R.S. VERMA, J.—The facts in this case are not very much in dispute. The petitioner is a member of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service and is currently working as Special Judge (CBI Cases), Jodhpur. He is suffering from aortic regurgitation, coronary artery disease, reheumatoid mild hypertension, ankylosing spondylitis, effort breathlessness-Gr. I and emotional angina. As back as 1983, he was referred to Bombay Hospital, Bombay for treatment of his ailments and since then, he has been periodically visiting the said hospital for check up and consultation. Rajasthan Civil Services (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1970, hereinafter called the Rules, regulate the reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with the treatment of an employee of the State and apply to the petitioner. Rule 7 of the Rules provides for treatment of a disease for which treatment is not available in the State. The rule, inter alia, provides the procedure for obtaining such treatment and also provides what charges/expenses shall be reimbursable. In terms, the rules does not speak of treatment abroad but by virtue of Rule 12, the Government has been relaxing the provisions of rule 7 and has been permitting its officers to go abroad for treatment. It has been reimbursing these officers of the charges/expenses incurred in connection with such treatment to certain extent. Advances were also made in connection with such treatment. Following officers were permitted to avail of such facility in the recent past. (1) Shri A.K. Bhargava, Additional Chief Engineer, P.H.E.D. (2) Shri Gopesh Bhatta, I.A.S. (3) Shri B.P. Bhargava, I.A.S. (4) Shri O.P. Bhargava, R.A.S. (5) Shri Dardi, Executive Engineer, P.H.E.D. and Doctors. (6) Shri S.C. Mathur, & (7) Shri A.B.L. Mathur. 2. The case of the petitioner is that his ailments have been aggravated recently and hence the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court recommended his case, to the Govt. of Rajasthan, for open heart surgery in Houston (U.S.A.) vide Annex. I. In this connection, the petitioner was examined by a Medical Board constituted by the Principal and Controller, Dr. Sampurnanand Medical College and allied hospitals vide Annex. 4. The Board gave its report Annex. 5, recommending the petitioner for surgery abroad. On the basis of this report, the said Principal also recommended the petitioner for surgery abroad vide Annex. 6. In this very connection, the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. Sampurnanand Medical College and allied hospitals vide Annex. 4. The Board gave its report Annex. 5, recommending the petitioner for surgery abroad. On the basis of this report, the said Principal also recommended the petitioner for surgery abroad vide Annex. 6. In this very connection, the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. in Law & Legal Affairs Department of the State desired the petitioner to send some further information and material and also asked him to provide a report from the Principal, S.M.S. College, Jaipur. Dr. S, R. Mehta, Principal, S.M.S. Medical College, Jaipur issued his certificate Annex. 8 on 29.12.1988 in this regard, recommending valve replacement, coronary angiography and Bypass surgery. The case of the petitioner was, then, processed in the government. It may, here, be stated that at no time during such processing, the reports of the Medical Board or of the Principals Dr. Sampurnanand Medical College, Jodhpur and S.M.S. College, Jaipur were questioned or doubted. Eventually, the govt. by its order Annex. 9 informed the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court that the Govt. has taken a decision that if a govt. servant wants treatment abroad for better facilities, or better patient care/after operation care, he may do so at his own expenses and the Govt. may consider reimbursement only to the extent of actual hospital expenses which would have been (incurred) if the treatment was (taken) within India. Thus practically, the request of the petitioner for treatment abroad at govt. expenses was turned down. 3. The petitioner complains of hostile, discriminatory treatment by the govt. and it is contended on his behalf that when similarly situated officers were reimbursed for their treatment abroad, his case standing on an equal footing, the govt. could not have treated him differently and may be directed to make available a sum of 11,500 Ponds, necessary to enable him to have his open heart surgery in U.S A. Here, it may be pointed out that this amount was claimed on the basis that in the past Shri A.K. Bhargava was allowed to take treatment in U.S.A. though, was reimbursed the amount as if he had taken the treatment at U.K. 4. The stand of the Govt. which has resisted the writ petition with particular zeal, is that the petitioner has no vested right to take treatment abroad. The stand of the Govt. which has resisted the writ petition with particular zeal, is that the petitioner has no vested right to take treatment abroad. Rule 7 of the Rules does not confer any such right upon him and as such no mandamus can be issued. Grant of relaxation was a matter of pure discretion and subjective satisfaction of the Govt. and action based on such subjective satisfaction could not be a basis for issuance of a writ of mandamus. It was next pleaded that there was no hostile discrimination as alleged and the cases of the various officers referred to above stood differently. All of them had taken coronary angiography test while the petitioner had not taken such test. At any rate, since the medical facilities had developed in the country, the petitioner could very well take the treatment in the country itself at any of the recognized hospitals. It was also pleaded that the petitioner had failed to make out a case for relaxation of the Rules. It was ultimately averred that Govt. by its decision Annex. R/4 had laid down fresh guidelines and since the case of the petitioner was not covered by such guidelines, the govt. was right in refusing the request of the petitioner. 5. It may, here, be stated that during the course of the hearing of the present writ petition, an application was moved on behalf of the respondent under Art. 226 of the Constitution read with s. 151 C.P.C. whereby a stand was taken that the opinions placed before the govt. regarding the ailment of the petitioner were not consistent and convincing and hence the case of the petitioner may be referred to All India Institute of Medical Science, New Delhi and its Director may be asked to constitute a Medical Board consisting of one specialised Cardiologist and a highly qualified Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgeon to give its opinion in the matter of the petitioner. This application was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that at no stage of the processing of the case of the petitioner by the govt., doubt or suspicion was entertained regarding the genuineness of the various reports of the Medical experts; this application was a device to prolong the matter and create a new ground of defence, which was never spelled out till the passing of order Annex. 9. 9. Such a course was not permissible and should not be allowed to delay and defeat this petition. 6. We have heard the learned counsel on either side and have perused the pleadings of the parties as also the record made available to us. We have also carefully considered the rival contentions. 7. We may state at the outset of this discussion that the Rules have been promulgated by the Governor of Rajasthan in exercise of his rule making power conferred by proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution of India. Thus, these Rules are statutory in nature. Relaxation to be granted in favour of the petitioner, as in case of other officers in the past, was to be made/declined by the govt. in exercise of its statutory power, vested in ii by Rule 12, which reads as under:— "12. Savings.—Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to : (1) entitle a government servant to reimbursement of any cost incurred in respect of medical services obtained by him or to travelling for any journey performed by him otherwise than as expressly provided in these rules; or (2) prevent the government from granting to a Government servant any concession relating to medical treatment or attendance or travelling allowance for any journey performed by him which is not authorised by these rules." Precisely, it is clause (2) of this rule, which enables the govt. to permit its officers to go abroad for treatment. 8. At one stage of his arguments, learned Addl. Advocate General tried to contend that actually in past in the cases referred to above, various officers named in para 1 of this judgment, were granted concession of treatment abroad in violation of the rules, but he abandoned the stand, and we think, rightly so, in view of the aforesaid clause (2) of Rule 12, and further in view of the specific plea of the "govt. in para 10 of its reply to the writ petition, which may be reproduced. It reads:— "Although the Rules of 1970 do not provide for referring the case for treatment abroad, but if the State Government in its opinion in suitable and exceptional cases recommend some cases in relaxation of the Rules of 1970, in that case no government servant can claim relaxation of rules in his favour as of right." The aforesaid plea makes it abundantly clear that the learned Addl. Advocate General was not right, when he tried to contend that previously the officers had been granted facility for treatment abroad in violation of rules. The true position, as we see, is that in past cases, the relaxation was made by the govt. in exercise of its statutory powers, vested in it by clause (2) of the said Rule 12. 9. Now, we may turn to Annex. 9 by which the request of the petitioner for facility of treatment abroad was declined. We may reproduce relevant portion of this document. It reads as follows:— "I am directed to inform on the subject that the Government has taken a decision that if a Government Servant wants treatment abroad for better facilities, or better patient care/after operation care, he may do so at his own expenses and the Government may consider reimbursement only to the extent of actual Hospital expenses which would have been if the treatment was within India, Further action may therefore, be taken accordingly. Now this document does not, in any way doubt the genuineness of the ailment or severity thereof. It merely refers to a decision of the govt. that "if a Government Servant wants treatment abroad for better facilities, or better patient care/after operation care, he may do so at his own expenses and the Government may consider reimbursement only to the extent of actual Hospital expenses which would have been if the treatment was within India." No such decision passed prior to 28. 1. 89, when Annex. 9 was passed, has been placed on record except Annex. R/2 dated 22. 3. 85. We may extract para (2) of this Circular, which alone is relevant for our purposes. It reads as under: (2) In such cases where adequate facilities for a particular disease is not available in the State but is available in the Country, even then a Government Servant choses to go for abroad for treatment in those cases, reimbursement should only be made on an equal amount that would have been incurred for equivalent treatment in any of the recognised institutions in India where reasonable facilities exist." It may readily be observed that Sarva Shri A. K. Bhargava, Gopesh Bhatta, B. P. Bhargava, O. P. Bhargava, D. S. Dardi and S. C. Mathur were permitted to avail the facility of treatment abroad inspite of para (2) of the Circular Annex. R/2. R/2. Hence, whatever riders had been placed regarding treatment abroad, where treatment was available in the country also, were also relaxed in the cases of the said officers. Hence, reference to an unspecified govt. decision in Annex. 9 could be of no avail. 10. We may, here, state that the validity of Annex. 9 has to be judged solely on the ground mentioned in it and no other ground, reasons or explanations advanced by the respondent, could be taken into consideration, to judge its validity. In Commissioner of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhandas Bhanji (1), a licence for a cinema theatre was cancelled by the Govt. though it could have been cancelled only by the Commissioner of Police. In his affidavit, Commissioner of Police tried to explain that in fact, the order of cancellation had been passed by him and not by the Govt. Commenting upon this aspect, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed : "We are clear that the public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." This very view was reiterated by the apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi (2). It was observed therein : "When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and can not be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge get validated by additional grounds later brought out." 11. In the present case, we find that validity of Annex. 9 shall have to be judged on the grounds mentioned therein alone and the application of the respondent referred to above is only a very crude attempt to add a new ground to Annex. 9 viz. In the present case, we find that validity of Annex. 9 shall have to be judged on the grounds mentioned therein alone and the application of the respondent referred to above is only a very crude attempt to add a new ground to Annex. 9 viz. that the opinions of experts, made available by the petitioner were not consistent and convincing, In our considered opinion, such an attempt can not be countenanced at all and hence we did not deem it proper to direct the petitioner to submit himself for further examination before a Medical Board to be constituted by the Director, All India Institute of Medical Science, New Delhi. 12. We may add that if the respondent State was not satisfied about the nature, extent and severity of the ailments of the petitioner, it should have told the petitioner specifically to undergo examination by a Board of its choice. Now, when the petitioner has come to this Court against Annex. 9, it is too late to complain that the expert opinions and reports about the ailment of the petitioner are not consistent or not convincing. Actually, this application is a subterfuge to add a new ground to Annex. 9, which was never in contemplation of the Govt. when it issued the same. We can not permit this to be done. 13. Learned Addl. Advocate General was at pains to submit that the petitioner had no vested right to get treatment abroad and as such a mandamus would not lie. We may readily concede this much that the petitioner can not claim the facility of treatment abroad as of right. The rules do not create such a vested right in him. The petitioners learned counsel also did not claim such a vested right in the petitioner. However, what he claimed was that in the matter of grant of relaxation, the petitioner can not be treated differently from such officers, with whom he formed a class and who had been permitted the facility of treatment abroad. His contention was that in the matter of grant of relaxation, govt. could not pick and choose and all the members of a class deserved the same treatment. In other words, the govt. could not be permitted to make hostile discrimination. 14. We have considered the rival contentions and have gone through the various rulings cited at the Bar. His contention was that in the matter of grant of relaxation, govt. could not pick and choose and all the members of a class deserved the same treatment. In other words, the govt. could not be permitted to make hostile discrimination. 14. We have considered the rival contentions and have gone through the various rulings cited at the Bar. Shri M.I. Khan has, relied upon a large number of rulings to substantiate his plea. G. Veerappa Pillai vs. Raman & Raman Ltd. (3) pertained to grant of a permit under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The apex Court was of the view that issue or refusal of permits was solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and is not a matter of right. In the facts and circumstances of the case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that it was not a fit case where interference should have been made in exercise of powers vested in the High Court by Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. This was not a case where the petitioner had complained of any hostile discrimination. Hence, this ruling is of no assistance to the respondents. 15. In the State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.C. Mandawar (4) a Pay Committee appointed by the State Govt. recommended two different scales of dearness allowances-one for those getting a salary of Rs. 400/- or more per mensem and the other for those getting less than Rs. 400/- p.m. The recommendations of the Pay Committee followed the recommendations of a Central Pay Commission so far as dearness allowance payable to persons in the first category: however, it did not follow the recommendations of the Central Pay Commission so far as grant of dearness allowance to the second category of employees. In these peculiar circumstances, the plea of the employees of the second category to grant them the same dearness allowance, as was admissible to others of the 1st category was negatived and it was in this context that the following observations were made:- "Undertakes provision it is a matter of discretion with the local Government whether it will grant dearness allowance and if so, how much. That being so, the prayer for mandamus is clearly misconceived, as that could be granted only when there is in the applicant a right to compel the performance of some duty cast on the opponent. That being so, the prayer for mandamus is clearly misconceived, as that could be granted only when there is in the applicant a right to compel the performance of some duty cast on the opponent. Rule 44 of the Fundamental Rules confers no right on the Government servants to the grant of dearness allowance; it imposes no duty on the State to grant it. It merely confers a power on the State to grant compassionate allowance as its own discretion, and no mandamus can issue to compel the exercise of such a power. Nor, indeed, could any other writ or direction be issued in respect of it, as there is no right in the applicant which is capable of being protected or enforced." In our opinion, this ruling can hardly be applied to the facts of the present case. 16. Shri M.I. Khan next placed reliance upon K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore (5). In this case, by way of executive instructions, certain concessions were granted to two batches of officers: similar concessions were not granted to petitioners. It was held that concessions could not be claimed as of right and mandamus could not be issued commanding the authority concerned to grant concessions. It may be recalled that the concessions in that case were not granted under any statutory rule. Moreover, the concessions to two other batches were purely adhoc. The apex Court, touching this aspect of the matter observed: "The State of Mysore might have shown some indulgence to this batch of 63 persons but we cannot issue a writ of mandamus commanding it to do so. There was no service rule which the State had transgressed nor has the State evolved any principle to be followed in respect of persons who were promoted to the rank of Assistant Engineers from surveyors. The indulgence shown to the different batches of persons were really ad hoc and we are not in a position to say, what, if any, ad hoc indulgence should be meted out to the appellants before us." Moreover, in that case, the petitioners were guilty of extreme laches. Hence, this authority also does not afford us adequate guidance on the point under consideration. 17. Learned Addl. Advocate General also relied upon Tukaram G. Gaokar v. R.N. Shukha(6). In that case, the Customs Officers had a discretion to stay the proceedings held before them under secs. Hence, this authority also does not afford us adequate guidance on the point under consideration. 17. Learned Addl. Advocate General also relied upon Tukaram G. Gaokar v. R.N. Shukha(6). In that case, the Customs Officers had a discretion to stay the proceedings held before them under secs. 111 and 112 of the Sea Customs Act during the pendency of a criminal trial. They declined to stay the proceedings Their refusal to stay proceedings was neither malafide nor arbitrary. It did not suffer from the vice of hostile discrimination either. In these circumstances, it was observed that courts will not issue a mandamus to control this exercise of jurisdiction. To us, this ruling also does not resolve the controversy. 18. To our mind, the power of relaxation of rules conferred by Rule 12 is basically a discretionary power. But, this power being a statutory one, has to be exercised not arbitrarily, nor capriciously but fairly. It is not an unbridled power of an autocrat. It is the discretionary power of a govt. duly constituted by law and wedded to the concept of rule of law oriented to achieve the goals of a welfare State. It is a power reposed in the govt. as a sacred trust. How such power is to be exercised has been stated succinctly by the apex Court in S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India (7) as follows: "In this context, it is important to emphasize that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. (See Dicey- "Law of the Constitution" Tenth Edn., Introduction ex). If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. (See Dicey- "Law of the Constitution" Tenth Edn., Introduction ex). "Law has reached its finest moments," stated Douglas, J.in United States v. Wunderlich, (1951)342 U5 98 "when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler ------------Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered." It is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. Discretion, as Lord Mans-field stated it in classic terms in the case of John Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr 2528 at p. 2539 "means sound discretion guided by law, it must be governed by rule, not by humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful." To us. hostile discrimination would be a negation of the principles of fair play and justice. Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner has no vested right to be reimbursed for treatment abroad, he has a right to be treated at par with such officers, who formed a class with him, in the matter of relaxation of the rules. We may, here, cite a bench decision of this court reported in Samrath Bottlers (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (8). In that case, the petitioner was granted a licence to erect and run a bottling plant of liquor by the Excise Commissioner. The petitioner failed to do so within the stipulated period. Under the relevant statute, the petitioner could not have claimed a renewal of his licence as of right. Yet he applied for such renewal and the same was refused. However, certain other licensees were granted renewals. Aggrieved, the petitioner came to this Court complaining of hostile treatment. The respondents took a plea that since the petitioner had no vested right of renewal and renewal was within the discretion of the authorities, a mandamus could not be issued. The plea was negatived and it was held that the petitioner, though he had no vested right of renewal, yet had a right to be treated at par with others, similarly situated. The plea was negatived and it was held that the petitioner, though he had no vested right of renewal, yet had a right to be treated at par with others, similarly situated. The same view was taken by another bench decision of this Court, to which one of us (Verma, J.) was a party (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 487 of 1989), M/s. R.N. Products v. The State of Rajasthan & others, decided on 03.5.89). In that case, too, a renewal of licence had been refused under the provisions of the Excise Act. The relevant statute had a rule as follows: "No person to whom licence has been granted under this Act shall have any claim to the renewal of such licence." A plea was raised in view of this provision that the petitioner was disentitled to any relief in view of the specific rule that renewal could not be claimed as of right. The plea was negatived and it was observed : "True, that there is no inherent right of renewal, but, in this case, the petitioner has complained of a hostile and discriminatory treatment based on an unreasonable and arbitrary refusal. In our opinion, in such a case, this objection does not disentitle the petitioner from coming to this Court." In that case, it was further observed that (though) no body had a right to trade in liquor and nobody had a right to renewal of a licence of an excisable article, yet everybody had a right to be treated equally with others, who were similarly situated. 19. We may cite here Vishundas Hundumal vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh (9). In this case, the petitioners were operators of stage carriage buses and their routes overlapped part of the nationalised routes. The authorities curtailed their permits for the part of the route so nationalised. There were other 19 operators similarly situated, yet their permits were not so curtailed. The authorities took the stand that the discrimination was unintentional and accidental, yet they were not willing to rectify this error. The apex Court took note of this unwillingness on the part of the authorities to rectify this discrimination and said as under: "Conceding that this was discrimination unconsciously indulged into by inadvertence: or oversight on the part of a governmental agency, by this order we only propose to rectify the same and not reject the whole scheme. The apex Court took note of this unwillingness on the part of the authorities to rectify this discrimination and said as under: "Conceding that this was discrimination unconsciously indulged into by inadvertence: or oversight on the part of a governmental agency, by this order we only propose to rectify the same and not reject the whole scheme. Such an approach would be destructive of a wholesome effort towards nationalisation of bus transport which is generally undertaken in public interest. When discrimination is glaring the State cannot take recourse to inadvertence in its action resulting in discrimination. The approach is, what is the impact of Stale action on the fundamental rights of citizen. In this case denial of equal protection is complained of. And this denial of equal protection flows from State action and has a direct impact on the fundamental rights of the petitioners. We, therefore, propose to take a constructive approach by removing the discrimination by putting the present petitioners in the same class as those who have enjoyed favourable treatment by inadvertence on the part of the Regional Transport Authority. Accordingly we hereby direct that the order/conditions in permits curtailing the permits of the petitioners prohibiting them from passing over the overlapping portion of their route with the notified route be quashed and declared to be of no consequence till all the operators including those excluded and similarly situated are similarly treated." The apex Court, thus, set the balance right by removing the act of discrimination, even though the petitioners, could not have under law plied their stage carriage vehicles, on the nationalised portion of the route. How power of relaxation of a rule is to be exercised by an authority, has been spelled out by the apex Court in King George Medical College vs. V.K. Agrawal (10). The apex Court observed as under:- "Whether the rules contained in the Ordinance governing admission to the post-graduate course of studies are mandatory or directory is a matter which the University shall have to consider after taking all relevant factors into account like the nature of the requirement, its purpose and the consequences of its relaxation on educational excellence. We have not gone into that question because, no contention in that behalf was made either before us or in the High Court. We have not gone into that question because, no contention in that behalf was made either before us or in the High Court. One thing, however, must be made clear that if the University considers that any provision is not mandatory, its relaxation in particular cases has to be governed by objective considerations. Mo public authority, least of all a University which is entrusted with the future of the student community, can pick and choose persons for receiving the benefit of relaxation of the rules. In the first place, the rigour of a rule can be relaxed provided such relaxation is permissible under the rules or if the rule is directory and not mandatory. Secondly, even if it is permissible to relax a rule, such relaxation, as stated above, must be governed by defined guidelines." These observations would aptly apply to the power of relaxation vested in the State Government by virtue of clause (2) of Rule 12. We find no escape from this proposition and are firmly of the view, that the govt. could not pick and choose persons for receiving the benefit of the relaxation of the Rules. Hence, we will have to examine how far the charge of hostile discrimination is true. If we find that the petitioner has been discriminated hostilely in an arbitrary manner, then we would have no option but to direct the respondent to treat the petitioner on the same basis, as others have been treated. However, if we find that there has been no hostile discrimination then the petition of the petitioner is bound to be dismissed. It is in this perspective that the matter shall have to be examined. 20. However, before we embark upon such an enquiry, we may take note of one particular matter. The petitioner in para 14 of his petition stated as under:- "The petitioner may not be taken amiss if he states that erstwhile Honble Chief Justice of this Court Shri P.K. Banerjee, Honble Mr. Justice D.L. Mehta and Honble Mr. Justice M.B. Sharma were sent to Housten for their treatment. The petitioner in para 14 of his petition stated as under:- "The petitioner may not be taken amiss if he states that erstwhile Honble Chief Justice of this Court Shri P.K. Banerjee, Honble Mr. Justice D.L. Mehta and Honble Mr. Justice M.B. Sharma were sent to Housten for their treatment. While saying so the petitioner may not taken to be comparing himself to these Honble Judges of this Court but in all the humility at his command he states that although his life may not be as precious as of the Honble Judges of this Court, but he is certainly entitled to the same treatment as the State Government have been allowing to its employees and others." In the opening part of this para, he also stated that the State Government have been permitting the Honble Minister, Honble Judges of this Court politicians and its employees to undertake the specialised treatment abroad. We, however, need not examine the question of medical facilities to Honble Ministers, Honble Judges and politicians because admittedly they are governed by separate set of rules and not by the Rules applicable to the employees of the State as stated by the respondent State in para 14 of its reply to the writ petition. High Court Judges are governed by High Court Judges Rules, 1956. Ministers are governed by the Rajasthan Ministers (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1961 framed under s. 7 of the Rajasthan Ministers Salaries Act, 1 56. M.L. As. are governed by Rajasthan Legislative Assembly Members (Medical) Facilities Rules, 1964. We by saying this, do not mean to say that the lives of the employees of the State are not as precious as those of Governors, Ministers, Judges of the High Court and the M.L. As. The life of any employee of the State is as precious as any other life. What we mean to state that when different set of rules govern the other categories, we need not compare the case of the petitioner to that of such other persons governed by different set of rules. Hence we leave this aspect of the matter at that and do not propose to delve deeper into it. Moreover, we do not have before us the particular of ailments and details of circumstances under which Honble Chief Justice P.K. Banerjee and Honble Judges Mr. DL Mehta and M.B. Sharma were sent to Houston for treatment. Hence we leave this aspect of the matter at that and do not propose to delve deeper into it. Moreover, we do not have before us the particular of ailments and details of circumstances under which Honble Chief Justice P.K. Banerjee and Honble Judges Mr. DL Mehta and M.B. Sharma were sent to Houston for treatment. For this reason also, we may not consider and compare the case of the petitioner vis-a-vis the aforesaid dignitaries. 21. We may now revert to Annex. R/2 relied upon by the respondent State in refuting the case of the petitioner. We have already quoted its para-graph 2 particular reliance upon which has been placed by the learned Addl. Advocate General. Now, this Circular can not override the statutory Rule 12 of the Rules. This Circular does not and can not whittle down the powers of the govt. to relax the Rules. Referency may be made in this connection to Guraan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (11). Moreover, as we have pointed out already the rigour of this Circular was itself relieved by the respondent in case of Sarva Shri A.K. Bhargava, Gopesh Bhatta, B.P. Bhargava, O.P. Bhargava, D.S. Dardi & Dr. S.C. Mathur. Hence, this Circular could not come in the way of the petitioner, to get a similar treatment, in case he stands on the same footing as the aforesaid officers. 22. We may also take note of two more circumstances upon which great reliance has been placed by the learned Addl. Advocate General. He has urged with all the vehemence at his command that ours is a poor State, the burden on the State on account of medical facilities granted to the employees has been constantly increasing every year and hence the govt. has now reviewed its policy in the matter of treatment abroad. Moreover, the facilities of the treatment have also considerably improved over the years within the State as also within the country itself. Hence, Annex. R/4 has been issued on 21.2.89 and in view of this Circular, the petitioner is not entitled to the facility of treatment abroad and on this very ground, this petition should be thrown away. Shri M. Mridul has met this contention by saying that firstly Annex. R/4 was issued on 21.2.89 and could not have a retrospective application; secondly, it could not be called a Circular of the govt. Shri M. Mridul has met this contention by saying that firstly Annex. R/4 was issued on 21.2.89 and could not have a retrospective application; secondly, it could not be called a Circular of the govt. at all and was only an office memorandum issued by the Finance Department; thirdly, it does not take away the powers of the govt. vested in it by clause (2) of Rule 12 of the Rules. 23. In reply to this contention, Shri Khan has drawn our attention to affidavit of Shri K. N. Kapoor dated 6. 4. 89 and his insistence is that the guidelines laid down by Annex. R/4 should be held applicable w.e.f. 10. 8. 88, when the Honble Chief Minister initiated the proposals to have the said guidelines. We are afraid that we can not accept this proposition. Initiating proposals for laying down guidelines is quite different from taking a decision and then issuing guidelines. Annex. R/4 was finally and formally approved on 21. 2. 89 only and in our opinion Annex. R/4 can not govern the petitioners case, which had been formally rejected by the Govt. on 28. 1. 89 vide Annex. 9. In this view of the matter, we need not examine the other objections of Shri M. Mridul regarding validity of Annex. R/4. To our mind, Annex.R/4 can have only prospective application and it can not be applied to the case of the petitioner. 24. We would, however, like to observe that the Govt. have a right to review their policy decisions from time to time, keeping in view the changed circumstances. It need not be gainsaid that medical facilities in the State and in the country have improved considerably over the years. If keeping such advancement in the field of medical science, the govt. decides to lay down new guide lines, keeping in view its financial condition and financial obligations for the development of the State, the govt. cannot be faulted. However, a word of caution here. (The guidelines have to be consistent with the statutory provisions and they can not amend or supersede such provisions. Of course, if (I) the rules are silent on any particular point, the Govt. can definitely fill up the gaps and supplement the rules. See Sant Ram Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan (12) and Guman Singhs case (supra). 25. One more contention of learned Addl. Of course, if (I) the rules are silent on any particular point, the Govt. can definitely fill up the gaps and supplement the rules. See Sant Ram Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan (12) and Guman Singhs case (supra). 25. One more contention of learned Addl. Advocate General may be considered at this stage. He has contended with vehemence that the petitioner did not undergo coronary angiography, which was necessary to evaluate the severity and extent of the coronary artery disease of the petitioner and as such, the petitioner was not entitled to claim that his case was as grave as that of the other officers, who had gone abroad for treatment. To our mind, such a plea is not open to the respondent. If the respondent thought that the petitioner must undergo coronary angiography, before his case for relaxation could be considered on merits, there was nothing to prevent the respondent from unequivocally asking the petitioner to undergo such a test before finalization of his case. It does not appear that the petitioner was specifically required by the govt. to undergo such a test before finalisation of his case. Annex 2 was the only letter requiring the petitioner to furnish further information and material to enable the govt. to process his case. No document has been placed on record to show that there was any such clear or specific direction that the petitioner should undergo coronary angiography before finalisation of his case, failing which he may not be considered for relaxation. Moreover, Annex. 9 does not recite this as a ground of non-relaxation in favour of the petitioner. Hence, we are of the opinion that this ground can not be legitimately taken by the govt. now to support its refusal to relax the rules for the petitioner for treatment abroad. 26. In this context, we may observe that the Medical Board was conscious of the fact that the petitioner will be required to undergo coronary angiography as would be evident from Annex. 5. They, still however, did not suggest coronary angiography for the petitioner, to be held in India, because they were categorical in their opinion that looking to the complicated nature of disease, it was absolutely essential for the petitioner to get the highly specialised treatment abroad. 27. 5. They, still however, did not suggest coronary angiography for the petitioner, to be held in India, because they were categorical in their opinion that looking to the complicated nature of disease, it was absolutely essential for the petitioner to get the highly specialised treatment abroad. 27. Shri M. Mridul contended that coronary angiography was a highly invasive technique of investigation and has high incidence of morbidity and mortality. He has relied upon AP Text Book of Medicine-4th edition-in support of his contention. He has relied upon observations at page 400 which read However one must realise that it is an invasive procedure and does carry some amount of risk. The observation actually pertains to cardiac catheterization and not to coronary angiography, which is selective specification of coronary arteries by radio opaque material and their radiological filming. As against this, cardia catheterization involves insertion of a catheter on the guide wire into the brachial or femoral vessels. The catheters are guided under flureseopic control. The right heart catheter is pushed through the right atrium, right ventricle pulmonary artery, its branches and advanced further into edge position-In the absence of pulmonary venous obstruction the pulmenary wedge pressure corresponds to the left atrial pressure. The left atrial pressure in the absence of mitral valve obstruction reflects left ventricular end diastolic pressure. Similarly a radio opaque catheter is pushed through the brachial or femoral artery and negotiated through the aortic valve in the left ventricle. 28. The blood samples are collected from various sites to look for any step up in the 02 saturation at atrial, ventricular or pulmonary artery level. If there is atrial septal defect, (ASD) or patent foramen oval (PFO) left heart can be catheterized via femoral vein route by negotiating the catheter through ASD or PFO." Coronary angiography does involve some complications which have been detailed at page 402 of the said Text Book as follows:— COMPLICATIONS (1) Death may occur in cases with advanced coronary disease. In experienced hands its incidence is 0.1%. (2) Shock and hypotension, (3) Myocardial infection, (4) Vagal reaction - hypotension and bradycardia, (5) Embolisation, (6) Allergic Reactions. LOCAL COMPLICATIONS (1) Arterial blockade at the site of puncture (1 to 2%). (2) Haematoma. (3) Infection. Coronary Angiography is today, the most sensitive diagnostic test for detecting arterio sclerotic, coronary disease. In experienced hands, the risk of procedure is negligible (1. 1000). LOCAL COMPLICATIONS (1) Arterial blockade at the site of puncture (1 to 2%). (2) Haematoma. (3) Infection. Coronary Angiography is today, the most sensitive diagnostic test for detecting arterio sclerotic, coronary disease. In experienced hands, the risk of procedure is negligible (1. 1000). With advent of bypass surgery, balloon angioplasty and streptokinase therapy its indications are more liberalised." Therefore, it would not be right to say that coronary angiography is an invasive technique leading to morbidity and mortality. However, we need not dwell any further on this aspect of the matter, because we have already taken the view that the respondent is not entitled to take up any other ground, which was not made a ground for passing the order Annex. 9. 28. Learned Addl. Advocate General strenuously contended before us that Rule 7 of the: Rules did not authorise the Principals of the two Medical Colleges or the Medical Board to recommend the case of the petitioner for treatment abroad, hence their recommendations were of no avail. This contention deserves to be stated only for the sake of rejection. It is not the case of either side that cases of Sarva Shri A. K. Bhargava & others were recommended under Rule 7 of the Rules. In cases of these officers, also similar recommendations were made, as in the case of the petitioner, by concerned Principals or Boards, as would be evident from Annex. R/5A, R/5/B, R/6/A, R/6/B, R/7/A, R/7/B, R/8/A, R/8/B, R/8/C, R/9/A, R/9/B, R/10/A, R/10/B,& R/10/C. If these reports could be valid basis for allowing concerned officers to take treatment abroad, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent to say that the reports of the Principals and the Board are not a good basis for considering the case of the petitioner. Again, it may be noted that the request of the petitioner was not turned down on such a ground. Annex. 9 does not give any such indication at all. It does not appear that, anytime prior to passing Annex. 9, the Govt. told the petitioner that the reports of the two Principals or of the Medical Board were incompetent and invalid and hence his case would not be considered on this ground. To our mind, this objection is also an after thought and can not be allowed to be taken. 30. Learned Addl. 9, the Govt. told the petitioner that the reports of the two Principals or of the Medical Board were incompetent and invalid and hence his case would not be considered on this ground. To our mind, this objection is also an after thought and can not be allowed to be taken. 30. Learned Addl. Advocate General vehemently contended that the petitioner could be granted facility for treatment abroad only when it could be shown that he was suffering from an ailment, for which treatment was not available at any hospital in the State or in the country. We find that this contention is not well taken. Annex. R5/A in respect of Shri A. K. Bhargava does not at all state that the ailment of Shri A. K. Bhargava could not be treated in any hospital in the country/Likewise, Annex. R/7/A in respect of Shri Bhargava does not state that his ailment could not be treated at any hospital in India. The same is the position with Annex. R/7/B. The same holds good for Annex. R/8/A and R/8/B in respect of Shri O. P. Bhagarva. Annex. R/9/A & R/9/B in respect of Shri D. S. Dardi also do not say that he could not be treated for his ailment in any hospital in India. We need not multiply the instances. It was only in the case of Shri Gopesh Bhatta that the certificate mentioned that the facilities did not exist in any Govt. Hospital in India. Hence, we find that this objection lacks bonafides and deserves to the rejected. 30. We may take note of yet another contention of the learned Addl. Advocate General. His contention is that on the material placed before the Courts it is not established successfully that the petitioner at all needs bypass surgery. According to him, the petitioner only needs what is known as Aortic valve replacement. Aortic valve replacement can be done in India with competence and efficiency and hence the claim of the petitioner should not be countenanced. He has relied in this connection upon Annex. 5 submitted by the petitioner. This is true that Annex. 5 is silent about by-pass surgery. But Annex. 8 specifically advises Aortic valve replacement, Coronary Angiography and Bypass Surgery. This is further corroborated by certificate of Dr. Natoo Bhai Shah (Annex. He has relied in this connection upon Annex. 5 submitted by the petitioner. This is true that Annex. 5 is silent about by-pass surgery. But Annex. 8 specifically advises Aortic valve replacement, Coronary Angiography and Bypass Surgery. This is further corroborated by certificate of Dr. Natoo Bhai Shah (Annex. 15), who is the treating Physician of the petitioner at Bombay Hospital, Bombay He has very specifically advised bypass surgery. Hence, we find that this objection has no legs to stand upon and must be repelled unhesitatingly and we hereby do so. 31. Learned Addl. Advocate General then contended that both aortic valve replacement and bypass surgery are being conducted in India. The Govt. of India as well Rajasthan. Govt. have identified institutions,where such surgery is being undertaken. He has submitted a list of govt. employees who took such treatment in the various hospitals of India. On the strength of these facts, it is submitted that the petitioner can as well get his treatment in India. Reliance is placed in this connection upon Annex. R3, Annex. R4 and affidavit of Shri K.N. Kapoor dated 9.5.89 with the list of patients annexed thereto. Shri M. Mridul points out that this material does not support the contention of the State in as much as it has not been indicated that any of such employees had been advised surgery abroad in view of the nature of their ailments. We find that by Annex. R/3 Govt. of India has identified certain institutions where bypass surgery may be undertaken in India. Likewise, Annex. R/4 also identifies some institutions for the above purpose. However, the affidavit of Shri K.N. Kapoor and the list annexed thereto does not indicate in any manner whatsoever if any of the employees mentioned therein suffered from such a complication which required surgery abroad. Hence, this contention of Shri Khan is of no avail. 32. Shri Khan particularly relied upon Annex. R/13 dated 18.3.89 which mentions that open heart surgery is being conducted in Bombay Hospital, Bombay, for last 25 years and risk of surgery in Arctic valve Replacement is the same as any other hospital in U.S.A. He also refers to Annex. R/5, a certificate issued by Dr. Devendra Saxena on 30.8.88 saying that Shri Bhargava will require Aortic valve Replacement. R/5, a certificate issued by Dr. Devendra Saxena on 30.8.88 saying that Shri Bhargava will require Aortic valve Replacement. The contention is that when these documents are read together, it can be inferred that Shri Bhargava can get the surgery done at Bombay Hospital, Bombay without any risk factor. We find that this contention is not sound. Annex. R/5 is silent altogether on the question of risk factor. Annex. R/13 generally speaks of risk factor being the same as in U.S.A. Aortic valve replacements. It does not particularly refer to the complicated nature of the ailment of Shri Bhargava and does not say that no risk factor is involved in this particular case. As against this, we have Annex. 15 referred to above which specifically refers to the case of Shri Bhargava and points out that the type of surgery required in the case of the petitioner is done with minimum risk either in U.S.A. or UK. Here, we may point out that Dr. Matoo Bhai Shah is the treating physician of the petitioner and the petitioner has been under his care. He is expected to be better acquainted with the case of the petitioner than Dr. D.S. Saxena, who examined the petitioner only once. Certificate of Dr. Matoo Bhai Shah gets strengthened from Annexures 5 and 6, which recommend his case for surgery abroad in unequivocal terms. Hence, we find that this contention of Shri Khan is neither here nor there. 33. Shri M.I. Khan contended that the son of the petitioner is living abroad in U.S.A. and the petitioner did visit U.S.A. earlier, but at that occasion did not get himself operated. He could have got himself operated at that stage too because he has been suffering from his various ailments since 1983. Hence, his claim should be turned down. Shri Khan forgets that there is absolutely no material on the record to suggest that bypass surgery or replacement of Aortic valve were at all indicated at the time, when the petitioner had gone abroad to visit his son in U.S.A. Hence, this contention of Shri Khan is also not sound. 34. Shri Khan contended that the petitioners case Was re-examined by the govt. during the pendency of this petition, as indicated in the application of the respondent dated 9.5.89 and the State Govt. after such re-examination has found that the petitioner need not be treated abroad. 34. Shri Khan contended that the petitioners case Was re-examined by the govt. during the pendency of this petition, as indicated in the application of the respondent dated 9.5.89 and the State Govt. after such re-examination has found that the petitioner need not be treated abroad. He submits that in view of this re-examination, the petitioners writ petition has become infructuous and should be rejected. Reliance is placed in this connection upon Piare Lal v. Union of India (13). In that case, the petitioner challenged some orders whereby his juniors were promoted. During the pendency of the writ petition, these orders were superseded and fresh orders were passed. The petitioner did not challenge such fresh orders. In view of these facts, it was held that previous orders having been superseded, the writ petition had become infructuous, inasmuch as new orders were not challenged. We find that this contention also deserves to be stated only for the sake of rejection. Though the application of the respondent does state of a re-examination of the case of the petitioner, it does not state by what order, the case of the petitioner was rejected afresh. No such order superseding the earlier order has been placed on record. We have no hesitation in saying that in the present case, this application is only a devious and dubious device to defeat the claim of the petitioner. To our mind, such a subterfuge can not be permitted to defeat a genuine claim of the petitioner. In this context, Shri M. Mridul relying upon the following observations made in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. L.K. Ratna (14) has contended that assuming that the Govt. might have re-examined the case of the petitioner, such re-examination would be a farce, inasmuch as the re-examining authorities being the same| officers in the Finance Department, are likely to stick to their earlier views, there being a built in psychological complex to maintain, whatever they have said earlier. We find a good deal of force in this submission. In that case, following observations were made in para 25 of the report:- "We must remember that the President and the Vice-President of the Council and 3 members of the Council compose the Disciplinary Committee. The President and the Vice-President do certainly held significant status in the meetings of the Council. In that case, following observations were made in para 25 of the report:- "We must remember that the President and the Vice-President of the Council and 3 members of the Council compose the Disciplinary Committee. The President and the Vice-President do certainly held significant status in the meetings of the Council. A member whose conduct has been the subject of enquiry by the Disciplinary Committee ending in conclusions adverse to him can legitimately entertain an apprehension that the President and the Vice-President of the Council and the other members of the Disciplinary Committee would maintain the opinion expressed by them in their report and would press for the acceptance of the report by the Council. To the member whose conduct has been investigated by the Committee, the possibility of the Council disagreeing with the report in the presence of the Presi-dent and the Vice-President and the other members of the Committee would be rather remote. His fears would be aggravated by the circumstance that the President would preside over the meeting of the Council, and would thus be in a position to control and possibly dominate the proceedings during the meeting. We do not doubt that the President and the Vice-President, and also the three other members of the Disciplinary Committee, should find it possible to act objectively during the decision-making process of the Council. But to the member accused of misconduct, the danger of partisan consideration being accorded to the report would seem very real indeed." Without entirely agreeing with Shri M. Mridul we may say that the apprehension of the petitioner can not be said to be without foundation. The officers in the Finance Department, who earlier examined his case, are likely to maintain and stick to their earlier stand and hence apprehension is well founded. However, as we have already observed, no order of the govt. has been placed before us indicating that a fresh and objective re-evaluation of the case of the petitioner was made and the same was rejected. Actually, the application under reference adopts and states two highly inconsistent and incompatible things. In the earlier part, it mentions : "That the State Government has carefully and without prejudice and being influenced by its earlier order dated 28.1.89 has re-examined the case of Sh. Uma Shanker Bhargava for granting him concession for treatment abroad in relaxation of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1970. In the earlier part, it mentions : "That the State Government has carefully and without prejudice and being influenced by its earlier order dated 28.1.89 has re-examined the case of Sh. Uma Shanker Bhargava for granting him concession for treatment abroad in relaxation of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1970. That after examination of the matter, the State Government finds that the opinions available before the government in case of Sh. Umashanker Bhargava regarding his ailment and need to get treatment abroad, are not consistent and convincing------" In para 6 of the application, it states as under :- "That in the facts and circumstances of this case, it has become necessary for taking a fresh decision to get examined Sh. Uma Shanker Bhargava by a higher team of doctors of All India Institute of Medical Science, New Delhi---------" This goes to show that in fact no fresh decision on re-examination has been at all made as claimed. Hence, we need not comment any further on this aspect of the matter and we leave the matter at that. 35. Now, we may examine the charge of hostile discrimination. If we may say so, hostile discrimination, not based on any rational and intelligible distinction, is writ large in this case. Shri M. Mridul with his typical eloquence made an impassioned plea that a judicial officer is being given a shabby treatment as compared to those officers, who are blue eyed boys of the govt. Without sharing this impassioned plea, we may say that this is in fact a case, where the govt. has refused to exercise its powers of relaxation, in a highly discriminatory and hostile | manner. The case of the petitioner, may be compared with the case of other officials/officers succinctly by way of a tabular chart, to bring out the hostile nature of discrimination. "Comparative chart showing the status of the petitioner vis-a-vis other persons who were sent for treatment abroad. S. No. Name Disease Who had recomm--ended the case Reasons of Recommendations 1 2 3 4 5 Petitioner Aortic Reg- Principal Dr. urgitation S.N. Medical coronary College, Jodh- Artery Dise- pur en the ase, Rheum- basis of report atoid, Mild of the Medical Hypertension Board Annexure Ankylesing 6 dated 24.9.88 spondylitis Effort Brea- thlessness Gr. I and Emotional Angina. S. No. Name Disease Who had recomm--ended the case Reasons of Recommendations 1 2 3 4 5 Petitioner Aortic Reg- Principal Dr. urgitation S.N. Medical coronary College, Jodh- Artery Dise- pur en the ase, Rheum- basis of report atoid, Mild of the Medical Hypertension Board Annexure Ankylesing 6 dated 24.9.88 spondylitis Effort Brea- thlessness Gr. I and Emotional Angina. A.K.Bhar - DM, DT Principal SMS gava CAD & unsta - Medical Coll- ble Angina ege, Jaipur on the basis of report of Medical Board-R/5/A dated 18-7-87 Gopesh Unstable Principal SMS Bhatt Angina Medical College, Jaipur on the basis of report of Medical Board-R/6/A dated 22.7.88 B.P. Ischemic Principal SMS Bbargava t Heart Dise- Medical College ase and Jaipur on vertigo the basis of report of Medical Board R/7/A dated 13.2.87 O.P. Bha ir- Diabetes Principal SMS gava Mellitus, Medical College systemic Jaipur on the Hypertension , basis of report of Triple vessel Medical Board disease Ann: R/8/A dated 2nd March 1988 D.S. Dar di Coronary Principal JLN Artery Medical College Disease Ajmer on the basis of letter from Dr. N.J. Shah R/9/A dated 23-7-87 Looking into the complicated nature of disease, it is absolutely essential to get this highly specialised treatment abroad. It is a fit case to refer it for surgery abroad. Advised to get his CABG done in a more advanced institute which has got the maximum number of operations done and in particular comparatively better results in such complicated cases. He is required to be referred at USA for coronary bypass surgery as recommended by the Board. The Board has recommended for referring the case at London for PTCA/coronary Bypass surgery, if required as the facilities do not exist in any Govt. Hospital in India Past History of illness (Eight years). He is advised to go to UK for Bypass surgery. Looking to the condition of the patient I strongly recommend that Mr. Bhargava may kindly be permitted to go to UK for further treatment surgery. This is necessary for the recovery of the patient. Operation undertaken in the country would be a great risk to his life. Principal SMS. He is advised to go to UK for Bypass surgery. Looking to the condition of the patient I strongly recommend that Mr. Bhargava may kindly be permitted to go to UK for further treatment surgery. This is necessary for the recovery of the patient. Operation undertaken in the country would be a great risk to his life. Principal SMS. Medical Board has recommen- Medical College ded that keeping in view of on the basis of his complicated disease and report of Medical the clinical condition he meeds Board R/10/A coronary Bypass surgery in dated 4-12-85 USA/UK (at a well established and equipped Heart centre." The above comparative table shows that the ailment of the petitioner, is not in any way, less grave or complicated, than of the officers referred to in this chart. It was only in case of Shri Gopesh Bhatta that it was said that facilities did not exist for treatment in India. In cases of A.K. Bhargava. B.P. Bhargava, O.P. Bhargava, D.S. Dardi and S.C. Mathur, it was not indicated that treatment was not available in India, yet all these persons were allowed to take treatment abroad. Hence, we find that the Govt. was not right in refusing relaxation to the petitioner, as was done in the cases of officers named above. We find no rational basis for discriminating the petitioner vis-a-vis these officers. We categorically find that there has been hositle discrimination so far as the petitioner is concerned without there being any valid, convincing or cogent reason for the same. The latest guidelines contained in Annex.R/4 dated 21.2.89 have no applicability to the case of the petitioner and they are at best prospective in nature. We are, therefore, of the view that the petition must succeed. 36. In the present petition, the petitioner has shown by Annex. 10 that a sum of 11,500/- would be required, if the petitioner would be operated upon in U.K. In the case of Shri A.K. Bhargava, he was allowed to take treatment in U.S,A. but was reimbursed only to the extent such treatment would have cost in U,K. we find no reason to treat the petitioner differently. 37. 10 that a sum of 11,500/- would be required, if the petitioner would be operated upon in U.K. In the case of Shri A.K. Bhargava, he was allowed to take treatment in U.S,A. but was reimbursed only to the extent such treatment would have cost in U,K. we find no reason to treat the petitioner differently. 37. Accordingly, we accept this writ petition and direct the respondent State, to make available to the petitioner an advance in a sum equivalent to £11,500 within a period of 10 days from today, subject to such similar conditions as may have been imposed in the cases of the aforesaid officers. We may make it clear that the petitioner shall be entitled to take his treatment in the U.S.A. but his total entitlement shall be restricted to such amount, as would have been incurred, if the treatment would have been taken in U.K. 38. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.