JASRAJ CHOPRA, J.—By this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner Dr. Dhannaram has challenged the Order Ex. 7 dated 28 12.19 8, by which, the petitioner has been transferred from Rajaldesar to Chandan in District Jaisalmer as Incharge Veterinary Hospital and in his place, Dr. Mahesh Prakash Gupta (respondent No. 3) has been transferred from Chandan to Rajaldesar in District Churu as Incharge, Veterinary Hospital, Rajaldesar. 2. The facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this writ petition briefly stated are: that earlier, the petitioner was posted as Veterinary Doctor in Ratangarh for the past about 12 years Thereafter, he was transferred from Ratangarh to Sadri in District Pali vide Order Ex. 2 dated 27. 2. 1988 The petitioner did not join his duties at Sadri and proceeded on medical leave upto .21.5. 1988. He joined back his duties at Ratangarh after his transfer order Ex. 2 was kept in abeyance. Thereafter, vide Order Ex. 4 dated 8.8.1988, the petitioner was again transferred from Ratangarh to village Chandan in District Jaisalmer and he again proceeded on leave. He made representations to the Govt. and thereafter, his transfer order from Ratangarh to Chandan was cancelled and he was transferred back to Rajaldesar vide Order Ex. 6 dated 30 9.1988. The petitioner resumed his duties at Rajaldesar and while he was working there, he was again transferred from Rajaldesar to village Chandan in District Jaisalmer vide Order Ex. 7 dated 28.12.1988, which is under challenge in this writ petition. 3. The grounds on which the petitioner has avoided these transfer orders are that he has a large family settled at Ratangarh having six children beside his wife and mother aged about 94 years. It is alleged that his wife has been recently operated. This operation took place way back on 12.11.1987 and she was discharged from the Hospital on 18.12 1987. She was operated for hystarectomy. The petitioner has further submitted that his mother is sick for the last many years and he is the sole member in the family to look after her. According to the petitioner, he is going to retire within two years and so, as per the policy of the Govt., he cannot be transferred from his present place of posting. The petitioner has further submitted that his mother is sick for the last many years and he is the sole member in the family to look after her. According to the petitioner, he is going to retire within two years and so, as per the policy of the Govt., he cannot be transferred from his present place of posting. The petitioner has also submitted that his children are reading at Ratangarh and his transfer at this juncture will adversely affect their studies. It was on the basis of these grounds that the petitioner made representations to the Govt. and on two occasions, his transfer orders were cancelled but after his transfer to Chandan from Rajaldesar vide Order Annexure-7 dated 28.12.1988, the Government has refused to accept his contentions and, therefore, he has come before this Court in this writ petition. As per him this transfer order has been made to accommodate respondent No. 3 and, therefore, it is per-se illegal. Moreover, he has complained that respondent No. 3 after his transfer from Rajaldesar to Chandan has not joined at Chandan and has managed to got his transfer order cancelled and thereafter, joined his duties back at Rajaldesar. 4. No return has been filed on behalf of the State of Rajasthan but respondent No. 3 has filed a return. He has submitted that all the grounds taken by the petitioner to got himself transferred back to Rajaldesar are wrong, false and based on mis-statement and suppression of facts. He has submitted that petitioners wife was operated on 12.11.1987 and she was discharged from the Hospital on 18.12.1987. She cannot have any problem to move out of Ratangarh at this juncture. He has further submitted that the petitioners mother is not residing with him but she is residing at Bikaner with his youngest brother. It was also submitted that the transfer orders of the petitioner i.e. Ex. 2, Ex. 4 and Ex. 7 have not been passed within two years from the date of his retirement. It has been contended by respondent No. 3 that the petitioner has four sorts and two daughters. His eldest son who is aged about 30 years has gone in ¦ adoption . to his maternal grand father and lives with him in Haryana. His second son aged 25 years is serving in Air Force. It has been contended by respondent No. 3 that the petitioner has four sorts and two daughters. His eldest son who is aged about 30 years has gone in ¦ adoption . to his maternal grand father and lives with him in Haryana. His second son aged 25 years is serving in Air Force. The third son of the petitioner is aged about 22 years and is serving in some private concern outside Ratangarh. The youngest son of the petitioner is aged about 19 to 20 years and is undergoing final year course of I.T.I. at Ratangarh. Petitioners two daughters have been married and they have two children each. He has, therefore, submitted that all the grounds that have been alleged by the petitioner for avoiding his transfer are either based on mis--statement of facts or suppression of material facts. According to him, the contention of the petitioner that he was serving without any complaint also is wrong because there were lot of complaints against him while he was working at Ratangarh. It was submitted that the petitioner issued a wrong certificate to one Bhagirath son of Kamrudeen alleging that his horse has died. Actually, it was a mare which has died and he has issued this certificate without conducting the postmortem examination of its carcass. The petitioner was warned by the Director, Animal Husbandry Department, Jaipur to be careful in future in such matters. It was, therefore, submitted that the petitioner is guilty of suppressing material facts before this Court, and, therefore, he cannot claim any equitable relief from this Court. 5. We have heard Mr. M.L. Shreemali, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. R.K. Singhal, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 as also Mr. R.P. Dave, the learned Additional Govt. Advocate, 6. It is a settled law that the transfer is a normal incident of service. It is not usually justiciable unless it is shown that it was actuated or any malafides, dishonesty malice or has been made in colourable exercise of power for extraneous purposes or considerations or for accommodating the third party in contravention of the guidelines for transfer prescribed by the Govt. In this respect, our attention was drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Shanti Kumari V. Regl. Dy. Director, Health (1) wherein it has been observed that transfer of a Govt. In this respect, our attention was drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Shanti Kumari V. Regl. Dy. Director, Health (1) wherein it has been observed that transfer of a Govt. servant may be due to exigencies of service or due to administrative reasons. The Courts cannot interfere in such matters. 7. The exigencies of service came up for interpretation before their lordships of the Supreme Court in K.B. Shukla V. Union of India (2) wherein it has been held: "It is true that formation of opinion by the Central Govt. as to the existence of exigencies of the Service requiring appointment by such method, as a pre-requisite for the exercise of the power. But the formation of such opinion is a matter, which in view of the particular nature of the function and the language of the provision, has primarily been left to the subjective satisfaction of the Government. In deed, it is as it ought to be. The responsibility for good administration is that of the Government The maintenance of an efficient, honest and experienced administrative service is a must for the due discharge of that responsibility. Therefore, the Govt. alone is a best suited to judge as to the existance of exigencies of such a service requiring appointments by transfer. The term exigence being understood in its widest and pragmative sense as rule, the court would not judge the propriety or sufficiency of such opinion by objective standards, save where the subjectc-tive process of forming it is vitiated by malafides, dishonesty, extraneous purpose or transgression of the limits circumscribed by the legislation." It is, therefore, clear that satisfaction of the existence of exigencies of service is not open to judicial scruting except when it is vitiated by malafides, dishonesty, notice, colourable exercise of power or extraneous purpose or consideration. 9. It has been observed in Nanak Chand Khanna vs. Union of India (3) by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court that the order of transfer is purely administrative and the law does not require the authorities to indicate the reason or considerations, which impel them to make a transfer. 9. It has been observed in Nanak Chand Khanna vs. Union of India (3) by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court that the order of transfer is purely administrative and the law does not require the authorities to indicate the reason or considerations, which impel them to make a transfer. In Ilyas Ahmed V. The Station Director, All India Radio, Hyderabad (4) it has been held that judicial review or justifiability is permissible if the order of transfer is made in mala fide exercise of power or vitiated by hostile discrimination thereby rendering the action ultra vires and attracting the inhibitions enshrined in Arts 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 9. Mr. R.P. Dave, the learned Additional Govt. Advocate has submitted that it is not the case of the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed malafide, dishonestly, or for extraneous purpose, There is no allegation of even hostile discrimination. He has submitted that earlier, the representations sub-mitted by the petitioner were considered by the Govt. and his transfer orders were put in abeyance or cancelled but when it was brought to the notice of the Government that the facts disclosed by him for avoiding his transfer are wrong, it did not pay head to his representation and transferred him from Rajaldesar to Chandan due to some exigencies of service There is nothing in this order which may either be characterised as malafide or it can be said that it has been passed for some extraneous purpose and, therefore, the impugned order deserves to be sustained. 10. Mr. M.L. Shreemali, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the transfer of the petitioner from Rajaldesar to Chandan has been made for accommodating the third party in contravention of. the guida-lines of transfer prescribed by the Govt. and so, the impugned order falls within the category of colourable exercise of its powers and, therefore, it deserves to be quashed. In this respect, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Kerala High Court in Dr. P. Damodaran Vs. State of Kerala (5). That was a case where certain guidelines for transfer of Doctors were prescribed by the Govt. and the petitioner was transferred in contravention of those guidelines for accommodating the third respondent and, therefore the impugned order was held to be against law. P. Damodaran Vs. State of Kerala (5). That was a case where certain guidelines for transfer of Doctors were prescribed by the Govt. and the petitioner was transferred in contravention of those guidelines for accommodating the third respondent and, therefore the impugned order was held to be against law. In the case on hand, no guidelines for transfer have been prescribed by the Govt. Mr. Shreemali has drawn our attention to clause (8) of the guidelins for transfer of teachers, wherein it has been provided that if a teacher is about to retire within two years, he should not be transferred. We may state that these guidelines do not apply to the Veterhaiy Doctors and further, the transfer orders of the petitioner have been made more than two years prior to the date of his retirement and, therefore, Dr. P. Damodarans case (supra) cannot help the case of the petitioner. 11. In Dr. P. Damodarans case (supra), it was observed that the ques-tion that really, arises for consideration in this case is when the Government itseif has laid down the guidelines in the matter of transfer can a transfer be effected admittedly in violation of the guidelines laid down therein on sympathetic grounds in respect of a Doctor when such deviation of the guide line might result in considerable inconvenience and hardship to another person. The learned Judge further observed that it is true that the Govt. have the inherent right to transfer employees from one service to other or from one District to another but it should not be misused. The learned Judge has placed reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in N.N. Singh Vs. General Manager, Chittranjan Locomotive Works (6) wherein it has been held that the administrative orders, not other wise justiciable, thus come under courts scrutiny if there allegations of mala fides or colourable exercise of powers behind such orders, even though they are free from violation of any constitutional or statutory provisions. Such orders again are liable to be interfered with if the allegations noted above are established or evident on materials on record in the absence of any rebuttable evidence. In the case in hand, as observed earlier, there is no allegation of malatides against the respondents. The only allegation that has been made by the petitioner is that respondent No. 3 has managed his transfer. In the case in hand, as observed earlier, there is no allegation of malatides against the respondents. The only allegation that has been made by the petitioner is that respondent No. 3 has managed his transfer. Thus, there is no allegation of colourable exercise of power against the petitioner. Unless such an allegation is proved by evidence or some material is brought on record, it cannot be held as proved in the absence of any rebuttable evidence. 12. In Lachman Dass Vs. Shiveshwarkar (7) it has been held that the question about the transfer of an official is primarily for the authorities concerned. A variety of factors may weigh with the authorities while considering the question of transfer, viz , the suitability of the official for the post, his aptitude, past eonduct, reputation, the period for which he had been on that post and a number of other grounds which may be clubbed together under the head exigencies of service. It is not for this Court in a petition under Art 226 to go into the matter and adjudicate about the advisibility or propriety of the transfer. The Court can only interfere if the transfer is violative of any legal provision or otherwise malafide. 13. In Pratapsingh V. State of Punjab (8) their lordship of the Supreme Court have observed that doubtless, he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any actor order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a misuse by Govt. of its powers. While the indirect motive or purpose, or bad faith or personal ill-will is not to be held established except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously difficult to establish the state of a mans mind, for that is what the appellant has to establish in this case, though this may sometimes be done. It was further observed that we must however, demur to the suggestion that malafides in the sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence that is that it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the notings in the file which proceeded the order. If bad faith would vitiate the order the same can, in our opinion, be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts. If bad faith would vitiate the order the same can, in our opinion, be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts. It was also observed that when a court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power and its jurisdiction is involved then it is incumbent on the court to afford justice to the individual. Thus, it is clear that as regards the allegation of misuse of power is concerned either direct evidence is required or a reasonable and inescapable inference must be deduci-ble from the proved facts, which we do not find in this case. Rather, there is no allegation against the respondents that they have misused the powers. The only allegation of the petitioner is that respondent No. 3 has managed his transfer back to Rajaldesar. We find that it is not a case where the Govt. can be accused of bad faith so as to vitiate the order passed by the Director, Animal Husband-ary Department, Govt. of Rajasthan, Jaipur dated 28.12.1988 (Ex.7). 14. Their lordship of the Supreme Court have observed in Tarachand V. Delhi Municipality (9) that the burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it. In Kedar Nath V. State of Punjab (10) it has again been observed by their lordships of the Supreme Court that the appellant had to prove malus-shimus indicating that the respondent was actua-ted either by spite of ill will against him or by indirect or improper motives. In the case in hand, there is no allegations of malus shimus or ill will against the Government. 15. Mr. M.L. Shreemali, the learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on a decision of Calcutta High Court in Dr. (Smt.) Pushpika Chatterjee V. State of West Bengal (11) wherein in para 13, it has been observed that the order of transfer of Govt. servants like any other Govt. administrative or executive order are passed invariably for administrative purpose or in public interest. Such orders normally are outside the purview of examination by courts of law. But an executive decision or action or an administrative decision is liable to be struck down if it is used malafide or for a collateral purpose. servants like any other Govt. administrative or executive order are passed invariably for administrative purpose or in public interest. Such orders normally are outside the purview of examination by courts of law. But an executive decision or action or an administrative decision is liable to be struck down if it is used malafide or for a collateral purpose. It is well established that unless it is shown that the transfer order is actuated by malice, malafides, colourable exercise of powers in violation of the statutory rules or administrative instructions, such an order cannot be interfered with in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In this case, the petitioner himself is guilty of suppressing material facts or misstatement of facts, because neither his mother lives with him nor his wife has been recently operated nor except one of his other children study at Ratangarh. Rather, three of his sons have settled in life and have two children each. Moreover, his transfer order has not been made within two years of date of retirement and there are no Govt. directions that in case, where a Veterinary Doctor, who is about to retire within two years from the date of his retirement, he cannot be transferred. Ordinarily, one who seeks equity must be fair in submitting the statement of facts and he should not misstate or suppress the material facts. Moreover, there is no allegation against the State Government that the transfer order is actuted by malice, malafides, or has been made in colourable exercise of powers in violation of the statutory rules or administrative instruction to accommodate the respondent No.3 and, therefore such an order cannot be interfered with in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 16. In this view of the matter, we find on force in this writ petition and it is hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.