JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner-landlord has filed this revision under Section 23-E of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short the Act), against the order dated 4-8-1987 of the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore (for short the authority) in case No. 90/7/19/85-86. ( 2. ) BRIEF facts leading to this petition are that the petitioner being a retired government servant filed an application under Section 23-A (a) of the Act claiming eviction of the respondent-tenant from the accommodation let for residential purpose on the ground that the same is required bona fide for occupation as residence for himself and for the members of his family. It was also pleaded that one portion of the said house is inadequate and insufficient and there is no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city of Indore. ( 3. ) THE respondent filed the written statement and contended that the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the special provisions of eviction of tenants on the ground of bona fide requirement as contained in Chapter III-A of the Act. Though the petitioner is a retired Government servant and falls within the definition of landlord under section 23-J of the Act, which specifies the special categories of landlords who are entitled to invoke the special provisions, but the petitioner having already in his occupation a portion of the house in which he is residing with his family members, therefore even if the petitioner is a retiree government servant, he cannot invoke the special provisions in relation to eviction of tenants on ground of bona fide requirement. ( 4. ) LEAVE was granted to the respondent. The Authority framed the issues on 27-3-1987. No issue related to the maintainability of the petition was raised but on the basis of the submission about the maintainability of the application under section 23-A (a) the Authority, after placing reliance on a decision of the Apex court in case of S. P. Jain vs. Krishna Mohan, AIR 1987 SC 222 held that the petitioner-landlord cannot invoke these special provisions as he is already in occupation of a portion of the accommodation and cannot get the remaining portion of the house vacated by filing an application under Section 23-A (a) of the act and as such the application of the petitioner was transferred to the Civil court. Aggrieved of this, the petitioner has filed this petition. ( 5. ) SHRI V. M. Rege, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that admittedly the petitioner is a retired Government servant and in the Act under section 11-A, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in respect of those who fall as landlord specified or defined in Section 23-J of Chapter III-A of the Act. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim eviction under section 12 of the Act in the civil Court. Learned counsel contended that the applicability of Section 12 (l) (e)and (f) in respect of the landlord covered by the restrictive definition of landlord as given in Section 23-J of the Act, such a landlord has to seek his remedy for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement before the Authority and not in the ordinary Civil Court. Reliance was placed on a report of this court in Jagdish prasad vs. Sumitra Bai and others, 1986 JLJ 765 . Three other decisions of this court in Durga Prasad vs. Shantilal, 1987 (I) MPWN Note 70, Rukmani Bai vs. Shivnarayan, 1987 (II) MPWN Note 125, and Kamlabai vs. Omprakash, 1987 (11)MPWN Note 181 were also relied in support of the jurisdiction of the Authority. The learned counsel also submitted that Section 11-A of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to the landlords who are specified in Section 23-J and such landlords have to invoke the special jurisdiction before the Authority under Section 23-A of the Act, considering the hardship to such landlords the provision has been inserted, which has been held to be valid and is not violative of art. 14 of the Constitution. See Division Bench case of this court in B. Johnson bernard vs. C. S. Naidu, 1985 MPLJ 675 . Therefore, the authority committed an illegality on wrong assumption that a retired Government servant, who possesses some portion of a floor of the house, cannot seek eviction of the tenant under section 23-A (a) of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that the case of the Apex court in S. P. Jain vs. Krishna Mohan Gupta (supra) is not applicable in the facts of the case. ( 6. ) SHRI K. B. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant contended that Section 11-A of the Act relates to Chapter II which contains the provisions in relation to fixation of standard rent. ( 6. ) SHRI K. B. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant contended that Section 11-A of the Act relates to Chapter II which contains the provisions in relation to fixation of standard rent. As the petitioner was already in part possession of the house, therefore, the Authority rightly on placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in case of S. P. Jain (supra) ordered transfer of the application to the Civil Court as special provisions contained in Chapter III-A of the Act could not be invoked. Shri Joshi, in support of his contention besides the case of the Apex Court in case of S. P. Jain (supra) also placed reliance on two decisions of this Court in C. R. No. 313 of 1986 (J) decided on 11-12-1987, A. N. Seth vs. Bibhutiranjan Mandal reported as Note No. 33 in 1988 (I) MPWN and C. R. No. 254 of1987 (I) decided on 22-6-1988, Madhukarvs. Sampatrao reported as note No. 93 in 1988 (II) MPWN and C. R. No. 111 of 1985 (G) decided on 7-11-1985, Ramprosad vs. Dashrath, reported as Note No. 186 in 1987 (I) MPWN. ( 7. ) AFTER hearing the counsel, I am of the opinion that the order of transfer by the Authority deserves to be set aside in the circumstances of the case. In case of B. Johnson Bernard vs. C. S. Naidu (supra) the Division Bench of this Court has considered the validity of Section 11-A and section 23-A and other provisions contained in Chapter III-A, inserted in the principal Act by the 1985 Amendment act and held that the provisions are not ultra vires, but are valid. Section 11-A of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to the matters specially provided in Chapter III-A, the provisions of Chapter II do not apply to the landlords as defined in Section23-J of the Act. Section 11-A of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to the matters specially provided in Chapter III-A, the provisions of Chapter II do not apply to the landlords as defined in Section23-J of the Act. Section23-J, in Chapter III-A reads as under: - "23-J. Definition of landlord for the purpose of Chapter III-A. For the purposes of this Chapter landlord means a landlord who is - (1) a retired servant of any Government, including a retired member of Defence Services; or (ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the central or State Government; or (iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or (iv) physically handicapped person; or (v) a servant of any Government, including a member of defence services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent on his posting to such a place. " Section 45 of the Act also bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Section 45 reads as under: - "45. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred in respect of certain matters. (1)Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to fixation of standard rent in relation to any accommodation to which this Act applies or to any other matter which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under this Act to decide and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Rent Controlling Authority under this Act shall be granted by any Civil Courts or other authority. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed as preventing a Civil court from entertaining any suit or proceeding for the decision of any question of title to any accommodation to which this Act applies or any question as to the person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such accommodation. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed as preventing a Civil court from entertaining any suit or proceeding for the decision of any question of title to any accommodation to which this Act applies or any question as to the person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such accommodation. " A bare look to the language of Section 45 clearly shows that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding so far as it relates to the fixation of standard rent in relation to any accommodation to which this Act applies or to any other matter which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under this Act to decide. . . . . . . " ( 8. ) IN Chapter III-A a retired Government servant is one of the landlords as specified in Section 23-J of the Act. Therefore, it is clear that the special provisions exclude the applicability of Section 12 (l) (e) and (f) in respect of landlord covered by the definition of landlord as given in Section 23-J and such a landlord has to seek his remedy for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement before the Authority and not in the ordinary Civil Court. The authority alone has the jurisdiction to try eviction application. This is the view which has been taken in case of Jagdish Prasad vs. Sumitra Bai (supra) and also in rukmanibai vs. Shivnarayan, 1987 (II) MPWN 125 and Kamlabai vs. Omprakash (supra ). Recently I have taken the same view in C. R. No. 279 of 1987, Sharifanbi vs. Zamaklal decided on 24-1-1989, where while considering the case of a widow it was held by this Court that a widow cannot claim eviction under the provisions of section 12 of the Act, but she has to approach the Authority only and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in view of the provisions of section 11-A and Section 45 of the Act. ( 9. ) THE law enunciated in case of S. P. Jain (supra) by the Apex Court has no application in the present facts and circumstances, of the case. ( 9. ) THE law enunciated in case of S. P. Jain (supra) by the Apex Court has no application in the present facts and circumstances, of the case. The Apex Court while considering the urgency provisions for recovery of possession of premises under Sections 24-B and 24-C of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, rent and Eviction) Act (13 of 1972) considered that a landlord who is already in possession of the premises and a floor used and enjoyed independently, which is having a common staircase and the ground floor and the first floor are in separate occupation of the landlord and the tenant in the past, such a landlord, a member of military service, would not be entitled to take recourse to the urgency provisions in sections 24-A, 24-B and 24-C for getting the portion of premises in occupation of tenant vacated. The Apex Court in para 25 observed that - "if the portion in the occupation of the appellant could not be separately dwelled in by the appellant, it was only then that the extraordinary provisions of sections 24-A, 24-B and 24-C could be resorted to. Otherwise the owner or the landord is entitled to take recourse to other provisions of Rent Act contending that the premises in question is reasonably required bona fide for the landlords use but in the situation like the present the landlord was not entitled to take recourse to the urgency provisions in Sections 24-A, 24-B and 24-C of the Act as the dwelling house or residential accommodation must be capable of being separately enjoyed". In this case it has not been considered whether the landlords specified in Section 23-J of the Act cannot invoke special provisions if they already possessed a part of the house and will have to approach the Civil Court and whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. The provisions of the Act like 11-A and Section 45 have not been considered, where the persons who fall in specified category of landord as defined in Section 23-A cannot obtain eviction of the accommodation residential or non-residential on bona fide requirement. Therefore, the case of the Apex court in my opinion cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 10. Therefore, the case of the Apex court in my opinion cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 10. ) THE case of A. N. Seth (supra) of this Court has no application as in that case the retired Government servant after his retirement let out the accommodation to the tenant with his eyes open, which is not the case here. The other authority cited by Shri Joshi has no application to the facts of the present case. Therefore I am of the clear opinion that the application of the petitioner under section 23-A (a)of the Act was maintainable before the Authority. It is another matter that the respondent may become successful in proving that the requirement of the petitioner is not bona fide and the petitioner in his occupation has sufficient accommodation, but that could only be decided after the conclusion of the trial and the application of the petitioner cannot be thrown out at the initial stage by ordering its transfer to the Civil Court holding that as the petitioner is in occupation of a portion of the house, hence he cannot claim eviction under the special provisions as contained in Section 23-A (a) of Chapter III-A of the Act ( 11. ) IN the result the revision is allowed. The impugned order of the authority is set aside. The Authority is directed to dispose of the case in accordance with law. Let the record of the case be sent back to the Authority so as to reach before the Authority on or before 17-2-1989 on which date the parties shall appear before the Authority. No fresh notice will be issued to the parties for their appearance. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. Revision allowed.