Committee of Management v. Deputy Director of Education
1989-04-26
A.P.MISRA, V.K.KHANNA
body1989
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT A.P. Misra, J. - In the aforesaid two writ petitions since counter and rejoinder affidavits have been filed and similar and connected questions are involved in the aforesaid two writ petitions, they are being disposed of finally in accordance with the Rules of the Court by one common judgment. Writ Petition No. 12829 of 1986 has been filed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 8th August, 1986 (Annexure-6 to the Writ Petition) by virtue of which the District Inspector of Schools has referred the matter to the Deputy Director of Education by holding that the dispute exists between the two rival Committee of Management. The other writ petition (being writ Petition No. 817 of 1988) is directed against the order dated 3rd December, 1988 passed by respondent No. 1 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition). The Deputy Director of Education has passed an order that in any case on account of the period of three years and one month having expired from the date of election i. e. 7th July, 1985 the Committee of Management headed by the petitioners came to an end and thus the Prabandh Sanchalak was appointed for holding fresh election in accordance with law. Petitioners being aggrieved as against the aforesaid orders have filed these writ petitions. 2. The case of the petitioners is that the fresh election was held on 7th July, 1985. However, on account of the writ petition (writ petition No. 10534 of 1985) filed by respondents on 17th July, 1985 and the stay order having been obtained from this Court, his Committee of Management could not work. The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed on 24th July, 1986. Argument of the petitioners is that since the petitioners' Committee of Management, on account of the slay order passed by this Court, was not allowed to function, the period of three years could only expire after July, 1989, and the said period would only start from the date when the petitioners took over charge as such. Petitioners further grievance is that the order of the District Inspector of Schools referring the dispute regarding two rival Committee of Management to respondent No. 2 on 8-8-1986 is illegal and without jurisdiction as there was no dispute between two rival Committee of Management.
Petitioners further grievance is that the order of the District Inspector of Schools referring the dispute regarding two rival Committee of Management to respondent No. 2 on 8-8-1986 is illegal and without jurisdiction as there was no dispute between two rival Committee of Management. Respondents' case is that even through they held the election on 31st January, 1985, the District, Inspector of Schools quashed the same with a direction for holding fresh election in accordance with the Scheme of Administration and thus any election held contrary to this is illegal. That in any case election held on 7-7-1985 could not be a valid election even otherwise. Further it was urged even otherwise since the period of three years one month having come to an end starting from the date of election i.e. 7th July, 1985, even if it is held to be valid, therefore, the Deputy Director of Education validly directed for the appointment of. the Prabandh Sanchalak and for holding fresh election. Thus the impugned order does not call for any interference by this Court. 3. On behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on the case of Committee of Management of Kisan Uchchattar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Bulandshahar v. Deputy Director of Education, Division I, Meerut and others, 1985 (2) UPLBEC 1595 and on the case of Management Committee of Raja Mahendra Pratap Vidyalaya, Gorkull, Narsan Saharanpur v. Deputy Inspector of Schools and others, 1986 UPLBEC 793. In the aforesaid two decisions it is held that the period of the Committee of Management as per Scheme of Administration is three years and one month and it comes to an end after expiry of the said period. Further reliance was placed on the case of State of U. P. and another v. Municipal Board and others, 1970 ALJ 964, where the question was about the period of Municipal Board and the computation of such period. 4. The principle laid down there is not in dispute. Looking to the Scheme of Administration which is annexed as Aunexure-4 to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents it is clear that the period prescribed therein for the Committee of Management is three years and the earlier validly elected Committee of Management automatically comes to an end after one month thereafter. It is significant that the language used therein makes no option.
It is significant that the language used therein makes no option. The Scheme of Administration has been framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act and the language used therein . for the life of Committee-oi Management is mandatory and its ceaser is also automatic. However, the question still remains regarding the starling point for the computation oi this period of three years. In none of the decisions relied upon this question has been gone into. The petitioners' argument is it would only start running Iron; the date newly elected Committee of Management takes charge as such. 5. In case where the petitioners' Committee of Management, even if duly elected, is not made to take charge of the office even for a single day in view of the stay order passed by this Court, then the period of three years and one month would not start from the date of such election. There was sonic controversy regarding taking over charge by the elected Committee oi Management and it has been argued on behalf of the respondents including the learned Standing Counsel that the attestation of signatures is not the starting point as the date of functioning of the Committee, of Management. Attestation is only for the purpose of distribution of salary under the payment of Salary Act. It is true that the functioning of the Committee of Management is varied and is not confined merely for the purposes of distribution of the salary and thus the attention of the signatures by the District Inspector of Schools could not be the starting point of the life of the Committee of Management. It may be in a given case from the date of the election's results are declared as urged by the respondents. However in case the election took place earlier than the prescribed period of the earlier Committee of Management coming to an end. In such cases it cannot be said that the period started from the date of election. Question, therefore, would be as to what would be the date which can be said that the period of the Management Committee starts. We find that there is nothing in the Act, Rules or under the Scheme of Administration.
In such cases it cannot be said that the period started from the date of election. Question, therefore, would be as to what would be the date which can be said that the period of the Management Committee starts. We find that there is nothing in the Act, Rules or under the Scheme of Administration. However, we feel after perusing, the Scheme of Administrations, the various provisions of the Act and the Rules that its period would start running either from the date of election validly held where the period of earlier Committee of Management has already come to an end prior to this date and there being no dispute or from the date the elected Committee of Management takes over the charge of the Management. 6. The purpose of prescribing period of three years is that elected Committee of Management to function. It for some reasons even after election, the newly elected Committee of Management is not made to take charge from the earlier Committee of Management or from the Prabandh Sanchalak the period of that Committee of Management would not start. However, the day such elected Committee of Management taken over charge and or starts functioning as such, then the period of three years starts running. By looking to the relevant clause of the Scheme of Administration we feel thereafter the period of three years is fixed and in no case extended even if intermittently such Committee of Management is not able to discharge its function on account of in righting litigations between the parties, or on account of stary order passed by this Court. It is thus necessary for the authority to come to the conclusion, in case of such dispute, of the date from which the elected Committee of Management has taken charge or started to function as such. In the present case the dispute raised by the petitioners is that even after the election on 7th July, 1985 on account of stay order of this Court as aforesaid it could neither take charge nor start functioning, thus the period of three years could not be from the date oi election and thus the impugned order holding its period having come to an end is legally not justified. 7.
7. Apart from this on behalf of the petitioners it was urged that the District Inspector of Schools was not justified in referring the matter to the Deputy Director of Education as there was no dispute between the Committee of Management as contemplated under Section 16-A(7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act. We would not like to enter into this part of the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners as we find that under Clause 8 of the Scheme of Administration the Deputy Director of Education is empowered to decide in a situation like this, and thus direction by the District Inspector of Schools for referring the matter to the Deputy Director of Education is not liable to be quashed on this ground. 8. in the present case since the question as to the starting point of the life of the petitioners' Committee of Management including when it took charge or started functioning has not been adjudicated by the Deputy Director of Education in order to find when the period of petitioners' Committee of Management of three years has come to an end it is necessary to send the case back to him. We accordingly direct the Deputy Director of Education to go into both the questions, firstly as to when the election of the petitioners' Committee of Management has taken place and whether such election was a valid election or not and secondly if it is validly held as to what was the starting time of the life of the petitioners' Committee of Management in the light of the observations made above. After deciding that be should compute total period of three years and then pass consequential order. 9. Argument on behalf of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that the said election could not be held on that date as there was validly elected Committee of Management already in existence and there was a direction to the respondent's Committee of Management for holding election in accordance with the Scheme of Administration. However, we do not like to go into this in view of the fact that since this case is being sent back for the adjudication including this question. He should decide all the questions after looking into the entire facts and circumstances of the case and giving opportunity to the parties concerned. 10.
However, we do not like to go into this in view of the fact that since this case is being sent back for the adjudication including this question. He should decide all the questions after looking into the entire facts and circumstances of the case and giving opportunity to the parties concerned. 10. We accordingly direct the Deputy Director of Education to decide the aforesaid controversy under Clause 8 of the Scheme of Administration after giving opportunity to the parties and decide whether the election of the petitioners' Committee of Management on 7-7-1985 was validly held or not and secondly if it is validly held, what would be the starting point of time of its life and then to compute the period of three years from that date under the Scheme of Administration. Thereafter pass consequential order as it deem fit and proper in accordance with law. Till the aforesaid decision is given by the Deputy Director of Education, the Authorised Controller already appointed, shall continue to manage the affairs of the institution. 11. With the aforesaid directions the aforesaid two writ petitions are finally disposed of. On the facts and circumstances of this case, costs shall be borne by the parties.