JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - These two second appeals arise out of two cross suits nos. 148 of 1977 and 29 of 1978. Suit no. 148 of 1977 was filed by Mohd. Yusuf, the respondents in these two appeals while suit no. 29 of 1978 was instituted by Ali Mohammad, the appellant. The trial court dismissed the suit of Mohd. Yusuf and decreed the filed by Ali Mohammad. Two appeals were thereupon filed against the decrees passed by the trial court. The lower appellate court has by the impugned judgment allowed both the appeals decreeing the suit filed by Mohd. Yusuf and dismissing that filed by Ali Mohammad. Hence these second appeals by Ali Mohammad. Two appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. In suit no. 148 of 1977 instituted on December 16, 1977 the plaint case set up by Mohd. Yusuf was that the four shops in suit and the business carried on therein was the joint property and ventures of himself and Ali Mohammad, though it is Ali Mahammad and his sons who were looking after the businesses. However, Mohd. Yusuf discovered recently that the income from these businesses was being misappropriated and misutilised by Ali Mohammad and his sons and consequently, he wants that a proper accounting be done and he be given his half share therein. A relief for partition of the land and the shops was also claimed. 3. Suit no. 29 of 1978 was filed on February 22, 1978 on the allegation that in 1978 differences arose between the female members of the two families as a result of which they separated in business. The family business which was continuing from the lift time jointly continued notwithstanding the separation in mess. A little later in 1971, Ali Mohammad with the help of the money obtained from the sale of the jewellery of his wife who had died and the loan raised from relations and money lenders, Ali Mohammad took a piece of land on a monthly rental of Rs. 5.00 constructed a building thereon and installed an oil speller and a thrasher and started an independent business with the help of the machinery so installed. So far as the ancestral business was concerned, Ali Mohammad asked his son to look after his interest therein. Taking advantage of his inexperience and tender age of Ali Mohammad's son Mohd. 5.00 constructed a building thereon and installed an oil speller and a thrasher and started an independent business with the help of the machinery so installed. So far as the ancestral business was concerned, Ali Mohammad asked his son to look after his interest therein. Taking advantage of his inexperience and tender age of Ali Mohammad's son Mohd. Yusuf started misappropriating the income from the ancestral business. Ali Mohammad thereupon demanded an accounting of the income from that business. After accounting a memorandum was prepared according to which the share of Ali Mohammad worked out to Rs. 11400.00 which Mohd. Yusuf promised to give within a month. Mohd. Yusuf, however, did not honour his commitment where upon suit no. 29 of 1978 was filed for a decree for Rs. 11400.00. 4. The defence of Mohd. Yusuf in Ali Mohammad's suit was the plaint case set up in bis own suit no. 148 of 1977. In addition it was pleaded by Mohd. Yusuf that no accounting was done nor was memorandum alleged by Ali Mohammad prepared. It was further pleaded that the land, oil speller and the thrasher installed thereon together with the business being carried on in respect thereof were of joint property and business of All Mohammad and Mohd. Yusuf but all the business including these were being looked after by Ali Mohd. and his sons but the income accruing therefrom was being misappropriated by the father and the sons. 5. The learned Civil Judge trying the two suits together accepted the case of Ali Mohammad. He held that the oil speller and the thrasher together with the land on which the same were installed were the exclusive property and business of Ali Mohammad. He further found that a memorandum was executed between the parties after the accounting under which Ali Mohammad was held entitled to receive Rs. 11400.00. On these findings the trial court decreed the suit filed by Ali Mohammad and dismissed that of Mohd. Yusuf. 6. The lower appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court. On a careful and exhaustive consideration of the entire evidence as well as all the relevant facts emerging therefrom, the lower appellate court accepted the case of Mohd. Yusuf and disbelieved Ali Mohammad's version of facts. 7. For the appellant the main point urged was that Mohd. Yusuf. 6. The lower appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court. On a careful and exhaustive consideration of the entire evidence as well as all the relevant facts emerging therefrom, the lower appellate court accepted the case of Mohd. Yusuf and disbelieved Ali Mohammad's version of facts. 7. For the appellant the main point urged was that Mohd. Yusuf not having pleaded that the land was acquired benami on his behalf in the name of Smt. Fatima, the lower appellate court committed serious error of law in holding that the land was acquired by both Ali Mohammad and Mohd. Yusuf. In support, learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1980 Supreme Court 1040 and submitted that the benami nature of a transaction has to be specifically pleaded and proved by the person with sets up that plea. 8. Having given the submission a careful consideration I find it difficult to accept it. Mohd. Yusuf has specifically pleaded in paragraph 3 of the plaint that the land in dispute was acquired under two pattas (lease deeds) executed on October 4, 1971 and December 31, 1971 by Saiyad Ali Afsad in favour of Ali Mohammad and himself (Mohd. Yusuf) in the name of his wife Smt. Fatima on an annual rental of Rs. 5.00 and thereafter after getting the map of the proposed building sanctioned by the Town Area, the parties built a Pukka construction over the same in which they started their business jointly. In this connection it must be remembered that the pleadings have to be read liberally and broadly and not in a narrow, pedantic way. The consistent view of all the High Courts is that one should not be hyper-technical in construing the pleadings. And if the pleadings of Mohd. Yusuf are read in a broad way, there is no manner of doubt that the plea that the land was acquired on his behalf benami in the name of his wife, is clearly there in the plaint. The parties also understood it that way. The foundation for such a plea having been unmistakably laid in the plaint, the lower appellate court committed no error in recording a finding in favour of Mohd. Yusuf. In his statement, Mohd. The parties also understood it that way. The foundation for such a plea having been unmistakably laid in the plaint, the lower appellate court committed no error in recording a finding in favour of Mohd. Yusuf. In his statement, Mohd. Yusuf categorically asserted that the land was acquired under the aforesaid two lease deeds by Ali Mohammad and himself in the name of his wife Fatima. He has further asserted that though the name of his wife Fatima was shown in the papers, the money for acquisition of the land was provided by himself. In regard to the building standing thereon also he has said that the requisite money of his share was provided by him though in the sanctioned map and the receipt the name of his wife Fatima was shown. The Court below has believed the statement of Mohd. Yusuf. 9. The submission, therefore, that the finding of the lower appellate court is contrary to the pleadings of the parties or that the evidence led by Mohd. Yusuf was inconsistent with his pleadings is clearly untenable and must be rejected. 10. In this connection, it is necessary to mention that the issue relating to the ownership of the land was one essentially of fact and has been discussed by the lower appellate court elaborately in paragraphs 8 to 11 of its judgment. The learned Judge has observed that whereas Mohd. Yusuf specifically mentioned about the two pattas dated October 4, 1971 and December 31, 1971 in the plaint in support of his claim that the property was joint and also produced the scribe and the marginal witnesses of the two pattas to corroborate his version, significantly Ali Mohammad neither mentioned about the date of the patta in the two notices that were given on his behalf prior to the institution of his suit or even in the written statement filed by him in Mohd. Yusuf's suit. The lower appellate court has further observed that no independent or reliable evidence apart from his own interested testimony was adduced by Ali Mohammad on this point. Yusuf's suit. The lower appellate court has further observed that no independent or reliable evidence apart from his own interested testimony was adduced by Ali Mohammad on this point. Yet another significant fact noticed by the lower appellate court was the absence of any mention in the memorandum of settlement filed by Ali Mohammad in his suit about the exclusive acquisition of land, though there is a mention of machinery installed over this land as well as the business carried thereon as belonging exclusively to Ali Mohammad. The plea of Ali Mohammad that the original lease deed granted in his favour was with Mohd. Yusuf has been disbelieved by the lower appellate court as totally unworthy of reliance. 11. On the basis of these facts and circumstances and the inconsistencies inherent in the evidence led on behalf of Ali Mohammad the lower appellate court has rejected the case set up by him as completely unreliable. It has, on the other hand, accepted the case of Mohd. Yusuf of joint acquisition under the two pattas by himself in the name of his wife Fatima and Ali Mohammad and inasmuch as the finding is based on evidence, it cannot be reviewed in a second appeal. 12. Be that as it may, there two pattas accepted by the lower appellate court as genuine, conclusively demolished Ali Mohammad's case of the land having been acquired exclusively. 13. The above discussion also furnishes an answer to the criticism made by the learned counsel for the appellant in regard to the receipt and the sanctioned map issued by the Town Area (Exhs. 3 and 4) in which again the name of both Ali Mohammad and Fatima have been mentioned. Here again the finding of the lower appellate court is based on specific plea taken by Mohd. Yusuf in the plaint that though the name of Fatima appears in these papers, it was he who had got the map sanctioned along with Ali Mohammad. As the name of Fatima appeared in the lease deeds, it is not surprising that in the receipt issued for sanction of the map for the construction of the building standing on the disputed land was also shown together with that of Ali Mohammad. As the name of Fatima appeared in the lease deeds, it is not surprising that in the receipt issued for sanction of the map for the construction of the building standing on the disputed land was also shown together with that of Ali Mohammad. The lower appellate court hence committed no error in relying on these two papers in support of its finding that the building standing over the land was constructed jointly by Ali Mohammad and Mohd. Yusuf. 14. Another submission urged by the learned counsel was that the lower appellate court committed an error in not giving the due importance to the supposed admission made by Mohd. Yusuf in his statement to the effect that the persons whose name appear in the pattas are owners of the disputed land. 15. I have already made comments in detail about the significance of the mention of the name of Fatima in these pattas. The categorical statement of Mohd. Yusuf was that the patta was acquired jointly by Ali Mohammad and himself though the name of Fatima was shown on his behalf. The lower appellate court has believed the evidence of Mohd. Yusuf on this point. The stray sentence in the statement of Mohd. Yusuf that the owners of the land are the persons whose names appear in the pattas has to be read and understood in the context of his entire statement. In any case, it was no body's case that the land was acquired by Ali Mohammad and Fatima. In this view, the stray sentence pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant in the statement of Mohd. Yusuf does not have this fact of producing any substantial error of law. 16. The next submission of the learned counsel was that the finding of the lower appellate court in regard to the joint-ness of the business being carried on over the disputed land suffers from a substantial error of law is that it has omitted to consider material facts and circumstances relying on which the trial court had come to a different conclusion. 17. The submission is devoid of any substance. In the first place the lower appellate court has considered every single circumstance relevant to the issue. To start with it has found that the land and the building standing thereon are joint and not exclusively that of Ali Mohammad. 17. The submission is devoid of any substance. In the first place the lower appellate court has considered every single circumstance relevant to the issue. To start with it has found that the land and the building standing thereon are joint and not exclusively that of Ali Mohammad. It has also taken into account the fact, on which learned counsel placed strong reliance that in the various papers pertaining to the business including the electric connection, the license and the receipts of the machinery etc. the name of Ali Mohammad alone appears. It has, however, explained for valid reasons why these papers do not have the decisive value, in that they do not conclusively prove that the business was exclusively that of Ali Mohammad. 18. It is apparent from a bare perusal of the judgment that all material facts have been noticed by the lower appellate court elaborately in paragraphs 16 to 23 of the judgment. It is, therefore, impossible to hold that the court has omitted to consider any material fact worthy of note. 19. Secondly, as has been ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of K. Rama Chandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam 1963 S.C. 302, even prior to the amendment of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure that if the lower appellate court does not specifically reverse any reasoning adopted by the trial court that would not produce any error or defect in procedure so as to warrant interference, in a second appeal After the amendment the scope of interference in a second appeal under Section 100 has been restricted further and is now confined only to substantial error of law. Even if, therefore, in the present case the lower appellate court did not specifically refer to any reasoning that found favour with the trial court, the same cannot be said to have produced any substantial error of law as in my opinion, the finding of the lower appellate court is based on consideration of all the relevant and material facts and circumstances. The lower appellate court has considered inter alia the statement of the witnesses examined on behalf of Ali Mohammad as regards the source from which money was alleged to have been raised by him and rejected the same on the ground that it was unworthy of reliance. The lower appellate court has considered inter alia the statement of the witnesses examined on behalf of Ali Mohammad as regards the source from which money was alleged to have been raised by him and rejected the same on the ground that it was unworthy of reliance. The criticism of the judgment of the lower appellate court, therefore, that it did not take into account all the material facts and circumstances is clearly unjustified. 20. Learned next submitted relying on 1983 S.C. 114 and J.T. 1988 (3) S.C. 593 (Judgment's Today) in support of his contention that where the case turns on the appreciation of oral evidence, the appellate court ought not to interfere with the conclusion of fact recorded by the trial court unless the conclusions are perverse. The decision cited by the learned counsel lend no support to his submission. In the present case the decision of the court below turned not merely on oral evidence but on over all assessment of both oral and documentary evidence led by the parties as well as the circumstances emerging therefrom. As a court of fact the lower appellate court, in my opinion, was free to come on its own conclusions on the evidence led by the parties. Further as as mentioned above the grounds set out by the lower appellate court for differing with the trial court are all cogent and rational not producing any error of law much less a substantial error of law. 21. Sri R.N. Singh also cited a few decisions on how the benami nature of a transaction ought to be proved. It is, however, not necessary to refer to them as in my opinion, the main point at issue was whether the land was exclusive acquisition of Ali Mohammad under the lease set up by or it was jointly acquired under the pattas set forth by Mohd. Yusuf. There was no third case before the courts below-that of joint acquisition by Ali Mohammad and Fatima. In any case, the legal requirement as to the pleading and the nature of evidence in proof of the benami nature of the acquisition was fully complied with. 22. That brings me finally to the issue of memorandum of settlement under which Ali Mohammad asserted that he was entitled to receive Rs. 1,400.00 as his share. In any case, the legal requirement as to the pleading and the nature of evidence in proof of the benami nature of the acquisition was fully complied with. 22. That brings me finally to the issue of memorandum of settlement under which Ali Mohammad asserted that he was entitled to receive Rs. 1,400.00 as his share. The lower appellate court has dealt with this aspect elaborately including the report of the expert and has given cogent reasons for rejecting the testimony of Abdul Majid, the brother in law of Ali Mohammad with regard to the genuineness of the memorandum of settlement. He has also considered the expert's evidence on this point. The issue whether the memorandum of settlement set up by Ali Mohammad was genuine or not was also a pure issue of fact and the finding of the lower appellate court in respect of the same not having been demonstrated to be vitiated by any error of law, I see no ground for interfering with the conclusion reached by the lower appellate court. 23. In the result, both the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.