in whose favour transfer has been made under Ext. A do not belong to Scheduled Tribe. It is also not in dispute that there is no previous permission in writing from the Revenue Officer in respect of such transfer. Section 22 (1) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act provides that unless the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied, the transfer shall be void. In case Civil Court can entertain the question, there is no doubt that the sale is void. However, language of S. 22 (1) is that the transfer shall be void. The word 'shall' in S. 22 (1) means that the same shall be void on an enquiry. This is clear from Ss. 23 (1) and (2) where the Revenue Officer has been vested with power to declare a transfer in contravention of the provisions of S. 22 (1) after giving opportunity to the transferor and the transferee and making the necessary enquiry. It is, no doubt true that Revenue Officer has no discretion other than declaring the transfer invalid even if the language of S. 23 (2) is 'may declare'. The word `may' has been used to denote that in case it finds on enquiry that the provisions of S. 22 (1) have been satisfied, it will not declare the transfer invalid. On declaration, such transfer becomes void ab initio and Revenue Officer is vested with power to cause restoration of the transferred property either to the transferor or his heirs and for the purpose may take steps as may be necessary for compliance with the order of restoration or prevents breach of peace as provided in S. 23 (3 ). However, if in opinion of the Revenue Officer such restoration is not reasonably practicable, he has been empowered to settle the property with another member of a Scheduled Tribe as provided in S. 23 (3), Proviso. Order under S. 23 (2) declaring a transfer invalid or imposing penalty is subject to right of appeal under S. 58. Although there is no right of appeal against an order under S. 23 (3) of Proviso thereof, the same can be revised as provided in S. 59 (2 ). Order under S. 23 (2) declaring a transfer invalid or imposing penalty is subject to right of appeal under S. 58. Although there is no right of appeal against an order under S. 23 (3) of Proviso thereof, the same can be revised as provided in S. 59 (2 ). ( 11 ) WITH such exhaustive provisions in the Orissa Land Reforms Act, S. 67 provides for bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts to try and decide a suit so far as it relates to any matter which any officer or other competent authority is empowered by or under the Act to decide. Section 9, C. P. C. provides that a Civil Court cannot take cognizance of a suit which is expressly barred. Section 67 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act having provided express bar, Civil Court cannot declare a transfer in contravention of S. 22 (1) of the Act invalid. Setting aside a sale deed is possible only after finding that S. 22 (1) has been contravened. The word 'void' in S. 22 (1) does not mean that it is not necessary to be avoided. As provided in S. 23, the same is to be avoided. The Civil Court cannot try and decide the suit with regard to the question whether the sale deed in question shall be void under S. 22 (1) since Revenue Officer has been empowered to decide the said question. ( 12 ) EVEN though there is an express bar to suit under S. 67 of the Act, Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine whether the statutory authority has decided the question in accordance with the Statute as has been laid down in the Full Bench decision of this Court, reported in ILR (1975) Cut 789 (Mangulu v. Bhagaban ). It cannot, however, substitute its own views as an appellate Court. Civil Court on finding that the decision is not in conformity with the Statute or is not based on sound judicial determination can direct that authority to decide the question afresh by invalidating the order impugned. For this purpose, the authority whose decision is subject-matter of consideration by the Civil Court is to be given an opportunity of being heard by making him a party. This bar, however, would not be attracted where the transaction is void and is not required by law to be avoided. For this purpose, the authority whose decision is subject-matter of consideration by the Civil Court is to be given an opportunity of being heard by making him a party. This bar, however, would not be attracted where the transaction is void and is not required by law to be avoided. ( 13 ) ON the aforesaid analysis, it is clear that trial Court was not competent to set aside the sale deed (Ext. A) on the ground that it has contravened S. 22 (1) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act. If that would have been the only ground, I would have remitted the matter back to the trial Court to stay the suit giving opportunity to the plaintiffs to approach the Revenue authorities. However, trial Court held that the sale deed was not supported by consideration and was not for legal necessity. ( 14 ) AS regards validity of transfer under Ext. A trial Court held that there was no consideration and there was no legal necessity. Exhibit A has been executed by all the persons interested in the property. Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and plaintiff No. 1 for herself and her minor son. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have not challenged the passing of consideration. Trial Court held for cogent reasons that there was no fraud, undue influence or coercion. In the circumstances when all the members of the joint family transferred their interests jointly and plaintiff No. 1 alone challenges absence of consideration, I am not inclined to hold that there was no consideration for the sale when the document itself indicates that it was for consideration and defendant No. 1 asserts that he has received the consideration. His evidence that after receipt of the consideration the same was divided cannot be disbelieved in absence of effective cross-examination. Accordingly, I am not inclinned to accept the finding of the trial Court in this regard and hold that Ext. A was for consideration. ( 15 ) AS regards legal necessity for the transfer, interest of plaintiff No. 2 who is a minor would not be affected if there is no legal necessity or in case the transfer is not for the benefit of the estate. There is no case of benefit to the estate. As regards legal necessity, defendant No. 1 stated that there was legal necessity. There is no case of benefit to the estate. As regards legal necessity, defendant No. 1 stated that there was legal necessity. No doubt, the alienees are to prove either that there was legal necessity or that they enquired to find that there was legal necessity. Defendant No. 1 represented to defendant No. 7 that there was legal necessity. On the face of the finding that the transaction was not tainted with fraud, undue influence or coercion, defendant Nos. 3 to 7 cannot suffer if on the representation of the respondent No. 1 they believed that sale was effected for discharge of loan, purchase of seeds and other cultivation expenses. Accordingly, I am not inclined to accept the finding of the trial Court in this regard and hold that there was legal necessity which would bind plaintiff No. 2. ( 16 ) ON the aforesaid discussion, I am inclined to find that Ext. A is not otherwise invalid which shall be subject to Ss. 22 and 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act. ( 17 ) AS regards Ext. B dt. 16-9-1970, there is permission from the Revenue Officer under S. 22 of the O. L. R. Act. Thereafter under Ext. B relates to land of defendant No. 1 and plaintiff No. 2, plaintiff No. 1 has executed the sale deed on behalf of minor plaintiff No. 1. Sale was for discharge of loan which was a liability of the minor. If this is proved, there would be legal necessity for the sale under Ext. B. Defendant No. 1 represented to the purchasers that there was legal necessity. They believed in it and purchased. Plaintiff No. 1 also represented to the Revenue Officer that transfer is necessary for discharge of loan and the Revenue Officer while giving permission in writing stated in the order that the transfer is sought for to discharge loan. There is no assertion in the plaint that mark of plaintiff No. 2 in the application for permission was obtained by fraud. When much before the transaction plaintiff No. 1 as another-guardian gave out that transfer was required for discharge of loan which also finds place in the order of the Revenue Officer, I am inclined to hold that the transfer was for legal necessity. For the reasons stated an respect of Ext. A, I am also inclined to hold that Ext. B was for consideration. For the reasons stated an respect of Ext. A, I am also inclined to hold that Ext. B was for consideration. ( 18 ) IN the result, First Appeal is allowed in part so far as Ext. B. Suit is remitted back to the trial Court to give opportunity to the parties to produce evidence that the sale under Ext. A has been declared invalid by the Revenue Officer. No costs. Appeal allowed in part.