JUDGMENT - T.D. SUGLA, J.:---By judgment and order dated April, 21, 1989 rule on this application was made absolute and six months' time to vacate the suit premises was granted on the application of Shri Mandlik, the learned Counsel for the respondent-opponent subject to the opponent giving an undertaking in writing to the competent authority. 2. The opponent filed appeal before the Supreme Court being Civil Appeal No. 2858 of 1989 arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 7564 of 1989. Observing that the matter was covered by it earlier decision, the appeal was allowed by a short judgment dated June 19, 1989 reading as : "Heard Counsel, Special leave is granted. The matter in my opinion, is covered by the decision of this Court in (Shivram Anand Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantaram Kowshik another)1, 1984(1) Bom.C.R. 415 . It is, therefore, not necessary to keep the matter pending any longer. I allow the appeal. In reversal of the order of the High Court dated 3-5-1989 (sic) the matter stands remitted to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law and on the merits, in particular on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord. The appeal is disposed of accordingly." 3. The first question raised herein pertains to the scope of the above remand order. According to Shri Karkamkar, the learned Counsel for the applicant, the scope of the order of remand is limited. It is only to decide the question whether the applicant's requirement for the suit premises is bona fide. Shri Dalvi, the learned Counsel for the opponent, submitted that the scope of remand order was not limited and it was open to this Court to dispose of the application on other issues as well in accordance with the law and on merits. 4. In order to appreciates the rival contentions, it is desirable to refer to the Supreme Court's decision in Shivram Anand Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantaram Kowshik and another, 1984(1) Bom.C.R. 415 . 4. In order to appreciates the rival contentions, it is desirable to refer to the Supreme Court's decision in Shivram Anand Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantaram Kowshik and another, 1984(1) Bom.C.R. 415 . Besides holding that a member of the armed forces was entitled to claim possession under section 13-A1 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short the Rent Act) over the premises irrespective of the fact whether he was the owner of the premises before or after he joined service in the armed forces, the Supreme Court at page 756 observed as under : ".......Section 13-A1 was enacted, relaxing the rigour of section 13 in favour of landlord who is or was a member of the armed forces. It is now provided that if he produces a certificate in the manner prescribed it shall be taken as established, without further proof that he is presently a member of the armed forces of the Union or that he was such member and is now a retired ex-serviceman and that he does not possess any other suitable residence in the local area where he or any member of his family can reside. All that he had to further prove is that he bonafide requires the premises for occupation by himself or any member of his family.The certificate is conclusive proof that he does not possess any suitable residence in the local area, but not that he bona fide requires the same for occupation by himself or any member of his family can reside. All that he had to further prove is that he bonafide requires the permises for occupation by himself or any member of his family. There may be cases where he does not possess any other suitable residence in the local area and yet he does not bona fide require the premises for occupation by himself or any member of his family, being comfortably settled elsewhere with no need or pressure to move............" The certificate produced by the applicant being in the manner prescribed, in view of the above decision, it has to be held without further proof that the applicant was a member of the armed forces of the Union and is now a retired serviceman and that he does not possess any other suitable residence in the local area where he or any other member of his family can reside. All that he has to further prove is that he bona fide requires the premises for his residence. 5. According to Shri Dalvi ordinarily the certificate in the prescribed manner should be conclusive of the aforesaid two facts. In a case where the certificate is, on the face of it, obtained on misrepresentation or by not stating full facts, it would be open to the competent authority as well as to this court to hold that the certificate was not a conclusive evidence of the fact that the member of the armed forces did not possess any suitable residence. For this purpose, Shri Dalvi stated that the applicant has not placed on record his application on the basis of which the requisite certificate was obtained by him. The Will on the basis of which the suit house was stated to have become joint property of the two brothers was also not produced. The partition of the suit house is not proved. In the absence of these documents, he contended that it was difficult to hold that the applicant did not possess a suitable residence on the basis of the certificate. Shri Karkamkar, the learned Counsel for the applicant stated that the Will was not produced as it was not necessary to do so. But entry in the City Survey records was made to the effect that the two brothers were joint co-owners inter alia on the basis of the Will. It was thus not quite correct to say that the Will was not produced before anybody. Suit house, it was pointed out, was so constructed that division could be easily effected. Application on the basis of which requisite certificate was granted was not a material document. The authority issuing the certificate would not issue the certificate without satisfying itself of the genuineness of the claim. Application before the competent authority is produced. This application contains all relevant details such as the area of the suit house, the fact of joint ownership of the two brothers under the Will, the division/partition between the two brothers. 6. In my judgment, the submission made on behalf of the opponent are without any merit for more than one reason. Application before the competent authority is produced. This application contains all relevant details such as the area of the suit house, the fact of joint ownership of the two brothers under the Will, the division/partition between the two brothers. 6. In my judgment, the submission made on behalf of the opponent are without any merit for more than one reason. In the first place, the Supreme Court in Shivram Anand Shiroor's case held that the certificate obtained by a person from the armed forces in the manner prescribed was conclusive evidence of the fact that he was serving in the armed forces and since retired and that he had no suitable residential premises in the area. In the second place, in the face of evidence available on record, it is not possible to accept that the requisite certificate was obtained by the applicant on misrepresentation or without disclosing full facts. Hence as laid down in the above stated Supreme Court decision, the certificate being in the manner prescribed it has to be taken as conclusive evidence of the fact that the applicant did not possess any suitable residence in the local area. 7. This takes this Court to the question of the Applicant's bona fide requirement. Placing reliance on a decision of this Court in (Abdul Samad Makhadum Baksh Shaikh v. Sudha Akant Parakhe)2, 1982 Mh.L.J. 647, the Supreme Court decision in (Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai)3, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 1341 (paragraphs 15 and 16 at pages 1346 and 1347) and the Supreme Court decision in (Sher Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation)4, 1978(3) S.C.C. 172 (first paragraph of the head-note) Shri Dalvi contended that the jurisdiction of this Court in revision was very much limited. This Court could interfere with the judgment of the competent authority only if the authority had acted without jurisdiction. In case the authority had jurisdiction to decide the issue but the issue was decided wrongly in law or on facts, this Court would not interfere. Learned Counsel for the applicant pointed out that the decisions relied upon by Shri Dalvi, pertained to this Court's jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The application herein was not under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The application was under section 31-F of the Rent Act. Learned Counsel for the applicant pointed out that the decisions relied upon by Shri Dalvi, pertained to this Court's jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The application herein was not under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The application was under section 31-F of the Rent Act. He invited the Court's attention to the fact that Part II-A of the Chapter was inserted in the Rent Act in the year 1987. The heading of the Chapter is "Summary Disposal of certain Applications" Application in this case was made before the competent authority under section 31-B. The revision was filed against the order of the competent authority under section 31F of the Rent Act. Section 31-F of the Rent Act, according to him, did not provide any such limitation in the matter of this Court's jurisdiction as are contemplated under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Further according to the learned Counsel, this Court in the present proceeding was exercising jurisdiction under order of remand from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had in term directed this Court to decide the question of bona fide requirement of the applicant. It was too much to urge that this court would not decide that question in the present case. 8. Section 31-F of the Rent Act reads as under : "31-F(1). No appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Competent Authority in accordance with the procedure specified in section 31-E. (2) The High Court may, at any time suo motu or on the application of any person aggrieved, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made in any case by the Competent Authority under section 31-E is according to law, call for the record of that case and pass such order in respect there to as it thinks fit : Provided that, no powers of revision at the instance of person aggrieved shall be exercised unless an application is presented within ninety days of the date of the order sought to be revised." It is evident that there is no appeal provided against the order of the competent authority. The expression used in section 31-F(2) is as wide as it could possibly be. It entitles the Court to pass such order as it thinks fit. The expression used in section 31-F(2) is as wide as it could possibly be. It entitles the Court to pass such order as it thinks fit. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to accept Shri Dalvi's contention that limitation to Court's jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has any bearing on the question of jurisdiction under section 31-F of the Rent Act. Moreover, as pointed out by the learned Counsel, this Court in the present proceeding is exercising jurisdiction under a remand order. The Supreme Courts' judgment is clear. This Court has been specifically directed to consider the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord. Assuming that there is any merit in the contention of Shri Dalvi, it is not possible for this Court to refuse to decide the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord. 9. As regards the question of bona fide requirement, it is to be noted that the suit house originally belonged to the father of the applicant. His father died some time in the year 1984. He left a Will. But for the Will the suit house would not have been a joint ownership property of the applicant and his brother, there being other heirs also whether or not there is a partition the fact remains that the suit house was owned by the two brothers and there is no suggestion in the evidence on record that the applicant owned any other house. However, Shri Dalvi emphasized a number of facts such as the suit premises were shop premises which had only one door opening towards the road side. The suit premises could not be used for residential purposes. Applicant's case was based on partition of the suit premises. But the partition was not established. Even the entry made in City Survey records in the year 1986 disclosed the applicant and his brother to be joint owners. Though the applicant had referred to the Will under which he became co-owner with his brother, the Will was not produced. The exact date of partition was not available. Brother's evidence in this regard was vague. When the so-called partition took place the applicant and his brother were serving in the armed forces at different places. It was inconceivable that the suit house could be divided without the physical presence of the two brothers. The exact date of partition was not available. Brother's evidence in this regard was vague. When the so-called partition took place the applicant and his brother were serving in the armed forces at different places. It was inconceivable that the suit house could be divided without the physical presence of the two brothers. Mother and the sisters of the applicant were not shown to have been consulted in the matter of partition. Evidence on record is not clear as to whether the applicant and his brother were claiming complete partition or partial partition i.e. partition in respect of suit house only or the entire estate left by their deceased father. Both the brothers had in their evidence stated that they had not informed about the partition to anybody else. The learned Counsel for the applicant, on the other hand, stated that the applicant owned only half portion of the suit house. The other half portion which he was occupying was with the permission of his brother, who was presently in service at Delhi. The applicant's occupation of his brother's portion of the suit house was permissive. The applicant could be asked to vacate the same any time. His brother is due to retire next year. He is likely to occupy his portion on his retirement. Thus for all practical purposes he had to depend upon his portion of the suit house which comprised of a room of size of 20' x 12' on the first floor and the suit premises i.e. a shop of the size of 16' x 12'. The pertinent question, therefore, will be whether for a family of 5 persons one room on the first floor, which the applicant was occupying in his own right was sufficient. The applicant, it was pointed out, was a Wing Commander. He took voluntary retirement. As Wing Commander he was used to specious bungalows. To expect such a person to manage with one room in his own right and to depend upon the mercy of his brother was too much. There was a stair case in between the front portion and rear portion which were equal in area. The stair case divided the house into two portions. Bathroom and privy were common. The division of the house, thus, did not require the physical presence of the brothers. There was a stair case in between the front portion and rear portion which were equal in area. The stair case divided the house into two portions. Bathroom and privy were common. The division of the house, thus, did not require the physical presence of the brothers. Rent receipt is in the name of the applicant at least from the year 1987. The opponent has accepted this fact in his evidence. According to the learned Counsel all this constituted as a clinching evidence as to the division of the property between the two brothers. 10. From the perusal of the impugned order passed by the competent authority in particular paragraphs 11 and 12 it is evident that the authority has given a finding against the applicant primarily on two grounds, namely, (i) the Will was not produced and (ii) the partition was not proved. On the evidence of the applicant and the opponent referred to earlier, the finding that partition/division was not proved cannot be sustained. Entry made in City Survey records in the year 1986, is, inter alia, on the basis of Will. Accordingly, it has to be held that though on record the applicant and his brother are shown as joint owners of the suit house, the applicant is the owner of the front portion only which comprises of one room of the size of 20' x 12' on the first floor and one room on the ground floor of the size of 16' x 12' which is the suit premises and the stair case, Courtyard, bathroom and privy are common to both. That the applicant is the owner of the suit premises and the rent is paid to him is in the evidence of the opponent itself. Having regard to the fact that there are five members in the family of the applicant and the fact that he retired as Wing Commander, it has to be accepted that it is not possible for the appellant to manage in one room which falls in his portion and which is in his occupation. The fact that during the period during which he is fighting the case with the opponent, his brother has accommodated him or allowed him to use his portion is, in my judgment, not germane to the issue. This fact certainly does not justify the conclusion that the applicant does not bona fide need suit premises. 11. The fact that during the period during which he is fighting the case with the opponent, his brother has accommodated him or allowed him to use his portion is, in my judgment, not germane to the issue. This fact certainly does not justify the conclusion that the applicant does not bona fide need suit premises. 11. In the result, rule is made absolute. The opponent is direct to hand over vacant possession of the suit premises within six weeks from to day. No order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----