Hansaria, J. — All the four writ petitioners were police officers of different ranks. They have come to be dismissed from their services in the wake of the finding given in January, 1987 by a learned Judge of this Court who conducted an enquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, for short the Act, relating to the death of one Subhash Sarma while in police custody. The contentions advanced against the orders of dismissal passed on different dates of July, 1987 being the same, all these Civil Rules were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. As the four orders of dismissal are similarly worded we may note the order passed in Civil Rule No. 709/87. “Whereas by Notification No. PLA. 490/84/6, dated 19fh Septem­ber, 1984 the Government constituted a Commission of Inquiry „ consisting of Justice S. Haque, Judge, Guwahati High Court, to inquire into and report on the circumstances leading to the death, of Shri Subhash Sarma in Police Custody, at Guwahati Medical College on 17.7.84. -And- Whereas the said Commission of Inquiry in its report dated 19.1.87 found that the following Police Officers viz Sri Birendra Kumar Hazarikia, now Additional Superintendent of Police, North Lakhimpur, was one of the four Police Officers for the injuries caused to Shri Subhash Sarma and as a consequence there of his death in police custody. -And- Whereas the said Commission of Inquiry recommended deferent action against the above named four Police Officers for restoration of public confidence in the Police Force and to discourage repetition of such atrocious conduct of the Police Officers as revealed during the said Inquiry. -And- Whereas the said Commission of Inquiry recommended deferent action against the above named four Police Officers for restoration of public confidence in the Police Force and to discourage repetition of such atrocious conduct of the Police Officers as revealed during the said Inquiry. -And - Whereas the said Police Officer Sri Birendra Kumar Hazarika participated in the conduct of the said inquiry by Justice S. Haque and had the fullest opportunity of showing cause and defending himself against the allegations brought against him relating to the death of Sri Subhash Sarma, Now, therefore, the Governor of Assam, being satisfied from the report of the said Commission of Inquiry that the conduct of the said officer in .relation to the death of Sri Subhash Sarma is so utterly unbecoming of a member of the police force that his further continuance as member of the police force is detrimental to the moral of the Police Force and being further satisfied in terms of Articl 311(2)(b) read with Rule 10 (ii) of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 that it is not reasonably practicable to hold any further inquiry because the delay in holding any further inquiry will not be conducive to the morale of the Police Force, the Governor of Assam is pleased to dismiss Shri Birendra Kumar Hazarika, Additional S. P. from service with immediate effect." 3. The first submission advanced by Shiri Mazumdar and Shri Kataky who have appeared for the petitioners is that the dismissal of the incumbents without holding any enquiry contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and Rule 9 of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964, for short the Rules, is unconstitutional and illegal. The second contention is that invocation of clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constit­ution and Rule 10 (ii) of the Rules has introduced a serious infirmity in the orders of dismissal inasmuch as the ground given for stating that holding of "further enquiry" is not reasonably practicable-the same being that delay in holding enquiry will not be conducive to the morale of the police force-is an altogether irrelevant consideration and is not at all germane to the question of reasonable practicability of holding further enquiry. 4. 4. The impugned orders assume that the opportunity made available to the learned Commission of Inquiry to the petitioners relating to the allegations against them was sufficient compliance with the law in this regard of which mention has been made in Article 3H (2) of the Constitution and Rule 9 of the Rules. We shall examine this aspect later. Here we may deal with the invocation of clause (2) of the aforesaid proviso. In this connection our attention has been invited to the well known case of Union of India vs. Tulshi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 in which decision the Apex Court had occasion to examine the width and scope of clause (b) of the second proviso. In para 130, the Court explained the meaning of the expression "not reasonably practicable" used in clause (b) which is also the expression used in Rule 10 (ii) of the Rules. This is what the Court stated in this connection : "According to the Oxford English Dictionary 'practicable' means "capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word 'practicable' inter alia as meaning "possible to practice or perform : capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished : feasible". Fur­ther, the words used are not "not practicable" but "not reasonably practicable". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent". Thus whether it was practicable to hold the enquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so . It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that holding of the enquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. What is requisite is that holding of the enquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold enquiry where the government servant, particularly through or together with is associates, so terrorises, threatens or intimidates witnesses who are going to give evidence against him with fear or reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or where the government servant by himself or together with or through other threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or members of his family so that he is afraid to hold the enquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the concerned government servant is or is not a party to bring­ing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in mind that members coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an enquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispe­nse with a disciplinary enquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an enquiry or because the Department's case against the government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the enquiry as also the order imposing penalty" 5. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the enquiry as also the order imposing penalty" 5. It is therefore submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the reason given in the dismissal orders for dispe­nsing with the enquiry contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution-the same being non-conduciveness to the morale of t e police force, has no nexus with the reasonable practicability of not holding the enquiry inasmuch as it cannot be said that the preserv­ation of the morale of the police force had anything to do with the non-feasibility of holding the enquiry. 6. In reply to this submission of the counsel for the petitioners, learned Advocate General appearing for the State has drawn our attention to Ikramuddin Ahmed vs. Superintendent of Police, AIR 1988 SC 2245 . In this case an S.I. of police was dismissed by the Superintendent of Police without holding enquiry by invoking clause (b) because of: (1) non-availability of witnesses to testify against the S.I. of Police out of various considerations, such as fear; and (2) the likelihood of causing of damage to the police image and administ­ration before the general public. In para 13 of the judgment the non-availability of witnesses was regarded as the main ground for invoking the said clause (b). As to this ground it was observed by the Supreme Court that it was not possible to take the view that there was any abuse of power by the disciplinary authority in invoking clause (b). It was further observed that the Superint­endent of Police who passed the order of dismissal was the best authority on the spot to assess the situation in the circumstances prevailing at the relevant time. Being of this view the order of dismissal after invoking clause (b) was upheld. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that though non-availability of witnesses was regarded as the main ground for justifying invocation of clause (b), the Apex Court had not stated that the likelihood of causing damage to the police image and administration before- the general public was an irrelevant ground. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that though non-availability of witnesses was regarded as the main ground for justifying invocation of clause (b), the Apex Court had not stated that the likelihood of causing damage to the police image and administration before- the general public was an irrelevant ground. It is further stated that the matter like the one at hand has to be judged in the light of the then prevailing situation and not as if the disciplinary authority was deciding the question whether the enquiry should be dispensed with or not in the cool and detached atmosphere of a court room, removed in time from the situation in question. The further submission in this regard is that where two views are possible, the court should decline to interfere. This is what had been stated in Tulshi Ram which was quoted in para 12 of the judgment in Ikramuddin. 7. We have applied our mind to the submission advanced by the learned Advocate General and we are of the view that the reason given in the present cases for dispensing with the enquiry can have really no relevance with reasonable practicability of holding the enquiry. The protection on upholding of the morale of the police force can have nothing to do with the reasonable impracticability of holding enquiry. It is not a case where two views are reasonable possible according? to us. We are therefore, of the opinion that the services of the four petitioners could not have been dispensed with the aid of clause (b) of the aforesaid proviso. We may point out here that protection of morale of police force might have relevance with non-expediency of holding an enquiry, but the same is not a permissible ground to dispense with an enquiry under clause (b), unlike clause (c) of the aforesaid proviso. 8. The real reason advanced by the learned Advocate General in support of the impugned orders is different. According to him the petitioners had got ample opportunity in the course of the enquiry held by the learned Judge of this Court of which reference has been made above. 8. The real reason advanced by the learned Advocate General in support of the impugned orders is different. According to him the petitioners had got ample opportunity in the course of the enquiry held by the learned Judge of this Court of which reference has been made above. According to the learned counsel as the petitioners had been given notices by the learned Commission under section 5 (2) read with section 8-B of the Act pursuant to which they had appeared before the Commission through their counsel and had full opportunity to say whatever they had in mind, the present is a case where the rule of audi alterem partem which is the motivating force behind Article 311 (2) of the Constitution stood excluded. To support him on this point, learned Advocate' General referred us to page 192 of the Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn , where, while dealing with the circumst­ances excluding the rule of audi alterem partem, it was stated under point No. (8) that where appropriate substitute for prior notice and opportunity to be heard are available this rule would stand excluded. A reference to the discussion of the aforesaid point shows that according to the learned author "the Courts have held that failure to give any formal opportunity to be heard is immaterial if the person affected was in fact aware of what was proposed or knew of have known that he could have made representations had he wished". This would show that the exclusion on the above count would be available if the person concerned had known what was proposed against him when he had got his opportunity to have his say. For the cases at hand it cannot be said that the petitioners had known while they had appeared before the learned Commission that it was enquiring into a matter which may led to their dismissal without anything more- We therefore, do not think that the opportunity which the petitioner had availed of before the Commission would really exclude, on the facts of the present case, the rule of audi alterem partem relating to their dismissals. 9. 9. In this context we may point out that the learned Judge of this Court was appointed to enquire and report about the following: "(1) The circumstance in which Subhash Sarma was arrested by the police and to ascertain the events that took place from the date of his arrest till his death under police custody in the Gauhati Medical College Hospital. (2) The arrangements made for his medical treatment in the Nalbari Civil Hospital and the Gauhati Medical College Hospital and the circumstances under which the inquest over his dead body and the post mortem examination were held. (3) The circumstances and the facts relating to the failure of electricity for some time in the evening of 17th July, 1984 and the alleged missing of the X-Ray plate of Shri Subhash Sarma. (4) Whether dead body was taken due care of till it was handed over to the relatives of Subhash Sarma. (5) Any other matter which the Commission may consider relevant." 10. It would, therefore, appear that the petitioners were not aware if the opportunity being given to them and which they had availed had anything to do with their dismissal. Learned Advocate General, however, states that as the finding of the learned Commission in para 46 of the report is that the four petitioners were responsible for causing injuries on Subhash Sarma which caused his death, and as the Commission had observed at the end of its report that "deterrent action for restoring public confidence and discourage the petition" was required, the authorities dismissing the petitioners had only implemented the finding of the Commission read along with the observations. It has also been urged that the petitioners have not approached the Court with clean hands as their hands are soiled and soaked with the blood of Subhash Sarma because of which we may not make available to them the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is urged by the learned Advocate General that as the granting of relief under Article 2 6 of the Constitution is an equitable remedy the same should be denied because of the reprehensible conduct of the petitioners. In this connection reference has been made to page 239 of Spry's Principle of Equitable Remedies, 3rd Edn. It is urged by the learned Advocate General that as the granting of relief under Article 2 6 of the Constitution is an equitable remedy the same should be denied because of the reprehensible conduct of the petitioners. In this connection reference has been made to page 239 of Spry's Principle of Equitable Remedies, 3rd Edn. wherein while dealing with the subject of "clean hands" it has been stated that a plaintiff in equity must approach the Court with clean hands and that he who seeks equity must do equity. Some strength is also sought to be derived from whit has been stated in para 16.26 at page 1357 of Seervai's Constitution Law of India, Vol. IT, 3rd Edn., wherein the learned author has stated that the person praying for writ must come with clean hands and who has been guilty of bad faith and fraud or improper conduct in respect of matters of controversy between the parties the Court will refuse him relief. 11. We have given our considered thought to this aspect of the submission advanced on behalf of the State and we are of the view that the petitioners cannot be said to have come with unclean hands in the- sense the expression "clean hands" has been mentioned in the aforesaid two works. We do not find any bad firth, fraud or improper conduct on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court feeling aggrieved with the orders of dismissal passed against them. The fact that the four petitioners were responsible according to the learned Commission for causing the death of Subhash Sarma cannot really be regarded as coming to the Court with unclean hands as is the expression understood in the legal parlance. A per on found guilty of say, misappropriation' or abuse of power in a departmental proceeding can well approach the Court praying for setting aside the order if there was violation of natural justice during the course of proceeding and this Court would not be justified in shutting its doors because the hands of the petitioners are unclean, as is this word understood in common parlance. The facts of Civil Rules 398-399/80 (infra) of this Court will bring home this point clearly. There a grievance was made about illegal cancellation of some foreign liquor licence. It was, however, found that the obtaining of the licence itself was illegal. The facts of Civil Rules 398-399/80 (infra) of this Court will bring home this point clearly. There a grievance was made about illegal cancellation of some foreign liquor licence. It was, however, found that the obtaining of the licence itself was illegal. So, the relief was refused though illegality was found in cancelling the licence. In such a case it may be said tnat the petitioners had not come with clean hands. But on the facts of the present case the argument of "unclean hands" has not appealed to us. We are, therefore^ not satisfied that we should refuse relief to the petitioners on the aforesaid ground urged by the learned Advocate General. 12. The learned counsel for the State has also urged that power under Article 226 being available only where there is failure of justice we may not make the rules absolute because in the present cases^ though no departmental enquiry was held the petitioners had got full opportunity to defend themselves before the Commission of Inquiry and as such failure of justice did not occur. It is further submitted that writ of certiorari may not be issued even if it is lawful to do so because the purpose of granting wide powers under Article 226 is to render justice an1 to uphold the rule of law and not to come to the aid of person on a technical ground of non-compliance with any provision of the Constitution, law or rule. 13. To establish the aforesaid legal submission the learned Advocate General referred to what has been stated at pages 138 and 139 of Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 14, wherein it has been stated that the writ of certiorari will be granted only where necessary to prevent substantial wrong or to do substantial justice specially where the matter in controversy are of a public nature. It has also been stated at page 141 that writ of certiorari would not be issued where the equities of the case do not warrant it Coming nearer home our attention ha& been drawn to the observations made in para 17 of A.M. Allison vs. B.L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227 where it was observed that a High Court has-power to refuse the writ if it is satisfied that there was no failure of justice and that interference may be refused unless the justice of the case requires it. In support of the proposition that writ of certiorari may not be issued even if it is lawful to do so we have been referred to what has been stated in para 5 of Champalal vs. CIT, (1971) 3 SCC 20 wherein it has been stated that a writ of certiorari is discretionary and it is not issued merely because it is lawful to do so. In this connection our attention has been drawn finally to a judgment of this Court rendered in Civil Rules 398 399/80(Temjen Jamir and another vs. State of Nagaland, disposed of on 9.1.81) wherein it was stated that in exercise of powers under Article 226 the Court has a duty to uphold the rule of law and it cannot lend its assistance to any person if it is found that in doing so it would be supporting the violation of the law. 14. We have duly considered this submission advanced by the learned Advocate General and in deciding the tenability or otherwise of the submission it would be worthwhile to apprise ourselves about the scope and object of appointing a Commission of Inquiry relating to a definite matter of public importance. For this purpose we may note some of the observations made in Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 . An argument was advanced there that the power of appointing Commission given to Parliament or the Government was usurpation of judicial function. The Court observed in para 8: "The Commission has no power of adjudication in the sense of passing an order which can be en orced proprio vigore. A clear distinction must, on the authorities, be drawn between a decision which, by itself, has no force and no penal effect and a decision which becomes enforceable immediately or which may become enforceable by some action being taken. Therefore, as the Commission we are concerned with is merely to investigate and record its findings and recommendations without having any power to enforce them, the inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry in the sense of its being an exercise of judicial function properly so called and consequently the question of usurpation by Parliament or the Government of the powers of the judicial organs of the Union of India cannot arise. ... ... ......" It was further observed in para 9 that the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry are of great importance to the Government in order to make up its mind as to what legislative or administrative measures should be adopted to eradicate evil found or to implement the beneficial object it has in view. This view was cited with approval in para 222 of Kehar Singh vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1988) 3 SCC 609 . Though we are satisfied that the four petitioners had got ample opportunity before the Commission to have their say but it has to be remembered that the notices to the petitioners had been issued under section 5(2) read with section 8-B~t)f the Act. The former section has authorised a Commission to require any person to furnish information which in the opinion of the Commission may be useful or relevant to the subject matter of enquiry. The latter section of the Act requires that where the Commission considers it necessary to enquire into the conduct of any person or is of the opinion. that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry the person concerned must be given an opportunity of being heard in the enquiry and to produce evidence in his defence. The four petitioners were called upon by the Commission to give them reasonable opportunity to defend themselves because of the view of the learned Commission that it was necessary to enquire into their conduct and because their reputation was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. In this connection it may stated that notices under the aforesaid sections had been issued by the Commission to ten other persons also, vide order of the Commission dated 22.2.85. A perusal of this order of the learned Commission shows that notices under the aforesaid sections were issued to 14 persons (including 4 petitioners) because on perusal of some of the memoranda it was found that direct allegations had been made against 14 persons in question. According to us the opportunity given by the Commission cannot be a full substitute for the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution which requires an enquiry to be held after the con-concerned person has been informed of the ''charges against him* and reasonable opportunity of being heard was given in respect of their charges. According to us the opportunity given by the Commission cannot be a full substitute for the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution which requires an enquiry to be held after the con-concerned person has been informed of the ''charges against him* and reasonable opportunity of being heard was given in respect of their charges. In the notices which were issued to the petitioners under section 5(2) read with section 8-B of the Act, a copy of which has been placed for our perusal, we do not find that the Commission had spelt out to the petitioners in its order dated 22.2.85, pursuant to which notices were issued, the precise charge against them. The scope of the enquiry being very wise as would appear from the terms of reference noted above, issue of notices, under the aforesaid section because "direct allegations have seen made" without spelling out the allegations, cannot be regarded as sufficient to have informed the petitioners the charges against them. which have to be specific and not vague to meet the demand of law relating to departmental action against a delinquent. In any case, the petitioners were not informed that if the finding of the Commission were to go against them, they might be dismissed by relying on the finding of the Commission. 15. It would be pertinent to refer here to clause(a) of the aforesaid second proviso which permits dismissal of a person / on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction in a criminal charge. According to Shri Kataky if we were to allow dismissal of the petitioners merely on the ground of finding recorded by the Commission, we would be re-writing the Constitution inasmuch as it is only conviction pursuant to a criminal trial relating to a conduct for which he was tried which permits- dispensation of the enquiry visualised by Article 311(2) of the Constitution, and not a finding recorded by a Commission of Inquiry of the present nature in which the delinquent might have even participated. A reference to Rule 9 of the Rules also shows that for imposing a penalty of dismissal or for that matter any other penalty specified in Rule 7 the disciplinary authority has to frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the enquiry is proposed to be held. A reference to Rule 9 of the Rules also shows that for imposing a penalty of dismissal or for that matter any other penalty specified in Rule 7 the disciplinary authority has to frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the enquiry is proposed to be held. Rule 9 which deals with the procedure for imposing penalty also requires, inter alia, furnishing of list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained. The enquiry held in the present case by the learned Commission cannot be regarded as a full substitute for the enquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution and Rule 9 of the Rules. If by relying on the finding of the Commission an opportunity would have been given to the petitioners by giving a copy of the report after spelling out the charge to have their say on the question of dismissal, the matter might have been different; in such a case some reliance could have perhaps been placed on Byrne vs. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd. 1958-2A1I ER 579 (which was cited with approval in Hira Nath vs. Rajendra Medical College, AIR 1973 SC 1260 ) to support the action taken. 16. It would also be pertinent in this connection to refer to S. L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 wherein the Court was concerned with the supersession of New Delhi Municipal Committee. An argument was advanced that as the Committee had been given opportunity to have its say on certain matters which led to the supersession of the Committee before the impugned order was passed, no further enquiry or opportunity was required to be spelt out before any action of supersession was taken under section 238 of the concerned Municipal Act. It was stated as below in para 16 of the judgment: “In our view, the requirements of natural justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of proposed action. The demands of natural justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against has furnished the information on which the action is based, if it is furnished in a casual way or for some other purpose. We do not suggest that the opportunity need be a 'double opportunity', that is, one opportunity on the factual allegations and another on the proposed penalty. We do not suggest that the opportunity need be a 'double opportunity', that is, one opportunity on the factual allegations and another on the proposed penalty. Both may be rolled into one. But the person proceeded against must km»w that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met”. 17. In the instant case it cannot be held that the four persons knew. that the opportunity which was made available to them by the Commission was to examine the question whether they should be dismissed from service. As already noted the Commission was appointed for different purpose, and not for the purpose of deciding whether the Tour persons would be dismissed or not. Therefore, it has to be held that the requirements of natural justice were not met in the present case because no opportunity was given to the petitioners to have their say against the proposed action of dismissal. As the four petitioners could not have been sentenced to life imprisonment straightway by any Court because they had been found" responsible for the injuries on Subhash Sarma and his death" by the learned Commission, without holding any trial; so too they could not have been dismissed by the appointing authorities because of the aforesaid finding of the Commission, without any further step or opportunity. 18. Before concluding we may observe that in all the four orders of dismissal the disciplinary authorities spoke about "further enquiry" which alone was dispensed with the aid of clause (b) of the second pro­viso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. It shows that the disciplinary authorities 1id feel the necessity of further enquiry even after what had taken once in the enquiry before the learned Commission. But as already pointed out the further enquiry could not have been dispensed with for the reason given in the impugned orders of dismissal. 19. In view of all the above, we are of the opinion that there was failure of justice in the present case in not giving reasonable opport­unity to the petitioners to meet the charge against them and as such we are not in a position to sustain the orders of dismissal 20. In the result, the petitions are allowed, the impugned orders are set aside and the rules are made absolute. In the result, the petitions are allowed, the impugned orders are set aside and the rules are made absolute. We may however observe that it would be open to the disciplinary authorities to proceed against the petitioners even now in accordance with law. S. K. Homchaudhnri, J. — I agree.