BALAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the I Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 244 of 1980 dated 11-12-1985 setting aside the order of the I Additional I Munsiff, Bangalore, in Misc. No. 435 of 1975 dated 25-8-1980 dismissing the petition for restitution of the immovable property. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY set out, the following are the material facts: - sheik Hyder @ Ameer Sab sued and obtained a judgment and decree against the father of Syed Nazir Sab, Syed Kalaq, Syed gaffar, Abidabi and Salihabi in O. S. No. 899 of 1954. In pursuance of the decree, a house property was brought to sale in Court auction in Execution Case No. 867 of 1955. The property was purchased by Mir Fatheulla @ babajan. Meanwhile, the father of Syed nazir Sab and four others demised and the children were brought on record as legal representatives and the application filed by them for setting aside the sale was in vain. Thereupon, they preferred an appeal to the Civil judge and the order was set aside and the matter came to be remanded. On remand, the Court confirmed the sale. The order of confirmation was the subject-matter of challenge before this Court in C. R. P. No. 269 of 1959 and the impugned order was set aside and the case was remanded for fresh disposal. During the pendency of the said c. R. P. , Mir Fatheulla took delivery of the property on 12-8-1959 and was also recovering the rent thereafter. Govindaraju, rasheed, Parusab and Mastan Sab were the tenants in respect of the said property. Thus, it is seen that the sale transaction stood confirmed through out the litigation. In the appeal preferred to the I Additional City Civil judge, Bangalore City, in M. A. No. 244 of 1980, the appellants therein maintained that they are entitled to restitution of the property. The appellants filed an application under section 144 read with Section 151 of the c. P. C. for an order directing Mir Fatheulla to re-deliver the property to the appellants and also to pay mesne profits. The said petition which is Misc. 270 of 1971 was posted on 5-1-1973 for evidence and it was dismissed for default. A miscellaneous application was filed'in Misc. The said petition which is Misc. 270 of 1971 was posted on 5-1-1973 for evidence and it was dismissed for default. A miscellaneous application was filed'in Misc. No. 41 of 1973 under Order 9, rule 8 of the C. P. C. for restoration. On 10- 10-1975, Misc. No. 41 of 1973 was dismissed on the ground that the proceeding under section 144 of the C. P. C. is an execution proceeding and that an application for restoration is not maintainable. Subsequently, the appellants filed a petition on 28-11-1975 and evidence was recorded. The I Additional I Munsiff, Bangalore, held after trial that the application filed on 28-11-1975 is barred by time and dismissed the petition. It is against that order that the appeal was preferred before the I Additional City Civil judge at Bangalore City in M. A. No. 244 of 1980. The Court of appeal set aside the impugned order by allowing the appeal and remanded the case to the trial Court with a direction that the application should be disposed of in accordance with law and the order was passed on 11-12-1985. It is against this order, this appeal is preferred. ( 3 ) THE point for consideration is whether the order of the lower appellate Court in holding that the period of limitation is 12 years in respect of an application filed under section 144 of the C. P. C. for restitution of property is liable to be set aside. ( 4 ) THE application for restitution was filed under Section 144 of the C. P. C. on 4-11-1971 and as on 1971 Section 144 (1) of the C. P. C. provides as hereunder:- "where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed, the Court of first instance shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed; and, for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation or reversal". By Amendment Act of 1976, Section 144 (1) of the C. P. C. as amended reads as follows:-"where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree or order shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified; and, for this purpose, the Court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or order. " ( 5 ) IT is, therefore, seen that both under section 144 of the C. P. C. prior to amendment in 1976 and subsequent to the amendment, restitution application was provided both against a decree and order passed by the Court of first instance. In the instant case, what is questioned is an order and not a decree and the application for restitution is in respect of immovable property. The property was brought to sale after attachment in the course of execution proceedings and, thereafter, the sale was confirmed by the executing Court. The appellant is only a purchaser in Court auction. The lower appellate Court took the view that the application for restitution was filed under Section 144 of the C. P. C. and not under Section 151 of the C. P. C. It, therefore, came to the conclusion that, in so far as limitation is concerned, what is applicable is 12 years of limitation and not 3 years under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. I do not see any error in the finding of the lower appellate Court. I do not see any error in the finding of the lower appellate Court. When there is a specific provision provided for restitution of property under Section 144 of the C. P. C. , it is unnecessary to make an application under Section 151 of the C. P. C. The provision of Section 151 of the C. P. C. is intended to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in the absence of a specific provision affording the necessary legal remedy. Since Section 144 of the C. P. C. affords the remedy of restitution and an application is made thereunder, there is no merit in the argument that it is an application filed under Section 151 of the C. P. C. and that article 137 of the Limitation Act is attracted. Since Section 144 of the C. P. C. is the provision under which the application for restitution was filed, it would be wrong to compute the period of limitation by applying article 137 of the Limitation Act. It only caters to situations of residuary nature for the purpose of limitation. ( 6 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. ( 7 ) IT was brought to my notice by the learned counsel appearing for respondents-2 to 5 that the case has been renumbered as misc. 889 of 1987 and is pending in Court hall No. 10 of the City Civil Court, Bangalore. Since the order of the lower appellate Court stands confirmed, it is hereby directed that the City Civil Court (Court Hall no. 10), Bangalore, shall dispose of Misc. 889 of 1987 on merits and in accordance with law within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Petition allowed. --- *** --- .