A. N. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a defendants second appeal arising out of a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendent appellant from interfering with the plaintiffs possession, Adarsh Co-operative Housing Society, the respondent No. 1 instituted the present suit against the appellant, Both the Courts below have decreed the suit. Hence the second appeal. ( 2 ) THE plaint averments were that the disputed land was owned by a Co-operative Society called Muradnagar Marketing Co-operative Society Ltd which was a Society registered under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act. Under the various sale-deeds, the said Society purchased plots of land comprising the disputed property from their erstwhile Zamindars. The Muradnagar Marketing Society Ltd. thereafter gifted the entire land to the present Society under a registered gift deed executed on 19-7-1966. The Pradhan of the village, however, illegally allotted portions of plot No. 259 to the u. P. Government Roadways the defendant No. 2 and other defendants who started interfering with the plaintiffs possession and hence the suit. It was further asserted that the defendants were in collusion with the Pradhan and the Land Management Committee and on the basis of the allotments made by the Pradhan in respect of the land which had already validly vested in Muradnagar Marketing Society and subsequently in the plaintiff-Society, the defendants started interfering with the plaintiffs possession. ( 3 ) THE suit was contested by the defendants who asserted that the land was lawfully allotted in their favour by Pradhan and in pursuance of the allotment made in their favour, they had also made constructions and were in possession of the same. They denied the title of the plaintiff. ( 4 ) ON the pleadings of the parties various issues were framed by the trial Court. On a consideration of the evidence on the record, the trial court decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff was the owner of the property in dispute and was also in possession thereof. The evidence led by th defendant was rejected. Accordingly, a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs possession was passed. ( 5 ) THE appellate Court on an appeal by the appellant affirmed the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the decrees passed by the Courts below the appellants have filed this second appeal. Accordingly, a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs possession was passed. ( 5 ) THE appellate Court on an appeal by the appellant affirmed the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the decrees passed by the Courts below the appellants have filed this second appeal. ( 6 ) FOR the appellant the principal point urged is that the lower appellate Court has committed a substantial error of law in holding that the disputed land was exempt from the operation of the U. P. Zamindari abolition and Land Reforms Act. It was contended that Muradnagar marketing Society cannot be said to have held the disputed land on the relevant date, that is, 7-7-1949 for the purpose of a Housing Scheme within the meaning of the Explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by U. P. Act No. 150 of 1978)and consequently the dispatad land was not exenot from the operation of the said Act. The argument was that the dominent object of the said society was the construction of a Mandi and not residential houses. That being so, the disputed land cannot be said to have vested in the Society. ( 7 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties and given the matter a careful consideration, I find no merit in the above contention. In order to appreciate the submission, it will be necessary to have a look at the relevant statutory provisions. Section 1 of the Act states that it would apply to-the whole of the Uttar Pradesh except inter alia the areas mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act. Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 reads thus :" (1) The State Government may by notification in the Gazette apply the whole or any provision of thi s Act to any of the following areas or estates subject to such exceptions or modifications, not affecting the substance, as the circumstances of the case may require (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c) areas held and occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility and declared as such by the State Government or acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), the united Provinces Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees)act, 1948 (U. P. Act XXXIX of 1948), the United Provinces acquisition of Property (Food Relief) (Temporary Powers) Act, 1948 (U. P. Act XXIX of 1948), or any other enactment other than this Act, relating to acquisition of land for a public purpose. "the next relevant provision if sub-section (2) and the Explanation to the same (as the provision stood prior to its amendment in 1972) which states :" (2) The declaration of the State Government under clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall be conclusive evidence that the land is held and occupied for a public purpose or a work of public utility. Explanation, Any area held on the seventh day of July, 1949, for the purposes of a housing scheme by a Co-operative Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 (II of 1912) or a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, (XXI of 1860) or a limited liability company under the Indian companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913) shall be deemed to be held for a work of public utility. " ( 8 ) IN pursuance of these provisions a notification was issued by the state Government under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 declaring that any area held on the 7th day of July, 1949 for the purpose of a Housing scheme by a Co-operative Society registered under the Co-operative societies Act or a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1960 shall be deemed to be held for a work of public utility. This notification was, however, repealed on 1-9-1969 w. e. f. that date except in regard to areas held by a Co-operative Societies on 7-7-1949 which had been actually utilised in execution of a Housing Scheme before 1-9-1969. ( 9 ) THIS then in the statutory background in which the question posed for consideration in the second appeal shall have to be examined. ( 9 ) THIS then in the statutory background in which the question posed for consideration in the second appeal shall have to be examined. The first question is whether Muradnagar Marketing Society can be characterised as the Society which held land for a Housing Scheme. The contention was that the Society was essentially a Marketing Society and not a Housing society and consequently, the disputed land cannot be said to be exempt from the operation of the Act ( 10 ) THE argument is untenable. The language used in the Explanation to sub-section (2) of Section 2 is not a Housing Society but a Co-operative society which held any area of land on the relevant date (7-7-1949) for the purposes of a Housing Scheme. There might, therefore, have been Co-operative societies which though not Housing Societies properly so called but which may still have held an area for the purposes of a Housing scheme. The essential requirement of the law is that the land should have been held for the purpose of a Housing Scheme. ( 11 ) THAT brings us to the question whether the disputed land was held for the purpose of a Housing Scheme. In order to determine this question one may have a look at the object of the Society as reflected by its bye-laws. The relevant bye-laws is bye-law No. 2 (24) which has been extracted in the judgment of the lower appellate Court. The same reads as follows :"to secure land for the construction of shops and residential houses in the form of a Mandi and to dispose of the same to the members on the settled terms. " ( 12 ) THERE can be no manner of doubt from a bare perusal of the bye-law that construction of residential houses and the allotment thereof to the members of the Society was also one of the objects of the Society. It may be that the Society had twin purposes in its mind, namely, construction of shops as well as residential houses. But that does not derogate from the fact that construction of residential houses was one of the objects of the society even if residential houses might have been intended for being used by the shopkeepers. It may be that the Society had twin purposes in its mind, namely, construction of shops as well as residential houses. But that does not derogate from the fact that construction of residential houses was one of the objects of the society even if residential houses might have been intended for being used by the shopkeepers. ( 13 ) BE that as it may, upon plain terms of bye-law No. 2 (24) the conclusion is inescapable that Muradnagar Marketing Society held the disputed land for the purpose of a Housing Scheme which implies a scheme providing for houses add their allotment in favour of the members. ( 14 ) IN this connection learned counsel for the respondent also invited my attention to the meaning of the word house as defined in the standard Dictionary according to which house connotes not only residential house but also other buildings. It is, however, not necessary to dilate on the point further as in my opinion the land was held by the aforesaid Society for the purpose of a Housing Scheme on the relevant date. ( 15 ) THIS takes me to the question whether in view of the notification issued on 1-9-1969 the area held by Muradnagar Marketing Society c,an be said to have been brought within the purview of the aforesaid Act. This question turns on a preliminary issue of fact whether the area in question had not been utilised for the purpose of a Housing Scheme until 1-9-1969. On an assessment of the evidence on the record, the lower appellate Court has answered this issue against the appellants. The finding is that the land in question had been utilised for the purpose of the Housing Scheme. Plots were carved out in pursuance of the scheme and allotted to various individuals who had also made some constructions thereon. However, the lower appellate Court accepting the oral and documentary evidence led by the other side held that the constructions made by the allottees were washed away in the floods which ravaged that area in 1967. The finding recorded by the lower appellate Court on this issue which is indisputably one of fact is perfectly correct and souad supported by the evidence on the record and not being vitiated by any error of law, cannot be reviewed in a second appeal. The finding recorded by the lower appellate Court on this issue which is indisputably one of fact is perfectly correct and souad supported by the evidence on the record and not being vitiated by any error of law, cannot be reviewed in a second appeal. ( 16 ) IN this connection, it will be relevant to refer to a decision of the supreme Court reported in 1976 Revenue Decisions page 23 (Slate of U. P. v. Anghalia Housing (P) Ltd.) in which Their Lordships were dealing with an identical situation. There the concerned Society held some land on the relevant date for a housing scheme but owing to the restriction imposed by the Forest Act, the scheme could not be fully implemented because it involved certain formalities like securing permission of the various authorities. However, a blue print had already been prepared for the housing scheme before the relevant date. But further progress could not be made, as mentioned above, on account of certain legal and technical obstacles. In this state of things it was urged on behalf of the State that the Society could not claim the exemption contemplated under the provision. The argument was repelled by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Society had taken all the necessary steps for utilisation of the land for the Housing Scheme. The forest had been cleared by felling the trees. All these acts had been achieved prior to 1-9-1969. On these facts, Their Lordships of the Suprme court ruled that the land should be deemed in law to have, been. actually utilised for a Housing Scheme and, therefore, liable to be excluded. The supreme Court gave a wider meaning to the words "had been actually utilised" relying on the term "utilised" as defined in the Oxford English dictionary according to which the word means "to make useful. " ( 17 ) IN my opinion, the dictum of the Supreme Court fully applies to the facts of the present case. On the facts referred to above and found by the lower appellate Court, the conclusion is inescapable that the land in question was utilised for a Housing Scheme before the relevant date and consequently the same was liable to be exempted. The Society had already taken such steps as it could to effectuate the purpose, namely, construction of houses. On the facts referred to above and found by the lower appellate Court, the conclusion is inescapable that the land in question was utilised for a Housing Scheme before the relevant date and consequently the same was liable to be exempted. The Society had already taken such steps as it could to effectuate the purpose, namely, construction of houses. The land was bence liable to be exempt from the operation of the Act. ( 18 ) LEARNED counsel, however, placed strong reliance on paragraph 5 of the plaint in which the plaintiff averred "the plots were allotted to its members and some of whom also made constructions on the plots allotted but the work of the Society could not continue and it could not fulfil its purpose and carry out its object. " From this, learned counsel wanted this court to conclude that the scheme had proved abortive and on the own showing of the plaintiff it could not carry out its purpose, namely, the housing scheme envisaged by it. ( 19 ) I am unable to agree. From the averments made in paragraph 5 of the plaint, it cannot be said that the disputed area had not been utilised by the Society for the purpose of housing scheme. On the contrary, the averments go to show that the purpose had been partially achieved also in that some of the members 1o whom plots had been allotted had also made constructions. It is another matter that owing to certain obstacles, the object could not be completely achieved and accomplished. That, however, does not mean that the area was not utilised for the purpose of a housing scheme. ( 20 ) LASTLY, learned counsel submitted that the finding of the Courts below on the issue of possession is vitiated in law in that the inferences which have been drawn from the various facts and documents existing oil the record are wholly unsustainable. ( 21 ) I have considered the above argument but find that there is no substance in it. The trial Court has dealt with the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties including the admissions made by the defendants witnesses elaborately. Every single material piece of evidence had been noticed both by the trial Court as well as by the appellate Court. The trial Court has dealt with the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties including the admissions made by the defendants witnesses elaborately. Every single material piece of evidence had been noticed both by the trial Court as well as by the appellate Court. The finding of the appellate Court which was one of affirmance also indicates that it has considered all the relevant facts and circumstances. The grounds on which the appellate Court has rejected the documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the appellants are all valid and proper. The inferences drawn by the courts below from preliminary facts are also proper. At any rate, they do not disclose any substantial error of law so as to warrant interference by this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 22 ) IN the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. But I make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.