P. N. Nag, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a suit for recovery of possession of the premisesdescribed in schedule attached to the plaint and also for payment of damagesamounting to Rs. 1,96,000. 00 together with future damages for use and occupa-tion of the premises @ Rs 100. 00 per day from the date of suit till the plaintiffgets actual possession of the premises. ( 2 ) THE suit is grounded on the allegations that the plaintiff is themanaging Trustee of Arya Vaidyasala, Kottakkal (hereinafter REFERRED TO to asthe vaidyasala ), a charitable trust, and is competent to file the suit. Thedefendant is residing on the second floor of building. E-76, South Extensionpart I, New Delhi belonging to Vaidyasala in which the plaintiff is also running its Medical Centre at New Delhi. In fact this Medical Centre of theplaintiff at New Delhi was started in February, 1982 and with a view toestablishing necessary contracts with the Govt. Departments, Foreignembassies, visiting dignitaries of foreign countries etc. and having necessaryliaison work at New Delhi for the Medical Centre the defendant wasappointed as the Coordination Officer at New Delhi with effect from 1/05/1982. Since the defendant was residing in a remote area of Delhi, athis request, he was allowed to use one room and kitchen on the 2nd floorof the premises, as a special case and on a temporary basis, on the specificunderstanding that the room and kitchen which are really a portion of theguest House of the Vaidyasala buildings at South Extension, New Delhiwould be given vacant possession to the plaintiff as and when required by theplaintiff. It was also made clear that this permission to use the room andkitchen on a temporary basis would not give any claims to the defendant forresidence or H. R. A. in lieu of residence at a future date etc. The defendantafter accepting these terms and conditions was allowed to occupy the aforementioned premises. ( 3 ) THE defendant worked as Coordination Officer for more than3 yrs. and by this time the Medical Centre at New Delhi became well established and there was not much of coordination work to be attended to and itwas found that the work of the Vaidyasala could be conveniently got donethrough the Manager and Physician Incharge of the Medical Centre and thatthe continuance of the post of Coordination Officer at New Delhi was not onlycounter productive but was superfluous and unnecessary. Therefore, the Boardof Trustees vide resolution No. 14 (d) dated 19/01/1986 decided toabolish the post of Coordination Officer at New Delhi with the result that theservices of the defendant were terminated w. e. f. 31. 1. 1986 (A. N.) by proceedingno. 36740 dated 24. 1. 1986 after tendering to the defendant a cheque forrs. 9,427. 50 being 3 months salary in lieu of notice and 2 month s salary asex-gratia compensation for the services rendered by him. The defendant wasfurther directed to vacate the portion of the building in Ins occupation withinfour works w. c. f. 1. 2. 1986, i. e. , on or before 28. 2. 1986. The defendant did notaccept the cheque nor did. be vacate the premises occupied by him as residencethough he was given sufficient time to vacate in spite of lawyer s notice dated 6/05/1986 but of no use. ( 4 ) IN substance the defendant was given only leave and licence to usethe portion of the Guest House for residence temporarily and he had no rightto continue to occupy the premises after his services were terminated on theabolition of the post as the permission granted to use the premises by thedefendant was withdrawn and the licence was revoked. Furthermore thepremises occupied by the defendant can easily fetch Rs. 100. 00 per day and theplaintiff is entitled to recover damages in occupation of the defendant (a)Rs. 100. 00 per day. Hence this suit for payment of damages as well. ( 5 ) IN the written statement the defendant has taken various preliminaryobjections as well as filed reply on merits. In substance the objections arethat the suit is not maintainable as the trust is not a legal entity and is notentitled to sue in its own name. Further the introductory para of the plainthas not been admitted in which the averment has been made by the plaintiffthat the plaintiff being managing trustee is competent to file this suit. ( 6 ) THE defendant was earlier employed with Mettalurgical and Engg. Consultants (India) Ltd. , a Government of India undertaking, at monthy salaryof Rs. 1. 600. 00 p. m. and the present salary attached to that post is Rs. 3. 300. 00p. m. plus perquisites. In February, 1982 a branch of the trust was inaugurated at E-76, New Delhi South Extension Part 1. Consultants (India) Ltd. , a Government of India undertaking, at monthy salaryof Rs. 1. 600. 00 p. m. and the present salary attached to that post is Rs. 3. 300. 00p. m. plus perquisites. In February, 1982 a branch of the trust was inaugurated at E-76, New Delhi South Extension Part 1. The plaintiff had sent aphysician to Delhi from Kerala for conducting its business and to look afterits affairs but he had no contacts in Delhi nor did he know the local language,the managing trust (M. T. for short) persuaded the respondent to work for thetrust for the Delhi branch on a monthly salary of Rs. 1,500. 00 with the understanding that he would bo made a trustee of the trust. The defendant wasgiven a designation of Coordination Officer on his appointment with the Trustand his duties included day-to-day office work, writing account books, attending correspondence, telephone calls, receiving people at airport, railwaystation, bus stands, meeting different Govt. Officials, calling at Embassies,providing travel arrangements and hotel accommodation to all the officials etc. In short he was supposed to do anything for the plaintiff. The defendant wasearlier living at Mayur Vihar in a rented accommodal. ion. Since the plaintiff wanted 24 hour services of the defendant, he was requested to temporarilyshift to the premises of the plaintiff which the defendant did unwillingly tohelp the plaintiff. All the trustees of the plaintiff, including the defendant,are inter-related. In the capacity of Coordination Officer the defendantrendered exceptional good services to the Trust inasmuch as there was noprovision for giving exemption from payment of income tax forreligious and charitable trust if the trust did some business but becauseof the exemplary services rendered by the defendant to the trust such anexemption was given to the trust. In fact such an exemption was got by thedefendant because of high connections with high dignitaries, including the thenfinance Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee as otherwise such an exemption couldnot have been possible and this step was very much appreciated and acknoledged not only by the MT but by all the members of the trust. On persuationby the MT, the defendant left the Mayur Vihar accommodation and shifted tothe premises of the plaintiff on the condition that he would not be asked tovacate the same on any pretext whether he was in the service of the plaintiffor not. On persuationby the MT, the defendant left the Mayur Vihar accommodation and shifted tothe premises of the plaintiff on the condition that he would not be asked tovacate the same on any pretext whether he was in the service of the plaintiffor not. The accommodation was given as a consideration for defendant sout of turn services to the plaintiff, while working with the plaintiff the defendant had to perform another impossible task. The plaintiff wanted to set upa hospital and a research centre in Delhi and for which the defendant got aplot of land of more than 2 acres in Delhi allotted to the plaintiff, althoughthe earlier application of the plaintiff for allotment of such a plot of land hadbeen rejected by the DDA and this task was made possible because ofhis high connections and after having met Shri Jag Mohan the thenlt. Governor of Delhi. It has been reiterated time and again by thedefendant that because of the distinguished and exemplary services renderedby him to the Trust the premises in dispute were given to him on a permanentbasis and as a matter of right and not on the mercy of anybody and theplaintiff has no right to eject him from the premises. The defendant has furtherstated that these premises do not form part of any guest house and the usageof the word "guest House" is motivated. The building is not used as a guesthouse nor can it be used as a guest house because there is no facility of aguest house available in the premises. There is no regular water supply on thesecond floor. The defendant was not keen to move to the present premisesand for some time he maintained two establishment - one at Mayur Viharand the other at present premises - only with a view to render 24 hoursservice to the plaintiff he left the Mayur Vihar and on the understanding givenby the plaintiff to him that he would have life interest in the said premises andwould not be asked to vacate at any time even after termination of his services. These premises have been given to the defendant permanentlyby the trust because of exceptional services rendered by him to the trust, as has been explain-ed hereinabove. The suit has not been valued for the purpose of court fees andjurisdiction correctly. These premises have been given to the defendant permanentlyby the trust because of exceptional services rendered by him to the trust, as has been explain-ed hereinabove. The suit has not been valued for the purpose of court fees andjurisdiction correctly. ( 7 ) OUT of the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framedon 7/09/1988 : 1 Whether the suit is properly valued for the purpose of court feeand jurisdiction ?2. Whether the plaint has been signed, verified and the suit institutedby a duly authorised person ?3. Whether the suit is not maintainable by the plaintiff ?4. Whether the premises in suit were given to the defendant onpermanent basis in consideration of his extraordinary services tothe plaintiff, as alleged ?5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages ? If so, at whatrate arid for what period ? ( 8 ) AT the very outset I propose to deal with Issue No. 4, whether ornot the premises were given to defendant permanently on considerationof his extraordinary services rendered to the trust, as the case mainly dependsupon the decision of such an issue. ( 9 ) THE plaintiff streneously urged that the defendant has no right toretain the premises in dispute after the termination of his services and thesepremises were never allotted to him on permanent basis in consideration ofservices rendered by the defendant to the plaintiff. In this connection hereferred TO to a letter dated 15. 12. 1982, Ext. P-1, written by U. K. Warrier,general Manager of the plaintiff, to Shri T. V. Ramankutty, Manager, kattakkal Arya Vaidya Sala Branch, E-76, South Extension Part I, New Delhiin which it was stipulated : "sri Vijaikumar can use one room and the kitchen on the second floorof the branch premises as a special case and on a temporary basis. The room and the kitchen will be given vacant possession to us as andwhen we find it necessary. The permission to use the room and kitchentemporarily does not give any claim to Sri Vijaikumar for residence of H. R. A. in lieu of residence at a future date. If the above terms are agreeable, please get his signature in the copyof this letter and return the same for our records. " ( 10 ) THESE conditions mentioned in Ex. P-1 were accepted by thedefendant and his acceptance dated 20. 2. 1982 were noted on the letter itself. Ex. If the above terms are agreeable, please get his signature in the copyof this letter and return the same for our records. " ( 10 ) THESE conditions mentioned in Ex. P-1 were accepted by thedefendant and his acceptance dated 20. 2. 1982 were noted on the letter itself. Ex. P-2 is a notice dated 6/05/1986 given by the Advocate on behalf ofthe plaintiff to the defendant which has explained the whole position that thedefendant had requested that he be permitted to use portion of the guesthouse on the second floor and leave and licence to use a portion of the guesthouse for defendant s residence was granted and he had been using the portionwith permission subject always to the requirements of the plaintiff to use theguest house. According to the said notice consequent on the termination ofhis services w. e. f. 1. 2. 1986 as per proceedings dated 24/01/1986 thethe defendant had ceased to be an officer of plaintiff and the permission granted to him to use the premises had been withdrawn and the licence stoodrevoked. Despite the termination of service, withdrawal of permission andexpiry of notice period to quit the defendant continued to remain in thepremises and, therefore, through the legal notice he was asked to quit thepremises as also to pay damages for illegal use and occupation from 1. 3. 1986@ Rs. 100. 00 per day. Ex. P-3 is a letter dated 13/05/1986 written by thedefendant which shows that the defendant had received notice dated 6. 5. 1986sent on behalf of the plaintiff. Ex. P-4 to P-7 are the proceedings of the Boardrelating to the appointment of the defendant in the trust, putting him onprobation and approving his probation etc. Ex. P-8 is a resolution No. 14 (d)dated 19. 1. 1986 where the trustees have resolved to abolish the post and toterminate the services of the defendant w. e. f. 31. 1. 1986 (A. N. ). In the saidresolution that defendant has also been asked to vacate the portion of thebuilding in his occupation within four weeks from 1. 2. 1986, i. e. , on or before28. 2. 1986. ( 11 ) THE MT, P. K. Warrier, appeared as Public Witness 2 and deposed that hewas the MT of plaintiff" trust since 1954 and defendant was appointed ascoordination Officer i. i the Trust firstly on probation and later on he wasconfirmed. 2. 1986, i. e. , on or before28. 2. 1986. ( 11 ) THE MT, P. K. Warrier, appeared as Public Witness 2 and deposed that hewas the MT of plaintiff" trust since 1954 and defendant was appointed ascoordination Officer i. i the Trust firstly on probation and later on he wasconfirmed. However, defendant himself contacted him and offered to workwith the plaintiff. On perusal of these documents and the deposition of Public Witness 2it becomes clear that the premises in dispute were given to him for use andoccupation as a special case and on a temporary basis. Further it was stipulatedthat the defendant will hand over the vacant possession of the premiseswhenever it- was found necessary. Permission to use the room and kitchentemporary would not give any claim to the defendant for residence of H. R. A. in lieu of residence at a future date and these conditions contained in Ex. P-1were accepted by him. On the other hand I do not find any single documenton record produced by the defendant on the basis of which it can be said thatthese premises have been given to the defendant permanently and as a matterof right and life interest in view of his distinguished and exemplary servicesrendered by him to the trust. Counsel for the defendant also could not showany such document during the course of hearing. The defendant no doubthas tried to substantiate that he has rendered good services to the Trust but hehas not been able to show a single document which could show that thepremises were given to the defendant on permanent basis in consideration ofhis extraordinary services. In the absence of any documents to the contraryproved by the defendant 1 cannot but hold that the premises in dispute wereallowed to be used by the defendant on the specific condition that he would begiven vacant possession whenever is found necessary and the same have beengiven to him purely on temporary basis and as a special case. This issue is,therefore, decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. ( 12 ) IN support of Issue No. 1 whether the suit has been properlyvalued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction, Public Witness 1 has stated that hehas prepared the plan of the premises in dispute. This issue is,therefore, decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. ( 12 ) IN support of Issue No. 1 whether the suit has been properlyvalued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction, Public Witness 1 has stated that hehas prepared the plan of the premises in dispute. He had prepared a valuationreport of the property some time in February, 1987 and no question in crossexamination has been put to him. There ore, the valuation report as preparedby Public Witness 1 has got to be accepted. In paragraph 12 of the plaint the valuationfor the purposes of court fee arid jurisdiction has been assessed atrs. l,96,000. 00 collectively. Nothing has been shown that such a valuation forthe purposes of court fee and jurisdiction cannot be assessed collectively, andtins has to be assessed separately. In view of this I decide issue No. 1 infavour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. ( 13 ) ISSUES Nos. 2and3 can be conveniently decided together whichi propose to deal next Counsel for the defendant vehemently contended thatthe suit is not maintainable by the plaintiff, nor has the plaint been signed,verified and instituted by a duly authorised person and, therefore, the suitmust be dismissed on tins ground only. In support of his submission hestressed that law governing the execution of trusts is well settled. In the caseof a private trust, where there are more trustees than one, all must join inthe execution of the trust. The concurrence of ail is in general necessary ina transaction affecting the trust property and a majority cannot bind thetrust estate. In order to bind the trust estate, the act must be the act of all. They constitute one body in the eye of law and all must act together. In theevidence this has already come that there are seven trustees. The presentsuit as such without impleading all the seven trustees in the suit is notmaintainable, nor the managing trustee can alone sign and verify the pleadingsand institute the suit. They constitute one body in the eye of law and all must act together. In theevidence this has already come that there are seven trustees. The presentsuit as such without impleading all the seven trustees in the suit is notmaintainable, nor the managing trustee can alone sign and verify the pleadingsand institute the suit. In this connection various authorities have been cited :lala Man Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad and others (AIR 1945 PC 23)-L. Janakiraina lyer Kayum and others v. P. M. Nilakanta lyer and others (AIR 1962sc 633): Sheikh Abdul and others v. Mulla Alibhai and others ( AIR 1963 SC 309 ); Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust v. Kanhaiyaalal Shamlal ( 1972 RLR 142 ); Amritlal Nathubhai Shah and others v. Union Government ofindia and another (All 1973 Guj. 1 17); M/s. Shanii Vijay and Co. etc. v. Princessfatima Fouzia and others ( AIR 1980 SC 17 ); and Dull Chand v. M/s. Mahabirpershad Trilok Chand Charitable Trust. Delhi (AIR. 1984 Del. 145 ). It is notnecessary to discuss all the authorities in the peresent case as all theseauthorities lay down and reiterate the same principle that all the members oftrust must be joined as parties in order to maintain tlie suit subject of courseto certain stipulations laid down in the law. However, suffice it to refer totwo authorities. ( 14 ) IN a case M/s Shanti Vijay and Co. etc. v. Princess Fatima Fouzia and others ( AIR 1980 SC 17 ) the Supreme Court in this context has held : "the law governing the execution of trusts is well settled. In thecase of a private trust, where there are more trustees than one, allmust join in the execution of the trust. The concurrence of all is ingeneral necessary in a transaction affecting the trust property, and amajority cannot bind the trust estate. In order to bind the trust estate. the act must be the act of all. They constiute one body in the eyeof law and all must act together. This is, of course subject to anyexpress direction given by the settlor. The Judicial Committee inman Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad (1945) 72 Ind App 39 (PC) quoted apassage from Lewin s Law of Trusts, 15th Edn. , p. 190 to the effect :in the case of co-trustees the office is a joint one. This is, of course subject to anyexpress direction given by the settlor. The Judicial Committee inman Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad (1945) 72 Ind App 39 (PC) quoted apassage from Lewin s Law of Trusts, 15th Edn. , p. 190 to the effect :in the case of co-trustees the office is a joint one. Where theadministration of the trust is vested in co-trustees they all form as itwere but one collective trustee, and therefore must execute the dutiesof the office in their joint capacity. It is not uncommon to hear one ofseveral trustees spoken of as the acting trustee but the Court knows nosuch distinction : all who accept the office are in the eye of the lawacting trustees. If any one refuses or be incapable to join, it is notcompetent for the others to proceed without him, but the administrationof the trust must be in that case devolve upon the Court. However,the act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of aco-trustee may be regarded as the act of both. But such sanction orapproval must be strictly proved". ( 15 ) REFERENCE may also be made to acase in Duli Chand v. M/smahahir Prashad Trilok Chand Charilable Trust ( AIR 1984 Del. 145 ). In thiscase, the question arose for consideration was whether the suit by co-trusteeson the basis of resolution passed by all other co-trustees unanimouslyauthorising that trustee to file the suit for recovery of possession of the premisesfrom a person who claims to have acquired rights of tenancy. This questionwas, however, considered in the context of allowing or disallowing the amendment to the effect whether all trustees should be added as parties to the suitas plaintiffs. The question whether the suit filed by one of the trustees againsta trespasser is maintainable was not the issue before the Court. In thisconnection the relevant observations are produced below : 16. . . . . . . . There is, therefore, a very grave doubt in our mind as towhether a single trustee can sue and whether he can sue in the nameof the Trust. It is also very doubtful whether a resolution can bepassed authorising only some of the trustees to file asuit. But, thatresolution had not been proved. It was also observed : but the trust is not a legal person and description of the petitioner is, therefore, wrong. It could have been amended, if necessary. It is also very doubtful whether a resolution can bepassed authorising only some of the trustees to file asuit. But, thatresolution had not been proved. It was also observed : but the trust is not a legal person and description of the petitioner is, therefore, wrong. It could have been amended, if necessary. But that question does not now arise. "while referring to decision in Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulammohiyaddin ( AIR 1973 Guj 113 ), the Supreme Court held :17. . . . . . . . . . . . On the second question, namely as to whether a singletrustee could maintain the suit, it was found that there was a unanimityamongst all the High Courts on this question and the conclusion ofthe Full Bench was as follows (at p. 117):-We are, therefore, of the view that unless the instrument oftrust otherwise provides, all co-trustees must join in filing a suitto recover possession of the property from the tenant afterdetermination of the lease. No one single co-trustee, even he be amanaging trustee unanimously chosen by co-trustees, can maintainsuch a suit against the tenant without jointing the other co-trustees. All co-trustees must be joined in the suit and if any one or more ofthem are unwilling to be joined in the suit as plaintiffs or for somereason or the other it is not possible to join them as plaintiffs,they must be impleaded as defendants so that all co-trustees arebefore the court . "we completely agree with this view and are, therefore, of theopinion that the suit could not have been maintained by one of theco-trustees and further, no resolution passed unanimously by all theother co-trustees could authorise one of the trustees to file the suit. Theposition of trustees is exactly the same as of any other set of co ownerswho must necessarily join together to file a suit. " ( 16 ) THE above argument of counsel for the defendant has lost completesignificance after allowing 1. A. 6498/89 on 19/09/1989, wherebyall the trustees have been impleaded as plaintiffs. It may, therefore, not benecessary to go into thisquestion as all the trustees are now the plaintiffs inthe suit. However, since the issues have been framed by the court on thisaspect and counsel for the defendant has taken pains to address the court onthis question I propose to examine this issue as well. It may, therefore, not benecessary to go into thisquestion as all the trustees are now the plaintiffs inthe suit. However, since the issues have been framed by the court on thisaspect and counsel for the defendant has taken pains to address the court onthis question I propose to examine this issue as well. ( 17 ) IT is no doubt true that all the trustees must join in a suit in orderto maintain it and delegation is not permissible unless the trust deed soprovides or the delegation is in the regular course of business or the delegationis necessary or the beneficiary being competent to contract, consents to thedelegation. Such a sanction or approval or delegation by other trustees toone trustee must be specifically provided. But perhaps, to my mind, thisprinciple cannot be extended to a case where the suit is filed by one trusteeagainst a mere trespasser who has no right to retain the premises. As laiddown by this court in Dull Chand s case (supra) the position of trustees isexactly the same as of any other set of co-owners who must necessarily jointogether to file a suit. But there is an exception to this rule that one of severalco-owners can maintain an action in ejectment against a trespasser withoutimpleading the other co-owners as parties thereto. The reason obviously isthat a co-sharer or co-owner having an interest in the property jointly withothers is apparently a person with a better title then a trespasser. Followingthis principle there is no reason why the suit by one co-trustee should not bemaintainable against a trespasser. Similar view has been taken by a Divisionbench of this Court in Shri Mahavir Prashad v. Shri Sukhdev Mongict andanother (1983-3 Delhi Lawyer 250-DB) and held that the suit by a co-ownerof the property against the trespasser without impleading other co-owners ismaintainable. In the present case since the suit has been filed by one of thetrustees, i. e. , Managing Trustee who is placed exactly in similar situation asthat a co-owner, the suit filed by him must be held to be maintainable againstthe defendant. The authorities cited by the counsel for the defendant aredistinguishable inasmuch as those authorities do not discuss the maintainabilityof the suit filed by one of the trustees for recovery of possession against amere trespasser. The authorities cited by the counsel for the defendant aredistinguishable inasmuch as those authorities do not discuss the maintainabilityof the suit filed by one of the trustees for recovery of possession against amere trespasser. However, at the cost of repetition it maybe stated since allthe trustees have now become the plaintiffs in the suit, this objection of thedefendant even otherwise is not maintainable and, therefore, both the issuesare decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. Furthermorei have already observed and held in I. A. 6498/89 in this case decided todaythat no doubt the suit has been filed by the trust but that has been filedthrough the Managing Trustee, Shri P. K. Varier and, therefore, it would notbe unreasonable to hold that one of the trustees, i. e. , the Managing Trustee isthe plaintiff in the suit in case it is held that the trust is not a legal entity. Ithas been stated in the plaint as well as in I. A. 6498/89 supported by anaffidavit that the suit has been filed by the Managing Trustee on the basis ofauthorisation by the other trustees of the trust and, therefore, there cannot beany dispute that the other trustees, who have since been arrayed as plaintiffs 2to 7. have full knowledge of the institution of the suit. It is settled principleof law that where several persons institute a suit, it is not necessary that allshould sign the plaint. It is sufficient that one of them signs the plaint withthe other plaintiffs knowledge and authority. There is no rule providing thata person named as co-plaintiff is not to be treated as plaintiff unless he signsand verifies the plaint. In the face of the settled proposition of law I have nohesitation to hold that the plaint has been signed, verified and instituted by aduly authorised person. ( 18 ) THIS takes me to the last issue, i. e. , Issue No. 5. Public Witness 1 hasdeposed that the area in dispute is 750 sq. ft. in possession of the defendantand the prevalent rate is Rs. 4. 00 per sq. ft. per month. In other words, theprevalent rate is Rs. 3. 000. 00 p. m. for the premises in dispute, i. e. , Rs. 100. 00per day. Public Witness 1 hasdeposed that the area in dispute is 750 sq. ft. in possession of the defendantand the prevalent rate is Rs. 4. 00 per sq. ft. per month. In other words, theprevalent rate is Rs. 3. 000. 00 p. m. for the premises in dispute, i. e. , Rs. 100. 00per day. Again, no question has been put to the witness by the defendantand in the absence of which this prevalent rate has to be assumed to be trueand therefore, Issue No. 5 is decided in favour of the plaintiffs and againstthe defendant, and as such the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover damagesfrom the defendant @ Rs. 100. 00 per day as prayed for by the plaintiffs. ( 19 ) IN the result, I hereby pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffs andagainst the defendant for possession of the premises in dispute and forrs. l,96,00. 00 as damages for use and occupation of the premises upto the dateof the suit together with future damages for use and occupation @ Rs. 100. 00per day from the date of filing of the suit till the plaintiffs get actual possession of the premises. The plaintiffs shall also be entitled to costs.