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1989 DIGILAW 364 (RAJ)

Narendra Kumar Yadav v. State of Rajasthan

1989-05-12

D.L.MEHTA, S.S.BYAS

body1989
JUDGMENT 1. - These three writ petitions, being identical in all respects, were heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The petitioners are Ex-Police employees, who were dismissed from service on account of their participation in the Police agitation, which took place in the State of Rajasthan somewhere in the early half of 1979. 3. According to the averments disclosed in the writ petitions, the petitioners were in the service of the Police and were holding different posts like that of Constable, Head Constable. Assistant Sub-Inspector or Sub-Inspector of Police. There was a police agitation in the State during 1979. A case under Section 3/4 of the Rajasthan Police (Incitement of Disaffection) Ordinance, 1979 was registered against the petitioners. A decision was taken by the Governor of the State that no inquiry should be conducted against those police employees who took active part in the police agitation and they be dismissed from service without holding inquiry in accordance with the provisions of Clause (c) of the Second Proviso of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. As a result, the Superintendent of Police, Tonk by his orders dated 6.7.79 and 7.7.79 dismissed the petitioners from service. 4. The petitioners challenged the dismissal orders by filing writ petitions. The writ petitions were allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 28.4.1980. However, on appeal by the State Government, the judgment of the learned Single Judge was reversed and the writ petitions were dismissed by the judgment delivered on 19 9.1985. Learned Judges of the Division Bench, no doubt, permitted the petitioners to file appeals before the Appeal Authority. The petitioners, thereafter filed the appeals, which were heard by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range, Jaipur. The appeals were dismissed by order dated 5/3/89. 5. The Police also registered a case against the petitioners and a challan was filed against the petitioners in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk. After a joint trial of the petitioners, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate acquitted them all of the offence under Section 3 of the Rajasthan Police (Incitement of Disaffection) Ordinance, 1979. The fact of acquittal was taken into consideration by the Appellate Authority. 6. It so happened that some of the Police employees went in appeals before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgment of the Division Bench dated 19.9.1985. The fact of acquittal was taken into consideration by the Appellate Authority. 6. It so happened that some of the Police employees went in appeals before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgment of the Division Bench dated 19.9.1985. The Hon'ble Supreme Court decided those appeals and directed the authorities for reconsideration of the cases. The relevant portion of the judgment of their Lordships reads as under : "The counsel for the State has agreed that an appellate authority not below the rank of a Deputy Inspector General of Police shall be constituted forthwith and at any rate not later than one month from today to ascertain appeals from each of the appellants before us and to factually examine the justification of the orders of dismissal Such appeals shall. if presented within 30 days, be taken to have been filled within limitation. As particulars of the designated appellate authority are not yet known, such appeals may be presented in the office of the Inspector General of Police, Head Quarters and as soon as the designated authority is appointed, the papers may be sent to him. The appellants shall be given full opportunity to the material in support of their respective cases with reference to records and unless the appellate authority desires oral evidence to be adduced, no appellant shall be entitled to adduce such evidence. We hope and trust that the appellate authority will look into the material with an open mind for coming to his decision. In these cases if any, where the appellate authority decides to restore the dismissed police officer in service, he shall also decide as to how far the job period (date of dismissal to restoration) the appellant would be compensated. Such Officer should at any rate have the benefits of condonation of break in service for purposes of promotion and other retiral benefits. In such cases where retirement to service is not granted each one of them would ordinarily be entitled to such compensation as the appellate authority would consider reasonable. Such Officer should at any rate have the benefits of condonation of break in service for purposes of promotion and other retiral benefits. In such cases where retirement to service is not granted each one of them would ordinarily be entitled to such compensation as the appellate authority would consider reasonable. Length of service, past performance and the record maintained in respect of each of the incumbents are relevant aspects to be taken into consideration in holding either way viz., whether the officer is to be restored to service or what the quantum of compensation should be." In view of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships, the appeals were heard by the Inspector General of Police (Head Quarters) and by his various orders issued in March, 1988, some police employees were reinstated with penalties. The appeals of two of them were dismissed. The list of such persons has been given in Schedule-3 Annexed with the writ petitions. A specimen order passed in the appeals by the Inspector General of Police was filed to show that the penalty of dismissal was set aside, in the case of Shri Chand Singh. 7. The contention of the petitioners is that the appeals filed by them before the Deputy Inspector General of Police require reconsideration in view of the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court quoted above. It is contended that different approaches have been made in respect of the police employees, who were dismissed from service. Some of them were reinstated by virtue of the orders passed in appeals, while the petitioners' appeals were dismissed. This amounts to hostile discrimination between the police employees belonging to the same category, i.e. of those who had taken part in the police agitation. 8. The petitions are resisted, though the facts are not disputed. The defence taken is that the appeals of the petitioners were dismissed by a detailed order. They required no reconsideration or rehearing. The appellants did not file the appeals in accordance with the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court quoted above. They are, therefore, not entitled to any relief. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Govt. Advocate. 10. There is no dispute between the parties that many police employees were dismissed from service on account of their taking part in the police agitation, which took place in the early half of 1979. They are, therefore, not entitled to any relief. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Govt. Advocate. 10. There is no dispute between the parties that many police employees were dismissed from service on account of their taking part in the police agitation, which took place in the early half of 1979. In our opinion, all those persons who were dismissed from service on one and the same ground of their participation in the police agitation constitute a class in themselves. They belonged to one category. The principal question, which arises for our consideration is. whether there is any violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in respect of the petitioners? 11. We need not stress that these articles create a guarantee of equality in the matter of public employment. The right of equality implies that equals should be treated alike. In Jaswant Singh v. Union of India ( AIR 1980 SC 115 ) . it was observed in para 34 of the judgment that equals must be treated alike. Some amongst equals cannot be subjected to hostile discrimination by giving favoured treatments to others who are similarly situated. 12. In the instant case, as we have observed above, some of the police employees who filed appeals before the Designated Appellate Authority in accordance with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were allowed to furnish material before the appellate authority. The penalty of dismissal in respect of many of them were set aside and they were given punishment short of dismissal or removal. Their Lordships of the Apex Court had issued directions as to what material will be taken into consideration while imposing penalties on the delinquent police employees. Unfortunately, the appeals of the petitioners, which they filed before the Deputy Inspector General of Police came to be decided before the appeals were decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. 13. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees a right of equality before law. The main principle behind article 14 is that there should be no discrimination between one person and another, if as regards the subject matter they stand on the same footing. In other words, Article 14 prohibits arbitrary actions, which are irrational or discriminatory. Article 16(1) of the Constitution grants equality of opportunity to all citizens "in matters relating to employment" etc. In other words, Article 14 prohibits arbitrary actions, which are irrational or discriminatory. Article 16(1) of the Constitution grants equality of opportunity to all citizens "in matters relating to employment" etc. The words matters relating to employment" connote that no discrimination can be made in the matter of employment either before the employment or subsequent to the employment. It can be, therefore read in Article 16 that it prohibits the termination of service if it is on a tainted discrimination. 14. The contention of the learned Additional Govt. Advocate is that the petitioners were not appellants in the Supreme Court and moreover, they preferred no appeals before the Designated Appellate Authority as per the directions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. As such no interference should be made. We are not impressed with the contention. The discrimination had taken its roots when some of those who preferred appeals in accordance with the directions of the Apex Court and the appeals were allowed partly or fully. All those police employees who were dismissed on account of their participation in the police agitation constitute a class in itself. It will be unfortunate that some of those employees are reinstated and some stand deprived of the reinstatement simply because they could not approach the Supreme Court or file appeals as directed by their Lordships. In our opinion, the inability of the petitioners to file appeals before the Supreme Court their further inability to file appeals before the Designated Appellate Authority in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court, should not stand as snags or obstacles in their way. The ends of justice would be evenly balanced, if the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range, Jaipur (respondent No. 2) is directed to rehear the appeals keeping the observations of their Lordships in view and thereafter to decide the appeals afresh. If we do not have a recourse to this method it would result in hostile discrimination between the employees who are equals in all respects, that is to say, they belong to that category who were dismissed from service on account of their participation in the police agitation. Hostile discrimination between the persons belonging to the same class or category is not permitted and should be avoided. The essence of right of equality is that equals must be treated alike. Hostile discrimination between the persons belonging to the same class or category is not permitted and should be avoided. The essence of right of equality is that equals must be treated alike. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appeals filed by the petitioners before the respondent No. 2 should be reheard. 15. In the result, we allow the writ petitions and quash the order dated 5.3.1987 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range, Jaipur, which is Annexure-6 in Narendra Kumar's case. Annexure 4 in Gajanand's case and Annexure-2 in Kalik Ahmed's, case. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range, Jaipur (respondent No. 2) will decide the appeals of the petitioners afresh in accordance with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted above. The appeals will be decided within three months from now. 16. The writ petitions shall stand accordingly disposed of. 17. No order as to cost.Petition allowed. *******