K. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack, convicting appellants Ganesh and Sanatan under Section 302 and sentencing both of them to undergo imprisonment for life, and the other appellants under Sections 147 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. ( 2 ) PROSECUTION case may be stated in brief. The appellants on one side and the deceased, his brother (P. W. l) and other members of their family on the other, had enmity and litigations. The appellants had been convicted previously in sessions case for an offence under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code when they had attempted to commits the murder of the elder brother of the father of P. W. 1 and the deceased. They had also previously assaulted the deceased for which G. R. Case No. 1053 of 1979 was initiated on 24. 10. 1979. In that case they were released on bail on 11. 5. 1981. The occurrence took place on 13-5-1981 at about 4 p. m. The appellants and seven others formed on unlawful assembly and attacked the deceased who was digging earth from the land by means of a Gainti. On being attacked, the deceased began to run. Appellant Sanatan was armed with a Tenta, appellant Ganesh was armed with an Ekmuna and the other appellants were armed with lathis. They stabbed the Tenta and Ekmuna and also assaulted the deceased by lathis, as a result of which, he died instantaneously. When P. W. 1 came to the rescue of the deceased, appellant Ganesh stabbed him with the Ekmuna and the other appellants assaulted him. In order to save his life, P. W. 1 run away. After the assault was over, the deceased was taken to Pritipur Dispensary here he was declared dead. P. W. 1 lodged First Information Report (Ext. 1) with the assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Elakunda Out-Post who come to the said dispensary. In due course, investigation commenced and the appellants and seven others were charge-sheeted. ( 3 ) THE plea of appellant Gangadhar was that while he was going to his field with manure, he was attacked by P. W. 1, deceased and others with deadly weapons, such as, Tenta and lathi and was assaulted. In due course, investigation commenced and the appellants and seven others were charge-sheeted. ( 3 ) THE plea of appellant Gangadhar was that while he was going to his field with manure, he was attacked by P. W. 1, deceased and others with deadly weapons, such as, Tenta and lathi and was assaulted. When he cried for help, his father, appellant Ganesh came to defend him and in order to save his life, he brandished a Tenta by which P. W. 1 and the deceased might have received injuries. The rest of the appellants and the other accused took the plea of alibi and false implication. ( 4 ) THE learned Additional Sessions Judge found only the appellants guilty of the offences referred to above and acquitted the rest. ( 5 ) P. W. 5 was no Medical Officer at Jaipur Sub-Rivisional Hospital. On 14-5-1981 be conducted post-mortem examination of the dead body of the deceased and found as many as eight penetrating wounds and six contusions on different parts of the body. All the injuries were ante- mortem in nature. The penetrating wounds, according to his opinion, could have been caused by sharp and pointed piercing weapons. The contusions could have been caused by hard and blunt weapons, such as, lathi iron rod or whip. Death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of the injuries. The punctured wounds together with the corresponding internal injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death of the deceased. In view of his evidence, the learned judge held that the death of the deceased was on account homicide. This finding was not challenged in appeal. ( 6 ) P. W. 6 was another Medical Officer of the Sub-Divisional Hospital, Jajpur, who examined P. W. 1 on 14-5-1981 and found five bruises and abrasions on different parts of the body, such as, head one scapula. According to mis opinion, the injuries were simple and could have been caused by hard and blunt weapons (vide injury report. Ext. 8 ). ( 7 ) D. W. 6 was the Medical Officer of Pritipur dispensary. On 13. 5-1981 he examined appellant Ganesh and found the following injuries: 1. One incised wound of the size of 1 x 1/2 over the bridge of the nose involving whole of the skin thickness which could have been caused by a sharp and pointed weapon; and 2. On 13. 5-1981 he examined appellant Ganesh and found the following injuries: 1. One incised wound of the size of 1 x 1/2 over the bridge of the nose involving whole of the skin thickness which could have been caused by a sharp and pointed weapon; and 2. One bruise of the size of 1 x 2'1 on the right scapula. According to his opinion, both the injuries were simple in nature (vide injury report Ext. J ). On the same day, he also examined appellant Gangadhar and found the following injuries: 1. One punctured wound of the size of 21/2 x 1 over the midule of the left thigh above that knee-joint. It was the entry wounds. The size of the exit wound was 11/'1 x 1/ on the front of the left thigh about 11 above the knee-joint; and 2. One lacerated wound of the size of 1/2') x 1/2 over the upper lie towards the left side which was skin deep. According to his opinion, although the injury No. 1 was simple in nature, it could have been caused by a sharp and pointed weapon. Injury No. 2 was also simple in nature and could have been caused by a hard and blunt weapon (vide injury report Ext. A ). ( 8 ) MR. J. P. Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, raised the following contentions: 1. On Account of previous enmity and past. litigations, the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 8 and 9 should be wholly discarded; 2. P. W. 2 was purely a chance witness belonging to a distant village and did not disclose about the occurrence to anyone. He was examined by the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11) seven to eight months after. His evidence, therefore, should not be taken into consideration, Similarly, the evidence of P. W. 7, who was also a chance witness belonging to a different village, should be rejected; 3. The evidence of P. Ws. 7 to 10 deserves rejection on the ground that they did not make any statement under Section 161 before the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11), but, at the instance of P. W. 1, for the first time, disclosed about the incident in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a couple of months after; and 4. 7 to 10 deserves rejection on the ground that they did not make any statement under Section 161 before the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11), but, at the instance of P. W. 1, for the first time, disclosed about the incident in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a couple of months after; and 4. Serious injuries on the person of appellants Ganesh and Gangadhar were not explained by the prosecution which will indicate that it suppressed the true story. So, the appellants in the absence of credible evidence are entitled to be acquitted of the charges. Mr. S. S. Das, learned Additional Standing Counsel, urged that the prosecution evidence ill indeed true and so interference with the draughed judgment is unwarranted. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to the evidence of P. W. 1, who was the informant, there were long standing dispute and litigations between the parties. On the date of occurrence, the deceased was assaulted by the appellants by means of Tenta, Ekmuna and lathis resulting in his instantaneous death. When he intervened, he was himself assaulted. He sustained a number of injuries which were found by the Medical Officer (P. W. 6 ). It thus appears that he was present when the occurrence took place. But as he is a relation and interested witness, his evidence would require close and careful scrutiny and, in the facts of this case, some amount of independent corroboration, so as to be believed. ( 10 ) P. W. 2 belongs to village Brahmanigaon which, according to his own evidence, is at a distance of ten to twelve miles from Jaipur town. Village Guhali in which the occurrence took place, according to him, is at a distance of six miles from his village and seven miles from Binjharpur Police Station. He denied that his village is more than twenty miles from Guhali. According to the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11), Guhali is about thirty kilo-metres from Binjharpur Police Station. If that be so village Brahmanigaon to which the witness belongs is about twenty- eight kilometres from Guhali. In order to make himself a probable eye witness to the occurrence, he minimised the distance between Brahmanigaon and Guhali. According to the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11), Guhali is about thirty kilo-metres from Binjharpur Police Station. If that be so village Brahmanigaon to which the witness belongs is about twenty- eight kilometres from Guhali. In order to make himself a probable eye witness to the occurrence, he minimised the distance between Brahmanigaon and Guhali. This attempt at the outset makes him a person without any regard for truth, about the occurrence, he stated that he had purchased a bullock from a person belonging to Kusunpur. It was lost. Therefore, he came to Kusunpur in search of the bullock and found it grazing on fields, while he was returning with the bullock, he saw the occurrence. He admitted that he saw the assailants for the first time in his life and identified them for the first time in court: No, test identification parade was conducted so as to enable him to identify the appellants as the assailants of the deceased and P. W. 1. No person of village Kusunpur or of any other village was examined to say that P. W. 2 had travelled a distance of about twenty eight kilo-metres in search of the bullock: and on the way back saw the occurrence. His evidence read us a whole does not at all inspire confidence. He is a pure and simple chance witness. His evidence has found no independent corroboration and identification of the appellants for the first time in court had no probative value. His evidence, therefore, deserves complete rejection. ( 11 ) THE evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 7 to 10 shall be consider together. Their evidence apparently is that they had seen the assault on the deceased and P. W. 1 by the appellants on the date of occurrence. Curiously enough they did not disclose about the details of the occurrence before the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11) and for the first time at the instance of P. W. 1 made statements under Section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code before the judicial Magistrate a long time after the occurrence. During investigation; the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11) came to the village, but these witnesses did not make statements before him and remained content by saying that he did not examine them. During investigation; the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11) came to the village, but these witnesses did not make statements before him and remained content by saying that he did not examine them. If, as a matter of fact, they had knowledge of the occurrence, it was for them to assist in the investigation and volunteer statements before the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11); If, for any reason, the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11) ignored them and refused to record their statements, they ought to have brought this fact in writing to the notice of the higher police authorities forthwith, but they did not do so. The learned Additional Sessions Judge drew an adverse inference against the conduct of the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11) by observing that he sided with the appellants and did not investigate into the case properly by not recording the statement of a large number of eye witnesses to the occurrence. The reasons for making such observation are that P. W. 1 made repeated representations to the higher police authorities about the negligence of the Investigating Officer in recording the statements of eye witness to the occurrence and subsequently he made an application before the Judicial Magistrate for recording their statements sunder Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. These reasons, in our view, are not adequate for drawing an adverse inference against the Investigating Officer in the conduct of the investigation of the case; firstly because, not a single question was asked to the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11) about this aspect; and secondly because, repeated applications to higher police authorities will not by themselves prove partiality and negligence of the Investigating Officer in the investigation of the case. Had questions in the above light been put to him, he would have been in a position to explain. It is to be understood that a cause of lack of sufficient evidence to prove the prosecution case, it was not impossible or improbable on the part of P. W. 1 to make out a case by making representations and getting some witnesses examined under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The statements have not also been admitted into evidence. The statements have not also been admitted into evidence. In view of the above infirmities and in disagreement with the learned Additional Sessions Judge, we are of the opinion that it would be unsafe to place reliance on the evidence of all these witnesses who did not make statements under Section 161 before the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11) and after a long time disclosed about the facts of the case in their statements under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. ( 12 ) TWO of the appellants, namely, Ganesh and Gangadhar, father and son respectively, were injured. Ganesh sustained an incised wound over the bridge of his , nose which is a sensitive and vital organ of the body. Appellant Gangadhar received a punctured wound which could have been caused by a sharp and pointed weapon, such as, Tenta or Ekmuna. The weapon pierced the left thigh on one I point and came out on the other, because both exit and entrance wounds were found. Though P. W. 6 opined that these were of simple nature, yet they were not minor or superficial injuries so that a court of law will not take notice of them. On the other hand, they were serious and dangerous injuries. The prosecution did not explain these injuries sustained by two of the appellants an did not adduce evidences so as to introduce the injury reports. (Exts. J and K ). Mr. Ghosh, therefore, argued that for non-explanation of these injuries, or adverse view should be taken so as to hold that the prosecution did not expose the whole story and at least suppressed a part of it. In connection with this question, it is necessary to refer to one of the latest decisions reported in Han Krishan Singh and ors. v. State of Bihar, etc. after referring to a number of decisions including Lalcshmi Singh and ors. v. State of Bihar, and Jagdishv. In connection with this question, it is necessary to refer to one of the latest decisions reported in Han Krishan Singh and ors. v. State of Bihar, etc. after referring to a number of decisions including Lalcshmi Singh and ors. v. State of Bihar, and Jagdishv. State of Rajasthan, the Court held as follows: We have referred to the have decisions in extense in order to consider whether it is an invariable proposition of law that the prosecution is obliged to explain the injuries sustained by the accused in the same occurrence anti whether failure of the prosecution to so explain the injuries on the person of the accused would mean that the prosecution has suppressed the truth and also the genesis or origin of the occurrence. Upon a conspectus of the decisions mentioned above, we are of the view that the question as to the obligation of the prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused in the same occurrence may not arise in each and every case. In other words, it is not an invariable rule that the prosecution has to explain the injuries sustained by the accused in the same occurrence. The burden of proving the guilt of the accused is undoubtedly on the prosecution. The accused is not bound to say anything in defence. The prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. If the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution are believed by the Court in proof of the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt, the question of the obligation of the prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused will not arise. When the prosecution comes with a definite case that the offence has been committed by the accused and proves its case beyond any reasonable doubt, it becomes hardly necessary for the prosecution to, again explain now and in what circumstances injuries have been inflicted on the person of the accused. From the above principle it is manifest that in all cases it is not the duty of the prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused. In cases where the, accused sustains very minor and superficial injuries and the court believes the prosecution evidence, it is neither necessary nor obligatory on the part of the prosecution to prove such injuries. In cases where the, accused sustains very minor and superficial injuries and the court believes the prosecution evidence, it is neither necessary nor obligatory on the part of the prosecution to prove such injuries. But there may be cases, where the prosecution evidence is of a weak or unbelievable type and the injuries sustained by the accused are serious and dangerous in nature. In such cases the prosecution is bound to-prove as to how and in what circumstances, the accused had sustained the injuries. If the prosecution fails to do so, it cannot but be held that is guilty of suppression of facts essential for the court to know for doing substantial justice. The case before us falls within the latter category. The prosecution witnesses do not seem to be reliable as discussed. The injuries sustained by two of the appellants are serious and dangerous in nature inflicted by dangerous sharp cutting and sharp pointed weapons. Therefore, it was obligatory on the part of the prosecution to explain as to how these two appellants sustained these injuries. As the prosecution failed to do so, we are constrained to hold in disagreement with the learned trial judge that it did to come with clean hands by unfolding the true story and was guilty of suppression of facts. In are above view of the matter, the sole testimony of P. W. I cannot be accepted and so the contentions raised by Mr. Ghosh must prevail and the appellants are wound to be acquitted. ( 13 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. The appellants are acquitted of all charges and are set at liberty forthwith.